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
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VARIA SOCRATICA

FIRST SERIES

BY

A. E. TAYLOR

πάντα ταῦτα προοίμιά ἐστιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ νόμου ὃν δεῖ μαθεῖν.

PLATO, *Republic* 581 d.

ἐπιλαβοῦ τῆς αἰωνίου ζωῆς.

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FOREWORD

THE following Essays form, as their title-page shows, only the first half of a collection which the writer hopes to complete in the course of a few months. Even when completed, the whole work is designed to be merely preparatory to another on the interpretation of the Platonic Philosophy, and the materials brought together in the following pages, as well as those which, it is trusted, will form their continuation, were originally intended to appear in the Introduction to that projected work. As the matter grew, however, the author found it increasingly impossible to exhibit what in his conception forms the very soul of the special *πραγματεία* of Plato, and to discriminate, so to say, what is Platonic in Platonism from what can be shown to be the *depositum fidei* transmitted from Socrates, without allowing the projected Introduction to develop to such an extent as to demand separate treatment.

The main thesis in virtue of which the five Essays now submitted for the reader's judgment form some kind of literary unity may be very succinctly stated. It is that the portrait drawn in the Platonic dialogues of the personal and philosophical individuality of Socrates is in all its main points strictly historical, and capable of being shown to be so. In other words, the demonstrably Orphic and Pythagorean peculiarities of Plato's hero, his conception of

φιλοσοφία as an ascetic discipline in the proper meaning of the word, leading through sainthood to the attainment of everlasting life, the stress laid on the μαθήματα as a vehicle of spiritual purification, and the doctrine of the eternal things, the ἀσώματα καὶ νοητὰ εἶδη, as the true objects of knowledge, are no inventions of the idealising imagination of Plato, but belong in very truth, as their common faith, to the Pythagorean or semi-Pythagorean group whose central figure twice over receives something like formal canonisation from the head of the Academy (once in the famous closing words of the *Phaedo*, and again, after many years, in the echo of them at *Epistle* vii. 324 e δὲ ἐγὼ σχεδὸν οὐκ ἂν αἰσχυνοίμην εἰπὼν δικαιοτάτον εἶναι τῶν τότε). In a word, what the genius of Plato has done for his master is not, as is too often thought, to transfigure him, but to understand him. In particular, it is urged that there is not, and, so far as we know, there never was, any really faithful historical account of the personality of Socrates except the Academic tradition which goes back to Plato, and on which Aristotle was absolutely dependent for all that is significant in his information, and the brilliant caricature which Aristophanes reasonably thought his own comic masterpiece. It will be shown that these two sources confirm one another surprisingly even in little matters of detail. The conclusion is that classical antiquity was right in accepting the tradition as substantially correct, and the nineteenth century wrong, in a way which distorts the whole history of Greek thought in the later fifth and the fourth centuries, in trying to get behind it. If the main results of this series of studies and the continuation with which I hope to follow it up are correct, the whole of what passes in the current textbooks as the orthodox account of Socrates and the "minor Socratics" will have to be rewritten.

In arguing my case I have necessarily made constant use of Diels's *Doxographi* and *Vorsokratiker*, and perhaps to an even greater extent of my colleague Professor Burnet's work on *Early Greek Philosophy*. To these, and to all other works of which I have availed myself, I beg once for all to express my grateful obligations. I trust, however, that in the main my conclusions have been made my own by genuine direct personal thought. Where I have been conscious of owing the first suggestion of a train of thought to others, I have tried to make proper acknowledgment of the fact. My work might no doubt have been much benefited by a closer study of the current literature of its subject, but, whether for good or bad, I have sought mainly to see with my own eyes rather than with the spectacles of others, and to be guided (I hope the expression is not unduly self-confident) by the two watch-words τὸ δὲ φῶαι κράτιστον ἅπαν and ὀλίγον τε φίλον τε.

My sincerest gratitude is due to the Warden and Fellows of Merton College, who, by electing me in 1902 to the Fellowship vacant by the death of Professor S. R. Gardiner, made it possible for me to devote such leisure as I have been able to enjoy in the intervals of University teaching during the past few years to the studies of which the present work records some results. I am particularly grateful for the generosity which they have shown in allowing me to take so long a time for reiterated study before attempting publication, and I earnestly trust both that the present instalment of my projected work may prove not altogether unworthy of their acceptance, and that the execution of the remainder may follow without unnecessary delay. I have also to express my thanks to the University Court of St. Andrews for the honour which they have done me in consenting to issue this volume as one of the

series of University Publications. I have finally to thank my friend and colleague Professor Burnet for the great help I have received both from his writings and from personal intercourse with him, but more especially for his kindness in reading the whole of the volume in manuscript.

I may mention here that all references to the Platonic text are to the edition of Professor Burnet; for Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, *Poetics* and *Metaphysics*, as well as for the Attic orators, I have used the texts of the Teubner series, and for the *Ethics* that of Professor Bywater; for Herodotus, Thucydides, Aristophanes, Euripides, and for Xenophon (so far as the edition was available at the time of writing), the texts of the Oxford *Bibliotheca*. In the case of quotations from other writers the text used has been regularly named when necessary.

A. E. TAYLOR.

ST. ANDREWS, *December 1, 1910.*

I

THE IMPIETY OF SOCRATES

As we all know, the proceeding formally employed by the leaders of the restored democracy to get rid of Socrates was a *γραφὴ ἀσεβείας*. The precise nature of the "impiety" alleged against the philosopher has, however, always been wrapped in a cloud of mystery, some part of which it is the object of the present essay to dispel. So far as I know, no one has as yet made it quite clear why Socrates should have been one of the earliest victims of the restored democracy,¹ nor why so influential and upright a person as Anytus should have lent the weight of his reputation to the prosecution. There is no evidence to show that Socrates, until the time of the prosecution, had been the object of popular dislike. The comedians, to be sure, had attacked him, but we must remember that comedy, at least so far as we may take Aristophanes as its representative, does not express the views of the democracy but of a group of literary men, whose bias is strongly against both the Periclean democracy and the Imperialistic policy with which the existence of the democracy was inseparably bound up. Its favourite butts were precisely the chosen statesmen of the democracy who set themselves to carry out the Periclean policy resolutely and with full consciousness of what they were doing. And we may add that, so far as we can judge, the attacks of the comedians on Socrates were as complete

¹ As Professor Bury puts it (*History of Greece*, p. 581), "It is not clear why their manifesto for orthodoxy was made at that particular time."

a failure as their attacks on Euripides. The *Clouds* was not a success on the stage; the actual condemnation of Socrates was the work of a very small majority of the voters; after his death, his reputation, like that of Alcibiades, was the subject of a regular literary warfare. If we turn to the Platonic dialogues, we find Socrates represented as an object of public curiosity, but there is no sign that he was regarded with dislike.

It is idle to attempt to solve the problem by talking of the proceedings against Socrates as an act of revenge, or an exhibition of bigotry on the part of the judges, or of the real prosecutor, Anytus. The recently restored democracy was notoriously not revengeful, in spite of the efforts of men like Lysias to spur it on to high-handed measures against all who had filled administrative offices in the year of anarchy.¹ The fidelity with which it adhered to the terms of the general amnesty is undisputed matter of fact, and Anytus, in particular, distinguished himself by setting the example of renouncing all demands for compensation for the loss of a considerable fortune.² Neither can we suppose bigotry to have played any prominent part in securing the philosopher's condemnation. Anytus was assuredly no bigot, or he would not be found, in the very year of the trial of Socrates, using his influence on behalf of Andocides.³ Nor can the judges have been specially bigoted, since the influence of Anytus and the rhetoric of Meletus combined only succeeded in securing

¹ So Plato himself expressly says, with reference to the proceedings of Anytus and Thrasybulus, that the treatment of Socrates was exceptional; in general πολλοὶ ἐχρήσαντο οἱ τότε κατελθόντες ἐπιεικέλαι, *Epr.* vii. 325 b.

² Isocrates xviii. 23 Θρασύβουλος καὶ Ἄνυτος, μέγιστον μὲν δυνάμενοι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, πολλῶν δ' ἀπεστερημένοι χρημάτων, εἰδότες δὲ τοὺς ἀπογράφοντας, ὁμῶς οὐ τολμῶσιν αὐτοῖς δίκας λαγχάνειν οὐδὲ μνησικακεῖν.

³ Andocides i. 150 ἀξιῶ δ' ἔγωγε τοὺς οἷτινες ὑμῖν ἀρετῆς ἤδη τῆς μεγίστης εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον ἐλεγχον ἔδοσαν ἀναβάντες ἐνταυθοῖ συμβουλεύειν ὑμῖν ἃ γινώσκουσι περὶ ἐμοῦ· δεῦρο Ἄνυτε, Κέφαλε, κτλ. Neither a fanatical demagogue nor a bigoted religionist would have been likely to use his influence for Andocides, whose political antecedents were of the worst kind, and who was on his trial for a scandalous sacrilege against the "two deities" of Eleusis.

a verdict by the small majority of 280 votes against 220.¹ One may add that the curious fragment of a speech by Lysias against Aeschines the Socratic contains some evidence to the same effect. The plaintiff, who had imprudently advanced money to set up Aeschines in business, naïvely explains to the jury that, as a pupil of Socrates, Aeschines might be assumed to know all about justice, and to be, therefore, a safe person to lend money to. The language rather implies that Socrates was already dead, and thus shows that, even after the famous trial, an Athenian court might reasonably be expected to regard a pupil of Socrates as a person of more than ordinary probity.² Taking everything into account, it is only fair to Anytus and his friends to assume that when they decided to prosecute Socrates for impiety they were honestly convinced that he was a menace to the re-established constitutional democracy, and that they knew of facts about his life which seemed to justify the conviction. This is universally admitted about one part of the indictment; I propose to show that it is probably equally true of the rest.

As we all know, the *γραφὴ* brought against Socrates indicted him of *ἀσέβεια* on two distinct counts. He was charged (1) with corrupting the young, (2) with certain impieties in respect of the official religious cultus. And it must be noted that the charge of offences against the official cultus cannot have been included, as I once used to suspect, for technical legal purposes, merely to bring the principal offence, the corruption of the young, within the bounds of a *γραφὴ ἀσεβείας*. It would have been quite feasible to lay a capital *γραφὴ ἀσεβείας* on the latter ground alone. This is clear from the pamphlet of Isocrates *περὶ τῆς ἀντιδόσεως*. In effect this manifesto is a mere senile effusion of self-praise, but in form, as Blass has shown,

¹ Professor Bury (*loc. cit.*) has rightly called attention to this point, though he seems to attach no significance to the "religious" part of the accusation.

² Lysias πρὸς Αἰσχίνην τὸν Σωκρατικὸν χρέως: πεισθεὶς δ' ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοιαῦτα λέγοντος καὶ ἅμα οἴμενος τοιούτῳ Αἰσχίνῃ Σωκράτους γεγονότα μαθητὴν καὶ περὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀρετῆς πολλοὺς καὶ σεμνοὺς λέγοντα λόγους οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐπιχειρήσαι οὐδὲ τολμήσαι ἅπερ οἱ πονηρότατοι καὶ ἀδικώτατοι ἄνθρωποι . . .

the work is a tasteless imitation of Plato's *Apologia*. Isocrates makes an occasion for self-laudation by pretending that he, like Socrates, is on his trial for the *capital* offence of "corrupting the young," and that the imminent danger justifies what would otherwise be a transgression of the bounds of decency. But there is this difference between the original and the copy, that with Isocrates the pretended *γραφή* includes no charge of offences against cultus. This shows that a capital indictment could be laid on the charge of "corrupting" the young alone, and that Anytus and his friends could have effected their object (which was, of course, merely to frighten Socrates away from Athens) without laying anything further to his account. Since they did in fact specify a further offence, it is only reasonable to think that they believed themselves to have evidence of it, and to ask whether we cannot still discover what the evidence was.

When we turn to our ancient authorities we find that, whereas the nature of the evidence adduced by the accusers in proof of the charge of "corruption of the young" is unmistakably indicated, the meaning of the other accusation is only explained in a way which, as I hope to show, is demonstrably false. We learn from Xenophon's *Memorabilia* that the corrupting influence of Socrates upon his young friends was alleged to lie in inspiring them with anti-democratic and unconstitutional sentiments, and that the "accuser" rested his case largely on the notorious fact that both Alcibiades and Critias had belonged to the Socratic circle.¹ For my purpose it makes little difference whether this "accuser" is, as Blass, in my opinion rightly, maintains, Meletus, or, as Cobet held, Polycrates, the author of the pamphlet against Socrates disparaged by Isocrates. The pains which Xenophon takes to refute the charge are

¹ Aeschines also, we must remember, asserts that the "sophist Socrates" was put to death because he had been the teacher of Critias (i. 175). It is probable that the accusers dwelt more on the case of Critias, for whom no one had a good word, than on that of Alcibiades, whose character, as we see from Isocrates *περὶ τοῦ ζεύγους*, as well as from the polemics ascribed to Lysias and Andocides, had its warm defenders.

sufficient proof that it was the one which told most heavily against his master with the public, and we may be sure that Meletus made the most of it, whether he is the particular "accuser" whom Xenophon has in mind or not—not to say that it would be an easy task to show that the accusation was, in fact, true.¹

When we come to the other account, the case is altered. Plato gives us no real explanation of it in the *Apology*, and Xenophon offers one which, as I propose to show, is both false and absurd.

First, however, we must attempt, if we can, to reconstruct the actual words of the indictment. According to Favorinus (Diogenes Laertius ii. 5. 40), the document was still preserved in his own day among the archives of the Metroon. The words were ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγούμενος· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων· τίμημα θάνατος. In the opening sentence of the *Memorabilia*, Xenophon gives the accusation in the same words, only that he has εἰσφέρων instead of the equivalent εἰσηγούμενος. Plato, on the other hand, makes Socrates quote the ἀντωμοσία of his prosecutors rather differently. According to him, the charge of "corrupting the young" came first, and the accusation ran somewhat thus: ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης, τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείρων καὶ θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά.² If one could be sure that Favorinus had actually seen and transcribed the original indictment (though this goes beyond the mere statement that it was still extant in his day), his evidence would be conclusive in favour of Xenophon's version as against that

¹ For what it means is that the influence of Socrates was opposed to the revival of the old democratic ideals which the leaders of the returned exiles dreamed of. That this was the case is certain. The political leanings ascribed to Socrates by both Plato and Xenophon, and reflected in their own judgment on the men of the fifth century, are definitely hostile to democratic imperialism and in accord with the aims of the "moderates." Aristotle's well-known panegyric on Thucydides, Nicias and Theramenes is a witness to the preservation of this political tradition in the Academy. It is significant that the agitation of Demosthenes and his party had no Academic support.

² *Apology* 24 b.

of Plato. I must confess, however, that I am not satisfied either that Favorinus had seen the actual document or had carefully transcribed something shown to him as the actual document. One may reasonably doubt whether the actual affidavit can have been still extant and legible in the middle of the second century A.D.; and, even if it were, it would still be a question whether we can trust the fidelity of Favorinus as a transcriber, if he did make a professed transcription of it, for he actually made the blunder of declaring that Meletus did not himself speak in the prosecution, in the face of the express statements of the Platonic and Xenophontic *Apologies*. We have not, then, as it seems to me, sufficient independent testimony to enable us to decide between Plato and Xenophon. This being the case, it seems to me most probable on the whole that Plato, who was actually present at the trial, gives us the heads of the accusation in the order in which they were actually dealt with by Socrates, while Xenophon, precisely because he was absent, is all the more likely to have consulted the formal *ἀντωμοσία* of the prosecutors, and to have reproduced the charges as they stood in the indictment. In this case, it will follow that the offences against cultus were primarily specified as the chief legal ground for procedure. Another point, which we may afterwards find to have some significance, is that in Xenophon's version (with which that apparently derived from Favorinus agrees) Socrates is charged explicitly with "importing" a *foreign* cultus (*εἰσφέρων, εἰσηγούμενος*), a charge which the Platonic, and presumably the actual Socrates, for good reasons, replaces by the less serious one of "recognising" novel divinities (*ἕτερα καὶνὰ δαιμόνια* being in Plato governed by *νομίζοντα*).¹

¹ For the insinuation implied in *εἰσφέρων, εἰσηγούμενος* cf. Euripides, *Bacchae* 255 *σὺ ταῦτ' ἔπεισας, Τειρεσία· τόνδ' αὖ θέλεις | τὸν δαῖμον' ἀνθρώποισιν εἰσφέρων νέον | σκοπεῖν πτερωτοὺς κάμπύρων μισθοὺς φέρειν*, 353 *τὸν θηλύμορφον ξένον ὃς εἰσφέρει νόσον | καὶνὴν γυναῖξί καὶ λέχῃ λυμάλινεται*. Aristotle intends a similar suggestion when he speaks of those who imported (*τοὺς κομισάντας* or *εἰσαγαγόντας*) the *εἶδη*. The insinuation is, in fact, that Platonism is a mere modification of Italian Pythagoreanism, a statement made explicitly in *Met.*

Next as to the precise character of the alleged offence against cultus. It is really double-edged. Socrates is accused (*a*) of not "recognising" the official divinities, (*b*) of "importing"—Plato makes him soften the charge, as he probably did, to one of "recognising"—certain unauthorised objects of cultus. The accusation has often been misunderstood to be one of unbelief, or atheism, and the Platonic Socrates affects to take the first part of it in that sense, for very good reasons of his own. But this cannot have been the sense originally intended by Anytus and Meletus. As Plato's Socrates goes on to argue, an accusation of believing in no gods whatever *and* believing in *καὶνὰ δαιμόνια* is pure nonsense, and we owe it to the very capable statesmen who were behind the prosecution of Socrates not to believe them guilty of having framed so ridiculous a charge except on the very strongest of evidence. Taken in their strict sense, the words of the accusation do not even imply that Socrates had ever called in question the *existence* of the "gods whom the city recognises." For *νομίζειν θεούς* does not mean merely to believe that there are gods, but to "recognise" the gods by paying them the honour due to them. An atheist is necessarily, if he is consistent in his conduct, a man who *οὐ νομίζει θεούς*, but a man who *οὐ νομίζει θεούς* may be very far from atheism. This is excellently shown by the fact that Lysias can say of Pison, one of the Thirty, that *οὔτε θεοὺς οὔτε ἀνθρώπους νομίζει*,¹ which means not, of course, that Pison was a philosophical solipsist, who disbelieved in the existence of his fellow-men, but that he had no regard for God or man, no fear of either before his eyes. Similarly the charge against Socrates is strictly that "he does not recognise the gods whom our city recognises, but reserves his recognition for certain other novel supernatural beings." What he is accused of is neither atheism nor moral delinquency, in any sense we should attach to the words, but devotion to a religious cultus which has not the stamp of the State's approval, and

¹ Lysias xii. 9. Pison was an "unjust judge," like the one who says in the Gospel τὸν θεὸν οὐ φοβοῦμαι οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπον ἐντρέπομαι.

is, in fact, an unlicensed importation from abroad. As our ancestors of the seventeenth century would have put it, he frequents a foreign conventicle.¹

That this is the true interpretation of the accusation appears when we examine the structure of the Platonic *Apology*. Socrates is there made to distinguish sharply between the specific accusation on which he has been brought to trial, and a more general accusation which, as he says, has been informally brought against him by the comic poets. This more general accusation is humorously put by him into the form of a regular *ἀντωμοσία*, with which he deals before he comes to examine the actual *ἀντωμοσία* of Meletus. This charge is one of atheism, the atheism which the well-known speculations of Anaxagoras had caused to attach to students of physical science. It is briefly disposed of by the consideration that, as Socrates has never professed to be able to teach Physics, the Anaxagorean speculations, whatever their value may be (and he is careful not to prejudge this issue), have nothing to do with him. This part of the *Apology* has thus no connection with the charges of offending against religion made by Meletus, and Plato is careful to make it clear that it is not meant as having any reference to the *ἀντωμοσία* of the prosecutors. The whole section which deals with the caricatures of the comic poets forms no part of the *ἀγών* proper, and is not directed *πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον*. It belongs altogether to the proem of the real *ἀγών*, and its

¹ We need not suppose that any evidence was adduced to show that Socrates had actually neglected the formal obligations of the official cultus, since such unnecessary "nonconformity" is foreign to both Plato's and Xenophon's pictures of the man. In point of fact, the proof that Socrates did not pay due reverence to the official gods would be sufficiently established by showing that he *did* pay special reverence to foreign and unlicensed divinities. "Mine honour will I not give to another" is the rule in affairs of this kind. E.g. if you show yourself peculiarly "devout to" a strange god, while you content yourself with no more than the discharge of officially established politenesses to Athena of the Burg, you are *ipso facto* giving Athena's proper honour to her rival, just as an Englishman might show disloyalty if he merely treated the Archbishop of Canterbury with ceremonial courtesy, but went out of his way to be effusive to a Papal Nuncio. It would not be necessary to add a positive insult to the Archbishop.

function is simply διαλύειν τὰς ὑποψίας, to remove any initial prejudice which might prevent the audience from giving an unbiased hearing to the arguments and evidence on which the defence proper is based. When we do at last reach the actual ἀγών, Socrates treats the specific allegation of religious disloyalty in a very singular fashion. He isolates the first, or negative, clause of the accusation from the second, which as a matter of fact contains the real complaint, and asks Meletus what he means by his statement that Socrates does not "recognise" the gods of Athens. Does he mean that Socrates "recognises" some other god or gods, or that he "recognises" none at all? Of course what the indictment really meant was the former alternative, but Meletus, being wholly unversed in dialectic, falls into a booby-trap of the simplest kind. He adopts the second alternative, no doubt because it makes Socrates' wickedness more astounding, and thus the original charge of disloyalty to the State religion is adroitly converted into one of pure atheism. It is easy for Socrates to show that *this* accusation conflicts with the very next clause of the indictment, but meanwhile the really serious charge of disloyalty to the city's gods has been allowed to fall into the background, and goes unanswered.

Thus Plato neither explains what the real accusation was, nor does he offer any reply to it. I can find no reasonable explanation of his conduct but the obvious one, that his account of what he heard Socrates say at the trial is in the main closely true to fact, and that Socrates indulged his "accustomed irony" at the expense of his prosecutor to confuse the issue at stake, precisely because he had no satisfactory defence against the charge which had been made in the ἀνωμοσία, and would have been pressed home by Meletus coherently enough if he had not allowed Socrates to cross-examine him. The Platonic *Apology* vindicates Socrates triumphantly on the score of "atheism," but silently owns that he was guilty on the real charge of unlicensed innovation in religion.

This being so, we naturally ask whether any reasonable

conjecture can be formed about the nature of these "innovations" with regard to which Socrates could not defend himself; and, as Plato has not seen fit to enlighten us in the *Apology*, we naturally turn next to the apologetic materials supplied by Xenophon, who shows himself far less adroit in following the sound maxim *πάσαι τὸ σιγᾶν φάρμακον βλάβης ἔχω*. Now Xenophon does profess to know the ground on which the accusation was based. He says that, in his opinion, it was Socrates' notorious claim to possess a "divine sign" which gave rise to the belief that he had imported unauthorised *δαιμόνια*.¹ I propose to show both that the statement is false and that Xenophon is uncandid if he intends to put it forward as a suggestion coming from himself. Later on we shall see that it is at least highly probable that Xenophon knew his explanation to be untrue, and that he was well aware of the real foundation of the accusation, though the degree of his unveracity is for us a minor question. What is important is to prove that the version of the matter which has been believed on his authority down to our own times is false, and to ask whether the genuine facts are not to be discerned even now. Our results will, I hope, be doubly interesting, as they not merely throw some fresh light on the most famous moments in the life of a very great man, but further present us with some curious information on the conception of "impiety" entertained by old-fashioned Athenians at the opening of the fourth century.

First, then, it should be noted that Xenophon's explanation is inherently incredible, and that he himself is naïve enough to point out the incredibility of it. It is Xenophon himself who goes on to say that Socrates' belief in his oracle stands on the same level with the belief of other men in *μαντική*.² If Socrates believed that "heaven" gave him revelations by means of the *σημεῖον*, he believed neither more

¹ *Memorabilia* i. 1. 2 *διετηρέλητο γὰρ ὡς φαίη Σωκράτης τὸ δαιμόνιον ἐαυτῷ σημαίνειν· ὅθεν δὴ καὶ μάλιστα μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸν αἰτιάσασθαι καὶ τὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρειν.*

² *Mem.* i. 1. 3 *ὁ δ' οὐδὲν καινότερον εἰσέφερε τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι μαντικὴν νομίζοντες οἰωνοῖς τε χρῶνται καὶ φήμαις καὶ συμβόλοις καὶ θυσίαις κτλ.* Note the

nor less than any of his neighbours who put their faith in omens, or consulted a soothsayer about their dreams. And it follows at once that if Socrates could be charged with impiety for believing in the prophetic significance of his "sign," Anytus and Meletus could equally have brought a successful *γραφὴ ἀσεβείας* against any Athenian who believed in dreams and omens, that is, against the great majority of the *δῆμος*. But surely it is certain that a prosecution on such grounds would not only have made its promoters ridiculous, but have laid them open to a counter-accusation of impiety which they would not have found it easy to defend.

Further, it seems clear from the Platonic *Apologia* that nothing at all was said about the "sign" in the speech of Meletus, and it is therefore presumable that it was not alluded to in the indictment. To prove this, we have only to observe that Plato is absolutely silent about the "sign" in that part of his work which deals with the accusation of impiety, that is, in the real *ἀγών*. The subject is brought up later on by Socrates himself in quite a different connection, as the professed explanation of his abstention from public life.¹ In other words, the "sign" is treated as falling outside the main issues of the case; the whole passage about it is simply a *διάλυσις τῆς ὑποψίας*. He abstained from politics, he says, because the "sign" restrained him. Now the mere fact that such an explanation is regarded by Plato as at least a plausible argument against the *ὑποψία* of suspicious dicasts, should of itself be sufficient proof that no accusation of *ἀσέβεια* could have been put forward on the

scornful echo of the indictment: "His 'importations' were no more 'novel' than those of every one else."

¹ *Apology* 31 c *ὥς ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἄτοπον εἶναι ὅτι δὴ ἐγὼ ἰδίαι μὲν ταῦτα συμβουλευόμενος περιὼν καὶ πολυπραγμονῶ, δημοσίαι δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνειν εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον συμβουλευεῖν τῇ πόλει. τοῦτον δὲ αἰτίον ἐστίν ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖον τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται . . . τοῦτ' ἐστίν ὃ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν κτλ. (We are to suppose, then, that Socrates had seriously thought of such a career, only that the *θεῖον τι* forbade it; his abstention from public life, as he implies in *Republic* 496 c, was forced on him by God against his inclination, just as was afterwards the case with Plato according to *Ep.* vii.)*

mere strength of the *δαιμόνιον σημεῖον*. A much less alert intelligence than that of either Socrates or Plato could not have failed to see the absurdity of trying to disarm suspicion by what, if Xenophon is telling the truth, was bound to be taken as a gratuitous confession of the crime laid to his charge. To make the point clearer, let us consider what the *ὑποψία* is under which Socrates lies. It is that, though notoriously influential in private among such young men as Alcibiades, Critias, Charmides, Aristotle *ὁ τῶν τριάκοντα*, as a leader of political discussions, he has never honestly come forward and openly placed his gifts at the service of the State. This inevitably creates a suspicion, not only reasonable enough in itself, but apparently so well backed by facts that Plato does not venture to put it into words, though we can easily read it between the lines of his reply.

The *ὑποψία* is, in fact, that Socrates is the able and dangerous head of an anti-democratic *ἐταιρία*, like that in which Antiphon had played the leading part a dozen years before.

That an audience which could remember the behaviour of the oligarchical clubs of 415, and had fresh in their memories two subversions of the Constitution within a dozen years, should cherish such suspicions about Socrates was the most natural thing in the world. His puppets, Critias and the others, it might be said, played up to their cues, and paid with their lives for doing so, but the "chief contriver of all harms" took care to keep himself safe behind the scenes, and here he is to-day ready to begin the old game again, if we do not give him his deserts. And I suspect that it would do Socrates no good that, as every one knew, he had not, like his friend Chaerephon, shared the exile of the patriots during the Terror; he was one of the "men of the city," as opposed to *οἱ ἐκ Πειραιῶς*, and what that means may be gathered from the speeches of Lysias belonging to the years 403-400.¹

¹ Cf. Lysias xxv. 1 *ὑμῶν μὲν πολλὴν συγγνώμην ἔχω, ὧς ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἀκούουσι τοιοῦτων λόγων καὶ ἀναμνησκόμενοις τῶν γεγενημένων, ὁμοίως ἅπασιν ὀργίζεσθαι τοῖς ἐν ἄστει μένουσι κτλ.*, xxvi. 2 *οὐ γὰρ ἐνθυμείσθε ὅτι οὗτοι μὲν, ὅτε ἡ πόλις ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἤρχετο, οὐδὲ τῆς αὐτῆς δουλείας ὑμῶν μεταδύναι*

Socrates thus lay under a false but highly natural suspicion, and it was evidently his business to dispel it by assigning his abstention from public life, which, in the friend of Critias and Charmides, looked like the cunning of unscrupulous self-preservation, to an innocent cause. The cause he assigns is the action of the *δαιμόνιον σημεῖον*. This is plain proof that, in Plato's opinion at least, the *σημεῖον* was not a thing at which the average dicast would be likely to take umbrage. Yet further, the language in which the explanation is introduced is such that, in the hands of a writer who knows what words mean, it ought to imply that the "sign" had never been referred to in the course of the trial until Socrates himself saw fit to "import" it into the argument. For it is introduced simply as "something you have often heard me speak of in many places" (a phrase which of itself implies that there could be no impiety in a thing of which Socrates was always and everywhere talking in the most open way). It is assumed that, though the dicasts may never have heard before that the "sign" had forbidden Socrates to speak in the *ἐκκλησία*, they already knew perfectly that he had such a "sign," and their knowledge did not come from the speeches of the prosecutors, but from Socrates himself. If the "sign" had played any part in the speech of Meletus, the language of Socrates, as reproduced by Plato, would be ridiculous. He could not possibly fall back on one of the very points of the accusation as an innocent explanation of a suspicious course of conduct; he must necessarily have dealt with the "sign" and have discussed its character in the *ἀγών* proper; or, if it were conceivable that he should have put the whole subject into the wrong division of his speech, he must at least have described the "sign" as "something which Meletus has misrepresented, but about which you shall now hear the

ἤξιωσαν, κτλ. The same soreness of feeling between the two parties is presupposed in xxviii., where Lysias has to argue against the presumption created in favour of Ergocles by his having notoriously been one of the "men of Piræus." See also xxxiv. (date immediately after the amnesty) for the feeling against persons who, like Socrates, *τῇ μὲν τύχῃ τῶν ἐκ Πειραιῶς πραγμάτων μετέσχον, τῇ δὲ γνώμῃ τῶν ἐξ ἄσπεως*.

truth." When we remember that we are dealing not with the work of a botcher but with that of Plato, we are bound to infer from the foregoing considerations that the "sign" had never been mentioned by the prosecutors at all, and that it cannot therefore have been any part of the grounds for the *γραφή* against Socrates.

An objection may perhaps be made to this conclusion on the ground that Plato's Socrates immediately goes on to say that it is presumably from a misrepresentation about the "sign" that Meletus has indicted him for *ἀσέβεια* (ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμωιδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράφητο). But the warning *δή* should of itself suggest that the pretended explanation may not be altogether serious. And when we add to the reasons already given for disbelieving that the "sign" had played any part in the accusation the further consideration that Socrates is careful not to say that the "burlesque" occurred in the *speech* of Meletus, but ascribes it solely to the formal indictment, it becomes clear that the remark is only an instance of the *εἰωθυῖα Σωκράτους εἰρωνεία*. It is, in fact, an admirable stroke of humour to suggest that the tremendous charge of "importing novel *δαιμόνια*" has nothing worse than this trifling business of the *σημεῖον* behind it. At least, if Meletus said nothing in his *speech* about the *σημεῖον*, that cannot have been what he and Anytus meant by the accusation.

We can see now how the traditional account of the impiety of Socrates has grown up. A suggestion made humorously by Plato, and in all likelihood by Socrates himself in the course of his address to the dicasts, has been taken up seriously by Xenophon, most probably out of the *Apology* itself, and given out as his own theory of the matter, and later writers have too often been content to echo this piece of pure "Pragmatismus" as if it were an ascertained fact.

Assuming, then, that the negative part of our case has been made out, we may say that the "impiety" alleged against Socrates was neither atheism nor the possession of a private oracle. We have next to ask whether any probable

conjecture can be made as to its real character. Any theory we can frame, let it be remembered, must satisfy the following conditions. It must assign a ground for the charge which is compatible with the known good sense and probity of Anytus, and also with what we know of current Athenian sentiment as to what is or is not "impious." It must also explain why Plato contrives to avoid the whole issue in the *Apology*, and why Xenophon gives only a palpably false explanation. Finally it must explain why the offence could fairly be represented as an *importation* of innovations in cultus. These considerations enable us at once to set aside a view which has found too much favour in quarters influenced by the Christian conception of heresy as the holding of false "doctrines concerning the faith."

Socrates was not condemned because, as we learn from the *Euthyphro*, he refused to believe in the tales of the rebellion of Zeus against his father, or of the war with the giants, or because he wished, like the Ionian philosophers before him, to "bowdlerise" Homer and Hesiod. Myths were never held *de fide* in the Hellenic world, and there is no evidence that disbelief in them was ever regarded as impiety. Pindar could deny with impunity the story of the banquet of Tantalus, Aeschylus that of the victory of Apollo over the serpent of Pytho.¹ Even the astounding picture of the character of Zeus in the *Prometheus*, and the very unsatisfactory morality of Loxias in the Oresteian trilogy, do not seem ever to have been felt as offences against religion.² Nor need I prove that the whole *chronique scandaleuse* of Olympus is denounced as an impious invention of the poets, not merely by Euripides,³ but by the cautious and

¹ *Eumenides* 4 ff. ἐν δὲ τῷ τρίτῳ | λάχει, θελούσης, οὐδὲ πρὸς βίαν τινός, | Τίταρις ἄλλη παῖς Χθονὸς καθέζετο, | Φοίβῃ · δίδωσι δ' ἢ γενέθλιον δόσιν | Φοίβῳ κτλ.

² It is a mistake to take the "theology" of the trilogy too seriously. Loxias, after commanding a peculiarly treacherous murder, proves quite unable to protect the murderer, and Athena only saves him by what is morally a "toss-up." The verdict is the familiar one, "Not guilty; don't do it again."

³ See, for a sample passage, Euripides, *Heracles* 1340-1346, with its thoroughly "philosophic" conclusion, αἰδῶν αἶδε δύστηνοι λόγοι, where there

conventional Isocrates.¹ Even Aristophanes regards the tale of the binding of Cronus as a blasphemy fit only for the mouth of wickedness personified.² The notion that the contemporaries of Socrates looked on the Hesiodic Theogony as a canonical body of doctrine from which it was criminal to depart is an anachronism. The *μῦθοι* of Hesiod and Orpheus were not dogmas, and the essential thing in Athenian religion was not dogma, but cultus, the practice of the proper rules of "giving and receiving between God and man." We may be quite sure that what Socrates was charged with was not unbelief or over-belief, but irregular religious practices, a method of "giving to and receiving from" heaven which had not the stamp of official approval, and therefore might very conceivably be used to influence τὸ θεῖον against the interests of the Athenian democracy. "Impiety" of this kind was naturally also high treason.

Nor, I may add, was the case of Socrates in the least parallel with that of Anaxagoras, except in so far as, in both cases, the considerations actually operative were

seems to be an intentional allusion to the proverb πολλὰ ψεύδονται αἰδοί. We have, of course, the famous case of the αἰδοῦς Stesichorus, who was blinded for blasphemy, but his crime lay precisely in believing Homer.

¹ *Busiris* 38-39 ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲν σοι τῆς ἀληθείας ἐμέλῃσεν, ἀλλὰ ταῖς τῶν ποιητῶν βλασφημίαις ἐπηκολούθησας, οἱ δεινότερα μὲν πεποιηκότας καὶ πεπονθότας ἀποφαίνουσι τοὺς ἐκ τῶν ἀθανάτων γεγονότας ἢ τοὺς ἐκ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἀνοσιωτάτων . . . ὑπὲρ ὧν τὴν μὲν ἀξίαν δίκην οὐκ ἔδοσαν, οὐ μὴν ἀτιμώρητοί γε διέφυγον . . . Ὀρφεὺς δ' ὁ μάλιστα τούτων τῶν λόγων ἀψάμενος διασπασθεὶς τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησεν. We may note, too, that even such a zealot as Euthyphro expresses neither horror nor surprise when Socrates refuses to believe his stories about the "ancient and violent deeds" of the gods. (The insinuation, which occurs at *Euthyphro* 6 b, that it is this want of faith which has led to the prosecution for impiety is manifestly a part of the irony which pervades the dialogue.) The implication of the whole passage is that these stories were commonly told as tales of what happened long ago, but that no one except professed mystery-mongers pretended to know whether there was any truth in them. The attitude of Euthyphro should dispose once for all of the notion that Euripides was risking his life by attacking popular mythology.

² *Clouds* 904 ΔΙΚΙΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ. πῶς δῆτα, δίκης οὐσης, ὁ Ζεὺς
οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν τὸν πατέρ' αὐτοῦ
δήσας;

ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ. αἰβοῖ, τουτὶ καὶ δὴ
χωρεῖ τὸ κακόν· ὅτε μοι λεκάνην.

political, and might have been put forward largely on their own merits. For Socrates, in Plato, says no single word which would indicate that the astronomical views of Anaxagoras had been laid to his charge by his actual accusers. It is not Meletus but Aristophanes whom he accuses of having involved him in the general prejudice against astronomers. This prejudice is represented as one of old standing, dating, in fact, from the production of the *Clouds*, and Meletus is said to have taken advantage of it to involve Socrates in a fresh accusation. But the line of distinction is very sharply drawn between the old and more general charge, which is not formally before the court at all, and the more specific accusation of Meletus. It is only after disposing of the general accusation, made by persons who cannot be confronted with him, that Socrates begins to consider the *γραφή* of Meletus; and when he does come to deal with it we hear no more of astronomy or Anaxagoras. What Meletus complained of was not that Socrates studied astronomy, but that he "corrupted the young" and followed an unlicensed form of religion.

Now the *Phaedo* and *Gorgias* profess to tell us facts about Socrates which, if authentic, at once explain how he might fairly be thought guilty of "impiety" by persons of high character and not totally devoid of common-sense. From both of them we learn that Socrates was a convinced believer in the Orphic-Pythagorean doctrine of the soul, according to which this present life in the body is only the prelude to the more real and endless life to come after the separation of soul and body, and the chief duty of man is to live for this redemption of the soul by means of "philosophy." In the *Gorgias* in particular this theory of the duty of man is made the ground for a severe indictment of one and all the famous men of the fifth century who had created Imperial Athens, and "philosophy" and the *δῆμος* are pitted against one another, like God and Mammon, as masters whom no one can serve at once.¹

¹ *Gorgias* 481 d λέγω δ' ἐννοήσας, ὅτι ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν τυγχάνομεν ταῦτόν τι πεπονθότες, ἐρῶντε δύο ὅντε δυοῖν ἑκάτερος, ἐγὼ μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδου τε τοῦ

Both dialogues exhibit him as closely connected in a sort of society with Pythagorean foreigners. In the *Gorgias* a special appeal is made to the authority of a "man of Italy" who is a transparent disguise for the Pythagorean refugee Philolaus.¹ In the *Phaedo*, Socrates is the central figure of a group of like-minded persons; there are Simmias and Cebes, pupils of Philolaus from Thebes, Echecrates, a Pythagorean from Phlius,² who form the minor group of interlocutors; and among the other persons are not only Phaedo, who figures as a well-known acquaintance of the society at Phlius, but also Euclides and Terpsion from Megara, of whom we only know as Eleatics, and Eleatics were regularly reckoned in antiquity as a sort of heterodox Pythagoreans. We could easily add more details to the picture by taking other dialogues into the account. Thus, for example, the whole doctrine of Eros as the impulse to philosophy, expounded in the *Symposium*, the *Phaedrus*, the nuptial metaphor of *Republic* vi., and the account of "spiritual midwifery" in the *Theaetetus*, requires to be read in the light of Hesiod, Parmenides, and the *Hippolytus*, whose hero, it is essential to remember, is an Orphic

Κλεινίου καὶ φιλοσοφίας, σὺ δὲ δυοῖν, τοῦ τε Ἀθηναίων δήμου καὶ τοῦ Πυριλάμπους. Cf. 513 c ὁ δήμου γὰρ ἔρως, ὃ Καλλικλείς, ἐνὼν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ σῇ ἀντιστατεῖ μοι. When we remember that the conversation is supposed to take place somewhere between the trial of the generals and the final surrender at the Goat's River, the allusion to Alcibiades is seen to be the expression of political hopes which would find little sympathy with the democratic leaders of a later time, and should be read in connection with the hopes and fears exhibited by Aristophanes in the *Frogs*. It is important to remember that the tone in which "democracy" is criticised in the *Gorgias* and *Republic* is throughout carefully adapted to the dramatic character of the speaker and the circumstances of the presupposed time. It is the criticism of an anti-Periclean who has lived to see the outcome of the great war-policy staring him in the face. Plato's own personal views must be sought more particularly in the *Laws* and the 7th *Epistle*. But this is no theme for a passing note, and I hope to deal more fully with it in a second series of these studies.

¹ *Gorgias* 493. As Professor Burnet has remarked, the Σικελός must be regarded as a mere reference to the proverb about the Σικελός κομψός ἀνὴρ, and this ties us down to an "Italian" Pythagorean as the authority followed. Comparison with *Phaedo* 61 b-62 b shows that Philolaus is meant.

² The quality of Echecrates as a Pythagorean is proved by his appearance in the list of Iamblichus.

"saint."¹ The *Phaedo* implies that the connection between Socrates and these communities was close enough for some members of the school to pay frequent visits to the philosopher throughout his imprisonment.² The same point

¹ I shall hardly be required to produce the formal proof of the Orphic origin of all this. It may be enough to call attention once more to the point that the doctrine of the "maieutic art," which is merely part of the theory of Eros as the aspiration to the immortal life, is guaranteed as Socratic by the jest of Aristophanes, *Clouds* 136 ἀπεριμερίμνω τὴν θύραν λελάκτικας | καὶ φροντίδ' ἐξήμβλωκας ἐξηρημένην. I may note that μέριμνα and φροντίς are both words with an Orphic ring about them. For μέριμνα in this sense cf. Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 459 μένει δ' ἀκούσαι τί μου | μέριμνα νυκτηρέφες, *Eumenides* 360 σπενδομένα δ' ἀφελεῖν | τινὰ τάσδε μερίμνας, | θεῶν δ' ἀτέλειαν ἐμαῖς | μελέταις ἐπικραίνειν. So it looks intentional that in Pindar *Ol.* ii. the vision of judgment to come is introduced by the thought (58) ὁ μὲν πλοῦτος ἀρεταῖς δεδαυδμένος | φέροι τῶν τε καὶ τῶν | καιρὸν, βαθείαν ὑπέχων μερίμναν. The man of wealth does well to be careful as knowing that he will have to render account of his stewardship. It can hardly be a mere coincidence that *Pyth.* viii., which ends with an echo of the Orphic thought that our life here is but a shadow, exhibits the same transition, (87 ff.) ὁ δὲ καλὸν τι νέον λαχὼν | ἀβρότατος ἐπὶ μεγάλας | ἐξ ἐλπίδος πέτεται | ὑποπτεροῖς ἀνορέαις, ἔχων | κρέσσονα πλούτου μερίμναν . . . ἐπάμεροι' τί δέ τις; | τί δ' ὅς τις; σκιάς ὄναρ | ἀνθρώπος. So it is the function of Bromius θιασεύειν τε χοροῖς | μετὰ τ' αὐλοῦ γελᾶσαι | ἀποπαῦσαι τε μερίμνας, Euripides, *Bacchae* 379. He hates, in fact, the pietistic anxiety of the unco guid, and requires his votaries σοφὰν ἀπέχειν πρᾶπιδα φρένα τε | περισσῶν παρὰ φωτῶν, that is, from the philosophers who make their lives a *meditatio mortis*, and the whole race of kill-joys. We see thus, I think, that "anxiety about one's soul" is a distinct meaning of μέριμνα, and Pindar's use of the word with special reference to a god who "watches over" his favourites, e.g. *Ol.* i. 107 θεὸς ἐπίτροπος ἐὼν τεαῖσι μῆδεται | ἔχων τοῦτο κᾶδος, Ἰέρων, | μερίμναισιν, *Nem.* iii. 68 δς τάνδε νᾶσον εὐκλεί προσέθηκε λόγῳ | καὶ σεμνὸν ἀγλααῖσι μερίμναις | Πυθίου Θεάριον, further illustrates the religious associations of the word. They may even colour Empedocles' νῆπιοι' οὐ γὰρ σφιν δολιχόφρονές εἰσι μερίμναι, since he is there speaking of men who have forgotten the "imperial palace whence" they "came." As for φροντίς, the whole point of the jest of the φροντιστήριον is that in Attic Greek φροντίζειν means to "take anxious thought" about a thing. For its religious associations cf. the well-known Aeschylean εἰ τὸ μάταν ἀπὸ φροντίδος ἀχθος χρή βαλεῖν ἐτητύμω; I think also *Ag.* 1530 ἀμυχανῶ φροντίδος στερηθεῖς | εὐπάλαμον μερίμναν | ὅπα τράπωμαι, πίνοντος οἴκου (the despairing cry is for a divine protector in so evil a world); Euripides, *Hippolytus* 375 ᾗδῃ ποτ' ἄλλως νυκτὸς ἐν μακρῷ χρόνῳ | θνητῶν ἐφρόντισ' ἦ διέφθαρται βίος. Many other examples could be readily supplied. In the sense in which φροντιστής is the opposite of the type glorified in the *Bacchae*, the word means the *dénoi* who works out his salvation with fear and trembling.

² *Phaedo* 59 d αἰεὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὰς πρόσθεν ἡμέρας εἰώθεμεν φοιτᾶν καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη, κτλ.; *Theaetetus* 142 c ff. That the "notes"

recurs in the *Theaetetus*, with the highly probable addition that some of them took full notes of his talk. The companion story of the *Crito*,¹ about the large sum of money which Simmias and Cebes brought from Thebes, can hardly mean less than that the Theban Pythagoreans had made a "collection" on his account, no doubt with the original intention of bribing the accusers to let the prosecution drop. In any case, no one will deny that Plato has chosen, especially in the *Phaedo*, to represent Socrates as intimately connected with the Pythagorean communities of northern and central Greece. I suggest, then, that, since the connection is incidentally revealed, much to the damage of his own theory of Socrates, by Xenophon,² we should

taken by the friends of Socrates are not a pure invention of Plato is clear; it is only their existence which explains the sudden appearance of so many examples of a new form of literature (reckoned by Aristotle as a kind of "mime" or drama), the Σωκρατικός λόγος, immediately after the philosopher's death. The reason why the Eleatics were regarded as a kind of Pythagoreans is simply that, in all probability, the school followed the Pythagorean "life," i.e. were members of the brotherhood, though in disagreement with the doctrines of the others. The evidence for this in the case of Parmenides and Zeno, which is quite good, will be found in Professor Burnet's treatment of these philosophers in his *Early Greek Philosophy*. Parmenides and Melissus are both in the list of Iamblichus. I have avoided speaking of a school of Megara, since it is not clear to me that "Megarians" were even recognised as a sect before the time of Aristotle. I suspect popular thought antedates Stilpo and Diodorus and Eubulides, as it certainly does the Cyrenaics, a school which really belongs to the age of Epicurus and Arcesilaus. (See Plutarch, *Adversus Colotem* 1120 c.)

¹ *Crito* 45 b εἰς δὲ καὶ κεκόμικεν ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀργύριον ἱκανόν, Σιμμίας ὁ Θηβαῖος, ξείριμος δὲ καὶ Κέβης καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πάνν. The object is expressly said just above to have been to buy off the "sycophants," i.e. the nominal accusers, and the mention of the πάνν πολλοί shows that the foreign friends of Socrates (all of whom, so far as we know, were connected with Pythagoreanism) were acting together. We must suppose either that they did not know that a man of the stamp of Anytus was the real mover, or that they were not in time. For obvious reasons, Plato says nothing as to their presence in Athens at the trial. I should add that my attention was first called to the passage of the *Crito* by Professor Burnet.

² *Mem.* i. 2. 48, Simmias, Cebes, and Phaedondas (see *Phaedo* 59 c) are mentioned among the friends of Socrates, and the former two at iii. 11. 17, where they are expressly designated as Thebans. At iv. 2. 10 Theodorus, the Pythagorean geometer, seems to be also spoken of as a personal friend. Note that this confirms the statements of the *Theaetetus* about the friendship between the two men.

accept it as probably true, and that it may possibly afford the missing clue to the real character of the "impiety" of the philosopher.

To see the probable effect on an Athenian dicastery of a well-founded assertion that Socrates was an associate of the Pythagoreans, we must bear in mind several points. The breaking-up of the Pythagoreans as a society in Magna Graecia was sufficiently recent for two of the survivors, Philolaus and Lysis, to have been active as teachers in Thebes at the end of Socrates' life, and the history of these chosen associates would not tell in favour of a philosopher already known to be no admirer of the democracy which the men of "practical sense" were fruitlessly trying to revive. The Pythagoreans were, moreover, known to have a secret cult of their own, based on mysterious beliefs about the soul, a matter which no ancient *πόλις* could be expected to treat lightly; and, to make matters worse, the sect was not popular in Athens, as we see from the fact that the catalogue of members given by Iamblichus mentions only one Athenian. Whether Socrates went further and actually participated in the common life and peculiar worship of his Pythagorean friends is more than we can say,¹ though it

¹ There is a curious difficulty about this point, from the solution of which much light might be thrown on the personality of Socrates. The Pythagorean Apollo was, as is natural in a religion originating with a Samian, the Ionian Apollo of Delos. This is shown by the way in which the Delian legend of the Hyperborean maidens has got mixed up with the Pythagoras legend as early as the work of Aristotle on the Pythagoreans. Yet the special favourite of Socrates is always the Delphian Apollo, the *πάτριος ἐξηγητής* whose services were to be invoked for the ideal *πόλις* and whose oracle had appointed him his mission. This is all the stranger, and the more certainly historical, that the Apollo of Delphi had fallen into deserved discredit at Athens for his partisanship throughout the Great War, so that we actually find the Athens of Demosthenes and Hyperides reviving the claims of Dodona to escape recognising the authority of Pytho. Possibly one should regard the devotion of Socrates to Delphi partly as indicating political sentiments, partly as due to the effect on his career of the oracle given to Chaerephon, which, as I could readily prove, belongs to a time before the war, when a man could fairly well serve both Athens and Delphi. The death-scene of the *Phaedo* is orthodox in all its details. The vision which warns Socrates of the approaching return of the sacred trireme comes, of course, from Delos, which the boat had just left. The poem to Apollo, as quoted by Diogenes, begins

is at least possible that his famous description of himself as a fellow-servant with the swans of Apollo should be understood in that light. In any case, the known fact that he chose to make special intimates of Pythagoreans from Thebes and Phlius, who, as every one knew, had a private cult of their own, not recognised by any Polis nor confined to members of any Polis, would be enough to lead to the inference that he shared in their practices, and to expose him to the charge of neglecting the deities of the State in favour of certain "imported novelties." And there is extant evidence that some such participation in "uncanny" rites was popularly ascribed to him years before his trial.¹

Taking all these points together, I think we are fairly justified in suggesting that the real impiety of Socrates was nothing other than an intimate connection, probably amounting to "inter-communion," with foreign Pythagoreans. If we were actually required to give a name to the foreign *δαιμόνιον* whom Socrates, according to his accusers, patronised, we should not go very far astray in calling him *Ἀπόλλων Ὑπερβόρειος*. But fortunately there is no need to "give the

correctly *Δῆλι' Ἀπολλων, χαίρε*, and the swans are Delian too (Euripides, *Iph. Taur.* 1104 *λίμναν θ' εἰλίσσουσαν ὕδωρ | κύκλιον, ἐνθα κύκνος μελωιδὸς Μούσας θεραπεύει*). Whatever a Pythagorean might have thought of his weakness for Delphi in life, Socrates at least died in the faith. Hence his mission of awakener of the dull imposed on him by Delphi cannot be the ground for calling himself a fellow-servant with the swans of Delos. I suspect it does mean that Socrates shared in some way in the Pythagorean life. This is borne out by Xen. *Mem.* iii. 14, in so far as it assumes that Socrates and his friends regularly had a common table, though Xenophon implies that there was no rule of vegetarianism. It is evidence perhaps for actual participation in the cult that Socrates says of himself (*Phaedo* 69 c ff.): *εἰσὶν γὰρ δὴ, [ὡς] φασιν οἱ περὶ τὰς τελετάς, νάρθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοί, βάκχοι δέ τε παῦροι· οὗτοι δ' εἰσὶν κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἄλλοι ἢ οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες ὁρθῶς. ὧν δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ κατὰ γὰρ τὸ δυνατόν οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπον ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προϋθυμήθην γενέσθαι*. When we bear in mind the very special significance which *φιλόσοφος*, *φιλοσοφία*, *φιλοσοφεῖν* bear throughout the dialogue, this statement probably means a great deal.

¹ Aristophanes, *Birds* 1553 *πρὸς δὲ τοῖς Σκιάποσιν λίμνη τις ἔστ' ἄλουτος οὐ | ψυχαγωγεῖ Σωκράτης· | ἐνθα καὶ Ἥλειανδρος ἦλθε | δεόμενος ψυχὴν ἰδεῖν . . . καίτ' ἀνῆλθ' αὐτῷ κάτωθεν | . . . Χαιρεφῶν ἡ νυκτερίς*. The representation of Socrates as president of a "séance" only becomes intelligible when we suppose his close connection with the Pythagorean-Orphic mystics to have been notorious.

real names." The *δαιμόνιον σημεῖον* itself would acquire a new and sinister significance if men could be persuaded that its owner was mixed up with unlicensed and probably discreditable foreign rites. The *αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ εἶδη*, if the accusers had ever heard of them, would probably be set down as outlandish deities of some kind, just as "Jesus and Anastasis" seem to have been four centuries later.¹ That Apollo, under a different name, was a god specially honoured by the State as a *θεὸς πατρῷος*, and in various other relations, and that the great Pindar had lavished some of his most enchanting lines on the blessedness of the Hyperboreans and the "magic road," which no man can find, to their earthly Paradise, would make no difference, since Pindar was not an Athenian, and the phrase *καὶνὰ δαιμόνια* does not mean *recentia numina* but *insolita numina*. The objection to Socrates' alleged divinities was not that they were *new*, but that they were *unofficial*.

This interpretation, it will be seen, at once explains why the accusation was one of "importing" religious novelties. Whatever may have been the home of Orphicism, Pythagoreanism, at any rate, was distinctly something un-Attic and belonging to a different world from Athens and her Ionian connections.² As I have already said, the catalogue of Pythagoreans in Iamblichus contains only one

¹ For an illustration of what the *δῆμος* could believe when its fears were excited by a hint of the existence of a private cult I need only refer to the extract preserved by Athenaeus from a speech (*Fr.* 53) of Lysias against Cinesias, in which the unlucky poet is described as belonging to a "Hell-Fire Club" (the *κακοδαιμονισταί*, or "Sorry Devils") who met every month on a "fast day" (*μὴν ἡμέραν ταξάμενοι τῶν ἀποφράδων*) to blaspheme the gods and the laws. This is just the kind of thing that an excited or unscrupulous *λογογράφος* would have been likely to say about Socrates and Cebes and the rest. Compare also the wild alarm created by the Hermocopidae.

² So, too, Socrates' trances, though far outdone by Epimenides and Pythagoras, are neither Attic nor Ionian. Both Plato and Aristophanes let us see how "odd" they were thought, and it is a singularly happy touch in the account of Socrates' conduct before Potidaea in the *Symposium* that it is the Ionians, the countrymen of the originators of Greek science, who are particularly struck by a kind of thing they evidently had never seen at home.

name from Athens, while there are four each from such insignificant states as Sicyon and Phlius. Since the list comes down to the time of Plato and his friends, this means that Pythagoreanism was virtually unknown in Athens at the end of the fifth century, and that there was no means of controlling the wildest notions which enemies of the imported wisdom of "gifted men of Italy" might diffuse among the *δῆμος*. All that would definitely be known of the "brethren" would be that they held strange views on the fate of the soul after death, that they had an unlicensed private cult, and—ominous fact—that they were foreigners from states which Athens had no cause to love. The question still remains whether there is positive proof that the Orphic and Pythagorean doctrine of the life to come was regarded as impious by the average Athenian opinion of the later part of the fifth century. I propose to show that it was by the concurrent testimony of Euripides, Aristophanes, and Plato himself. For Euripides we may naturally appeal to the *Hippolytus* in which the hero is himself a typical Orphic *καθαρός*, a devotee of absolute bodily purity and mental holiness, with his full measure of the saint's incapacity for ever understanding the sinner. In the Theseus of the play, as in the Theseus of Attic drama generally, we have, let it be remembered, the stock tragic type of the character burlesqued on the comic stage as *Δῆμος*, a character who would be almost "John Bull" if he could only be made a touch or two more puzzle-headed. He figures as the steady, common-sense, not over-brilliant representative of the best features in the *δῆμος*, in fact, as the sort of person Thrasybulus or Anytus was in real life. His opinions may generally be taken as typical of those of the ordinary good democrats whose ambitions are fairly summed up in the description of the good old days given by the *δίκαιος λόγος* of the *Clouds*; even when, as in the case before us, his verdict is given in anger and is unjust to an individual, it is thoroughly characteristic of the feelings of the best elements in the *δῆμος* towards whole classes. Hence it is significant that the freely expressed

opinion of Theseus about the congregation of the godly to which his son belongs is that they are one and all Puritans of the stage type, deliberate hypocrites who, like Tartuffe, make their religion and its musty scriptures a cloak for licentiousness.

σὺ δὲ θεοῦσιν ὡς περισσὸς ὢν ἀνὴρ
ξύνει; σὺ σώφρων καὶ κακῶν ἀκήρατος;

ἡδὲ(?) νυν αὖχει καὶ δι' ἀψύχον βορᾶς
σίτοις(?) καπήλευ', Ὀρφέα τ' ἀνακτ' ἔχων
βάκχευε πολλῶν γραμμάτων τιμῶν καπνοῖς.
ἐπεὶ γ' ἐλήφθης. τοὺς δὲ τοιοῦτους ἐγὼ
φεύγειν προφρονῶ πᾶσι· θηρεύουσι γὰρ
σεμνοῖς λόγοισιν, αἰσχρὰ μηχανώμενοι.

Hippolytus 948-957.¹

It may be said that the speaker is here giving vent to a natural but mistaken anger, founded on the false accusation of Phaedra. This is true, but not to the point. The real point is that when a man like Theseus is angry, his private opinion of the "saints," which courtesy and good nature would otherwise check, gets open utterance, just as a well-bred English layman's private opinion of "parsons" is most likely to be heard when he fancies himself wronged by a member of the profession. More could be quoted to illustrate the opinion of the *καθαροί* felt by Euripides to be natural to an Athenian democrat, but I will content myself with recalling the peculiarly biting sneer directed against the *ἄσκησις* which is, according to the *Phaedo*, as necessary a part of the philosopher's life as of the saint's—

πολλῶ γε μᾶλλον σαντὸν ἡσκησας σέβειν
ἢ τοὺς τεκόντας ὅσα δρᾶν δίκαιος ὢν.—*ib.* 1080-81.²

The testimony of Aristophanes is even more to the

¹ I quote the MSS. text with Murray's notes of corruption. I am not clear, however, that there is anything wrong. Why should not *σίτα* mean the "grain-market"?

² Hippolytus was under a "special obligation" to honour his father (the parent really meant) because, as a *νόθος*, he had no strict claim to be brought up, as he had been, like a prince.

point, since it shows that the Orphic doctrine of the future life was really, apart from any mere accessories, itself "impious" to Athenian ears. In the *Frogs*, an English reader may well be surprised to find the famous *σῶμα-σῆμα* doctrine of the world to come thrust in along with the incest of one heroine and the sacrilege of another among the crowning proofs of the "impiety" of Euripides himself. Yet here is the text—

ποίων δὲ κακῶν οὐκ αἰτιός ἐστ' ;
 οὐ προαγωγὸς κατέδειξ' οἶτος, (the nurse of Phaedra)
 καὶ τικτούσας ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς, (Auge)
 καὶ μιγνυμένας τοῖσιν ἀδελφοῖς, (Canace in the *Aeolus*)
 καὶ φασκούσας οὐ ζῆν τὸ ζῆν ;

where the last charge refers, of course, to the well-known lines, much in the spirit of a modern hymn—

τίς οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἐστὶ κατθανεῖν, κτλ.

Thus we get, in an ascending climax of iniquity, pimping, sacrilege, incest, the belief in the "life of the world to come"! That the climax is intended is clear from the arrangement of the three first accusations, and we also see that we were quite justified in holding that the authority of so great a poet as Pindar made no difference as to the "impiety" of a doctrine not recognised by, nor consistent with, the official cultus of the Athenian people. In fact, the famous Orphic lines of *Fr.* 131, καὶ σῶμα μὲν πάντων ἔπεται θανάτῳ περισθενεῖ, | ζῶν δ' ἔτι λείπεται αἰῶνος εἰδωλον· τὸ γάρ ἐστι μόνον | ἐκ θεῶν, preach the offending doctrine in words as plain as those of the *Gorgias* or *Phaedo*.

With regard to evidence to be derived from Plato (which is all the more valuable because he consistently depicts Socrates himself as a firm believer in the faith according to Orpheus), I would call special attention to the tone taken in the second book of the *Republic* towards the wandering priests and mystery-mongers who obviously represent a degraded religion of the same type as that of the *φιλόσοφος* who is seeking his soul's health by deliverance from servitude to the "body of death." The difference is that

the Attic equivalent of the "begging friar" tempts his clients to look for salvation not to knowledge, but to the ritual performance of cheap and amusing ceremonies.¹ The heretics in the *Laws* who teach sinners how to insure themselves against the wrath to come are plainly members of the same great brotherhood. Plato, in fact, is face to face with two very different developments of the same original Orphicism. On the one hand, there are the *φιλόσοφοι* who mean by salvation the true health of the soul, and seek it first and foremost through science, men such as Socrates and the group to whom the *Phaedo* is dedicated; on the other, there is the whole brood of quacks who promise relief to the alarmed conscience by spells ascribed to Musaeus, Eumolpus, Orpheus, and these Plato, like the Athenian *δῆμος*, regards as dangerous sectaries whom it is the duty of the city of the *Laws* to suppress. Owing to the non-existence of a school of Pythagoreans in Athens, it is probable that the sectaries were only known to the Athenian public at large on their worst side. Hence we find that the *Ὀρφεοτελεστής* regularly figures in Athenian literature as a disreputable person. (Compare the fictions of Demosthenes about the career of Aeschines' mother, the similar charges brought against the mother of Epicurus, the part played by the *Ὀρφεοτελεστής* in Theophrastus' character of the *δεισιδαίμων*.)

Nor is it hard to see why these ideas should have been specially obnoxious to the Athenian democracy. There are two obvious points which have to be taken into account. In the first place, the doctrine that the true business of man here is to prepare himself for the life beyond the grave, or, as Socrates puts it in the *Gorgias*, for the day when the soul will stand naked at the bar of the Judge to receive its doom, was quite incompatible with the ethical basis of Hellenic democracy, the view that service of the *πόλις* is the whole duty of man, and with an official cultus which aims at investing this conception of life with the sanctions of religion. The point is not whether the soul

¹ Cf. Plutarch, *Non posse suaviter vivi* etc. 1105 b.

retains some kind of consciousness after death or not; that it does was the foundation of the funeral rites of family worship, and the discussion in the first book of Aristotle's *Ethics* brings out clearly the strength of the popular objection to the theory that the dead are not touched by the good or ill fortune of their kinsmen among the living. The real point at issue, one which no civilisation has been able to evade or to settle, concerns the relative importance of the "here" and the "hereafter." The view so thoroughly ingrained with Athenian life that we have come to look upon it inaccurately as the "Hellenic" theory, and virtually adopted by modern Protestantism since the downfall of Calvinistic Evangelicalism, is that it is the *here* which matters for its own sake; the *there* may, to all intents and purposes, be left out of our calculations. The Orphic and Catholic Christian view, on the contrary, is that the *here* matters, in the end, as a means to the *there*; it is the eternal things which should be in the forefront in our whole ordering of our lives. And it is this point of view which Philosophy made its own from the time of Pythagoras to that of Aristotle. Hence the inevitable opposition between the spirit of the δῆμος and the spirit of Philosophy. The only attempt in Greek history to found a church ended, as we know, in a violent reaction, not, as is still frequently stated, on the part of the oligarchs, but on that of the democrats. This strife between the Pythagorean and the secular ideal was in spirit identical with the familiar modern strife between the Church and the State. Thus the impiety of association with the unlicensed conventicles of Pythagoreanism forms an important part of the wider charge of "corrupting the young" by inspiring them with a spirit hostile to the constitution.

Further, as has been already urged, the Pythagorean assemblies were international; the Pythagorean associates of Socrates, in particular, were, unless Chaerephon the "Bat" was one of them, as the jest of the *Birds* seems to imply, mainly foreigners, and it might fairly be argued that the objects pursued by such societies, and presumably promoted

by their secret worship, were not likely to be identical with the object of the official State religion, the good estate of the *δῆμος* of Athens. That was not a probable "intention" for the prayers of Megarians, Thebans, and Phliasians. In this respect the position of Socrates as an intimate associate of foreign Pythagoreans, and at least suspected of participation in their peculiar worship, would be closely analogous to that of an Englishman of 1690 who was known to associate daily with foreign Romanists and strongly suspected of being a "Papist" himself. Such an interpretation of the facts thus helps to make it clearer why so prominent a leader of the restored democracy as Anytus thought it right to lend his name to the prosecution.

It may be replied that the Eleusinian rites were widely believed to be concerned with the life to come, and were, moreover, international, and yet lay under no suspicion. But we must remember that the Eleusinian *ἔργα* had been incorporated in the official cultus ever since the sixth century, and were under the control of Athenian officials. Hence there could be no suspicion that they had any object inconsistent with the welfare of the *δῆμος*, and this would, of course, be a matter of personal knowledge with all the dicasts who had been initiated. The case of the Pythagorean rites was wholly different. They formed no part of the cultus of the State, and were not under Athenian control. From what we have already seen, it is most likely that neither the prosecutors of Socrates nor the dicasts knew, except from the wildest hearsay, what they were. And finally, in the mysteries, the important thing was not dogma but ritual. A man was free to believe that they taught a doctrine about the life to come or not, just as he pleased. What did matter was that he should take his bath in the sea, offer his pig, and be a spectator of the sacred mystery-play. With the Pythagorean, as with the modern theologian, it was the dogma of the fall and redemption of the soul which was the important thing; the cultus was throughout secondary. Hence the Eleusinia, unlike the Pythagorean religion, offered no possibility of a

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clash between a man's "eternal" and his "secular" duties. To take another modern parallel, the *δῆμος* was naturally suspicious of international secret rites for much the same reasons as the rulers of the Roman Church are to this day hostile to Freemasonry.

I suggest, then, that one chief reason for the prosecution of Socrates was that he was suspected of having been the centre of an anti-democratic *ἐραυρία*, and that the suspicion was supported by the belief that he was addicted to the "foreign" cult of the Pythagoreans. In other words, he was "impious," not as an atheist, or a disbeliever in Hesiod, or a person with an odd private oracle, but as an adherent of a *religio non licita*, in fact, as the first Nonconformist of note in history.

I have sufficiently indicated my opinion that Socrates was, according to law, actually guilty of the charge. The question of the historical fidelity of Plato's portrait of his master is, however, too large a problem to be dealt with at the tail-end of an essay. I can at least promise any student who will investigate it with an open mind, and with special reference to the data furnished by Aristophanes, that he will find abundant evidence—much of it, so far as I know, not yet published—in support of both theses, that Plato's historical accuracy is in the main demonstrable, and that Socrates, if not actually a Pythagorean, was next door to it. The inquiry ought to be seriously taken in hand, if it were only in the hope of recovering the true lineaments of one of the greatest figures in history, so long obliterated by ignorance and prejudice. There is just one point on which I must say a word, because of the popularity of a view which can fairly be shown to be a pure mistake. Whatever may have been the attitude of Socrates to Pythagoreanism as a whole, it should be evident that Plato is right in ascribing to him a firm belief in the *σῶμα-σῆμα* doctrine. It is still common to say that Socrates took up a purely agnostic position with respect to immortality, and the justification of the statement is usually sought in the supposed scepticism of the Platonic *Apology*, coupled with

the absolute silence of the Xenophontic *Memorabilia*. Now as regards the *Apology*, the view which I have called mistaken simply gives a false account of the facts. It is true that Socrates, after the final condemnation, shows himself ready to prove that death is no evil to him, even on the assumption that it is the end of all, but it requires a singularly dull and tasteless reader not to see that his own sympathies are with the hope of a blessed immortality. And it is instructive to observe that though no reference has been made to the Orphic beliefs during the defence, as, on my theory of the matter, none could be made, no sooner is the issue decided than the Orphic ideas make their way to the front. The first prospect Socrates proposes to himself on the other side of the grave is to stand before the Orphic judges of the dead, Minos and Rhadamanthys and Aeacus and, as a true Athenian could not forget to add, Triptolemus, and the next is to have the company of *Orpheus* and *Musaeus* and *Hesiod* and *Homer* (*Apology* 41 a). Of the grounds for the faith that was in him Socrates could naturally say nothing to the dicastery; they are kept for the like-minded few who gather round him in the prison-house in the *Phaedo*, but the faith itself is there, and without it the final thesis that the ways of an upright man are not unregarded of the Lord would lose most of its meaning.

As for Xenophon, the reason for his silence on everything that relates to the Orphic element in the life of Socrates is obvious. His purpose, as avowed by himself, is to show that Socrates had *no* dangerous originality; he merely taught the very lessons that an Anytus or Thrasybulus would have thought edifying, but with a skill which was beyond them. Hence he carefully suppresses, as far as he can, all mention of the personal peculiarities which distinguished Socrates from the average decent Athenian. He cannot help admitting that Socrates knew Cebes and Simmias and Theodorus, but he tries to cover up the fact that these intimate friends were foreigners,¹ and says not a

¹ The fact is let out at iii. 11. 17, as far as Cebes and Simmias are concerned, by the one word *Θηβαίων*, which is indispensable to the point of the passage,

word about their connection with Pythagoreanism. He labours to prove that Socrates despised mathematics, though he has in his own despite to allow that he was really acquainted with its higher theoretical developments,¹ and that he thought Anaxagoras a lunatic,² though his own story implies that Socrates had a pretty accurate knowledge of the lunatic's writings. The reason for all this economy of the truth is obvious; the truth could not have been told without disclosing the relations of Socrates with Pythagoreanism, and these relations would appear to an ordinary Athenian burgher as going far to justify the prosecution of the hero.

But there is one work in which Xenophon is not professedly writing a "discourse" of Socrates, and can therefore afford to show that he knows all about the doctrines on which the Socratic books maintain such a silence. Turn to the dying speech of Cyrus at the end of the *Cyropaedia* (viii. 7. 17 ff.). There we find that Xenophon not only knows the Orphic doctrine of *σῶμα-σῆμα*, but can expound it with arguments which agree so closely with those of Plato's dying Socrates as to force on us the conclusion that the whole passage was written, so to say, with the *Phaedo* lying open on the table, just as we have seen that the very first chapter of the *Memorabilia* showed signs of a knowledge of the *Apology*.

It may be worth while to point out the coincidences in

the object being to show that Socrates' field of magnetic attraction extended so far. In the curious list of special intimates given at i. 2. 48 the language seems to be purposely chosen to conceal the fact that three of the seven persons named were foreigners, *ἐκείνῳ συνῆσαν, οὐχ ἵνα δημηγορικοὶ ἢ δικανικοὶ γένωντο, ἀλλ' ἵνα καλοὶ τε καὶ ἀγαθοὶ γενόμενοι καὶ οἰκῶσι καὶ οἰκέταις καὶ οἰκείοις καὶ φίλοις καὶ πόλει καὶ πολλοῖς δύναιτο καλῶς χρῆσθαι*. I can hardly believe that it is by mere accident that the words read as if Crito, Chaerephon, Cebes, Phaedo all belonged to one and the same πόλις. Similarly, no one would guess from iv. 2. 10 that Theodorus was a Pythagorean from Cyrene.

¹ For we learn, iv. 7. 3, that he was *οὐκ ἄπειρος* of the *δυσσυνέτων διαγραμμαμάτων* of geometry, and, *ib.* 5, that he was not *ἀνήκοος* of mathematical astronomy (i.e. probably he was well acquainted with the theories of Philolaus).

² *Mem.* iv. 7. 6-9, a passage which should place the truth of Plato's narrative of the early impression made on Socrates by Anaxagoras out of doubt.

a little detail. Cyrus begins by reminding his sons that no one can be sure that there will be an end of him *ἐπειδὴν τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου βίου τελευτήσω*. For the fact that he will be no longer seen after his death proves nothing, since even in life the soul is invisible, and only detected by her actions. Now the very opening phrase of this argument is an echo of Orphic ideas. *ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος* means more than "this present life"; it means "this life *as* a human being," and thus implies as its antithesis in the writer's mind an earlier or later stage of existence in which the soul is not, properly speaking, "of human kind," i.e. the belief in transmigration or in purely discarnate existence, or in both. So in the *Phaedo* our past existence is expressly spoken of as the time when our souls existed *πρὶν εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ εἶδει, χωρὶς σωμάτων* (76 c), where *ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ εἶδει εἶναι* corresponds exactly with Xenophon's *ἀνθρώπινος βίος*. What the writer has in his mind in both cases is the doctrine that the human soul began its career as a divinity, and that its true destiny is to become once more *θεὸς ἄμβροτος, οὐκέτι θνητός*. The appeal to the activity of the soul during life to prove that a thing may exist without being visible has again its exact parallel in the *Phaedo*, in the great passage in which it is shown that the soul belongs to the class of the invisible, the body to the class of the visible, and that the former class is akin to the eternal, the latter to the perishable (79 a-80 b). Since the same points are made, for a different purpose, and especially the point that the directing and governing work in the partnership of soul and body belongs to the soul, in the argument of *Memorabilia* i. 4 against the atheist Aristodemus, the coincidence, if it proves use of Plato at all, goes to show that the *Phaedo* has been drawn on for the *Memorabilia* as well as for the *Cyropaedia*. In any case, the common source of Plato and Xenophon is manifestly Pythagorean, since the argument turns on the establishment of one of those pairs of "opposites" which Aristotle regarded as distinctive of the school. The next point (§ 18) is that the souls of the dead must still "have might" (*κύρια εἶναι*), as is shown

by the terrors they send on the bloodguilty, and the avenging demons (*παλαμναίους*) they send against the impure. The argument is poor enough, but its sources are clearly indicated, not only by its character but by the appearance in it of such words as *παλαμναίους* and *φθιμένους*. The next point (§ 20) is that the departed soul remains in possession of its faculties. It does not become *ἄφρων* by separation from the *ἄφρον σῶμα*, but rather *ὅταν ἄκρατος καὶ καθαρὸς ὁ νοῦς ἐκκριθῇ, τότε καὶ φρονιμώτατον αὐτὸν εἰκὸς εἶναι*. This is, of course, pure *Phaedo*. We have there too the thought that *φρόνησις* depends on the purification of the soul from the body (*ὅταν δέ γε αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν σκοπῇ, ἐκείσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ καθαρὸν τε καὶ αἰεὶ ὄν . . . καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται*, 79 d). The aim of the philosopher is that, when the final separation comes at death, the soul shall depart in a state of purity (*ἐὰν μὲν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττηται, μηδὲν τοῦ σώματος συνέφελκονσα . . . τὸ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦσα καὶ τῶι ὄντι τεθνάναι μελετῶσα ῥαιδίως*, 80 e). It is the souls which depart unpurified which become visible as ghosts, *αἱ μὴ καθαρῶς ἀπολυθεῖσαι ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ μετέχουσαι, διὸ καὶ ὁρῶνται* (81 d). Where all this comes from in the end, the words *καθαρός, κάθαρσις* are enough in themselves to show.

The next argument (§ 20)—it is a pity that Aristotle never took the examination of it in hand—is that when a man dies, we can see for ourselves that all the constituents of him are reunited to their kindred masses in the larger world (*πρὸς τὸ ὁμόφυλον*) except the soul, the departure of which is as invisible as its presence. Ergo—it is not at all clear what Xenophon meant to prove. But the poetical *ὁμόφυλον*, a word used only once by Aristotle and once by Plato (speaking through the mouth of the Pythagorean Timaeus), may give us a clue. The complete theory no doubt was that just as the materials of the body (the Empedoclean elements seem to be meant) return to the cosmic masses of earth, water, etc., at death, so the soul returns, by the same law, to its “connatural” and “proper”

place, just as Plato's *Timaeus* makes it return in the end to its "native star." The thought then will be that of the *Phaedo* that the soul is "naturally akin to" the eternal and invisible (οἷχεται εἰς τὸ καθαρὸν τε καὶ αἰεὶ ὄν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον, καὶ ὡς συγγενῆς οὕσα αὐτοῦ αἰεὶ μετ' ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται . . . καὶ πέπαιται τε τοῦ πλάνου κτλ., 79 d).¹

Finally, we have the argument (§ 21) that sleep and death are closely akin, but the soul shows its divine nature above all in sleep, for it is then freest from the body, and can foresee the future. This doctrine is not at all Platonic, though of course the thought that the soul is divinest when most free from servitude to the body is fundamental in the *Phaedo*. But we can easily see where the theory that the soul is "freest" in sleep, and therefore attains to prophecy in visions, comes from. We have only to turn to Pindar and Aeschylus for the connection with Orphicism. From an already quoted fragment of Pindar we learn of the immortal soul that εὔδει δὲ πρᾶσσόντων μελέων, ἀτὰρ εὐδόντεσσιν ἐν πολλοῖς ὀνείροις | δαίκνυσι τερπνῶν ἐφέρποισαν χαλεπῶν τε κρίσιν. Aeschylus' allusions to clairvoyance are well known, but it should be pointed out that they assume a curious physical theory derived from the Orphic Empedocles. The theory is that it is the blood round the heart with which we think. The heart itself is seated, like a μάντις on his professional chair, and reads off the pictures of things to come as they are mirrored in the never-ceasing flow of the περικάρδιον αἷμα. Presumably the process is better performed in sleep because, as the poet himself says, ἐν ἡμέραι δὲ μοῖρ' ἀπρόσκοπος βροτῶν; in the daytime the heart's attention is distracted by the sights and sounds of the outer world. As neglect of the curious physiology of the poet has led to unnecessary emendations of his text, I may be allowed to cite one or two passages in explanation.

Agamemnon 179 στάζει δ' ἐν θ' ὕπνῳ πρὸ καρδίας |

¹ The "wandering" of the soul is, of course, specifically Orphic. Compare the lines of Empedocles—

τῶν καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν εἰμι, φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης
νείκει μαινομένῳ πίσυνος.

μνησιπήμων πόνος κτλ. "And in sleep, too, the wakeful sore drips, drips *in front* of the heart, and so wisdom comes to men unsought."

ib. 975 τίπτε μοι τόδ' ἐμπέδως | δαῖμα προστατήριον |
καρδίας τερασκόπον ποτᾶται | οὐδ' ἀποπτύσαι δίκαν |
δυσκρίτων ὄνειράτων | θάρσος εὐπιθὲς ἵξει | φρενὸς φίλον
θρόνον; Tr. "Why does this haunting thing of ill (δαῖμα means not "fear" but "frightful thing"; for examples see the dictionaries) stay fluttering *before* my prophetic heart? Nor will hardihood to spit it away, like a perplexing dream, take its place on the wonted chair."

The δαῖμα is an ugly vision pictured in the "blood round the heart," as it were in a bowl of ink or a crystal. The heart is the diviner who would, in general, sit in his "wonted chair" and interpret the vision in the water or ink, or whatever may have been used for this purpose. In the case of a perplexing dream, which does not fall under any of the rules of his art, he dismisses the matter (ἀποδιοπομπεῖ) by the ceremony of "spitting the dream away," but in the present case the vision is so persistent that he has not the "face" to get rid of it so readily. When once the underlying physiological theory has been grasped, I can see no difficulty in the *textus receptus*. Unless possibly ἀποπτύσαν would give a slightly better sense than the infinitive, the μάντις being supposed to "spit away" his bad dream before taking his seat for the day?

Eumenides 102 ὄρα δὲ πληγὰς τάσδε καρδίαι σέθεν. So M. The text appears to be correct. Clytaemnestra is calling on the leader of the Erinyes to behold her injuries *in vision*, as the following lines show. Hence "see these wounds with thy heart" gives the very sense required. Hermann's ὁράτε πληγὰς τάσδε καρδίας ὅθεν is less satisfactory, since it must mean "behold the author of these wounds." But the Erinyes could not behold Orestes, as he had been already conveyed out of the temple by Hermes. The Erinyes were not clairvoyant except in sleep, and when they woke they had lost the scent (ἐξ ἀρκύων πέπτωκεν οἶχεται θ' ὁ θήρ—| ὕπνῳ κρατηθεῖς ἄγρην ὥλεσα).

We may take it, then, as fairly made out that Xenophon has utilised for the death-scene of the *Cyropaedia* the very same Orphic and Pythagorean materials which Plato has employed with infinitely greater skill for the *Phaedo*. If we consider how difficult it would have been for Xenophon to hold communications when at Scillus with members of the circle who had been present at the death of Socrates, the most natural inference is that he actually owed his knowledge of the last hours of Socrates' life to the reading of Plato's dialogue. That he should have made such a use of it would go far to prove that he regarded it as, in substance, a faithful picture of what was done and said in the prison. If we accept as genuine the *Apologia* ascribed to Xenophon, in which I can find no grounds for suspicion, the possibility becomes a certainty. For not only are the *Apology*—and to a less extent the *Phaedo*—of Plato laid under contribution, but the opening reference to the numerous earlier writings about the defence and end of Socrates, all of which are declared to be authentic narratives, must include the *Phaedo*.¹

I must here take leave of my subject, but in doing so I would urge once more that the special problem on which I have sought to throw a little much-needed light is only part of a much wider question. The question is whether the Platonic account of the life and character of Socrates cannot be shown by careful study to be consistent with itself both in respect of the fairly numerous biographical details which it contains, and in presenting us with a remarkably individual conception of a great personality with a very definite creed. If it can, and if Plato's portrait can be found in a host of little ways to be supported by the elaborate caricature of the *Clouds*, we shall be left

¹ The most famous instance of borrowing from the *Phaedo* is, of course, that in § 28, where the incident of Socrates smoothing down Phaedo's curls and the frantic weeping of Apollodorus ὁ μανικός mentioned in *Phaedo* 117 d are "contaminated." The words of § 1 referred to above are Σωκράτους δὲ ἀξίων μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι μνησθαι . . . περὶ τε τῆς ἀπολογίας καὶ τῆς τελευτῆς τοῦ βίου. γεγράφασι μὲν οὖν περὶ τούτου καὶ ἄλλοι καὶ πάντες ἐτυχον τῆς μεγαληγορίας αὐτοῦ· ὧς καὶ ὁ ἥλων ὅτι τῷ ὄντι οὕτως ἐρρήθη ὑπὸ Σωκράτους.

without excuse if we prefer to the life-like representations of Plato and Aristophanes the commonplaces of Xenophon and the second-hand notices of Aristotle, from which every really individual trait has evaporated. Incidentally, I may remark that the vindication of Plato's portrait of Socrates for history would clear up an unexplained difficulty in Aristotle's account of Plato himself. In the well-known chapter A 6 of the *Metaphysics* Aristotle expressly begins his account of Platonism with the remark that it was much the same thing as Pythagoreanism, with a few minor changes. In point of fact these modifications (the views which Aristotle calls ἰδία Πλάτωνος) are two—(1) that Plato held that the *Unlimited* is a duality, and (2) that he regarded numbers as something different both from physical things and from mathematical objects. This view of Platonism as simply a refined Pythagoreanism is that which in the main dominates both the *Metaphysics* and the *Physics*. But the curious thing is that Aristotle has filled out a chapter intended to prove the Pythagoreanism of Plato by an account of his mental development which appears to ascribe everything to the rival influences of Heraclitus and Socrates. We naturally ask, where then do the Pythagoreans come into the story? There is, indeed, no place left for them, except on one supposition. If Socrates was something very much like a Pythagorean himself, and Aristotle and his hearers knew the fact, there would be no need to specify Pythagorean ideas as a third source of the Platonic doctrine, because the hearers would at once understand that the Pythagorean influence was part of the influence of Socrates himself.¹

¹ One final comment on the remark already quoted from Professor Bury that "it is not clear" why the "manifesto for orthodoxy" should have been made just when it was. It may help us to recollect that such a manifesto could not well have been made before the end of the Great War for several reasons. For one thing Athens had been engaged ever since the Syracusan disaster in a life-and-death struggle for existence, and, for another, an attack on Socrates could hardly have been planned so long as his influential friends among the *νεώτεροι* had to be reckoned with. Socrates could hardly have been put out of the way while Critias and Charmides and their friends were

a serious factor in the situation. And the year or two immediately after the fall of the "tyrants" were fairly well taken up, as we can see from the speeches of Lysias which belong to that time, with the business of getting the new democracy into working order, and dealing with the remaining ministers of the oligarchy. All things considered, Anytus and his friends do not seem to have let the grass grow under their feet. If they did not bring their accusation against the preceptor of Critias sooner, I should say it was because they wanted to feel their position fairly secure before proceeding. As it was, they nearly lost their case. I ought to have added to the proofs of the connection between Socrates and the Pythagoreans the curious assumption of *Phaedo* 98 e, that if he had escaped, he would of course have made for Megara or Thebes. Why this selection of places? It may be said, because they were the nearest cities of refuge for anyone leaving Athens by land. But why should Socrates take it for granted that the escape would not in any case be made by sea? Is the explanation that he would have found a band of devotees of the "philosophic life" in either of these two cities, and would so have been among "co-religionists"?†

II

ON THE ALLEGED DISTINCTION IN ARISTOTLE BETWEEN Σωκράτης AND ὁ Σωκράτης

It has sometimes been argued that, in the difficulty of believing at once in the historical character of Plato's Socrates and of Xenophon's, our safest course is to begin historical inquiry with an appeal to the authority of Aristotle. Aristotle, it is urged, has what is for us the great advantage of being neither too near in time to Socrates nor too far from him to be disqualified for the part of the dispassionate student of thought and character. Never having known Socrates himself, he is under no temptation to yield to hero-worship; as an immediate disciple of Plato, he may be trusted to give us actual facts unmingled with the fables and anecdotes of a later age. Hence in trying to form a notion of the personality and teaching of Socrates, we may safely treat information coming from Aristotle as recommended by a special guarantee of authenticity, and regard it as a residuum of undoubted fact by the standard of which the rest of our alleged information may be tested. The object of the present essay is to establish the direct opposite of such a view. What I am going to maintain is that Aristotle neither had, nor could have been expected to have, any particular knowledge of the life and thought of Socrates, except what he learned from Plato, or read in the works of the "Socratic men," and more especially that every statement of importance made about Socrates in the Aristotelian corpus can be traced to an existing source in the Platonic

dialogues. All that is left over, when we have set aside the dialogues, amounts, as we shall find, to one or two rather trivial anecdotes which have the appearance of coming from now lost "Socratic" writings, and add nothing to our comprehension of the man or his thought. I shall also do what I can to show that Aristotle exercised no kind of higher criticism on his documents, but simply accepted what he read in the *Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι* of Plato and others as a dramatically faithful presentation of a real historical figure.

It will follow, then, that Aristotle's professed knowledge about the philosophical position of Socrates is drawn from no source except one which is equally available to ourselves, the Platonic dialogues, and that it is a mere blunder in criticism either to correct Plato's representations by an appeal to Aristotle, or to regard them as deriving any confirmation from coincidence with him. Incidentally I shall also try to show that on the one main point in which Aristotle is commonly supposed to have preserved the historical truth, as against the poetic imagination of Plato, his meaning has probably been entirely misunderstood. The net result of the inquiry will be to reduce us to the dilemma that *either* the Platonic dialogues have faithfully preserved the genuine tradition about the person and doctrine of Socrates, *or* the tradition has not been preserved at all, and we have no materials whatever for the reconstitution of the most influential personality in the history of Greek thought except the burlesque of the *Clouds*, and Socrates must take his place by the side of Pythagoras as one of the "great unknown" of history.

Before I come to the investigation of Aristotle's specific statements about Socrates, I must, however, deal briefly with a preliminary question of a purely linguistic kind. There is a widespread belief, even among scholars of high eminence, that Aristotle himself has marked his sense of the distinction between Socrates the actual fifth-century philosopher and "the Socrates" who is a *dramatis persona* in the Platonic dialogues by his use of the definite article.

Σωκράτης, it is said, regularly means Socrates who fought at Delium, drank the hemlock, and all the rest of it; ὁ Σωκράτης means "the Socrates" who discourses in Plato on the *ἰδέα τἀγαθοῦ*, the *τρίτος ἄνθρωπος*, *μέθεξις*, and other recondite themes undreamed of by his historical prototype. Now if this distinction is really founded, it is destructive of my main position. For even if Aristotle could be proved to have applied the distinction wrongly, attributing to "the Socrates" what rightly belongs to "Socrates," and *vice versa*, it would still be true that in drawing the distinction at all he implicitly recognises that the Socrates of Plato is an imaginary and purely dramatic character, and it would be a fact of the highest moment that such a distinction could be assumed as obvious to students within less than two generations after Socrates' death. I propose, then, to devote the first few pages of this essay to showing that the supposed distinction does not really exist, and that the so-called "canon of Fitzgerald" must disappear from future works on Aristotle.

Σωκράτης AND ὁ Σωκράτης

What I intend to show by the following citations is that, on the one hand, what is manifestly a quotation from the Socrates of Plato is introduced by a reference to Σωκράτης without the article, and that in other cases a remark is ascribed to ὁ Σωκράτης in circumstances where no special allusion to "the" Socrates of the dialogues would be possible. I shall then show that the text of Aristotle exhibits the same fluctuation in the presence or absence of the article with other proper names, and therefore that if there is any recognisable principle of difference in meaning it must be one which applies to all these cases alike, not one which holds good only of the name Socrates.

From the first, I shall, of course, exclude from consideration the numerous cases in which Σωκράτης is used as a "logical example," a mere blank which may be filled up, without detriment to the sense or truth of a proposition,

by any other proper name of a human being (*Σωκράτης ἐστὶ μουσικός*, *Σ. ἐστὶ λευκός*, and the like). *Σωκράτης* is here, of course, a mere variable, which may have any value we like to assign it in a given proposition, except that Aristotle's examples are usually so selected as to imply that the variable selected must be a member of the class "men," or, more exactly, that every value ($x_1, x_2 \dots$) of the variable x shall make the proposition " x is a man" true. About this usage, I have a suggestion to make which is not capable of strict proof, but may perhaps amuse the reader as it has amused me. The standing instances of such a "logical example" are, as we all remember, Socrates, Coriscus, Callias; of these Coriscus is obviously identical with Aristotle's own fellow-pupil in the Academy, Coriscus of Scepsis; Callias is not unlikely to be identical with Callippus, the notorious assassin of Dion, and Socrates with Socrates *ὁ νεώτερος*, the Academic mathematician who appears in the *Theaetetus* and its continuation in the *Sophistes* and *Politicus* as a student of the theory of irrationals. Hence I make the suggestion for what it is worth that Aristotle has preserved for us a personal trick employed by Plato in lecturing, as by many modern teachers of logic, the trick of using members of the audience as the logical subjects of sample propositions. In fact, the trick may be older still, since Plato makes Socrates himself employ it, e.g. at *Sophistes* 263 a, where *Θεαίτητος κάθηται*, *Θεαίτητος πέτεται* are taken as examples of a true and a false proposition respectively. When we remember that some of Aristotle's illustrations, e.g. the argument that *τὸ σοὶ εἶναι* is not the same thing as *τὸ μουσικῶι εἶναι*, or the assertion (*περὶ ζώων μορίων α'* 644 c 25) that Socrates and Coriscus *οὐ διαφέρουσι τῶι εἶδει*, or the long disquisition (*περὶ ζώων γενέσεως* 768) on what happens when Socrates becomes a father (which indeed reads like a characteristic piece of lecture-room "chaff" by a professor), almost force us to the conclusion that the person meant is a contemporary, the inference seems to me almost inevitable that the Socrates who shares with Mill's Duke of

Wellington such immortality as a text-book can bestow is not the famous philosopher at all, but Aristotle's own class-mate. (Can we really conceive that a man should mention together Coriscus and Socrates ὁ Σωφρονίσκου in one breath as examples of the same general truth? Would any lecturer to-day dream of illustrating the proposition "All men are mortal" by taking as his illustrations Alexander, Napoleon—and a reigning sovereign?) Of course, I do not mean that ὁ Σωφρονίσκου could not be used as an example, especially in a case where he is mentioned along with other famous names of history. There is no absurdity when we find Achilles, Alcibiades, Lysander, Socrates named together as examples of μεγαλοψυχία, or when Socrates and Hippias are associated as persons with such a public reputation that their utterances may be regarded as ἔνδοξα, because the combination of names makes a misunderstanding impossible. But to couple Coriscus, as an example of man in general, with a philosopher who had long been dead, while there was a contemporary Socrates of distinction belonging to the very same body as Coriscus, would have been absurd, because it would have been to invite misunderstanding.

To return to our point: let me take for special consideration, first the use of the article with the name Socrates, then its employment with proper names in general, in the *Rhetoric*, a specially useful book for the purpose because of the great number of anecdotes about real or supposed historical persons contained in it.

Σωκράτης and ὁ Σωκράτης in the *Rhetoric*. We have—

(a) 1398 b 30 ὥσπερ Ἀρίστιππος πρὸς Πλάτωνα ἐπαγγελτικώτερόν τι εἰπόντα, ὡς οἶετο· ἀλλὰ μὴν ὃ γ' ἐταῖρος ἡμῶν, ἔφη, οὐθὲν τοιοῦτον, λέγων τὸν Σωκράτην. I do not stop to ask where Aristotle may have picked up this story. There is no reason why it should not be true, and, true or not, it may probably enough have been told in some lost Socratic discourse, perhaps one of the many works said in Xenophon's *Apologia* to have dealt with the defence and death of Socrates, or in an anti-Platonic work of Antisthenes. The whole point of the reproof would, of

course, be lost if τὸν Σωκράτην were taken to mean "Plato's Socrates," or any man's Socrates except the actual man.

(b) 1419 a 8 οἷον Σωκράτης Μελήτου οὐ φάσκοντος αὐτὸν θεοὺς νομίζειν . . . ἤρετο εἰ οὐχ οἱ δαίμονες ἦτοι θεῶν παῖδες εἶεν ἢ θεῖόν τι. Here, though the question was no doubt held by Aristotle to have been put to the actual Meletus by the actual Socrates, the language shows that he is directly quoting from Plato, *Apology* 27 c. He ought therefore, if he really meant to mark a distinction by the use of the article, to have said ὁ Σωκράτης. Or does anyone suppose that Aristotle omits the article because he had satisfied himself that this particular remark of "the Socrates" of Plato had actually been uttered before the dicasts? The obvious explanation is that Aristotle depended on the *Apology* for his knowledge about the trial of Socrates, and simply assumed that the historical man said pretty much what Plato makes him say.

(c) Even more instructive is a comparison of two passages in which the same observation is ascribed first to "the" Socrates, and afterwards to Socrates simpliciter. 1367 b 8 ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν, οὐ χαλεπὸν Ἀθηναίους ἐν Ἀθηναίοις ἐπαινεῖν, 1415 b 31 ὁ γὰρ λέγει Σωκράτης ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐ χαλεπὸν Ἀθηναίους ἐν Ἀθηναίοις ἐπαινεῖν ἀλλ' ἐν Λακεδαιμονίοις. What Aristotle has in mind in both places is manifestly the remark of Plato's Socrates (one which might easily enough have been made by the actual Socrates, or by anybody else), in *Menexenus* 235 d; but it will be noted that, whereas in the passage where Plato's work is cited by name as the source of the quotation, the speaker is called simply Socrates, in the other place, where the saying is represented as an habitual one (ἔλεγε, "he used to say"), and is therefore attributed to the historical philosopher, the expression is ὁ Σωκράτης. If the theory of the "canon" were sound, we should have to suppose both that the actual Socrates delivered an ἐπιτάφιος (and it would then become a nice question whether this discourse is lost,

or whether it is identical with the *Menexenus*, and contained an account of the Corinthian war and the King's Peace), and also that "Plato's Socrates" was in the habit of saying what, in point of fact, he only says once. Or should we once more assume that Aristotle made historical researches which satisfied him that the historical Socrates had on some occasion made the very obvious remark which the *Menexenus* ascribes to him? Really, nothing could be stronger proof of the fact that Aristotle applied no criticism whatever to Plato's account of Socrates, but took it with the proverbial *foi de charbonnier*, than his ascription of a sentence of the *Menexenus* to Socrates, unless it be the astounding passage of the *Politics* (B 1264 b 24), where the *Laws* are discussed as "discourses of Socrates." These passages, of themselves, are enough to show that Aristotle cannot have meant to mark any difference in meaning by the use or omission of the article, and that he simply treated Socrates and "the Socrates of Plato" as for all purposes pretty much identical.¹

It would, no doubt, be possible to bring the passages quoted above under the "canon" by arbitrary insertions and excisions of the article; but the process, in the case of a canon which depends on the alleged uniformity of our text as its sole recommendation, would be quite indefensible. And we surely ought to lay down no rule of this kind without a previous study of Aristotle's employment of the article with proper names as a whole. Socrates is by no means the only person whose name figures sometimes with and sometimes without the article, and if the difference is significant in his case, we ought to find that it has a kindred significance in others. If Σωκράτης is Socrates, but ὁ Σωκράτης "Plato's Socrates," then Ἀχιλλεύς, Ἐκτωρ and the like should be real or supposed historical persons, but ὁ Ἀχιλλεύς, ὁ Ἐκτωρ should mean "Homer's," or

¹ I do not forget that throughout this criticism of the *Laws* and *Republic* the legislator is called ὁ Σωκράτης, but so, for the matter of that, is the law-giver of Sparta called ὁ Λυκοῦργος at 1270 a 7, and the Cretan king ὁ Μίνως at 1271 b 38.

"Sophocles'" or "Euripides'" Achilles, Hector, etc., according to the context. Similarly ὁ Κλέων should not mean Cleon, but "Cleon in Thucydides," and so on generally. In point of fact, it is easy to show from the *Rhetoric* alone that no such distinction can be carried out. The utmost we can say is that on the whole the names of famous historical persons seem to occur most commonly without the article, and those of a personage in a play or poem with it. But this is what we should naturally expect, since a reference to the character of a play or poem is frequently preceded by the mention of its author. When this occurs it is natural to use a defining article in going on to speak of the personages in his work, just as it is natural for us, when Shakespeare has been named, to speak of "his" Hamlet, "his" Cordelia. But the exceptions are far too pronounced to allow us to suppose that Aristotle had a hard and fast rule in such matters, any more than we have ourselves. I will quote only a few examples, but they will, I think, be amply sufficient to prove my point.

I. References to historical persons *with* the article.

1401 b 34 οἷον ὡς ὁ Δημάδης τὴν Δημοσθένους πολιτείαν πάντων τῶν κακῶν αἴτιον. Here Demades, who has the article, is, of course, as much the "historical" Demades as Demosthenes, who is without it, is the actual Demosthenes.

1377 a 19 καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφάνους ἀρμόττει κτλ.; ἰδ. 22 καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφάνους μεταστρέψαντα φατέον κτλ. ὁ Ξενοφάνης here is absolutely identical in meaning with the Ξενοφάνης of 1399 b 6 οἷον Ξενοφάνης ἔλεγεν, and 1400 b 5 οἷον Ξενοφάνης Ἐλεάταις . . . συνεβούλευεν.

1365 a 28 καὶ ὁ Ἰφικράτης αὐτὸν ἐνεκωμίαζε λέγων ἐξ ὧν ὑπῆρξεν ταῦτα.

1398 a 17 καὶ ὡς ὁ Ἰφικράτης ὅτι γενναϊότατος ὁ βέλτιστος. (Though the name is several times used without the article, no one, to my knowledge, has suggested that ὁ Ἰφικράτης means anything different from Ἰφικράτης.)

1364 a 19 ὥσπερ ὁ Λεωδάμας κατηγορῶν ἔφη Καλλίστρατον. (ὁ Λεωδάμας and Καλλίστρατος stand, of course, on exactly the same footing.)

1367 a 8 ὥσπερ καὶ Σαπφὼ πεποίηκεν, εἰπόντος τοῦ Ἀλκαίου κτλ.

1368 a 20 ὅπερ ὁ Ἰσοκράτης ἐποίει διὰ τὴν ἀσυνήθειαν τοῦ δικολογεῖν. (The article before the proper name omitted here only in the inferior MSS. More commonly we have simply Ἰσοκράτης, as in the examples given below.)

1384 b 15 διὸ εὖ ἔχει ἢ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου ἀπόκρισις πρὸς τοὺς Συρακοσίους. (More often simply Εὐριπίδης.)

1386 a 20 διὸ καὶ ὁ Ἀμασις ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ νικῶντι ἀγομένῳ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν οὐκ ἐδάκρυσεν. (It will hardly be maintained that there is here a conscious distinction between the unlucky Pharaoh and "Amasis in Herodotus.")

1392 b 11 ὥσπερ καὶ Ἰσοκράτης ἔφη δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ ὁ μὲν Εὐθύνοιο ἔμαθεν, αὐτὸς δὲ μὴ δυνήσεται εὐρεῖν.

1402 b 11 ἔνστασις ὅτι οὐκοῦν ὁ Πιπτακὸς αἰνετός, comparing 1389 a 16 ὥσπερ τὸ Πιπτακοῦ ἔχει ἀπόφθεγμα εἰς Ἀμφιάραον.

1405 b 23 ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ὅτε μὲν ἐδίδου μισθὸν ὀλίγον αὐτῷ ὁ νικήσας τοῖς ὁρεῦσιν κτλ. (Often simply Σιμωνίδης.)

II. References to *dramatis personae* in literature without the article.

(In some of these cases it might be urged that the article is omitted because Aristotle regarded the heroes of epic and tragic poetry as real men and women who had once actually lived. My object will none the less be gained by showing that the personages of myth and legend are *indifferently* named with or without the article, so that no particular significance can be attributed to its presence or absence. As before, my list makes no pretence to completeness.)

1396 b 14 ὥστε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὁ τοιοῦτος τὸν Ἀχιλλέα ἐπαινεῖ ἢ Διομήδην.

1399 a 2 καὶ περὶ τῆς Ἑλένης ὡς Ἰσοκράτης γράφει ὅτι σπουδαία, εἴπερ Θησεὺς ἔκρινεν.

1399 b 28 καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Αἴαντος τοῦ Θεοδέκτου (note the article) ὅτι ὁ Διομήδης προεἶλετο Ὀδυσσέα κτλ.

1400 a 28 ἐν τῷ Αἴαντι τοῦ Θεοδέκτου Ὀδυσσεὺς λέγει πρὸς τὸν Αἴαντα.

1401 b 36 ὅτι δικαίως Ἀλέξανδρος ἔλαβε τὴν Ἑλένην.

In each of these examples we have the names of a pair of persons from the epic and tragic cycle of myths; one name has the article, the other has not. No regular rule seems to exist for the preference of one form to the other. In some of the cases it is the name which stands in the nominative that takes the article, in others that which is in an oblique case; in some it is the first mentioned, in others the second. And it is quite clear that no distinction is made between real or supposedly real persons and personages in a play or poem. If the Ὀδυσσεύς who, in Theodectes, speaks to Ajax is a real person, so is ὁ Αἴας to whom he speaks. If "Alexander" is an historical character, so is "the" Helen whom he carried away. If "the Achilles" of the first example means "the poets' Achilles," so also must the Diomedes whose name stands without any article be "the Diomedes of the poets." (I purposely leave out the numerous cases in which a single name from the epic story occurs without the article, since it might be pleaded that Aristotle omitted the article because he looked on the personages of the heroic stories in general as real. Where you get a pair of such names, of which only one has the article, you are bound either to assert some general rule as to the difference in meaning, or to renounce the view that Σωκράτης and ὁ Σωκράτης must mean different things.)

My conclusion then is this:—

(1) The usage of the *Rhetoric* is inconsistent with the theory that there is any general difference of meaning intended by the insertion or absence of the article with a proper name in Aristotle. Whatever ὁ Σωκράτης can mean Σωκράτης can mean also. In fact, if Aristotle had intended to speak of "Socrates in Plato" as a being to be discriminated from some other Socrates, it is pretty clear that he would have made his meaning unambiguous by writing

of ὁ Πλάτωνος Σωκράτης, just as he distinguishes Antigone in Sophocles from Antigone in other tragedians by calling her ἡ Σοφοκλέους Ἀντιγόνη.

(2) If I am asked why Aristotle varies his practice in the matter so much, I have no answer to offer at present. I must be content merely to suggest that rhythmic considerations may have something to do with the matter, and that, in that case, we might expect to find less uniformity in some parts of his lectures, more in others, according as any given passage has or has not been polished up for literary effect.

Meanwhile, if I can fulfil my promise to show that every peculiarity of doctrine or method ascribed by Aristotle to Socrates (with or without the article) is to be found in Plato, and that we can almost always point with reasonable certainty to the specific passages he has in mind, we may regard as established the double equation Σωκράτης = ὁ Σωκράτης = Socrates as depicted in Plato, and dismiss to limbo the notion that Aristotle had any other source than the writings of Plato for his information about Socrates.

Perhaps, however, before I pass to this second part of the discussion, I may add a few remarks about the use of the article with proper names in the *Poetics*, where we seem to be dealing entirely with lecture-notes apart from any disturbing insertion of literary purple patches. The general rule here is, as might be expected from the absence of literary artifice and the business-like character of the document, that names of persons occur without the article, but there are exceptions, even in the case of some of the most famous names of literature. Thus the names of the great poets usually stand without the article, but we have ὁ Ὅμηρος at 1451 a 21 (and ὁ Ἡρακλῆς in the preceding line).

At 1452 a 6-7, the person whose statue fell on his murderer is twice ὁ Μίτυς (ὡς ὁ ἀνδριὰς ὁ τοῦ Μίτυος ἐν Ἀργεὶ ἀπέκτεινεν τὸν αἴτιον τοῦ θανάτου τῷ Μίτυι). At 1453 a 28 it is, contrary to the general rule, ὁ Εὐριπίδης who is said to be τραγικώτατος τῶν ποιητῶν. So at 1461 b 36 πίθηκον ὁ Μυννίσκος τὸν Καλλιπίδην ἐκάλει,

though Callippides is mentioned directly after without the article. Similarly there seems to be no fixed rule about either the names of plays and poems, or of the characters of the mythic cycle. We have *Ἰλιάς* (1449 a 1) and *ἡ Ἰλιάς* (1462 b 2), *ἡ Ὀδύσσεια* (1462 b 9) and *Ὀδύσσεια* (1451 a 23), and even the combination *Ἰλιάς καὶ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια* (1449 a 1). So we have more than once *ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι*, *ἐν τῷ Ὀρέστῃ*, but also *ἐν Ἀντιγόνη* (1454 a 1) and *ἐν Ἠλέκτραι* (1460 a 32). So with the names of the characters we have *τὴν Κλυταιμνήστραν ἀποθανοῦσαν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀρέστου καὶ τὴν Ἐριφύλην ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκμαίωνος* (1453 b 22), but *οἶον Ὀδυσσεὺς διὰ τῆς οὐλῆς . . . ἀνεγνωρίσθη* (1454 b 26), and *ὅταν ὁ σοφὸς μὲν μετὰ πονηρίας <δὲ> ἐξαπατηθῇ, ὥσπερ Σίσυφος* (1456 a 21), and *οἶον Οἰδίπους καὶ Θυέστης καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων γενῶν ἐπιφανεῖς ἄνδρες* (1453 a 11).

So in the historical sketch given in *Metaphysics* A, the names usually have no articles, but we have *ὁ γὰρ Παρμενίδης* at 986 b 22, *ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πλάτων* at 990 a 30, where the use of the article, if it meant anything, could easily have been avoided, and the Socrates of the "logical example" is indifferently *Σωκράτης* and *ὁ Σωκράτης* (991 a 25–27). And, if I may be allowed to anticipate a point, in *Metaphysics* M 1078 b 30 it is *ὁ Σωκράτης*—i.e. according to the "canon" I am attacking "Socrates in Plato"—who *τὰ καθόλου οὐ χωριστὰ ἐποίει*. So in the *De anima*, though most philosophers are introduced without any article, *ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ* 404 b 16, and we are naturally led to ask why if *ὁ Σωκράτης* means something different from *Σωκράτης*, *ὁ Πλάτων* should not equally mean something different from *Πλάτων*? The examination could be carried further, but with the same result. Insertion or omission of the article with a proper name seems to make no recognisable difference in any other case, and it is the "most horrid arbitrariness" to assume that it *must* make a difference in the one case of Socrates.

We come now to the consideration of the actual sources of Aristotle's information about Socrates. And, first of all, we must ask the question whether it is in itself likely that Aristotle should have known much about Socrates except what he could learn in the Academy. We may be fairly sure, to begin with, that he did not know much about him before his own arrival in Athens. Socrates was one of the "sights" of Athens, but he had no taste for foreign travel, and the connections of his special intimates were all with very different quarters from the Chalcidic peninsula. We can hardly suppose that stories about him were preserved at Potidaea for a couple of generations after his campaign there. And it is not very likely that either the inhabitants of Stageira or the habitués of the Macedonian court took much interest in the doings of the mainly Pythagorean coterie which met in the speculation-shop at Athens. How circumscribed an Athenian reputation might be, after the great disaster at Syracuse which destroyed the maritime supremacy of Athens, is illustrated for us by the seventh Platonic letter where the fate of Socrates is described in a way only intelligible on the supposition that he was all but an unknown quantity to Plato's Sicilian friends. He is introduced, and the language speaks volumes for the authenticity of the letter, as "an elderly friend of mine," φίλον ἄνδρα ἐμοὶ πρεσβύτερον Σωκράτη (*loc. cit.* 324 e).

Equally to the point is the utter absence of any demonstrable reference in Plato to Democritus, a philosopher about whom Aristotle is so well informed, and whose mechanical and physical theories, if we may judge from the *Timaeus*, Plato would have regarded with a friendly interest,¹

¹ I am sorry not to be able to agree with Professor Natorp in finding allusions to Democritus in the *Timaeus* and *Parmenides* (see the index to his *Platons Ideenlehre*, s.v. "Demokrit"). That the passages which he cites prove acquaintance with Atomism I am quite ready to believe, but Atomism was an older thing than the philosophy of Democritus. My own belief is that the doctrine to which Plato alludes is that of Leucippus. Leucippus had been originally an Eleatic, and it is only natural that Plato, who was specially interested in the

while he must have been in absolute accord with the famous distinction between the "bastard beliefs" begotten by sensation and the "legitimate" convictions based on rational insight. I can only account for this complete silence by what is, after all, the very natural suggestion that a man might make a very big reputation in Abdera without being known at Athens, as, in fact, Democritus himself complains (*ἤλθον γὰρ εἰς Ἀθήνας καὶ οὐ τις με ἔγνωκεν*, *Fr.* 116, Diels). Probably the same simple consideration may go far to explain the silence of our ancient sources of information about that tantalising figure Nausiphanes, and other adherents of Democritus whose mere names occasionally come under our notice.

We may take it, then, that Aristotle's information about Socrates is likely to have been entirely obtained in Athens itself. And further, I cannot see that in Athens there was any likely source of valuable tradition about Socrates outside the Academy. Acquaintance with the *philosophy* of Socrates was not to be got from anecdotes picked up in

Eleatic school and has more than once expressed his admiration for its leading men, should have been acquainted with the new development given to their theory of the *One* by Leucippus. Professor Natorp has forgotten that the very passage to which he rightly calls attention as bearing on the relations of Platonism with Atomism, Aristotle, *de generatione* A 325 a 23 ff., says nothing about Democritus at all, but is avowedly an account of the grounds on which Leucippus reached his conclusion (*Λεύκιππος δ' ἔχειν ὠήθη λόγους κτλ.*). What we should expect to find somewhere in Plato, if he had been acquainted with Democritus, is not merely an occasional allusion to Atomism, but some notice of the peculiar contribution of Democritus to the theory, his epistemological attack on the value of sensation, especially as it is at this point that Platonism and Atomism most nearly touch. In any case the references in the *Parmenides* and *Timaeus* must be primarily taken to be to Leucippus, since it would be a chronological blunder to make Parmenides allude to Democritus (though he would naturally be assumed to know something of the views of an ex-member of his own school). Similarly dramatic probability requires us to take allusions put in the mouth of Timaeus of Locri as intended for Leucippus, who was so closely connected with the Italian line of development, rather than for Democritus. It is a mistake to see any special allusion to the Atomists in Timaeus' criticism of the theory of "innumerable worlds," since that doctrine is a commonplace with nearly all the old physicists. The point is a small one, but it illustrates the dangers attendant on the mistaken notion that Democritus was a "pre-Socratic."

casual conversation with outsiders who had been on speaking terms with him, or remembered some incident in their boyhood in which his singular personality had figured. The way in which Aristotle presents certain formal dogmas as characteristic of Socrates plainly presupposes a fixed tradition handed down by a school, and there was no school in existence to form such a tradition except that of Plato. A priori, then, we should expect that Aristotle's conception of Socrates must come almost entirely from Academic sources, possibly amplified here and there by acquaintance with the *Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι* of Xenophon, and of other Socratic men, and by verbal remarks made by Plato in personal conversation. In the main it would be the picture of Socrates drawn in Plato's dialogues which would form the basis not only of Aristotle's statements, but of the whole Academic tradition. Other Socratic men, like Euclides and Phaedo, had, to be sure, founded philosophic coteries outside Athens, and these, no doubt, preserved their own version of the Socratic tradition, but it must surely be clear that nothing but the foundation of the Academy could have given one version of the tradition its literary importance and vitality. As it is, the reason why we know next to nothing of the figure of Socrates as it may have been conceived by most of those whose names have come down to us as authors of *Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι*, is that they were not connected with permanent "schools" by which their writings would have been preserved, and in which a definite tradition might have been perpetuated. The reasonable presumption is thus that the Aristotelian account of Socrates simply records familiar traits from an almost exclusively Academic school-tradition, which must rest, in its turn, on the writings of Plato. I turn now to the detailed establishment of the point, by examining the various pieces of information preserved in the Aristotelian corpus and indicating their apparent sources.

But first it may be worth our while to recall Aristotle's own expressed view as to the class of literature to which a *λόγος Σωκρατικός* belongs. A "Socratic discourse" is, for

Aristotle, primarily a kind of prose drama. It is a form of "imitation" just as an epic poem or a play is; as Professor Bywater has put it, its definition, in the terms employed in the *Poetics*, would be *μίμησις ἐν λόγῳ χωρὶς ἁρμονίας καὶ ῥυθμοῦ*. In this respect it stands on the same level with the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus; there ought to be a generic name for this kind of prose drama, which would include the prose mime and the Socratic discourse as its species, just as there is a common name of which both tragedy and comedy are species, "drama"; but the language unfortunately does not provide one. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἔχοιμεν ὀνομάσαι κοινὸν τοὺς Σώφρονος καὶ Ξενάρχου μίμους καὶ τοὺς Σωκρατικούς λόγους—as it is implied we ought to have (*Poetics* 1447 b 2).

Now we have already been told, by implication, what it is that all forms of mimetic art "imitate"; they "imitate" *ἥθη καὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις*, "men's characters and what they do and have done to them" (*ib.* 1447 a 28). It should follow that Aristotle, rightly or wrongly, regards the "Socratic discourse" as a highly realistic kind of composition. You cannot, of course, infer that he holds that the actual Socrates must have really made every remark ascribed to him in such a discourse, but it would not be a proper "imitation" of the character of Socrates unless it were in all its main points a faithful presentation. E.g. if Socrates notoriously disapproved of mathematics, or thought astronomy impious, discourses in which he is made to take a keen interest in the latest developments in arithmetic, or in the theories of astronomers, would be very bad *μιμήσεις* of his *ἥθος*. (So, if Xenophon's account of him is correct, *Republic* vi.-vii. are a bad *μίμησις*.) So, again, if you provided Socrates with an elaborately fictitious biography (as Plato is sometimes held to have done in the *Phaedo* and *Parmenides*), you would not be giving a proper *μίμησις* of "what he did or had done to him."

So when we come to the consideration of tragedy, the real subject of the part of the *Poetics* which has been preserved, we learn that one essential point in depicting the

ἥθος of a character is that it must be ὅμοιον (1454 a 23), which means, as Professor Bywater says, "like the original." You must, e.g., make your Hector, Orestes, etc., such as the accepted story says they were, and of course, in the same way, if a friend of an actual man, Socrates, makes him a personage in a work of art, his "Socrates" must be recognisably "like" the man whose name he bears. Similarly as to incident, it is regularly taken for granted in the *Poetics* that the main outlines of "what the characters did or had done to them" are prescribed beforehand by a story which the poet did not make (an ὦν λόγος, as "Euripides" says in the *Frogs*, with reference to the plot of the *Hippolytus*), and that it is only in the detailed way of leading up to the main fixed incidents that the poet has a free hand. In Aristotle's own illustration, anyone who wishes to compose an *Iphigenia* has to take as data the disappearance of the heroine, her appointment as the priestess at a shrine where strangers are sacrificed, the arrival of her brother, the recognition and the escape as fixed elements in the story. He is only free to invent the motivation of the successive events (e.g. to choose his own way of bringing the brother to the spot), and to fill in details (e.g. to choose the exact way in which the recognition shall be brought about). With much more right, then, may we demand that the writer of a Σωκρατικὸς λόγος, a drama in which the hero is one of the best-known characters of the most famous age of Athens, shall not present us with a biography of his hero which relates things none of which, nor the like of them, ever happened. If Socrates never met Parmenides and Zeno, never talked with them of the One and the Many, never crossed swords and exchanged compliments with Protagoras at the height of his fame, never threw himself with ardour into the studies of the φυσικοί or pondered over the book of Anaxagoras, never occupied himself with the problems of political reform which occupy the *Republic*, never belonged with Cebes, Simmias, and Phaedo to that quaint little band of believers in εἶδη who speak of themselves in the *Phaedo* as "we," then the Platonic λόγοι, by the canons which are

assumed in the *Poetics* for all forms of dramatic composition, are bad *λόγοι*, and Aristotle had no right to couple them with such realistic pictures from life as the compositions of Sophron and Xenarchus seem to have been, as examples of the kind of prose-drama which ought to have, though it has not, a single technical name. Yet he does so, not only in the passage before us, but in the fragment (61 of the Berlin edition, 1486 a 9) where the *Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι* are expressly named by the side of the mimes of Sophron as examples of the same kind of composition. It is, of course, open to anyone who likes, to dispute the correctness of the implied view of the *Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι*. Aristotle may have been deceived into taking for fidelity to fact what is really only the skill of the consummate master of fiction. But what I am concerned with now is merely the question what view Aristotle took, whether that view was sound or not.¹

Now to come to the examination of details. I may have overlooked a point here and there, but I believe my list will be found to contain every passage referred to in Bonitz's *Index* s.v. *Σωκράτης* or *ὁ Σωκράτης* in which the allusion to a Platonic dialogue could be called in doubt.

I begin with a few references which are not to statements in Plato, as illustrative of the amount of information about

¹ Incidentally I may note, as an illustration of Plato's attention to fact, that a careful reading of the *Phaedo* reveals the existence of two "we" groups in the *Phaedo*. There are the "we" who believe in the *εἶδη* and also in the doctrine (fortunately traceable right back to Pythagoras) of *ἀνάμνησις*. Socrates constantly includes himself in this group to which Cebes and Simmias at least, and presumably the *κωφὰ πρόσωπα* of the dialogue also, belong. There is another "we" group who are in the habit of believing the soul to be the *ἁρμονία τῆς ψυχῆς*, i.e. Pythagoreans who have been deeply interested in the medical developments arising out of the theories of Empedocles. Simmias belongs to this group and speaks for it at 86 b (*τοιούτων τι μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνομεν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι*), and Echecrates had at one time shared its doctrine (*αὐτῷ μοι ταῦτα προυδέδοκτο* 88 d) and still half inclines to it (*θανμαστὴς γάρ μου ὁ λόγος οὗτος ἀντιλαμβάνεται καὶ νῦν καὶ δέ, ib.*). Socrates, and apparently also Cebes, do not belong to *this* "we," and the apparent object of the whole by-play between *Phaedo* and Echecrates (88 d ff.) is to indicate that the difference on this point is logically the most important feature in the whole *λόγος*. It is scarcely credible that the distinction between the two "we's" existed only in Plato's fancy.

Socrates which Aristotle seems to have derived from other sources than the dialogues.

Rhetoric 1393 b 4 παραβολή δὲ τὰ Σωκρατικά, οἷον εἴ τις λέγοι ὅτι οὐ δεῖ κληρωτοὺς ἄρχειν. ὅμοιον γὰρ ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τοὺς ἀθλητὰς κληροίη μὴ οἷ δύνανται ἀγωνίζεσθαι ἀλλ' οἷ ἂν λάχωσιν, ἢ τῶν πλωτήρων ὅν τινα δεῖ κυβερνᾶν κληρώσειεν, ὥς οὐ δέον τὸν ἐπιστάμενον ἀλλὰ τὸν λαχόντα. This is apparently given not as an actual remark of Socrates but simply as "the sort of argument you get in the Socratic discourses." There are, of course, plenty of parallels with the reasoning to be found in Plato, and the same sort of thing must have been extant in many Socratic discourses now lost to us, so that it is hardly necessary to find a special source of any kind for the observation. The closest parallel, however, seems to be Xenophon, *Memorabilia* i. 2. 9 ὑπερορᾶν ἐποίει (sc. according to the κατήγορος) τῶν καθεστώτων νόμων τοὺς συνόντας, λέγων ὡς μῶρον¹ εἶη τοὺς μὲν τῆς πόλεως ἄρχοντας ἀπὸ κυάμον καθιστάναι, κυβερνήτην δὲ μηδένα θέλειν χρῆσθαι κυαμεντῷ μηδὲ τέκτονι μηδ' αὐλητῇ μηδ' ἐπ' ἄλλα τοιαῦτα (the same kind of saying which lies at the bottom of the famous picture of the mutinous crew and their disastrous voyage at the opening of *Republic* vi.). The close correspondence of the language suggests that, if Aristotle is directly taking his illustration from any specific source, it is from the *Memorabilia*. If so, this is, so far as I know, the only case in which the employment of Xenophon can be clearly shown. (I would suggest, incidentally, that very possibly we should emend the word ἀθλητὰς in the *Rhetoric* to αὐλητὰς on the strength of the Xenophontic passage. The fact that the "pairs" in athletic contests were often determined by lot makes the ἀθλητής rather an unfortunate example for the purpose of the παραβολή, and it is also clear that the person who is coupled with the πλωτήρ ought to be, what the αὐλητής is, both in Plato and Aristotle, a recognised example of the "professional" or τεχνίτης.)

¹ Thus Alcibiades was speaking as a genuine Socratic when he told the Spartans (Thucydides vi. 89) that the democracy was ὁμολογουμένη ἀνοία.

Ethica Eudemia 1235 a 37. It is an argument by example to prove that τὸ χρήσιμον δοκεῖ φίλον εἶναι μόνον that Σωκράτης ὁ γέρων (apparently so called because, in the time of Eudemus, Σωκράτης might have been taken to mean Σωκράτης ὁ νεώτερος) said men throw away even parts of their own bodies when they cease to be of use, ἀποβάλλουσι τὸν πτύελον καὶ τὰς τρίχας καὶ τοὺς ὀνυχας, καὶ τὰ μόρια ὅτι ρίπτοῦμεν τὰ ἄχρηστα, καὶ τέλος τὸ σῶμα ὅταν ἀποθάνῃ· ἄχρηστος γὰρ ὁ νεκρός. Eudemus seems here to be referring to Xenophon, *Mem.* i. 2. 53 καὶ πρὸς τοῦτοις γε δὴ ὅτι τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξελθούσης, ἐν ἧι μόνῃ γίγνεται φρόνησις, τὸ σῶμα τοῦ οἰκειοτάτου ἀνθρώπου τὴν ταχίστην ἐξενέγκαντες ἀφανίζουσιν. ἔλεγε δ' ὅτι καὶ ζῶν ἕκαστος ἑαυτοῦ, ὃ πάντων μάλιστα φιλεῖ, τοῦ σώματος ὃ τι ἂν ἄχρειον ᾖ καὶ ἀνωφελές, αὐτός τε ἀφαιρεῖ καὶ ἄλλωι παρέχει. αὐτοὶ τέ γε αὐτῶν ὀνυχάς τε καὶ τρίχας καὶ τύλους ἀφαιροῦσι καὶ τοῖς ἰατροῖς παρέχουσι μετὰ πόρων τε καὶ ἀλγηδόνων καὶ ἀποτέμνουν καὶ ἀποκάειν . . . καὶ τὸ σίαλον ἐκ τοῦ στόματος ἀποπτύουσιν ὥς δύνανται πορρωτάτω διότι ὠφελεῖ μὲν οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐνόν, βλάπτει δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον.

Rhetoric 1398 a 24. Socrates refused to visit the court of Archelaus on the ground that ὕβριν ἔφη εἶναι τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀμύνασθαι ὁμοίως καὶ εὖ παθόντας ὥσπερ καὶ κακῶς. (The point of the remark is, I think, generally overlooked. If Socrates εὖ πάσχει at the hands of Archelaus, it becomes his obligation εὖ ποιεῖν Ἀρχέλαον. But the only way to do this is to make the soul of Archelaus better, and the first step to its improvement would be that Archelaus should be punished for his crimes. As there is no hope of this, Socrates will not go where he can do no good. The meaning is not that Socrates accepts the current view that one should repay good with good and evil with evil. On this interpretation the two cases contemplated are not parallel. For, in the common view, if you fail to repay good with good, the ὕβρις is on your side; if you fail to return evil for evil, you do not commit ὕβρις, but ὕβρις is committed on you. What Socrates means is something profounder. According to the common view, if Archelaus does me a

wrong which I cannot requite, then ὑβρίζομαι, the worth of my personality is degraded. Yes, says Socrates, but exactly the same thing happens if I do not repay kindness at his hands by the only means in my power, which is to try to bring him to punishment for his crimes. It is not Archelaus, but Socrates, who ὑβρίζεται, suffers degradation, if he does not try to lead Archelaus to repentance, as he certainly will not be allowed to do. The thought is thus absolutely in accord with the ethical teaching of the *Gorgias* and *Republic*. The popular view of ὕβρις referred to is not that ὕβρις is committed by the man who accepts a kindness which he is unable to repay or by the man who leaves an injury unavenged, but merely that he who injures the defenceless commits ὕβρις. Socrates adds that he who is not allowed to make such a return for kindness as lies in his power also suffers ὕβρις.)

Rhetoric 1398 b 30. (The already discussed anecdote of the rebuke administered to Plato by Aristippus.) This and the preceding incident may well have been taken from lost "Socratic discourses," or may equally well be reminiscences derived from actual conversation with Plato.

Rhetoric 1417 a 19 διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχουσιν οἱ μαθηματικοὶ λόγοι ἥθη, ὅτι οὐδὲ προαίρεσιν· τὸ γὰρ οὐ ἔνεκα οὐκ ἔχουσιν. ἀλλ' οἱ Σωκρατικοί· περὶ τοιούτων γὰρ λέγουσιν. The reference is, no doubt, to the whole class of such λόγοι, and it may be noted that what is meant by their exhibiting ἥθος and προαίρεσις is not that they are *didactic*, concerned with the ends for which we ought to act, but that they are *dramatic*, and full of traits illustrating the characters of the personages who figure in the narrative, and showing what is *their* ἥθος and with what προαίρεσις they act. It is just what we call the "dramatic" touches in a work like the *Phaedo*, the picture of Socrates chafing the leg which had just been released from its chain, the playing with Phaedo's curls, the violent sobbing of Apollodorus, in which "Socratic discourses" exhibit ἥθος, i.e. just the touches in which Plato's way of narrating a conversation differs from the colourless manner of a Xenophon.

It would be as absurd not to believe that Aristotle is thinking chiefly of the Platonic "discourses" here as to suppose that he means any others when he says at *Politics* 1265 a 11 that *all* the λόγοι of Socrates exhibit τὸ περιττὸν καὶ τὸ καινοτόμον καὶ [τὸ] ζητητικόν. Of the reference in the *Poetics* to Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι I have already spoken.

There is a statement in Aristotle, *Fr.* 83 (Berlin edition), 1490 a 21, that Socrates defined εὐγένεια as ἐξ ἀγαθῶν γονέων εἶναι. This is included in the *Fragments* of Aristotle on the authority of Stobaeus, who says he is quoting the dialogue περὶ εὐγενείας. But it should be remembered that according to Plutarch (*Aristides* xxvii.) there was a doubt about the genuineness of this particular dialogue. The definition is connected with the curious tale about the bigamy of Socrates, who is said to have had, besides Xanthippe, as a second wife the daughter (Diogenes Laertius), or granddaughter (Plutarch), or great-granddaughter (Athenaeus) of Aristides ὁ δίκαιος, and it was, according to Stobaeus' account of what Aristotle said, in connection with her that the definition was given; a daughter of Aristides must be *wohlgeboren*, because she had so "righteous" a father.

As to the authority for the story, all the authors who tell it refer to Aristotle, and both Plutarch and Stobaeus to the work περὶ εὐγενείας.¹ Diogenes (ii. 26) further mentions Satyrus and Hieronymus of Rhodes, Plutarch adds Demetrius of Phalerum and *Aristoxenus*, and Athenaeus names Callisthenes, Demetrius, Satyrus and *Aristoxenus*. The appearance of Aristoxenus among the authorities for this tale goes far to discredit it, and it has considerable internal difficulties. The absolute absence of any unconscious allusion to the matter in Plato and Xenophon is a serious matter. It is a further difficulty that the various versions of it lay stress on the *poverty* of the alleged second wife, and Diogenes, in particular, insists, apparently on the strength of the περὶ εὐγενείας, that she brought no dowry

¹ Stobaeus does not give the story, but he mentions the daughter of Aristides in connection with the definition of εὐγένεια.

with her. Now it is in itself a difficult question, which has not been adequately examined, how Socrates, who was always ἐν μυρία πενία, supported himself, Xanthippe, and his sons, and the mystery deepens if we suppose that he married a second wife, as the story asserts, out of compassion for her impoverished condition. Still the names of Aristotle and Demetrius are of considerable weight, if one could only feel sure that the περὶ εὐγενείας was genuine. On the whole I should suggest, in the light of the testimony of the *Laches* to the old friendship between Socrates and the family of Aristides, that there is some foundation in fact for the story. Socrates may well have in some way charged himself with the protection of a daughter of Lysimachus (the story which makes her his sister raises chronological difficulties), and it was probably the mischievous genius of Aristoxenus which turned the incident, whatever it was, into a case of bigamy. That the tale is traced to the περὶ εὐγενείας seems to me to militate against the genuineness of the work, or the good faith of those who professed to be citing it.

Fragment 61 (Berlin edition), 1486 a 2. Aristotle said in his περὶ ποιητῶν that the dialogues of Alexamenus of Teos were earlier than the Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι (from Diogenes Laertius iii. 48, and Athenaeus xi. 505 c, in which latter context it forms part of an abusive attack on the originality of Plato). These are, I believe, all the passages in the Aristotelian corpus in which reference is made to Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι, or sayings of Socrates quoted which cannot be found in the extant Platonic literature. It will be seen that the number of such sayings is ridiculously small, and that none of them has any philosophical significance, except perhaps the reason for not visiting Archelaus which is put into Socrates' mouth in the *Rhetoric*, and this story, correctly interpreted, shows that Aristotle ascribed the ethical doctrine of the *Gorgias* to Socrates. Our results so far are highly unfavourable to the view that Aristotle's knowledge of the tenets of Socrates is at all independent of the tradition created by Plato. Even Xenophon only seems to have been utilised, if at all, in one single passage, and then only for an illustration

of Socratic method exactly parallel with scores that might have been taken from Plato. The one clear case of actual quotation from Xenophon which we have detected belongs not to Aristotle, but to Eudemos.

I come now to the passages which refer to the special tenets of Socrates. In every case, it will be seen, it is quite easy to point to the probable or certain Platonic source of the notice.

(1) The fundamental service of Socrates to science lay in his insistence on the importance of universal definition, and of ἐπακτικοὶ λόγοι.

Metaphysics A 987 b 1-4 Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰ ἠθικὰ πραγματευομένου, περὶ δὲ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως οὐδέν, ἐν μέντοι τούτοις τὸ καθόλου ζητούντος καὶ περὶ ὀρισμῶν ἐπιστήσαντος πρώτου τὴν διάνοιαν. M 1078 b 17, 28 Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετὰς πραγματευομένου καὶ περὶ τούτων ὀρίζεσθαι καθόλου ζητούντος πρώτου . . . δύο γὰρ ἐστὶν ἃ τις ἂν ἀποδοίη Σωκράτει δικαίως, τοὺς τ' ἐπακτικούς λόγους καὶ τὸ ὀρίζεσθαι καθόλου· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶν ἄμφω περὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Σωκράτης τὰ καθόλου οὐκ χωριστὰ ἐποίει οὐδὲ τοὺς ὀρισμούς· οἱ δ' ἐχώρισαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ἰδέας προσηγόρευσαν. The last statement about a difference of view between Socrates and the οἱ δέ, who are apparently identical with the οἱ πρότεροι τὰς ἰδέας φήσαντες εἶναι of 1078 b 11, must be left over for special discussion. As to the remainder of what we are told here, it is obvious that the statement might be made by a reader who knew Socrates only from his reading of Plato on the strength of almost any one of the discussions contained in, e.g., the *Charmides*, *Laches*, *Greater Hippias*, *Protagoras*, *Republic* i.

(2) Socrates used to ask questions but not to answer them, ὁμολογεῖ γὰρ οὐκ εἰδέναι, *Sophist. Elench.* 183 b 7. This is, I think, a plain allusion to the complaint of Thrasy-machus (*Rep.* 337 e) ἵνα Σωκράτης τὸ εἰωθὸς διαπράξῃται· αὐτὸς μὲν μὴ ἀποκρίνηται, ἄλλου δ' ἀποκρινομένου λαμβάνῃ λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχῃ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ βέλτιστε, τίς ἀποκρίναιτο, πρότερον μὲν μὴ εἰδώς κτλ.

(3) *Éthica Nic.* 1127 b 25. Socrates a typical εἴρων, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ ἔνδοξα ἀπαρνοῦνται, ὅπερ καὶ Σωκράτης ἐποίει. For possible sources see *Republic* 337 a αὕτη 'κείνη ἢ εἰωθυῖα εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους; *Gorgias* 489 e εἰρωνεύηι, ὦ Σώκρατες; *Apology* 37 e οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένωι.

(4) Virtue is φρόνησις, the several virtues are φρονήσεις, ἐπιστήμαι, λόγοι.

Eth. N. 1144 b 18, 29 καὶ Σωκράτης τῇ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἐξήτει, τῇ δ' ἡμάρτανεν, ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεις ὤιετο εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς ἡμάρτανεν, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄνευ φρονήσεως, καλῶς ἔλεγεν . . . Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ὤιετο εἶναι (ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι πάσας), ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγου. *ib.* 1116 b 4 ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ὠιήθη ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν (with which compare *Eth. Eud.* 1230 a 6 αὐτὸ γὰρ τούναντίον ἔχει ἢ ὡς ὤιετο Σωκράτης, ἐπιστήμην οἰόμενος εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν, 1216 b 2 Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν ὁ πρεσβύτερος ὤιεν εἶναι τέλος τὸ γινώσκειν τὴν ἀρετὴν κτλ.). [*Μαίγμα Moralia*] 1182 a 15 μετὰ τούτου Σωκράτης ἐπιγενόμενος βέλτιον καὶ ἐπὶ πλεῖον εἶπεν ὑπὲρ τούτων, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δὲ οὐδ' οὗτος. τὰς γὰρ ἀρετὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐποίει. 1183 b 8 οὐκ ὀρθῶς δὲ οὐδ' ὁ Σωκράτης ἐπιστήμας ἐποίει τὰς ἀρετὰς κτλ. 1190 b 28 οὐδὲ Σωκράτης δὲ ὀρθῶς ἔλεγεν, ἐπιστήμην εἶναι φάσκων τὴν ἀνδρείαν. 1198 a 10 δίο οὐκ ὀρθῶς Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν, φάσκων εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν λόγον. None of these passages tells us anything about Σωκράτης or ὁ Σωκράτης (both forms are found with reference to the very same statements), which may not be read in the *Charmides*, *Laches*, *Protagoras* and *Republic*, and the *Laches* and *Protagoras* are manifestly the sources of the statement that Socrates regarded ἀνδρεία as a form of ἐπιστήμη, while the more general view that all virtue is a "science" or "ratio" is manifestly based on Socrates' reduction of virtue to intelligent computations of pleasures and pains in the *Protagoras*.

(5) There is no such state as ἀκρασία. *Eth. Nic.* 1145 b 23 δεινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης, ὡς ὤιετο Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν καὶ περιέλκειν αὐτὴν ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον. Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅλως ἐμάχετο πρὸς τὸν λόγον

ὥς οὐκ οὔσης ἀκρασίας· οὐθένα γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν. Compare 1147 b 15 καὶ ἔοικεν δ' ἐξήτει Σωκράτης συμβαίνειν κτλ.; [*Magna Moralia*] 1187 a 7 ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔφη, οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν γενέσθαι τὸ σπουδαίους εἶναι ἢ φαύλους. εἰ γάρ τις, φησὶν, ἐρωτήσκειν ὀντιναοῦν πότερον ἂν βούλοιτο δίκαιος εἶναι ἢ ἄδικος, οὐθεὶς ἂν ἔλοιτο τὴν ἀδικίαν; 1200 b 25 Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν ὁ πρεσβύτης ἀνῆρει ὅλως καὶ οὐκ ἔφη ἀκρασίαν εἶναι. We might add here *Eth. Nic.* 1113 b 14 τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὥς οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδ' ἄκων μακάριος ἔοικε τὸ μὲν ψευδεῖ, τὸ δ' ἀληθεῖ, except that, as no name is mentioned there, one cannot be sure whether the reference is to Socrates or to Plato (who puts the doctrine not only into the mouth of Socrates, but into that of Timaeus, *Tim.* 86 d ff.). That the common source of all these allusions to Socrates' view that there is no vice except error is the *Protagoras* of Plato seems plain from the verbal echoes of Plato's language at *Protagoras* 352 b (ἐνούσης πολλάκις ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστήμης, οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ ἄρχειν ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι . . . ἀτεχνῶς διανοούμενοι περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνδραπόδου, περιελκομένης ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων) in the first of the passages cited from the *Ethics*.

(6) Self-knowledge, Aristotle, *Fr.* 4 (Berlin edition), 1475 a 1 καὶ τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς γραμμάτων θεϊότατον ἐδόκει τὸ Γνωθὶ Σαυτόν, ὃ δὴ καὶ Σωκράτει ἀπορίας καὶ ζητήσεως ταύτης ἀρχὴν ἐνέδωκεν ὥς Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τοῖς Πλατωνικοῖς εἴρηκε (Plutarch, *Adv. Colotem* 1118 c). The manifest source is *Phaedrus* 229 e ff. οὐ δύναμαί πω κατὰ τὸ Δελφικὸν γράμμα γινῶναι ἑμαυτόν κτλ.

(7) Aristotle, *Fr.* 3, 1474 b 10 = Diogenes Laertius ii. 23 καὶ Πυθῶδε ἐλθεῖν (sc. τὸν Σ.) Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶν. Probably no more than an inference from the fact that Aristotle had spoken of the influence of the Delphic inscription on Socrates.

(8) *Rhetoric* 1398 a 15, 1419 a 8. Both passages refer to the argument of Socrates in refutation of the charge of atheism, that one who believes in a δαιμόνιον or in δαίμονες

must necessarily believe in gods, since the *δαίμονες* are either the progeny or the handiwork of gods. (No names are mentioned in the earlier of the two passages.) The source is thus plainly *Apology* 27 b ff., and the fact that in 1419 a 8 the reasoning is ascribed to *Σωκράτης* of itself proves that *Σωκράτης* does not mean "the historical Socrates" in distinction from Plato's Socrates, but that Aristotle did not discriminate the two.

(9) *Rhetoric* 1367 b 8, 1415 b 31. Both passages, which have already been discussed in this paper, allude to a saying that "it is easy to deliver an encomium on Athenians before an Athenian audience." The later of the two attributes this to *Σωκράτης ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ*, which shows that the source on which Aristotle is drawing is *Menexenus* 235 d *εἰ μὲν γὰρ δέοι Ἀθηναίους ἐν Πελοποννησίοις εὖ λέγειν, ἢ Πελοποννησίου ἐν Ἀθηναίοις, ἀγαθοῦ ἂν ῥήτορος δέοι τοῦ πείσοντος καὶ εὐδοκιμήσοντος· ὅταν δέ τις ἐν τούτοις ἀγωνίζεται οὐσπερ καὶ ἐπαινεῖ, οὐδὲν μέγα δοκεῖν εὖ λέγειν*. There remain a few allusions which do not seem to have any source in Plato, and throw no light on the thought or character of Socrates. For the sake of completeness, I add them here.

(10) *Fr.* 65 (Berlin edition), 1486 b 26 = Diogenes Laertius ii. 46 *τούτωι τις, καθά φησιν Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν ᾧ περὶ ποιητικῆς, ἐφιλονεῖκει Ἀντίλοχος Δήμιος καὶ Ἀντιφῶν ὁ τερατοσκόπος*. Cf. Diogenes Laertius viii. 49 *τούτωι φασὶν ἀντιπαράσσεσθαι Κύλωνα καθάπερ Ἀντίδοκος (? Ἀντίλοχος) Σωκράτει*. Perhaps this comes from Xenophon, *Memorabilia* i. 6. 1, where we are told that Antiphon ὁ σοφιστής tried to steal pupils from Socrates (*βουλόμενος τοὺς συνουσιαστὰς αὐτοῦ παρελῆσθαι*).

(11) *Fr.* 27, 1479 a 14 = Diogenes Laertius ii. 27. "Aristotle says" that a magus from Syria told the fortune of Socrates and predicted his violent death.

(12) *Rhetoric* 1390 b 31. The sons of Socrates were insignificant persons.

(13) *Analytica posteriora* 97 b 21. Socrates—the great philosopher no doubt is meant, as he is coupled

with Alcibiades and Lysander—was a typical *μεγαλόψυχος*. (Aristotle was no doubt thinking of the *γενναιότης* shown by Socrates in his last hours, which is more than once referred to in the *Phaedo* as singularly impressive.)

[(14) *Problemata* 953 a 27. Socrates and Plato both had the *μελαγχολία* common in men of genius.]

So far I think the reader will be inclined to agree with me that there is nothing at all in Aristotle's account of the character or opinions of Socrates which he could not have taken, and in all probability did not take, direct from the *Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι* of Plato. Though he had no doubt read many other such "discourses of Socrates," there is no sign that he found anything in them which led him to modify in any recognisable way the view which he might have arrived at by confining himself to the dramatic portrait drawn for us in the Platonic writings, and it is therefore a highly unreasonable assumption that he made any distinction between the portrait and its historical original. In particular, he seems to have owed as good as nothing at all to the pretended portrait of Xenophon. I will add a reflection which may or may not impress the reader, but certainly has some weight with me. I cannot help feeling that, when all is said, Socrates remains for Aristotle a rather perplexing problem. In the historical sketch of *Metaphysics* A, he is the one figure who flits across the stage as a sort of mystery, like Melchisedec, without father or mother, without beginning or end of days. He is credited with having effected the most tremendous transformation in the general character of Greek thought, but no light is thrown on the question how he was led to strike out this new line for himself, or what were his relations with his predecessors and his contemporaries. This comes out more particularly in two ways. Socrates is the only important personage who is introduced into the narrative without any attempt to give a positive statement of his views about the "cause and principle," or to show how he came by them. He comes in incidentally in the course of a professed account of the origin of Platonism as a person

by whom Plato was known to have been influenced, and we are told that on one important point (the universal character of scientific propositions) he gave the impetus to the formation of the theory of *εἶδη*, and that is all. Also, as I have urged in the previous essay, even in the account of Platonism, Socrates seems to be a disturbing element. Aristotle appears, at first sight, to be holding two theories about the philosophical antecedents of Plato, which he merely places side by side without a word to show how they can be reconciled. On the one hand his main purpose is unmistakably to show that Platonism is an offshoot from the "Italian" philosophy, by which he manifestly means Pythagoreanism. On the other, he expressly treats it as due to the influence of Socrates on a mind already imbued with a scepticism as to the reality of the things which our senses perceive. I have argued in the last essay for a view of the position of Socrates which would make it possible to reconcile these two accounts. The inference I wish to draw here is that, if Aristotle has told us so little about the place of Socrates in the development of "first philosophy," the reason is that he knew little more about the facts than what we can still piece together from the hints given us in the dialogues of Plato. He therefore, like an honest man, left his hearer to read Plato for himself, and did not make a show of having independent knowledge where, in fact, he had none.

τὸ τρίτον τῷ Σωτῆρι: our hardest task yet lies before us. We have, I hope, disabused ourselves of the belief in the infallibility of "Fitzgerald's Canon." We have seen that there is no single statement, with one exception, made anywhere in the Aristotelian corpus about the doctrines of Socrates which either may not or must not be traced back to Plato. But the exception remains to be faced as our "third wave." It is a very remarkable statement, and, as it is commonly interpreted, is meant to insist upon a fundamental difference in doctrine between the historical Socrates and the historical Plato. If the accepted interpretation is correct, every word of the preceding argument

may be accepted, and yet my thesis is hopelessly ruined. Though Aristotle may depend for everything else he says about Socrates on Plato, the fact will remain that he knew of one absolutely vital difference between the teaching of Socrates and that of ὁ Σωκράτης, the protagonist in Plato's dramas. He had, therefore, information of the highest value independent of the Academic tradition, and we can only wonder why he made no further use of it. The statement in question is that of *Metaphysics* M 1078 b 30, where Aristotle is speaking of the difference between Socrates and certain persons "who had been the first to say that there are *ιδέαι*," but did not add that these *ιδέαι* are numbers. The critical words are ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Σωκράτης τὰ καθόλου οὐ χωριστὰ ἐποίει οὐδὲ τοὺς ὀρισμούς· οἱ δ' ἐχώρισαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ιδέας προσηγόρευσαν. In the briefer parallel account of A, there is nothing answering to the first clause of this statement, and all that corresponds to the second clause is οὕτως (or οὕτος, the MSS. authority is unhappily divided,) μὲν οὖν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ιδέας προσηγόρευσε (A 987 b 7). The further account of Plato in A makes it clear that Aristotle includes him in the charge contained in the words of M, οἱ δ' ἐχώρισαν, though it is worth noting that this accusation is not brought against him by name, and that he is nowhere unambiguously said to have been the *first* person to "separate the universals and definitions" or to call them *ιδέαι*.

Now, on the current interpretation, the sentence reads plausibly enough. "Socrates did not ascribe an independent reality to universals; this was done first by Plato, who also gave them the name of Ideas." (It is, of course, allowed that the Socrates referred to—in spite of his being ὁ Σωκράτης—is Socrates the actual man, since the *χωρισμός* of the Ideas is regarded as being what the Socrates of Plato means when he so often speaks of *εἶδη* or *ιδέαι*, which can only be apprehended by *νοῦς* as *χωρίς*, apart from, or distinct from, the things which are perceived by the senses.)

But the apparently simple statement bristles with difficulties. What does Aristotle really mean by the

operation of *χωρισμός*, of which he speaks so curtly as though his hearers would know at once what it meant? If it was an innovation made by Plato, why does he contrive never to say so in so many words? If Plato is distinguished as "those who first said there are *εἶδη*" from some one else who added that *εἶδη* are numbers, why does Aristotle constantly attribute the doctrine of the "numbers" to Plato himself, as if it were a matter of course that every one knew that he regarded the *εἶδη* as numbers? If he really knew that Plato's Socrates misrepresented the historical Socrates on so important a point, why does he everywhere else apparently take Plato's Socrates as a *bona fide* witness to the actual teachings of the real Socrates? In the face of problems like these we seem bound to raise the question whether the conventional interpretation of Aristotle's statement is correct. May not the Socrates who "did not separate" the universals after all be the Socrates of Plato, and Aristotle's statement about him and the difference between him and his successors a mere inference drawn by Aristotle from the Platonic writings themselves? If this should be the case, we may still be able to discover the passages in Plato on which Aristotle's conclusion about Socrates is based, and we may thus be led to modify our opinion as to what the view Aristotle means to ascribe to him is. In any case, I must repeat, before we acquiesce in the current explanation, if it is an explanation, we have to answer the awkward question: if Socrates was misrepresented by the tradition of the Academy, how did Aristotle find it out?

To begin with, then, I would raise the question, what precisely is the "non-separating of the universals" for which Aristotle appears to be commending Socrates? A logical distinction of the kind which Aristotle means to indicate is clearly something which goes down to the roots of a philosophical system, and it must be possible to make its significance clear without merely repeating the mysterious technical terminology in which Aristotle expresses it. The ancient tradition of the Peripatetics does not help us in

trying to accomplish the task, since it merely repeats Aristotle's statement in his own words, (e.g. Alexander on M 1078 b merely says *ὁ μὲν Σωκράτης τὰ καθόλου, ὧν καὶ τοὺς ὀρισμοὺς ἐξήτει, οὐ χωριστὰ ἐποίει τῶν αἰσθητῶν, οὐδὲ τοὺς ὀρισμοὺς χωριστῶν φύσεων εἶναι ἔλεγεν*), and we are thus thrown back on the acumen of the modern interpreters. So far as I can make out their view (and it is held by even so acute and independent a thinker as Professor Milhaud), they agree in bringing the statement into connection with the Socratic use of "arguments from example." Socrates, they hold, in effect, regarded "justice," "courage," "equality" and the rest of the "universals" simply as common characteristics which are actually equally and alike present in every individual member of the classes "just men," "brave men," "equal quantities," and can therefore be detected and defined by a simple process of *ἐπαγωγή*, i.e. by taking several members of a class and picking out the predicates which belong equally to each and all of them. What Plato did, according to this view, was to insist that "justice," "courage" and the like are never realised completely in the individual case; there is a truer justice or courage than has ever been actually exhibited by any man; exact equality is something which our methods of measurement can never detect. Yet justice, courage, equality are terms which must have a definite logical intension, since we can employ them in rational discourse. We can call one line of conduct more just than another, one approximation to a given length closer than another, though we may not believe that pure and perfect justice has ever been incarnate, or that anyone has ever constructed a rod which is *exactly* a yard long. Plato therefore conceived of the intension of a significant or general name as an "upper limit" not realised in actual experience, but implied in all scientific reasoning (a *ἐν ἐπὶ τῶν πολλῶν*, as Aristotle phrases it), postulated the existence of such limits and called them "*ἰδέαι*." (I am purposely stating the view which I find habitually taken of Aristotle's meaning in more careful language than its

defenders usually employ, in order that it may suffer no injustice from the introduction of loose metaphorical language about confusion between "notions and things," "the hypostatization of concepts," and the like.)

Now the first observation that occurs to one on an interpretation of this kind is that if Socrates really believed that justice, courage, equality can be found existing in absolute perfection, if he did not see that in the realm of facts we have to put up with approximations to them, and that it would therefore be idle to attempt to define them by looking for the actual existence of absolutely identical common predicates in all members of a group of actual persons or things, he must have been, what even his enemies never called him, a very great fool. This, however, it may be said, is an argument from merely subjective feeling, and should not be allowed to count, so I proceed at once to a consideration which is not of a subjective order. There is no foundation whatever for the view here implied as to the logical methods of Socrates in historical tradition. On the current interpretation of Aristotle, Socrates not merely rendered a service to science by employing *ἐπακτικοὶ λόγοι*—he knew of no other kind of reasoning; his talk was *ἐπακτικοὶ λόγοι* from beginning to end. In fact, he is not infrequently said to have *invented* the use of appeals to example! Such a view finds no support in either Plato or Xenophon. And I will add that the use of *ἐπακτικοὶ λόγοι* has, of itself, no special connection with Socraticism. An *ἐπακτικὸς λόγος* is simply an appeal to facts to confirm a theoretical conclusion, and the use of such an appeal did not remain unknown to mankind until Socrates arose to discover it. Indeed, one might have reason to suppose that the phrase itself was a familiar one before Socrates, and arose outside the special philosophical circles to which he belonged.

I shall show directly that the *Phaedo* assumes the existence of "reasoning from example" as a well-known and logically defective method familiar to the whole Eleatic-Pythagorean group who were present at the death of

Socrates. First, however, I would submit the following certainly un-Socratic passages to the judgment of the reader.

Hippocrates *περὶ ἀγμῶν* (a purely technical medical work, entirely independent of the speculations of "sophists"), 2 (Kühlewein ii. p. 47) *τὴν μὲν οὖν χεῖρα, περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, ἔδωκε τις ἐπιδῆσαι καταπρηνέα ποιήσας. ὁ δὲ ἡνάγκαζεν οὕτως ἔχειν ὥσπερ οἱ τοξεύοντες . . . καὶ οὕτως ἔχουσιν ἐπέδει . . . νομίζων ἐν τῷ εἶναι τοῦτο αὐτῇ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ μαρτύριον ἐπήγετο τὰ τε ὁστέα πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ πῆχει, ὅτι ἰθυωρήν ἔχει κατάλληλα κτλ.* I.e. the unskilful surgeon who insisted on setting the fractured member in an unnatural position "appealed" to the visible fact of the straightness of the forearm as evidence in support of his preformed theory as to the natural position of the bones of the hand. So immediately below, *καὶ τὴν τοξικὴν ἐπήγετο μαρτύριον*, "he appealed also to the art of archery," again in confirmation of his theory.

So *ib.* 3 (Kühlewein ii. 49), we read of another blundering practitioner that he insisted on a fractured hand being treated with the palm upwards (*ὑπτίη*), and that in order to justify his theory that this was the natural position (*τὸ κατὰ φύσιν*) he called attention to the sensible fact that "the bone which projected along the wrist against the little finger was in a straight line with the bone from which men measure the forearm," *οὕτως ἔχουσιν ἐπέδει τοῦτο νομίζων τὸ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι τῷ τε χροὶ σημαινόμενος καὶ τὰ ὁστέα νομίζων κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι οὕτως, ὅτι φαίνεται τὸ ἐξέχον ὁστέον τὸ παρὰ τὸν καρπὸν, ἧι ὁ μικρὸς δάκτυλος, κατ' ἰθυωρήν, εἶναι τοῦ ὁστέου, ἀπ' ὅτε τὸν πῆχυν οἱ ἄνθρωποι μετρεοῦσιν. ταῦτα μαρτύρια ἐπήγετο, ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἐδόκει εὖ λέγειν.* (Similarly in the few instances of a logical use of *ἐπάγεσθαι* in Plato and Aristotle, the word means always to support a statement by an appeal to witnesses.) These passages show, I think, that *ἐπάγεσθαι* was already known in the medical school of Cos, before the end of the fourth century, as a technical phrase for calling in sensible facts to confirm a previously formed conclusion. The fact is not unimportant when we remember that the

chief terms of Plato's logic, εἶδος, αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ (Plato's αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτοῦ), κοινωνεῖν, ὑπόθεσις, already meet us full developed in the περὶ ἀρχαίης ἱητρικῆς. I turn next to Plato, more especially with a view to determining the precise position which is ascribed by the company in the *Phaedo* to the logical process of ἐπαγωγή. It might be conceived that Plato should have attributed to Socrates a logical theory which was actually his own creation; it is hardly thinkable that he should have represented a whole group of persons as holding this theory in common, and as something so well established and understood that it has a technical vocabulary of its own, and needs no kind of explanation whatever, without betraying himself somewhere. A theory of logical method which is represented as familiar to and believed in by the whole Pythagorean-Socratic community of 399 B.C. is not lightly to be disposed of as an artistic anachronism.

Now there are two points of supreme importance in connection with the logical doctrine of the *Phaedo*. (1) The doctrine of the existence of αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ εἶδη, to which experience only presents imperfect approximations, is represented not as something peculiar to Socrates, but as a tenet common to him with Simmias, Cebes, and the rest, and so thoroughly understood that no word of explanation as to what it means is required. The doctrine is, indeed, described as ἄπερ ἀεὶ καὶ ἄλλοτε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι λόγῳ οὐδὲν πέπαυμαι λέγων, and as τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος ὃ πεπραγμάτευμαι (*Phaedo* 100 b), but Cebes makes haste to say that no introductory explanation is necessary, ὥς διδόντος σοι οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις περαινῶν, and Socrates had already described the "kind of cause in question" as ἐκεῖνα τὰ πολυθρύλητα, and the same assumption that anyone who knows much about Socrates and his friends knows that they believe in τὰ εἶδη is a standing one with Plato. Before we read the account of the spiritual development of Socrates, the εἶδη have already made their appearance in the *Phaedo* without a word of explanation, as "all those things οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα

“αὐτὸ τὸ ὃ ἔστι” καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι” (75 d). Similarly neither Glaucon in the *Republic* nor Parmenides and Zeno in the *Parmenides* need to have it explained to them what an εἶδος is, as indeed no reader of the earliest works of the Hippocratean corpus would; what the Eleatic philosophers want to be told is not what Socrates means by an εἶδος, but how he supposes these εἶδη to be related to the world of sense. Hence I cannot escape from the conclusion of Professor Burnet that the doctrine in its main outlines was, as Plato represents, common ground to Socrates and his Pythagorean friends. (Echecrates too, it will be observed, asks for no explanation.) But my object in referring to the matter is simply to remind the reader that Socrates and his friends in the *Phaedo* never speak of the εἶδη as established by a process of induction; their existence is throughout postulated. The technical phrase is ὑποτίθεσθαι, or simply τίθεσθαι εἰδός τι, the equivalence of the expressions showing that the word means to “postulate,” not to “assume provisionally.” The corresponding verbal noun is ὑπόθεσις, and these usages are universal in Plato. One ὑποτίθεται the existence of αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν exactly as he ὑποτίθεται that all integers are even or odd. Now ὑπόθεσις in the sense of “postulate” is not a word of Plato’s invention, it is a technical term of Ionian science. The ὑπόθεσις of a thinker means his fundamental premiss, in connection with Ionian philosophy in particular, his assumption as to the number and kind of the primary forms of body. For example, the object of the περὶ ἀρχαίης ἰατρικῆς is to show that medicine is independent of any preformed ὑπόθεσις. One or two examples of the way in which the author uses the word will be sufficient to show that he knows it as a *terminus technicus* in exactly the same sense in which we find it in the *Phaedo*.

§ 1. The very first sentence of the work: ὅποσοι μὲν ἐπεχείρησαν περὶ ἰατρικῆς λέγειν ἢ γράφειν, ὑπόθεσιν αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς ὑποθέμενοι τῷ λόγῳ θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ ὑγρὸν ἢ ξηρὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι ὃ ἂν θέλωσιν, ἐς βραχὺ ἄγοντες τὴν

ἀρχὴν τῆς αἰτίας τοῖσιν ἀνθρώποισι νούσων τε καὶ θανάτου, καὶ πᾶσι τὴν αὐτήν, ἐν ἣ δύο ὑποθέμενοι, ἐν πολλοῖσι μὲν καὶ <νοῖσι> οἷσι λέγουσι καταφανέες εἰσὶ ἀμαρτάνοντες, μάλιστα δὲ ἄξιον μεμψάσθαι, ὅτι ἀμφὶ τέχνης ἐούσης κτλ. I.e. the complaint is that medicine is an ἐούσα τέχνη, "a really established science," and therefore needs no justification by an argument from cosmological first principles. The ὑπόθεσις of each of the writers censured is his "postulate" as to the number and kinds of the ingredients of the human body; the particular example given is clearly one in which (as is the case in some of the Hippocratean books themselves) each of the four "elements" of Empedocles is made to contribute a special stuff, with its distinctive sensible quality, to the organism. The writer's view is that medicine is already firmly founded on a basis of solid empirical facts, there are trustworthy practitioners (cf. Socrates' habit of testing the claims of education to be an art by asking whether there really is an accredited body of specialists in education), and as our observation extends our knowledge of medical fact will extend too, so that all such ὑποθέσεις are superfluous, διὸ οὐκ ἠξίου αὐτὴν ἔγωγε καινῆς ὑποθέσιος δεῖσθαι ὥσπερ τὰ ἀφανέα τε καὶ ἀπορεύμενα, περὶ ὧν ἀνάγκη, ἢν τις ἐπιχειρήῃ τι λέγειν, ὑποθέσει χρῆσθαι, οἷον περὶ τῶν μετεώρων ἢ τῶν ὑπὸ γῆν· ἂ εἴ τις λέγοι καὶ γνώσκοι ὡς ἔχει, οὔτ' ἂν αὐτῷ τῷ λέγοντι οὔτε τοῖς ἀκούουσι δῆλα ἂν εἴη, εἴτε ἀληθέα ἐστὶν εἴτε μή. I.e. he thinks you cannot have the evidence of the senses to establish your theory of the things "on high" or of the interior of the earth; anything you say on these matters rests on "postulation." So § 13 begins ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν τὸν καινὸν τρόπον τὴν τέχνην ζητεῦντων ἕξ ὑποθέσιος τὸν λόγον ἐπανελθεῖν βούλομαι· εἰ γάρ τί ἐστιν θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ ξηρὸν ἢ ὕγρον τὸ λυμαινόμενον τὸν ἄνθρωπον κτλ. That is, his "innovating opponents" are the school who lay it down as a principle in physics that the human body and all others consist of four primary elements, each with its own peculiar quiddity, and that all disease is caused by excess or defect of one or

more of these four (the physicians who build on the theories of Empedocles). They are said to study their art ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, because they take the doctrine of the four "roots of things" as an axiom or postulate; they "take it for granted" that every disease can be traced back to one of these four. But the writer asserts that such a theory would be useless in medical practice. § 15 ἀπορέω δ' ἔγωγε, οἱ τὸν λόγον ἐκείνον λέγοντες καὶ ἄγοντες ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ὁδοῦ ἐπὶ ὑπόθεσιν τὴν τέχνην τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον θεραπεύουσι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ὥσπερ ὑποτίθενται. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν αὐτοῖς, οἶμαι, ἐξηρημένον αὐτό τι ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ ξηρὸν ἢ ὑγρὸν μηδένι ἄλλωι εἶδει κοινωνέον. That is, "As for those who maintain that theory and in this way bring their profession into accord with a physical assumption, I wonder how they manage to treat their patients in accord with their postulate. For I am sure they have never discovered anything which is merely hot or merely cold, or dry or moist, and has nothing in common with any other element." For, as he goes on to explain, all the remedies exhibited in practice show the supposed specific characters of the "elements" in combination, not in isolation. It is worth noting that in this single sentence we find all the leading terms of the so-called "Ideal Theory" already in use as words of art. There is ὑπόθεσις in the sense of a postulate, αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ meaning "in isolation," κοινωνέον meaning "in combination," εἶδος, in a sense only one remove from Plato's, as an "elementary body," a "thing-in-itself." Hence I commend the passage and the whole booklet to the special study of those who think that Plato is guilty of an anachronism in making Socrates argue with Parmenides and Zeno about αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ εἶδη and μέθεξις, or expound the nature of his own ὑπόθεσις, or fundamental philosophical assumption, to Cebes and Simmias.

I may subjoin just one single example from the Hippocratic corpus of the kind of use of ὑποθέσεις, general postulates of a science of nature, to which the writer of the περὶ ἀρχαίης ἱητρικῆς so properly objected. The writer of

the *περὶ φύσων* begins his work with just such a general postulate as his wiser colleague had protested against. His theory is that all diseases have one single cause—an undue aggregation of air in the cavities of the body, all other conditions being merely concomitant causes (*συναίτια*, a "Socratic" word, and *μεταίτια*). After propounding a series of unproved assertions as to the particular way in which each special disease is set up by some peculiar accumulation of air, he concludes triumphantly, *ἡγαγον δὲ τὸν λόγον ἐπὶ τὸ γνῶρισμα καὶ τῶν νοσημάτων καὶ τῶν ἀρρωστημάτων ἐν οἷσιν ἀληθὴς ὑπόθεσις* (? *ἐν οἷσιν ἀληθὴς ἡ ὑπόθεσις*) *ἐφάνη* (Kühn i. p. 586). Precisely similar are Aristotle's *πολιτεῖαι ἐξ ὑποθέσεως*, which are not, of course, "hypothetical constitutions," but constitutions in which some fundamental *postulate* must be carefully observed.

Further, the friends of Socrates in the *Phaedo* are perfectly familiar with the use of *ἐπακτικοὶ λόγοι*, and regard them as an inferior, and often deceptive, method of inference. In particular they insist vehemently that the immortality of the soul is not to be recommended to them by an argument "from sensible analogies," but by rigid demonstration (*ἀπόδειξις*) from a postulate they can agree to accept. Thus at 92 d Simmias is called on to make his choice between the doctrine that "learning is recollecting" and the theory that the soul is the "attunement" of the body, and at once prefers to adhere to the former because *ὁδε μὲν γάρ μοι γέγονεν ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως μετὰ εἰκότος τινὸς καὶ εὐπρεπείας, ὅθεν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις· ἐγὼ δὲ τοῖς διὰ τῶν εἰκότων τὰς ἀποδείξεις ποιουμένοις λόγοις σύννοια οὖσιν ἀλαζόσιν . . . ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀναμνήσεως καὶ μαθήσεως λόγος δι' ὑποθέσεως ἀξίας ἀποδέξασθαι εἴρηται*. So the method recommended by Socrates as his own, when we come to it (100 b ff.), has nothing inductive about it. It consists in starting with what seems to you the soundest postulate and rigidly deducing consequences from it. The postulate itself you leave untouched unless some one refuses to admit it; in that

case, you have, if you can, to deduce it from something still more primitive, until you come to *ικανόν τι*, some postulate which satisfies both your antagonist and yourself (101 d). It is thus not induction, argument from example, but the "geometrical method" of Descartes and Spinoza, which Plato represents Socrates as introducing into philosophy as the one satisfactory method of procedure. His argument for immortality satisfies his hearers precisely because the conclusion does not rest on parallels and analogies, but is rigidly deduced from the doctrine that there are *εἴδη*, exact scientific concepts, and that the soul has knowledge of them, and for Simmias and the rest this doctrine is an *ὑπόθεσις ἀξία ἀποδέξασθαι*. Hence they need to pursue the inquiry no further.

When we turn to Xenophon we find the accuracy of Plato's account curiously confirmed. He has nothing much to say about the logical method of his master, but he knows that *ὑπόθεσις* and *ἀπόδειξις* are the important features in it, and brings them together in a way which is all the more valuable as evidence because the triviality of his illustration shows that he is not inventing but repeating what he scarcely half understands. For he says (*Mem.* iv. 6. 13) that if Socrates were contradicted by a person *μηδὲν ἔχων σαφὲς λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως ἤτοι σοφώτερον φάσκων εἶναι ὃν αὐτὸς λέγοι, ἢ πολιτικώτερον ἢ ἀνδρειότερον ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐπανήγεν ἂν πάντα τὸν λόγον*. Thus Xenophon knows that one was not expected to speak in Socratic circles *ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως*; the proper thing was to be prepared with an *ἀπόδειξις* of your position. If you had none, Socrates used to bring the problem back (? has *ἐπανήγεν ἂν* anything to do with *ἐπάγεσθαι*) to the assumption which underlay it. In Xenophon's own trivial example, where Socrates and another speaker are supposed to be discussing which of two persons is the more efficient citizen, this assumption is some undefined conception as to the "work" of a good citizen. Unless the disputants are agreed what ought to be expected of a good citizen, clearly it is useless to ask whether A is a

better citizen than B. Socrates' reduction of the dispute to its *ὑπόθεσις* thus takes the form of raising this issue explicitly. *τί οὖν οὐκ ἐκείνο πρῶτον ἐπεσκεψάμεθα, τί ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀγαθοῦ πολίτου;*

Of course I am aware that there are plenty of "arguments from example" put into the mouth of Socrates both in Plato and in Xenophon, and that his fondness for homely illustrations from the trades and professions was proverbial. But my point is simply that this trait, however interesting as a touch of personal *ἥθος*, is of no serious philosophical significance. The "argument from example" could necessarily only play a subordinate part in the "Socratic method." It cannot of itself establish a general truth at all, but comes in, at best, as *ἐπαγωγή* does in Aristotle's own theory, as a means of making a proposition already found by *ἀπόδειξις* or assumed as an *ὑπόθεσις* in the mind of Socrates himself more easily apprehensible to an auditor. And so we find in Plato that the "arguments from example," though often sufficient to disprove the theories of an antagonist, are never put forward by Socrates as *proof* of his own convictions. When he is dealing with brothers in philosophy like Simmias and Cebes, we hear no more of these analogies; *ἀπόδειξις* from an *ὑπόθεσις* is expected, and Socrates does his best to provide it.

Turning back now to the statements of Aristotle, we may, I think, urge with the more force for our brief digression the following points. Though Aristotle lays hold of the telling use of illustration (*παραβολή, ἐπακτικοὶ λόγοι*) as characteristic of Socrates, he is never so absurd as to ascribe its invention to him, and it is not even clear that when he speaks of *τὰ Σωκρατικά*, in the *Rhetoric*, as coming under the head of *παραβολή*, he is not referring primarily to the pithy comparisons put into the philosopher's mouth by Plato and the other writers of Socratic discourses. The mere statement that Socrates made use of *ἐπακτικοὶ λόγοι* in discussing definitions reads like, and probably is, a remark suggested by the study of the dialogues themselves. Aristotle says nothing to indicate that he connected the

employment of *ἐπαγωγή* in any way with the trait he has in mind in stating that Socrates οὐ χωριστὰ ἐποίει τὰ καθόλου, or that he looked upon the process of ἀπόδειξις from an ὑπόθεσις as un-Socratic.

The connection of the two pieces of information is entirely due to the ingenuity of modern expositors, whose views are discounted for us by the fact that they have usually started with the assumption that Plato's account of Socrates is purely imaginative, and have never thought of submitting their theory to a serious test. Seeing, then, that the current view of what Aristotle meant by the distinction between Socrates and the persons "who first said that there are εἶδη" seems to lead into an impasse, it is worth while to set it aside at least for the purpose of an experiment. If we assume that Plato himself is the real source of this statement, as he appears to be of everything else which Aristotle professes to know about the views of Socrates, and that the latter leaves the nature of the χωρισμός which Socrates avoided unexplained, as we suggested that he omitted all account of the positive views of Socrates about τὸ αἴτιον from *Metaphysics* A, because his hearers were expected to know as much as he did himself from their reading of the Platonic dialogues, is there anything in Plato which, if we suppose Aristotle to be referring to it, would at once explain the whole mystery? I answer that there is such a passage, and that it makes the business so simple that I believe the reference would long ago have been universally recognised, but for the inveterate prejudice of the nineteenth century against believing in the accuracy of Plato's account of facts. The whole point becomes clear if we see that what Aristotle has in mind is the difference between the view ascribed to Socrates by Plato, and that which he assigns to the εἰδῶν φίλοι of the *Sophistes*. These latter persons are represented as asserting a kind of χωρισμός between the εἶδη and sensible things quite unlike any doctrine ever ascribed to Socrates. It is, of course, true that Plato's Socrates is frequently made to use the expressions χωρίς, αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό of an εἶδος or concept, as distinct from the sensible things

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since the things perceived by our senses are "always changing"; they do not permanently "partake of" the *εἶδος* once and for all; they "are" not, they only "become." To put the point in the language of Plato's mathematical physics, the elementary triangles of which a material particle is constructed can never be safely assumed to be geometrically perfect, since their edges get worn off and their corners rounded down, so that where mathematical theory assumes that you have a perfect sphere or tetrahedron, in physical fact you may be dealing with a spheroid or a merely approximate pyramid, the precise geometrical determination of which is impossible. And further, the triangles are constantly being dissolved and reformed in different groupings, so that even while you speak of a corpuscle as a tetrahedron, it may be turning into a sphere, and so on. But you can at least have "true opinion"; the approximation of sensible fact to the ideal geometrical scheme may, at a given moment, be so close that your judgment, though it is not "science," because it is affected by an amount of error which is not exactly known, is truer than any other which could be passed upon the same facts, and may, for purposes of practice, be taken as equivalent to truth. But it would be possible to hold that there is no relation whatever between science and sensible fact; that sensible facts are just a region in which no correspondence, not even an approximate one, can be found with the relations between pure concepts which form the object-matter of the *μαθήματα*. From such a point of view sensation would have no value whatever; it would be, in modern phrase, a complex of motor reactions on stimulus, or, in Plato's phrase, there would be *εἶδη*, but no *ἐπιστήμη*.

"synthetic" propositions can be established. What they assert (*Sophistes* 248 a) is that there is an absolute severance between γένεσις (process, fact) and οὐσία. We "share in process *with* our body through sensation but in real being *with* our soul by means of calculation" (σώματι μὲν ἡμᾶς γενέσκει δι' αἰσθήσεως κοινωνεῖν, διὰ λογισμοῦ δὲ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν ὄντως οὐσίαν), and the meaning of "sharing in" is explained immediately below to be, acting or being acted on (πάθημα ἢ ποίημα ἐκ δυνάμεώς τινος ἀπὸ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα συνιόντων γιγνόμενον, where every word is significant, "a condition of being affected by or affecting something else which occurs as the result of an activity in things which are coming into relation with one another"). The view of these unnamed persons is then clearly that perception is not a cognitive process at all; it is merely having your *body* affected in various ways by interaction with other *bodies* (and no reference is made to δόξα as a psychical result of such interrelation). Knowledge, on the other hand, if the theory were thought out in terms of modern philosophical systems, would have to be described as a relation which simply and always subsists between the soul and the εἶδη which are its objects, a simple "awareness" of eternally subsisting relations; or, as Mr. Bertrand Russell has put it, the relation of knower to known would have the peculiarity that one of its terms *is* nothing but the awareness of the relation between the terms. Hence Plato can refute these εἰδῶν φίλοι by the simple argument that "to come to know" a thing, or "to become known" is itself a form of process, and that their theory, pushed to its consequences, should lead to the view that knowledge is as impossible as δόξα. The fact that this very same argument appears in the *Parmenides* as one from which you cannot escape, unless you can produce a logically unexceptional account of the relation of μέθεξις, shows that we are dealing there with the same type of doctrine, and that the attack of the Eleatic philosophers on the youthful Socrates is meant to embody objections to the doctrine of μέθεξις, and the consequent recognition of the cognitive worth of "opinion,"

which originated with the same school of thinkers (*Parmenides* 133 b ff.). The question then arises who these thinkers may have been. It is often held that they represent some development posterior to the age of Socrates, some school who were busy in attacking the Platonic doctrine in Plato's middle and later life, and I should agree with the view so far as to admit that Plato's special occupation with them in the *Parmenides* and *Sophistes*, as well as his anxiety in the closely connected *Theaetetus* to give the fullest possible recognition to the claims of ὀρθὴ δόξα ἀνεν ἐπιστήμης, does show that the issue was a live one about the year 359, the most probable approximate date for the composition of these dialogues. For reasons into which I need not go fully here, I should be inclined to identify the actual opponents whom Plato has specially in mind with the circle connected with Polyxenus and the mathematician Bryson; but I do not wish to argue the question in this connection. I may, however, point out that we may probably exclude from consideration the identification of the persons criticized with either (1) Plato himself, as represented by his earlier writings, (2) disciples of Plato who had failed to apprehend him correctly, (3) Antisthenes. The extreme rationalism of the εἰδῶν φίλοι, with its complete rejection of ὀρθὴ δόξα as a means of information about the sensible world, is entirely unlike anything which can be found anywhere in Plato; and all that we know of his immediate followers seems to show that their tendency was to extend rather than to narrow the sphere in which δόξα is permissible.¹ And, so far as Antisthenes² is concerned, there

¹ Compare what we are told by Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. mathematicos*, vii. 145) about Speusippus' doctrine of ἐπιστημονικὴ αἰσθησις, and (vii. 147) about the views of Xenocrates on δόξα.

² I can see nothing in the accidental prosodical correspondence between ὀψιμαθής and Ἀντισθένης to warrant the view that the words τοῖς τε νέοις καὶ τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὀψιμαθέσι θόλην παρεσκευάκαμεν (*Soph.* 251 b) contain a personal allusion. The reference would be impossible if Antisthenes were dead when the dialogue was written (which is at least probable), and Plato has avoided allowing the allusion to be felt both by inserting the νέοι and choosing a form of ὀψιμαθής, the dative plural, which has no metrically equivalent case in the declension of Ἀντισθένης. Similarly the supposed

is really no evidence at all on which to attribute to him an elaborate theory of knowledge such as Plato ascribes to the εἰδῶν φίλοι. The persons whom Plato describes as attacking the "giants" μάλα εὐλαβῶς ἄνωθεν ἐξ ἀοράτου¹ ποθέν, and as easier to convince because they are ἡμερώτεροι, ought never to have been confused with the ἀπαίδευτοι of Aristotle; they are manifestly a body of subtle dialecticians. Moreover, on any one of these three suppositions it would be hard to explain the prominence given to Parmenides and the Eleatic following in general in connection with their criticisms. Why should the refutation of Plato himself, or of some followers of Plato unknown to history, or of Antisthenes, be dangerously like laying unfilial hands on "father Parmenides"?

Still it does not follow that because Plato's ultimate object is to meet the attacks of a set of thinkers who were flourishing forty years after the death of Socrates, there were no representatives of the view in question in Socrates' own time; and if we read the *Sophistes* carefully we may perhaps find out something about them. From 248 b we learn that Theaetetus, who is assumed to be a μειράκιον (*Theaetetus* 142 c) at the time of the conversation, which was held in 399 just before the trial of Socrates (ib. 210 d), might probably not have sufficient acquaintance with the

reference to Aristippus at *Philebus* 67 b (οὐδ' ἂν οἱ πάντες βόες τε καὶ ἵπποι καὶ τᾶλλα σύμπαντα θηρία φῶσι) is purely fanciful, since the doctrine attacked is shown by the allusions of Aristotle to be that of Eudoxus, and Aristippus as the head of a school seems to be a creation of the moderns. In the ancient world the "Cyrenaics" seem to have been unknown as a sect before the younger Aristippus. Plutarch expressly distinguishes them as contemporaries of Epicurus from his predecessors, who include not only Plato and Aristotle, but Theophrastus and Stilpo (*Adversus Colotem* 1120 c, and compare Eusebius, *P.E.* xiv. 31). Note how differently Plato proceeds in the myth of Er, where he plainly *does* mean "Ardiaeus" the Great to be a disguise for Archelaus. The names correspond in their first syllable, and very closely in their vocalisation, and the careers are made to correspond almost as carefully as the names. He makes the identification so obvious that the average reader can hardly miss it, not so obscure that it takes a German professor to discover it.

¹ Contrast the well-known anecdote of Antisthenes' objection to Plato, ἵππον μὲν ὀρῶ, ἱππότητα δ' οὐκ ὀρῶ.

persons in question to know how they would meet criticism of their views, but the Eleatic stranger can answer definitely for them on the ground of his personal knowledge of them, διὰ συνήθειαν. Now this stranger has already been introduced as a member of the school of Parmenides and Zeno (ἐταῖρον τῶν ἀμφὶ Παρμενίδην καὶ Ζήνωνα [ἐταίρων], *Sophistes* 216 a), but not sharing in the undue tendency of many of the school to "eristic." It seems to be meant that he is an actual disciple of Zeno or Parmenides or both, a thing which the data of the *Parmenides* show to be chronologically possible, and which is also suggested by the extreme personal reverence he feels for "his father Parmenides."¹ Where he comes from we are not told, though we learn that his family was native in Elea, and that (see note below) he had lived there as a boy. Thus Plato definitely assumes the existence, in the latter days of Socrates, of a school, apparently deriving from that of Parmenides, who maintained that all knowledge is knowledge of νοητὰ καὶ ἀσώματα εἶδη which are eternal and unchanging, and that all sensible existence is mere γένεσις of which we have no knowledge at all. In holding this view the school were, of course, following in the steps of Parmenides himself, who roundly asserts more than once that "there is no truth" in the δόξαι βροτῶν, though they have advanced upon him by substituting "bodiless forms" and their relations with one another for the spherical "One" as the object of knowledge (i.e. they are pretty definitely a school of mathematicians, half-Pythagorean and half-Eleatic). The reader will see at once to what all this points. That there was a group of such half-Parmenidean thinkers at Megara, for one place, in the year of Socrates' death, and that two of them, Euclides and Terpsion, were among the intimates of Socrates is certain, and is, in fact, about all we know of the so-called "Megarian" school before the time of Polyxenus, Bryson and Helicon, who

¹ Actual discipleship of Parmenides seems to be implied at 237 a Παρμενίδης δὲ ὁ μέγας, ὦ παῖ, παισὶν ἡμῖν οὖσιν ἀρχόμενός τε καὶ διὰ τέλους τοῦτο ἀπεμαρτύρητο, περὶ τε ᾧδε (i.e. in conversation) ἐκάστοτε λέγων καὶ μετὰ μέτρων.

figure in Plato's correspondence, and the first of whom, according to a well-known passage in Alexander's commentary on the *Metaphysics*, achieved a name as a critic of Platonism. It is the fact that these ultra-rationalists were historically descended from Eleaticism which explains why they cannot be answered in the *Sophistes* without a critical examination of Parmenides himself, and why their point of view, when Plato wants to express it in the most forcible way, is put into the mouths of Parmenides and Zeno in person.

We may now finally state our suggested interpretation of the passage we have been discussing. Its source is the account of the *εἰδῶν φίλοι* in the *Sophistes*, with perhaps the addition of the opening pages of the *Parmenides*. The Socrates of the sentence is, of course, the "real" Socrates, but he is the "real Socrates" as known to Aristotle from the whole series of dialogues in which the doctrine of *μέθεξις* is propounded. That he *οὐ χωριστὰ ἐποίει τὰ καθόλου* means that throughout Plato's dialogues, from the first to the last, he insisted on that positive relation of sensible facts to supra-sensible concepts which makes "right belief" about matters of experience possible, and permits at any rate of an approximate cosmology; those who "first said these are *ιδέαι*" are the unnamed *εἰδῶν φίλοι* of the *Sophistes*, who are in fact discriminated from Plato by Aristotle on the ground that they did not hold his view that these *εἶδη* are "numbers"; (it would be interesting to know whether this is a fact, or whether, what is at least as likely, Aristotle merely inferred it from the absence of any reference to the doctrine in the *Sophistes*;) the *οἱ δ' ἐχώρισαν* means precisely what Plato means when he speaks of the absolute gulf set up by the *εἰδῶν φίλοι* between the *γένεσις* with which we have communion through our body in sensation, and the unchanging relations of the bodiless *εἶδη* which are the sole objects of knowledge. The distinction is thus not made between Plato and Socrates, but between two parties both known to Aristotle from the pages of Plato, Socrates on the one side and the

"friends of εἶδη" who were personally intimate with the unnamed "stranger from Elea" on the other. Aristotle, indeed, held that Plato had laid himself open to the same criticism as these εἰδῶν φίλοι because he had never succeeded in giving anything more than a metaphorical account of the all-important relation of μέθεξις, but this does not alter the fact that his observation is meant in the first place to refer to Socrates as he appears in the pages of Plato, and asserts nothing which was not included in the Platonic tradition.

I conclude, then, that there is no evidence that Aristotle's statements about the views of Socrates rest on any authority except the tradition created for the Academy by the Platonic dialogues, and that, if he is allowed to count as a witness to anything, it must be to the absence in the latter half of the fourth century of any view of Socrates other than that presented by Plato. We have therefore a right to claim his testimony, such as it is, in favour of the view that Plato's dramatic portraiture of Socrates is, in all essentials, thoroughly historical.

NOTE

I hope it will not be ascribed to disrespect that I have made no reference in the text of my essay to Professor Bywater's recent remarks on Σωκράτης and ὁ Σωκράτης in his commentary on the *Poetics* (note on 1454 a 30). With regard to use of the article in the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* I must leave the examples cited in the text to speak for themselves, especially as Professor Bywater does not apparently take into account the varying usage with other names of *historical* persons, and it seems idle to me to attempt to lay down any rule until this has been examined. His statement that in the *Politics* ὁ Σωκράτης "is regularly used for the Socrates in Plato's dialogues," seems to me to involve a *petitio principii* until it has been shown independently that Aristotle consciously distinguished this "Socrates" from the historical Socrates. The only way to show this would be to prove that Aristotle attributes to Socrates views which are inconsistent with those ascribed by Plato to "Socrates." I have tried to argue that this is so far from being the case that every view ascribed by Aristotle to Socrates comes straight out of the mouth of "Socrates." If my contention has been made out, the whole theory that Aristotle made a distinction

between the two Socrates falls to the ground, since *Σωκράτης* will mean *both* Plato's Socrates and the *real* Socrates. So will the remark that the *ὁ Ἀριστοφάνης* of *Pol. B* 1262 b 11 "means the Aristophanes in Plato's *Symposium*." It is true, of course, that Aristotle is quoting from the *Symposium*, but the fact is of no moment unless you can prove that he is intentionally discriminating between the character who speaks there and the author of the comedies, and there is nothing in his text which throws any light on the point. He may have held that Plato simply invented the speech, or he may have held that such a gathering as that described by Plato took place (which is likely enough), and that Aristophanes really said something like the remark ascribed to him by Plato. And here, again, it *may* be the case that Plato *is* partly building up his speech out of real fragments of Aristophanes' table talk, or it may not. We have no means of deciding such a question. I, for one, should certainly not have felt justified in assuming that Aristophanes did actually make this special remark if Aristotle had happened to attribute it to *Ἀριστοφάνης* without the article. So if a modern writer spoke of "Wolsey's advice to Cromwell to shun ambition," it would be dangerous to assume that he consciously meant to assert that the advice was actually given, merely because he did not explicitly say "Wolsey's advice in *Henry VIII*." *Per contra*, if I say "Brutus in Shakespeare does so and so," I am not necessarily to be understood as implying that it is *only* in Shakespeare that Brutus does the act.

III

THE ΔΙΣΣΟΙ ΛΟΓΟΙ

THERE are several passages in Plato which show us that the type of the contentious *ἐριστικός* of whom Aristotle had so bad an opinion, was, or was assumed by Plato to be, in existence before the death of Socrates, and that the opinion that the "eristic men" of whom we hear both in Aristotle and in the later dialogues of Plato are Megarians or Cynics contemporary with Plato's manhood, who owed their existence to the popularity of Socrates' own particular art of "dialectic," must be correspondingly modified. Thus in the *Phaedo*, when Socrates utters his warning against *μισολογία*, he observes that it is precisely those who have been most occupied in the construction of antinomies who are most in danger of ending as sceptics and misologists. *καὶ μάλιστα δὴ οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρίψαντες οἴσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντες οἴονται σοφώτατοι γεγενῆναι καὶ κατανεοηκέναι μόνοι ὅτι οὔτε τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιᾶς οὔτε βέβαιον οὔτε τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πάντα [ὄντα] ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ἐν Εὐρίπῳ ἄνω κάτω στρέφεται καὶ χρόνον οὐδένα ἐν οὐδενὶ μένει* (90 c). And he goes on immediately to say that his own attitude towards the *λόγος* of the immortality of the soul, which seems at the moment to be endangered by the criticisms of Simmias and Cebes, differs in one little point from that of an *ἀντιλογικός*; his concern is not to talk for victory, but to arrive at truth, *καὶ ἐγὼ μοι δοκῶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοσοῦτον μόνον ἐκείνων διοίσειν· οὐ γὰρ ὅπως τοῖς παροῦσιν ἂ ἐγὼ λέγω δόξει ἀληθῆ εἶναι προθυμήσομαι*,

εἰ μὴ εἴη πάρεργον, ἀλλ' ὅπως αὐτῷ ἐμοὶ ὅτι μάλιστα δόξει οὕτως ἔχειν (91 a). It is obvious that constructors of ἀντιλογικοὶ λόγοι, antinomies, which aim merely at victory, are here alluded to as a well-known contemporary class, and that it would be absurd to suppose that Socrates means his allusion to touch two friends who are both, according to the dialogue, among the audience, Euclides and Antisthenes. ἀντιλογία then, Plato assumes, is a well-known trick in the age of Socrates, and certainly does not originate in a perversion of the Socratic elenchus by Euclides or Antisthenes. We meet the same set of persons again at the opening of the *Sophistes*, where we are told of the stranger from Elea that "his family is of Elea, and he is an associate of Parmenides and Zeno, but a very genuine philosopher" (μάλα δὲ ἄνδρα φιλόσοφον). The very expression singularly reminds us of Boswell's "Mr. Johnson, I do indeed come from Scotland, but I cannot help it," and distinctly suggests that you would not immediately suppose that a person of the antecedents specified was μάλα φιλόσοφος unless you were expressly told so.¹ What you would expect may be gathered from the following sentences. Socrates is afraid that a pupil of Zeno will prove a "very devil in logic-chopping" (θεὸς ὢν τις ἐλεγκτικός) far above the level of the present company, until Theodorus reassures him by the information that the newcomer is more reasonable to deal with than the enthusiasts for controversy (μετρίωτερος τῶν περὶ τὰς ἔριδας ἐσπουδακόντων, 216 b). Plato thus definitely connects the rise of Eristic not with the elenchus of Socrates but with the antinomies of Zeno. It is in the same spirit that he speaks of Zeno in the well-known passage, *Phaedrus* 261 d, as the "Yea-and-Nay of Elea" (τὸν Ἐλεατικὸν Παλαμήδην, where the commentators should point out that the jest lies in a hinted derivation of the name from πάλιν and μῆδομαι²),

¹ When we remember that the speaker is one of Iamblichus's Pythagoreans, we see what this means. The stranger is a φιλόσοφος in the sense of the *Gorgias* and *Phaedo*, a follower of the "narrow way that leadeth unto life."

² It is exactly the same thing which Timon of Phlius expressed less neatly

and Aristotle was only repeating what was evidently the Academic school tradition when he said that Zeno was the originator of Dialectic. As every one knows, Plato has drawn a lively satiric picture of a couple of the *περὶ τὰς ἔριδας ἐσπουδακότες* in his *Euthydemus*, and, as usual, the attempt has been made to find the omnipresent Antisthenes behind the satire. But if Plato is correct in assuming that men of this sort were a recognised class before the end of the fifth century, there is really no need to suspect the presence of Antisthenes whenever one comes on the traces of one of those wonderful *ἀντιλογικοί* who maintained *ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι ψευδῆ λέγειν*. It is fortunate, therefore, that we should still possess a large portion of a work by an "Eristic" which may be even earlier than the death of Socrates, and from which we see that Plato's assumption as to the comparatively early origin of the *ἀντιλογικοί λόγοι* is historical. What I propose to do in the few pages which follow is to show that we have in the *δισσοὶ λόγοι* such a specimen of early eristic which exhibits at once signs of Eleatic origin and of considerable Socratic influence. I hope by its aid also to throw a little additional light on the famous exordium of Isocrates' *Encomium of Helen*.

There are two reasons why it seems worth while to look for traces of Socratic thought, or ideas akin to Socraticism, in the anonymous and fragmentary *δισσοὶ λόγοι*, formerly entitled by Stephanus, for no very obvious reason, *Dialexeis*.¹ The work is, in any case, that of a member of some "philosophical" or "sophistic" circle contemporary with the closing years of the life of Socrates. The date is indicated by i. 8 (Diels, *Vorsokratiker*,² ii. 1. 636), where *ἀ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων νίκα ἂν ἐνίκων Ἀθηναίως καὶ τὼς συμμάχως* is referred to as the "most recent" (*τὰ νεώτατα*) example of a considerable war. The work was thus composed at

when he spoke of

*ἀμφοτερογλώσσον τε μέγα σθένος οὐκ ἀλαπαδνόν
Ζήνωνος πάντων ἐπιλήπτορος.*

¹ I shall appeal throughout to the text given at the end of Diels's *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*,² ii. 1.

the latest not long after 404, and possibly before the death of Socrates, since the writer evidently knows nothing of the expedition of Cyrus (401), nor of the war between Sparta and Elis (399). Further, the dialect of the work is Dorian, and its special peculiarities are said (with how much ground I do not feel competent to judge,) to point to the Argolid or its neighbourhood (then why not Megara or Phlius?) as its origin. Since the author's method throughout is the formal construction of antinomies, the facts strongly suggest that we are dealing, as Diels says, not with an epideixis by a wandering sophist, but with a formal lecture, a *Schulvortrag*, delivered by a "professor" resident in a Dorian-speaking town.¹ Whether the town were Megara

¹ The suggestion that the work was composed in Cyprus seems to me unhappy. Cyprus before Evagoras had established himself firmly at Salamis does not seem a likely place for "sophists," and the one reference to Cyprus in the text makes, if anything, against rather than for the theory, v. 5 τὰ γὰρ τῆδ' ἐόντα ἐν ταῖς Λιβύαις οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδέ γε τὰ ἐν ταῖς Λιβύαις ἐν Κόπρῳ. This is much as if one should say "What is here is not in Cape Town, and what is in Cape Town is not in New York." A writer who was actually in New York would hardly express himself thus, and the argument gains by supposing that three places are considered, "here," "Libya," "Cyprus," as you then get two distinct illustrations of the writer's point, whereas if "here" is Cyprus, you only have one, the proposition "what is in Libya is not in Cyprus" being then inferable, as a simple converse, from "what is here is not in Libya." From vi. 8, where the existence of Ἀναξαγόρειοι καὶ Πυθαγόρειοι is given as an argument in favour of the view that "wisdom and virtue can be taught," we may perhaps infer that these two schools of philosophy were those best known to the author. Argos, Sicyon, Phlius are all well represented in the list of Iamblichus. Cyprus, I need hardly say, is not there. Neither is Megara, though Euclides and his friends, from their connection with Parmenides, would probably have been roughly put down by the generality as Pythagoreans of a sort. That Polyclitus should be the only instance given of a τεχνίτης who taught his τέχνη to his son, tells perhaps in favour of Argos. The Ἀναξαγόρειοι are presumably those of Athens, of whom Archelaus was the head after the banishment of Anaxagoras himself. They occur as a well-known sect in Plato, *Cratylus* 409 b. Anaxagoras, in fact, would be, before the rise of the Σωκρατικοί, the latest example of a philosopher who had a regular band of pupils called after his name at Athens.

(I may take this opportunity of observing that, though Plato speaks so strongly in the *Phaedo* of the influence of Anaxagoras as decisive at the critical moment of Socrates' early life, he always avoids saying anything about any personal meeting between the two. The temptation to bring them together, as he has brought Socrates into company with Parmenides,

or Phlius or Sicyon or another is of no special moment. The important point is simply that it is a specimen of the kind of reasoning which Plato and Aristotle ascribe to the "eristics," and that it shows us what the kind of thing which Plato has reproduced in a glorified form in the *Hypotheses* of the *Parmenides* could sink to in the hands of a thoroughly common-place practitioner of the art. One may add, as minor personal touches, that the writer had read his Herodotus, and seems, as we should expect, to have a special familiarity with Euripides, from whom some of his examples, which have been mostly noted by Diels, appear to be taken. Thus the general conception that we are everywhere in life confronted with a pair of λόγοι, each destructive of the other, itself, as Blass notes, seems to allude to Euripides *Fr.* 189 (from the *Antiope*) ἐκ παντὸς ἂν τις πράγματος δισσῶν λόγων | ἀγῶνα θεῖτ' ἂν εἰ λέγειν εἴη σοφός, and this in turn to take us back to the well-known assertion of Protagoras that "there are two sides to every case" (δύο λόγους περὶ παντὸς πράγματος, ἀντικειμένους ἀλλήλοις). Even the obvious illustration of the alleged identity of καλόν and αἰσχρόν, that it is καλόν at Sparta, but αἰσχρόν

Zeno, Cratylus, Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, Thrasymachus, would naturally have been so strong, and the assumption that Socrates never did meet such a prominent figure of the Periclean circle is so apparently strange, that I can only account for Plato's making it on the supposition that he knew it to be a fact that Anaxagoras and Socrates, for some unexplained reason, had not met. E.g. I cannot understand why he should represent Socrates as only having learned the views of Anaxagoras about νοῦς from hearing "some one" (no doubt Archelaus) read his book, when it would have been so natural to describe him as hearing Anaxagoras expound the theory in person, unless from pure regard to fact. This is only one of the curious little points which constantly arise to perplex one who will not believe that Plato's veracity about details has a *prima facie* claim to be admitted until he has been found falsifying them. Let me mention just one other, at the cost of a line or two of irrelevance. There is no more pathetic touch in Plato than the fidelity with which he clings to the memory of his kinsman Critias. Anyone who compares his handling of Critias with his treatment of Alcibiades will see at once that Plato has a personal kindness for the one which he never exhibits towards the other. Of Critias he will say nothing but what can be said to his credit. Yet he never yields to the temptation to give Critias anything like the place of Alcibiades in the heart of his Socrates. For he knew the facts, and ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.)

everywhere among Ionians for the girls to practise "exercises," and to march about "with bare arms and no shifts" (*ἀχειριδῶτως καὶ ἀχίτωνας παρέρπεν*, ii. 9), may be a poetical reminiscence of the violences of Euripides' Peleus, οὐδ' ἂν εἰ βούλοιτό τις | σῶφρων γένοιτο Σπαρτιατίδων κόρη | αἰ ξὺν νέοισιν ἐξερημοῦσαι δόμους | γυμνοῖσι μηροῖς καὶ πέπλοις ἀναιμένοις | δρόμους παλαίστρας τ' οὐκ ἀνασχετοὺς ἐμοὶ | κοινὰς ἄγουσι, *Andromache* 595, especially since, as Diels notes, we have directly below (ii. 11) the further instance that the Thessalians think it a point of manhood to break in a horse for yourself, and to know how to kill and cut up an ox, whereas in Sicily this is αἰσχρόν and work for menials. The reference here seems plainly to be to Euripides, *Electra* 815 ἐκ τῶν καλῶν κομποῦσι τοῖσι Θεσσαλοῖς | εἶναι τόδ' ὅστις ταῦρον ἄρταμει καλῶς | ἵππους τ' ὀχμάζει. Of the "older poets" he quotes Aeschylus and Cleobuline. Any conjecture we may form as to the ultimate purport of his discourse must necessarily be deferred until we have examined its contents in some detail, as it is mutilated at the end (and possibly at the beginning, as it opens without any adequate prooemium). What we possess of the work is an excellent example of the "two arguments" which the "thinkers" in general are charged by Aristophanes with keeping on their premises. It is true, as we have said, that the possession of ἄμφω τὸ λόγῳ was a common accusation against *all* the wits, and that it is sometimes made a special charge against Protagoras. But the real origin of the whole thing was, as far as we can judge, Eleatic. It was the logical acumen of the "Yea-and-Nay of Elea" which made this kind of reasoning popular, and we have an excellent example of it in what we know of the argumentation of Gorgias in his work *περὶ φύσεως ἢ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος*, the Eleatic origin of which is unmistakable. This is a further reason for referring the *δισσοὶ λόγοι* to a school which drew its inspiration from Elea; and if we can find marks in the treatise of connection with Socraticism, it becomes all the easier for us to understand Aristophanes' ascription of the "two arguments" to

him. That Aristophanes' burlesque was a mere unfounded calumny is, in the nature of the case, most improbable.

I would further suggest that the work throws some light on the exordium of Isocrates' *Helena*. Isocrates there attacks three classes of triflers (*Helena* § 1)—(a) those who maintain that it is impossible to speak falsely, or to utter a contradiction or to "deliver two contradictory discourses" (δύο λόγῳ ἀντειπεῖν) about the same matter (περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων); (b) those who say that "courage and wisdom and justice are one and the same," and that we possess none of them φύσει, but that there is "one science of them all"; (c) the "eristics" (ἄλλοι δὲ περὶ τὰς ἔριδας διατρίβουσι; cf. Plato's περὶ τὰς ἔριδας ἐσπουδακότες).¹ It was at one time held (e.g. by Thompson in his edition of the *Phaedrus*, p. 175 ff.) that the allusions were to three eminent "Socratic men"—Antisthenes, Plato, Euclides. The identification must, however, be mistaken, at least as regards Plato, since Isocrates expressly says that the persons to whom he is referring have "grown grey" in the defence of their paradoxes. But, as Blass has shown, the *Helena* must be one of the earliest works of Isocrates, and belongs therefore to a time when Plato was on the sunny side of forty; to which I would add that if the *Helena* had been written when Plato was an elderly man, it must be later in date than the *Republic* (which, as

¹ For convenience' sake I quote the whole passage, Isocrates x. 1 εἰσι τινες οἱ μέγα φρονούσιν ἣν ὑπόθεσιν ἀτοπον καὶ παράδοξον ποιησάμενοι περὶ ταύτης ἀνεκτῶς εἰπεῖν δυνηθῶσι· καὶ καταγεγραμμάσιν οἱ μὲν οὐ φάσκοντες οἶόν τ' εἶναι ψευδῆ λέγειν οὐδ' ἀντιλέγειν, οὐδὲ δύο λόγῳ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων ἀντειπεῖν, οἱ δὲ διεξιόντες ὡς ἀνδρία καὶ σοφία καὶ δικαιοσύνη ταυτὸν ἐστί, καὶ φύσει μὲν οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἔχομεν, μία δ' ἐπιστήμη καθ' ἅπαντων ἐστίν· ἄλλοι δὲ περὶ τὰς ἔριδας διατρίβουσι τὰς οὐδὲν μὲν ὠφελοῦσας, πράγματα δὲ παρέχειν τοῖς πλησιάζουσι δυναμένας. 2 ἐγὼ δ' εἰ μὲν εὐρων νεωστὶ τὴν περιεργίαν ταύτην ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐγγεγεννημένην καὶ τούτους ἐπὶ τῇ καινότητι τῶν εὐρημένων φιλοτιμουμένους, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως ἐθαύμαζον αὐτῶν· νῦν δὲ τίς ἐστιν οὕτως ὀψιμαθής [Plato then has not devised this epithet in the *Sophistes* to suggest the name Antisthenes, but taken it over from a much earlier work by a well-known contemporary], ὅστις οὐκ οἶδε Πρωταγόραν καὶ τοὺς κατ' ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον γενομένους σοφιστὰς ὅτι καὶ τοιαῦτα καὶ πολλὰ πραγματωδέστερα συγγράμματα κατέλιπον ἡμῶν; (The σοφισταὶ contemporary with Protagoras are then identified in the next section with Gorgias, Zeno, and Melissus.)

I may have an opportunity to argue elsewhere, was written before 388/387), and that the doctrine of the identity of all the virtues could not have been ascribed to the author of the *Republic* in this unqualified way, even in a hostile caricature. We seem therefore forced to suppose that Socrates himself, along perhaps with other members of the *Phaedo* group, is one of the persons attacked by Isocrates, and it is no reason for suspecting this identification to urge that the tense of *καταγεγηράκασι* implies that the person intended must actually have been alive, since the plural would naturally include not only Socrates but any of his more elderly associates who continued to repeat his doctrine.¹ Hence the other two classes of triflers, (b) and (c), must be thought of also as belonging to the same time as Socrates. This is completely in accord with Plato, who represents the *ἀντιλογικοί* as well known in the time of Socrates (*Phaedo* 90 b, *Sophistes* 216 b, *Euthydemus* passim), and ascribes the doctrine *ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ψευδὴ λέγειν* not only to Euthydemus, but, in the *Sophistes*, to a class assumed to be numerous at the supposed date of the conversation. The *δισσοὶ λόγοι* equally prove the existence of such a class circa 400 B.C.; and I think the language of the *Helena* §§ 3–4 suggests that Isocrates regards all the doctrines which he derides as those of the generation

¹ Very similar is the explanation of Blass, who takes Antisthenes to be aimed at as the person who rejected the principle of contradiction, but thinks it *possible* that Plato may be the person who held that all virtues are one. According to Blass, this does not demand, what is on other grounds impossible, a late date for the *Helena*, since *καταγεγηράκασι* need only refer to the first person named, i.e., on Blass's interpretation, Antisthenes. I have already explained that this identification appears to me groundless, since there is plenty of evidence that the doctrine *οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν* goes back to the fifth century. Moreover all the alleged personal attacks of the *Theaetetus* and *Sophistes* on Antisthenes vanish under careful scrutiny. I do not believe that any personal name is concealed under the *ὀψιμαθῆς γέρον* of the *Sophistes*; if there is an allusion it is probably to *Ἰσοκράτης*, and Plato is referring to the sport made in the *Helena* over the logicians and their disputes. Blass's general argument for dating the *Helena* not later than 393 (*Attische Beredsamkeit*,² i. 75 note 1) seems to me irresistible. With these dates, the attack may well be specially on Socrates as represented in the *Phaedo* and *Protagoras*.

immediately posterior to Zeno and Melissus. This again takes us back to the time of Socrates and the *δισσοὶ λόγοι*.¹

To return to the *δισσοὶ λόγοι* itself. The text, as we have it, begins with the remark that there are two contrasted current views about "good" and "bad"; the one is that there is a real distinction between them, the other that they are the "same thing," and that "what is good for one man is bad for another," and the same thing good for the same man at one time and bad at another. Incidentally, I may observe that this abrupt opening appears to prove that our text is mutilated at the beginning, since the antithesis "good-bad" is actually only one of six which are discussed in the sequel. The contrasted views, both of which are very superficially conceived, are, then, (a) the distinction between good and bad is *absolute*, and presupposes a fixed and universal norm, the theory always ascribed to Socrates by Plato; (b) the theory that the distinction is merely *relative* to the particular ends proposed, which is connected by Plato with the *homo mensura* doctrine of Protagoras, and ascribed by Xenophon, as the basis of a purely dialectical argument against Aristippus, to Socrates.² The author declares himself, in respect of this

¹ A further argument for the same conclusion may be founded upon what Isocrates says in *Helena* § 8. The pretenders whom he is denouncing have given such an impetus to the maintenance of falsehood that *by now* (ἤδη) certain persons, "seeing the profit they derive from their profession, have ventured to assert in writing that the life of beggars and exiles is more enviable than any other." This seems to be a direct allusion to Cynicism. If it is so, the Cynics are distinguished from the earlier paradox-mongers whom, according to Isocrates, they have contrived to outdo, and it is therefore not they who are meant by the persons who have grown grey in maintaining *ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν*. (τοσοῦτον δ' ἐπιδεδωκέναι πεποιήκασι τὸ ψευδολογεῖν, ὥστ' ἤδη τινές, ὁρῶντες τοίτους ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων ὠφελουμένους, τολμῶσι γράφειν ὡς ἔστιν ὁ τῶν πτωχευόντων καὶ φειγόντων βίος ζηλωτότερος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων κτλ.) I take it, then, that the allusions of Isocrates are (a) to the same persons whose denial of the possibility of contradiction is reproduced as one side of the antinomy which pervades the *δισσοὶ λόγοι*, and that the Cynics cannot safely be assumed to be among them; (b) to Socrates, and very probably to the presentation of his personality in the *Phaedo* and *Protagoras*; (c) to the Neo-Eleatics, of whom our writer seems to be one, and who are, as we have seen, referred to by Plato in several places.

² Plato's Socrates is always consistent on this point. There is always a fixed standard with him, though the standard he uses in different dialogues

particular antinomy, on the side of the relativists (ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τοῖσδε ποτιτίθεται, i. 2), but proposes to argue the case by appeal to experience (ἐκ τῷ ἀνθρώπινῳ βίῳ). Thus we get as the

First Antinomy, Thesis: "good" and "bad" are identical (i.e. anything may be either, according to circumstances). *Antithesis:* "good" and "bad" are different in fact as well as in name. The thesis is defended by the ordinary arguments of the relativist, which are, of course, all irrelevant, since no one of them shows that a *determinate* thing belongs to both classes at once. Food, drink, τὰ ἀφροδίσια are good for the healthy, bad for the sick. (This refers principally, of course, to the prevalence of λιμοκτονίη as a feature of the medical treatment in vogue in the fifth century.) "Private vices are public benefits." ἀκρασία is bad for those who practise it, but good for the vendor of luxuries. "Luxury and waste are good for trade." What would doctors and undertakers do if there were no disease or death in the world? A bad harvest at home is the opportunity of the ἔμπορος, the dealer in imported corn. Shipwrecks make good business for the ship-building trade. "It is good for the smith that tools rust and break; good for the potter that crockery is fragile; victory of all kinds is good for the victor, but bad for the vanquished."

may vary with the exigencies of the situation. In general, the standard of moral currency is, as in the *Phaedo*, wisdom. The pretended Hedonism of the *Protagoras* is no exception. Socrates' whole objection there is to the purely relative view of Protagoras that "good" *per se* has no meaning; good means what is relative to an end, and there are as many different standards of good as there are different ends (*Protag.* 334 c, a precise parallel with our argument). It is against that view that Socrates champions the theory of an absolute standard. That this standard is "maximum of pleasure, minimum of pain" he never asserts as his own conviction, but simply as an assumption which the ordinary man will be ready to grant (cf. specially 355-356 c). Xenophon puts the argument, ascribed by Socrates to Protagoras, dogmatically in the mouth of Socrates against Aristippus (*Mem.* iii. 8. 4). If Xenophon's account is historical, the argument of Socrates may have been meant merely to tell *ad hominem*, but it is just as likely that the whole section is a mere confused reminiscence of the passage in the *Protagoras*. Even Xenophon must have been decidedly duller than is commonly assumed if he did not see that the representation of Socrates as a pure relativist in morals would seriously damage the apologetic value of his *Memorabilia*, and the passage is, in fact, quite out of harmony with the general spirit of the work.

All that seems Socratic here is the stress laid on the analogy from the "life of the shoemaker and mechanic." The reasoning of the antithesis is of a different kind, proceeding by *reductio ad absurdum*. If good and bad are the same, then if it is true that "I have done good to my parents or to my city," it will be equally true and on the same grounds that "I have done evil to my parents or to my city." If I pity the poor because they have so hard a lot, I must equally envy them for the same thing, since it is a great good as well as a great evil. If disease is bad for the sufferer, it must equally be good for him, and so forth.

Again the writer expresses sympathy with the argument. "For I think it would never be recognisable what kind of thing is a good and what kind an evil, if they were the same and not different." There is nothing which strikes one as specially Socratic about this reasoning except perhaps the cautious remark with which the *reductio ad absurdum* ends, that the author does not mean to assert any positive doctrine as to what "good" is, but merely to deny that it is the same thing as "bad" (καὶ οὐ λέγω τί ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο πειρώμαι διδάσκειν, ὥς οὐ τῶντὸν [εἶη] τὸ κακὸν καὶ τἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἐκάτερον). This is precisely the sort of conclusion we get in many of the Platonic dialogues, e.g. in the *Theaetetus*, where the final result is that we do not know what knowledge *is*, but have satisfied ourselves that it is not the same as sensation, nor yet as right opinion. The apagogic reasoning is of the Zenonian type copied by Plato repeatedly in the *Hypotheses* of the *Parmenides*.¹

¹ It should be observed that throughout the first five antinomies at least, each antinomy is simply a case of the standing "sophistic" antithesis between *φύσις* and *νόμος*. The thesis is regularly that a certain difference, marked in common language, is a merely verbal distinction (exists only *νόμῳ*, or, as our author puts it, there is only a difference in the *ὄνομα*, not in the *πράγμα* = *φύσει*). The antithesis asserts that the distinction is real, not merely verbal (exists in the *πράγμα* = *φύσει*). This distinction of *φύσις* and *νόμος* is commonly set down, in a vague way, as "sophistic," but it ought to be noted that, while latent in all early Greek thought, it first becomes explicit in Parmenides, when we meet for the first time the sharp distinction between *ἀληθείη* = *ὄν* = *φύσις*, and the *βροτῶν δόξαι* in which there is no truth at all, but a belief in the reality of distinctions which are purely verbal; *μορφὰς γὰρ κατέθετο δύο γνῶμας ὀνομάζειν* (i.e. men have given two names where there is only the one reality).

Second Antinomy. Thesis: καλόν and αἰσχρόν are identical (i.e. the difference between them is purely relative).

Study of the Hippocratean works which are dependent on the general theories of the physicists bring out the interesting point that already in the fifth century εἶδος had been appropriated as a term standing to φύσις in the same relation as ὄνομα to convention. Thus we get the view that things are distinct from one another νόμῳ when there is a distinct recognised name for each of them; they differ φύσει or have distinct φύσεις when they have each a special εἶδος, a primary *quiddity* (e.g. if τὸ θερμόν is the εἶδος of one, τὸ ψυχρόν of the other). Cf. Hippocrates περὶ τέχνης, Kühn i. 7, οὐδεμία ἐστὶν (sc. τέχνη) ἢ γε ἐκ τίνος εἶδος οὐκ ὁράται, οἶμαι δ' ἔγωγε καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῆς (leg. αὐτὰς) διὰ τὰ εἶδεα λαβεῖν. ἄλογον γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ εἶδεα ἡγεῖσθαι βλαστάνειν καὶ ἀδύνατον. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὀνόματα φύσις νομοθετήματά ἐστι, τὰ δὲ εἶδεα οὐ νομοθετήματα, ἀλλὰ βλαστήματα. (It should be noted that the writer is under Eleatic influence, for he says, *ib.* above, τὰ μὲν ἔοντα αἰεὶ ὁράται καὶ γινώσκεται, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἔοντα οὔτε ὁράται οὔτε γινώσκεται. εἶδεα then are apparently the fundamental "opposites" τὸ θερμόν, τὸ ξηρόν, etc.; compare the μορφαί of Parmenides.) So, *ib.* 11 ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν τε φνομένων καὶ τῶν ποιενμένων ἐνεστί τὰ εἶδεα τῶν θεραπειῶν καὶ τῶν φαρμάκων, εἶδεα means not "sorts" or "kinds," but "specific virtues." This is clear from the context. The writer is arguing that medicine is a true τέχνη and that even a cure effected without professional aid is not due to accident, τὸ αὐτόματον, but to the fact that the man who recovers had made use of an article of diet, a purge, etc., containing the very "specific virtue" which medicine, as an art, systematically looks for in things. For there is no οὐσία or real essence corresponding to the word "chance," but medicine consists in just such a search for οὐσία. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτόματον οὐ φαίνεται οὐσίην ἔχον οὐδεμίην ἀλλ' ἢ ὄνομα μόνον, but medicine ἐν τοῖς διὰ τε προσοιούμενοις φαίνεται τε καὶ ἔτι φανεῖται οὐσίην ἔχουσα. (Thus οὐσίην ἔχειν = φύσιν ἔχειν or φύσει εἶναι, to exist *in natura rerum*, and the εἶδεα of the φύσει ὄντα investigated by medicine are the healing "properties" or "virtues" specific to the various plants, minerals, etc.)

Compare with this the polemic of the περὶ φύσις ἀνθρώπου against the monists who say that man consists of only one material, blood, Kühn i. 350 νυνὶ δὲ πολλὰ (sc. ἀνθρώπος ἐστὶ)· πολλὰ γὰρ εἰσιν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἔοντα, ἃ ὀκόταν ἐπ' ἀλλήλων παρὰ φύσιν θερμαίνηται τε καὶ ψύχεται καὶ ξηραίνηται τε καὶ ὑγραίνηται νοῦσους τίκτει. ὥστε πολλοὶ μὲν ιδέαι τῶν νοσημάτων πολλὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἴησις αὐτέων ἐστίν. ἀξιώ δὲ ἔγωγε τὸν φάσκοντα αἷμα μόνον τὸν ἀνθρώπον καὶ ἄλλο μὴδὲν δεικνύναι αὐτὸν μὴ μεταλλάσσοντα τὴν ιδέην μὴδὲ γίνεσθαι παντοῖον, ἀλλ' ἢ ὥρην τινὰ τοῦ ἐνιαντοῦ ἢ τῆς ἡλικίης τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐν ἧι αἷμα ἐνεδὸν φαίνεται μόνον ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. *ib.* 353 (man is made of four things) καὶ τούτων πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ τὸν νόμον τὰ ὀνόματα διωρίσθαι φημί καὶ οὐδενὶ αὐτῶν τωὶτὸ ὄνομα εἶναι· ἔπειτα τὰς ιδέας κατὰ φύσιν κεχωρίσθαι, καὶ οὔτε τὸ φλέγμα οὐδὲν εἰκέναι τῷ αἵματι οὔτε τὸ αἷμα τῇ χολῇ οὔτε τὴν χολὴν τῷ φλέγματι. πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἰκότα εἴη ταῦτα ἀλληλοῖσιν, ὧν οὔτε τὰ χρώματα ὁμοία φαίνεται προσορώμενα, οὔτε τῇ χειρὶ ψάοντι ὁμοία δοκέει εἶναι; οὔτε γὰρ θερμὰ ὁμοίως ἐστὶν οὔτε ψυχρὰ οὔτε ξηρὰ οὔτε ὑγρὰ. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν ὅτι τοσούτον διήλλακται ἀλλήλων τὴν ιδέην τε καὶ τὴν δύναμιν μὴ ἐν αὐτὰ εἶναι. Thus here again the ιδέα is (like the εἶδος in the περὶ τέχνης) the objective counterpart *in re*, ἐν τῇ φύσει of the name, ὄνομα, which exists

Antithesis: καλόν and αἰσχρόν are different in fact as well as in name.

The reasoning proceeds as before. The thesis is supported by instances to show that anything and everything may be either καλόν or αἰσχρόν according to circumstances. Thus it is καλόν for a handsome boy ἐραστᾷ χαρίζεσθαι, but αἰσχρόν to do the same thing for one who is not his ἐραστάς (the opposite, it will be remembered, of the paradox of Lysias discussed in the *Phaedrus*, which may conceivably be in the writer's mind); it is αἰσχρόν for a woman to bathe in public, but καλόν for a man to do so; καλόν to have intercourse with her husband in secrecy, but αἰσχρόν to do so in public, and αἰσχιστοῖν for man or woman to commit adultery; it is αἰσχρόν for a man but καλόν for a woman to use cosmetics and jewellery; καλόν to do kindnesses to a friend, αἰσχρόν to do them to an enemy; αἰσχρόν to run in battle, but καλόν to run in a race; αἰσχρόν to slay your fellow-citizens, but καλόν to kill the enemies of the πόλις. So at Sparta it is καλόν for the girls to exercise and go half naked and for the boys not to learn their letters; both are αἰσχροί among Ionians; antenuptial unchastity is καλόν in a Macedonian girl, αἰσχρόν in a Greek girl; among the Thracians, tatooing enhances a girl's beauty, other folk regard it as the punishment of a scoundrel. The Scythians think it καλόν to scalp an enemy and make a drinking-cup of his skull; no Greek would darken the doors of a man

νόμῳ, or, as the scholastics would say, *in intellectu*. The word does not mean in passages like this "visible appearance"; you *prove* that the *ιδέα* of phlegm is different from that of blood by arguing from their sensible differences. Hence the *ιδέα* is that of which the sensible qualities are signs, the *proprietas occulta*, or *natura naturans*, or *substantia*, a regular *Ding an sich*, a Platonic "idea" long before Plato. Hence, in the *περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου* we find as strictly equivalent phrases κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν and τὴν *ιδέην* καὶ τὴν *δύναμιν*, where the *φύσις* or *ιδέα* is the "thing," the *δύναμις* its perceived "character." All this past medical history of the word, resulting in the correspondence or analogy, *ιδέα*: *ὄνομα* = *φύσις*: *νόμος*, explains why Democritus called the atoms *ιδέαι*, and shows us the source of Plato's speculations on the right assignment of names in the *Cratylus*. In another essay I hope to have more to say about the medical use of *εἶδος*, *ιδέα*, and the fundamental importance of the meaning *εἶδος* or *ιδέα* = *body*, a sense too often overlooked, though it actually persists in Plato and Aristotle.

who did such a thing. The Massagetæ eat their fathers, the Persians have intercourse with their mothers, daughters and sisters, the Lydians prostitute their daughters; the Greeks regard all these practices as *αἰσχρά*. So with the differences between the manners of Greeks and Egyptians (it will be seen that the writer is well up in his Herodotus). The conclusion is that if we form an aggregate of all the various *αἰσχρά* and an aggregate of all the *καλά*, we shall find that the two aggregates are identical. Whatever is *καλόν* for some one, or according to the view of some peoples, is *αἰσχρόν* for another, or in the eyes of some other people. *καλόν* and *αἰσχρόν* are, to anticipate Pascal, "geographical expressions." It is amusing to find that much the same conclusion, based on identical reasoning, has been just recently announced by Professor Westermarck from a chair in the University of London as the last word of anthropological "science."

The proof of the antithesis, *καλόν* and *αἰσχρόν* are different in fact as well as in name, proceeds as before. If they were identical, the very same thing which is *καλόν* for a Spartan would also be *αἰσχρόν* for the Spartan, and so forth, but this is absurd. The alleged argument from the identity of the two aggregates is analyzed, not without acuteness. "They say that if men were to make a collection of the *αἰσχρά* from all peoples, and then summon men together and bid each carry off what he thinks *καλόν*, everything would be carried off as *καλόν*. I should be much surprised if *αἰσχρά* when formed into an aggregate turn out to be *καλά*, and do not keep the character with which they came into the collection. Surely, if what had been brought together were horses or oxen or sheep or men, what was taken away again would be no other, any more than if gold or silver were brought into the heap, copper or lead could be taken from it." That is, the argument of the thesis is a fallacy of composition. That which is *Λακεδαιμονίῳ αἰσχρόν* does not cease to be so, merely because it is *καλόν Μακεδόνι* or *Πέρσαι*. It does not become *καλόν Λακεδαιμονίῳ* by the mere process of being included in the

aggregate of things which are καλά to some one. I do not observe anything particularly Socratic about the reasoning of this antinomy, and the image of the formation of the great aggregate of καλά or αἰσχροῖς reminds one more of the κεγχρίτης of Zeno (Aristotle, *Physics*, H 250 a 19) than of anything else. It is, however, interesting that ἐπάγεσθαι, which we have already found in Hippocrates as apparently a *terminus technicus* for "backing up" an argument by an appeal to independent testimony, is known in the same sense to our author, since the antithesis ends by commenting on an appeal to an unknown poet, probably Euripides, which had occurred in the thesis, ποιητὰς δὲ μάρτυρας ἐπάγονται <οἱ> ποτὶ ἄδονάν, οὐ ποτ' ἀλάθειαν ποιεῖντι, "they bring in to back up their reasoning the poets, whose standard in composing is not the true but the pleasing."

Third Antinomy. Thesis: just and unjust are identical. Antithesis: just and unjust are not identical. Proof of the thesis: lying is just, for one may righteously deceive the enemies of the State, or even one's nearest and dearest; e.g. it is right to get one's parents to take a medicated draught by saying that it is not medicine. Theft and violence are also just; e.g. it would be just to deprive one's friend of a weapon with which he was about to do himself an injury, by trickery, or, if needs be, by physical force. It would be just, in a στάσις, if one's father was lying in prison awaiting death at the hands of the opposite faction, to break into the gaol. Perjury may be just, as in the case of a man who has been forced by the public enemy to swear to commit treason, and then breaks his word. Sacrilege may be just, as, e.g., if Greeks should devote the treasures of Delphi and Olympia to the defence of Hellas against an invasion of barbarians. It may be just, at the bidding of God, to murder one's kindred as Orestes and Alcmaeon did. The induction is further supported by quotations from Aeschylus and Cleobuline.

Antithesis: just and unjust are as really different as their names are (ὥσπερ καὶ τὸννομα οὕτω καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα), since it is absurd to argue that he who commits a crime is *eo ipso* doing a virtuous act, and *vice versa*, or that the more

unjust a man is, the juster he is. The appeal made to the "analogy of the arts," that the best tragic poets or painters are just those who are most skilled in producing illusion, is worthless because there is no ethical principle at stake (*τέχνας δ' ἐπ'ἀγούνται, ἐν αἷς οὐκ ἔστι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἄδίκον*). And the poets, again, may be dismissed, since the standard on which they base their judgments is merely the taste of their audiences.

The genuinely "Socratic" character of the arguments adduced for the thesis of this antinomy seems indisputable. Trieber and Diels have pointed out that the reasoning is in the main identical with that of Xenophon (*Memorabilia* iv. 2. 14-18). Not only are the special examples much the same (the inducement of a relative to take medicine by friendly falsehood, the surreptitious or forcible removal of a dangerous weapon from a friend who may make a bad use of it), but the line of argument is precisely similar. We admit that certain practices are just when adopted against an enemy, and then show that there are cases in which the same conduct would be equally just in dealing with a friend (e.g. it is fair in a general not only to mislead the enemy, but to put heart into his own men by falsely telling them that reinforcements are close at hand). The same argument, and one of the same illustrations, that of the removal of the weapon, recurs in Plato at *Republic* i. 331, with exactly the same object of proving that the distinction between just and unjust conduct does not depend on the question whether the party affected is "the enemy"; and it is the same point which crops up again at 382 d in the notion of the "medicinal lie," so that we can hardly doubt that in all three cases we are dealing with echoes of the actual talk of the historical Socrates. In the antithesis we have further, if I am not mistaken, traces of polemic against the main ethical tenet of Socrates. In Plato and Xenophon the real object of Socrates' casuistry is to show from the inefficacy of popular conceptions the necessity of an "art" or "science" of good and evil by means of which it can be determined by the trained "craftsman" what line

of conduct is "just" and what "unjust." A trace of this conception of morality as a *τέχνη* appears in our author when he appeals to the "arts" in support of the view that deceit is just because "in the drama and in painting" he who produces the completest illusion is the best artist, ὅστις <κα> πλεῖστα ἐξαπατῇ ὅμοια τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς ποιέων οὗτος ἄριστος, iii. 10. Compare the attack on the *μιμητής* in *Republic* x.

Fourth Antinomy. Thesis: false discourse and true discourse are identical. *Antithesis:* false discourse and true discourse are not identical. The view argued in the thesis is that there is no *intrinsic* difference between true and false discourse; the difference is *extrinsic* and lies in correspondence or want of correspondence with "fact" (*πρᾶγμα*). In the antithesis it is urged that there is an *intrinsic* as well as an *extrinsic* difference between the two. The thesis is proved as follows. The same λόγος, or form of words, may be at once true and false. The λόγος or discourse is the same in both cases, but it is true when "things have happened as the words state," false when they have not so happened (ὅταν λόγος ῥηθῇ, αἱ μὲν ὧς <κα> λέγεται ὁ λόγος, οὕτω γεγένηται, ἀλαθὴς ὁ λόγος, αἱ δὲ μὴ γεγένηται, ψευδὴς ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, iv. 2). Thus, you accuse some one of *ἱεροσυλία*: "if the deed happened, the discourse is true; if the deed did not happen, it is false." So, if each of a company says, "I am a *μύστας*," they all utter the same words, but it may be that I only speak the truth, because I happen to be the only person who has really gone through the ceremony of *μύησις*. The conclusion is that the same discourse is false when falsehood is present to it (ὅταν μὲν αὐτῷ παρῇ τὸ ψεῦδος); but when truth is present to it, it is true (ὅταν δὲ τὸ ἀλαθές, ἀλαθής), just as the same man is successively a boy, a lad, a man, and a greybeard.

Antithesis: false and true discourse differ intrinsically and absolutely. For (1) otherwise whenever you tell the truth you are also telling a lie. (This is like the modern argument against those who maintain that all truths are partially false, that, if they are consistent, they must also hold that the statement "all truths are partially false" is

itself partially false.¹) (2) The very assertion of the thesis that "if the thing happened, the λόγος is true; if it did not happen, it is false," shows that the difference between truth and falsehood is one of πράγμα, not of ὄνυμα (i.e. the distinction between true and false rests on an objective foundation). (3) Dicasts, who have not been present at τὰ πράγματα, the facts in dispute between the parties to a law-suit, can yet distinguish between a true narrative and a false one. (The argument is apparently mutilated just after this, but the point seems to be that if there were only an extrinsic difference between true and false, only one who had been an eyewitness of the πράγματα in dispute could tell whether it is "the true" or "the false" which is "present" to the discourse. The ability of dicasts to judge of the truth of a narrative about events which they have not personally witnessed shows this consequence to be absurd, and therefore destroys the hypothesis on which it is based. The reasoning is thus, as in the previous cases, apagogic.)

Fragmentary as this section of the δισσοὶ λόγοι is, it seems to me to have a threefold interest.

(1) It makes it abundantly clear that the puzzles and paradoxes about predication which Plato treats humorously in the *Euthydemus* and seriously in the *Theaetetus* and *Sophistes*, were actually familiar in the lifetime of Socrates, and therefore likely enough to have formed a topic of conversation with him. This, however, is nothing fresh, since, apart altogether from the evidence of Plato, we have already drawn the same conclusion from the opening sentences of Isocrates' *Helena*, where οἱ περὶ τὰς ἐριδας, the persons who deny the possibility of contradiction, and those who hold that all virtue is one, and that there is a single "science" of it all (that is, before every one else, Socrates himself), are bracketed together as mischievous paradox-mongers all belonging to the same age. What our passage seems to add is a valuable light on the history of the Platonic conception of thought as the "converse of the soul

¹ I make no assumption as to the validity of this reasoning. See Whitehead and Russell, *Principia mathematica*, vol. i. ch. 2, for the view that it is invalid.

with itself." The fullest exposition of this idea does not meet us until the *Philebus* (38 c-40 c), but the thought occurs also at *Theaetetus* 189 c ff. in connection with the very problem of the nature of "false discourse" raised in the *δισσοὶ λόγοι*. According to our thesis, false discourse is identical with true discourse, and the proof of their identity depends wholly upon taking *λόγος* in the sense of verbal utterance. When it is said that *μύστας εἰμί* is one and the same *λόγος*, and yet may both be true when I utter it, and false when you utter it, it is obvious that *λόγος* is understood to mean the spoken sentence, not the meaning it expresses, which is, of course, different with each speaker. Before the arguments about the impossibility of falsehood could be examined, it was necessary to get rid of this implicit fallacy of ambiguity. Hence the stress laid by Plato's Socrates on the conception that the content of a proposition is a "discourse of the soul with herself." The idea, as we can now see, may perfectly well be due to the Socrates of history.

(2) Special attention is due to the phrase "when *τὸ ψεῦδος* is present" (*παρῇ*) to the *λόγος*, then it is false, and when *τὸ ἀλαθές* is present to it, it is true. This expression that predication depends on the "presence" of an *εἶδος* "to" the subject of predication is familiar to us all as one of the technical terms of the Platonic doctrine¹ of *μέθεξις*. *παρουσία* is, in fact, the logical converse of *μέθεξις*. According to the doctrine of the *Phaedo*, if it is true that "I am hot," there is a more ultimate ground for the truth of this proposition. Instead of regarding the predicative statement as ultimate, after the fashion of Aristotle, the *Phaedo* explains that every subject-predicate proposition depends on a more ultimate relational proposition containing no "predicate" at all. If "I am hot," that is because of the

¹ e.g. to illustrate from the *Phaedo* alone, 100 d *ἐάν τις μοι λέγῃ δι' ὃ τι καλὸν ἐστὶν ὁτιοῦν . . . τοῦτο ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀτεχνῶς καὶ ἴσως εὐθύθως ἔχω παρ' ἐμαντῶι, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἶτε παρουσία εἶτε κοινωνία [εἶτε] ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη, 105 c οὐδὲ ἂν ἔρῃ, ὡς ἂν σώματι τί ἐγγένηται, νοσήσει, οὐκ ἐρῶ ὅτι ὡς ἂν νόσος, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν πυρετός· οὐδ' ὡς ἂν ἀριθμῶι τί ἐγγένηται, περιττός ἐσται, οὐκ ἐρῶ ὡς ἂν περιττότης, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν μονάς. Compare the reiterated use of *ὑπομένειν*, *δέξασθαι* throughout the same passage.*

existence of a relation between me and the entity τὸ θερμόν, which may be expressed either by saying "I partake of τὸ θερμόν," or conversely "τὸ θερμόν is present to me." The peculiarity of this view is that it makes all predication logically secondary; the adjective θερμός can only be truly predicated about me, because there is a logically prior relation, which is not that of adjective to substantive, between me and τὸ θερμόν, and τὸ θερμόν is not an adjective but a substantival term or entity. So, from this point of view, "all men are mortal" asserts a relation between every man and τὸ θνητόν "mortality." Its real meaning is "every man possesses mortality," or "mortality is present in every man." This is precisely the view implied in the passage we are considering. τὸ ψεῦδος and τὸ ἀλαθές are regarded as substantival entities, and this is why, in the antithesis, the argument can be turned against the very persons who are said to employ it in support of the view that the difference between a true and a false λόγος is merely verbal or conventional. The point of the rejoinder is that in the act of saying a λόγος is true when τὸ ἀλαθές is present to it, you by implication avow that τὸ ἀλαθές has a φύσις or objective reality of its own, other than that of τὸ ψεῦδος. In fact, the underlying conception of τὸ ἀλαθές, or τὸ ψεῦδος, is exactly the same as that of a Platonic ἰδέα, that it is an entity with a determinate φύσις of its own—is, as the scholastics put it, something *in re*, not *in intellectu tantum*.

The passage thus shows us that the fundamental notion of the "Ideal Theory," together with a characteristic piece of its technical terminology, was familiar possibly before the death of Socrates, and may be adduced, along with the evidence of the *περὶ ἀρχαίης ἱητρικῆς*, and much more from the Hippocratean corpus, which I reserve for another place, to show how contrary to fact is the popular notion that Plato invented *ex nihilo* the doctrine of εἶδη or the technical terms in which it is expressed.

(3) It is also important that the argument of the antithesis for an intrinsic difference between truth and falsehood is supported by an example which is twice made

prominent in Plato, though with him for a rather different object, the establishment of the distinction between knowledge and right opinion. In *Theaetetus* 201 b ff. the distinction is illustrated by this very case of the dicasts who can be "persuaded" into a right opinion about facts which are only really *known* to the eyewitness,¹ and the same example is obviously present to the mind of Plato's Timaeus when he makes it a fundamental distinction between knowledge and opinion that the one can be produced by "persuasion" and destroyed by the same means, whereas the other only arises from "teaching," and is "not to be shaken by persuasion."² Here, again, the writer of the *δισσοὶ λόγοι* may be availing himself of a genuine piece of Socratic philosophy, though, of course, the insistence on the difference between ἀληθείη and δόξα may come straight from an Eleatic source. It is the recurrence of the illustration which seems important for our purpose.

Fifth Antinomy. *Thesis*: the insane and the sane, the wise and the ignorant, say and do the same things. *Antithesis*: the things which the sane and wise say and do are not the same as those said and done by the insane and ignorant.

The proof of the thesis is regarded by Diels as fragmentary, and, in any case, its force is far from clear. "(1) The sane and the insane use the same words for things, 'earth,' 'man,' 'horse,' 'fire.' And they perform the same acts. They sit down, eat, drink, go to bed and the like. (3) The same thing is both greater and less, more and fewer, heavier and lighter. The talent is heavier than the mina, but lighter than two talents. (4) The same man is alive and is not alive; the same things are and are not. For the things which *are* here *are not* in Libya, and

¹ *Theaetetus* 201 b ἢ σὺ οἶε δεινούς τινας οὕτω διδασκάλους εἶναι ὥστε οἷς μὴ παρεγένοντό τινες ἀποστερουμένοις χρήματα ἢ τι ἄλλο βιαζομένοις, τοῖσι δὲ δύνασθαι πρὸς ὕδωρ σμικρὸν διδάξαι ἱκανῶς τῶν γενομένων τὴν ἀλήθειαν; Οὐδαμῶς ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ἀλλὰ πείσαι μὲν. . . . Οὐκ ἂν, ὦ φίλε, εἰ γε ταῦτόν ἦν δόξα τε ἀληθὴς . . . καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὁρθά ποτ' ἂν δικαστὴς ἄκρος ἐδόξαζεν ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης· νῦν δὲ ἔοικεν ἄλλο τι ἐκότερον εἶναι.

² *Timaeus* 51 e τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν διὰ διδαχῆς, τὸ δ' ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται . . . καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον πειθοῖ, τὸ δὲ μεταπειστόν.

the things which *are* in Libya *are not* in Cyprus. So things both are and are not."

The exact purport of all this is obscure, and the only suggestion I can make is that the λόγος the writer has in view is the Heraclitean one, "things both are and are not," to which the antithesis would be that everything which *is* has a definite φύσις of its own. Thus the antinomy becomes: the law of contradiction is invalid; the law of contradiction is not invalid. The alleged identity of behaviour on the parts of the sane and the insane is thus only one example of the allegation that "things are and are not." That the Ἡρακλείτειοι did discourse in much this fashion is notorious from the Platonic references to them, and from the kind of thing we read in the Hippocratean *περὶ διαίτης α'*, the work of some Heracliteanising "sophist."

The antithesis is more interesting, as it brings us back to the λόγοι ἐπακτικοί. The writer first appeals, as is usual in his antitheses, to the point that we can after all make the distinction between a sane man and a lunatic; the *same* act is not at once equally a mark of sanity and of lunacy. Hence σωφροσύνη and σοφία cannot be the same as μανία and ἀμαθία. He then proceeds, καὶ ἐπακτέος ὁ λόγος πότερον ὄν ἐν δέοντι τοὶ σωφρονοῦντες λέγοντι ἢ τοὶ μαινόμενοι; that is, it is suggested that sanity differs from insanity by the relevance of the sane man's speech or act to the situation. The lunatic may have the same vocabulary as the sane man, but he employs it *mal à propos*, and it is the want of relevancy which makes all the difference. About the use of the word ἐπάγεσθαι in logic, the present passage suggests a remark which may be worth throwing out as a suggestion. We have already seen that in Hippocrates, Plato, Xenophon and our author, it regularly means to "adduce *testimony*" in favour of a statement already laid down, to "clinch" the argument by an appeal to sensible fact or to a supposed authority. So the sense here seems to be, "we must further bring in, we must call to our aid, the λόγος that . . ." Thus, if the original metaphor underlying the later technical meaning of ἐπαγωγή is not, as

Professor Burnet once maintained, the legal one of "citing witnesses," (a view which is, to my mind, strongly favoured by the Hippocratean *μαρτύριον ἐπάγεσθαι* = to put in affidavits, so to say,) I suggest that it may be military, "we must bring into play the *λόγος* that, etc.," the metaphor being from the reinforcement of one's front line or main battle by bringing up the *ἐπακτοί* or "reserves." In any case, the repeated appearance of the verb in a technical logical sense in the *δισσοὶ λόγοι* seems a valuable link in the evidence for regarding the general conception of "inductive reasoning" as familiar before the end of the fifth century, and for believing in the presence of a Socratic element in the work. The rest of the antithesis has a further interest of its own. The writer goes on to urge that a difference in meaning may be effected by a mere change of accent or quantity, as, e.g., from *Γλαῦκος* to *γλαυκός*, *Ξάνθος* to *ξανθός*, *Ξοῦθος* to *ξουθός*, or from *Τύρος* to *τυρός*, or from *σάκος* to *σακός* (= *σηκός*). Or, again, by a trifling change of letters, as from *κάρτος* to *κρατός*, from *ὄνος* to *νόος*. In these cases, nothing is added or taken away, there is only a change in the *ἁρμονία* or modulation of the voice. Yet the meaning is entirely altered. A fortiori, then, the change made by introducing or removing the qualification of relevancy must be much greater, and the modified *λόγος* cannot possibly remain what it was before. It is like thinking that you can add 1 to or subtract 1 from 10, and yet have the same sum as before. If one says that the same man is and is not, we must ask *τὶ ἢ τὰ πάντα ἔστιν*; "do you mean relatively, partially, or as a whole?" If anyone says that a thing "is not" in an absolute sense, he says what is false, and confuses relative with absolute denial. So everything "is" relatively. (*οὐκῶν αἱ τις μὴ φαίη ἡμεν, ψεύδεται, <τὸ τὶ καὶ> τὰ πάντα εἰπὼν ταῦτά. πάντα ὧν πῆμ ἔστι.* So Diels, but ? *ἔστι*.) All this is interesting, not only as illustrating the same sort of preoccupation with elementary problems of prosody and etymology as we can trace in Heracliteanism, and in Plato's picture of Prodicus, but also as indicating that Plato's own

final resolution of the difficulty about predicating non-being by the distinction between relative and absolute denial was not, in its main principle, a novelty when Plato wrote the *Sophistes*. Incidentally, the writer's insistence on the view that *all* denial is relative or qualified, and his assertion that "everything in some way is," is, of course, a mark of Eleatic influence.

Sixth Antinomy. Here we come to the closest point of contact with Socraticism, since the whole antinomy is concerned with the problem whether σοφία and ἀρετή are τέχνη or not. The *thesis* is: wisdom and virtue cannot be acquired by teaching (the very proposition on behalf of which Plato's Socrates makes out a case in the *Protagoras* and *Meno*); *antithesis*: wisdom and virtue can be taught, (the Socratic thesis which Protagoras tries to defend without knowing how to do so). The arguments and examples of the δισσοὶ λόγοι agree so closely with those of the *Protagoras* that a common source seems to me certain.

The arguments for the thesis are—(a) you cannot both impart a thing to another and retain it for yourself, as must be the case if one man can impart σοφία and ἀρετή to another by teaching; (b) if wisdom and virtue were teachable, there would be a recognised class of teachers of them, just as there is of music; (c) on the same assumption, the "wise men who have arisen throughout Hellas" would have taught wisdom and virtue to their families (τὼς φίλῳς), which, it is implied, we know they have not done; (d) as for the professed "sophists," many of their pupils have got no good from their instruction, while (e) many persons have risen to eminence (ἀξιοὶ λόγοι γεγέννηνται) without a sophistic education.

Against (a) it is then argued, in the antithesis, that in the case of a professional teacher of γράμματα, or of a professional κιθαριστάς, a man imparts knowledge without parting with it; against (b) that there is a recognized class of teachers of wisdom and virtue, the so-called "sophists," and that the existence of Anaxagoreans and Pythagoreans proves that Anaxagoras and Pythagoras did succeed in

teaching others; against (c) that Polyclitus taught his own art to his son; against (d) and (e) that the possibility of rising to eminence without instruction from a sophist proves nothing, since you may also learn to read without going to school; but it does not follow that schoolmasters are useless. For there is such a thing as φύσις, a natural capacity, and if one has enough of this, he may be able to dispense with education, just as a child learns to speak by imitating its elders, without needing professional instruction. We see, e.g., that a Persian child brought up from infancy among Greeks spontaneously talks Greek, and if a Greek infant were similarly brought up in Persia, it would naturally talk Persian. "Thus," concludes the author, "my discourse has been delivered, and you have its beginning, middle, and end. What I say is not that virtue is the result of teaching, but that the alleged demonstrations do not convince me" (οὐ λέγω ὡς διδακτόν ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀποχρῶντί μοι τῆναι αἱ ἀποδείξεις).

It will be seen at once that the arguments here canvassed are identical with those familiar to us from the *Protagoras* and *Meno* of Plato, and that the resemblance extends to the individual examples alleged. The only difference is that examples based upon the special peculiarities of Athenian life and references to specific facts of Attic history are present in the one case and absent in the other. Thus there is nothing in the *δισσοὶ λόγοι* answering to the picture drawn in the *Protagoras* of the behaviour of the ἐκκλησία which will listen to any and every citizen on the point of political or moral principle, but refuses a hearing on technical points of naval construction and the like to all but professionals (*Protagoras* 319 b-d). Again, in the development of the argument that there is clearly no τέχνη of virtue and σοφία, since we see that the "best" citizens do not succeed in imparting virtue and wisdom to their sons, whereas the τεχνίτης can always teach his τέχνη to his children, we miss in the *δισσοὶ λόγοι* a parallel to the cases of Pericles, Thucydides, and Themistocles, by which Plato's Socrates drives

the argument home. All that this proves, however, is the already manifest point that the *δισσοὶ λόγοι* was not composed at Athens, or for the instruction of Athenian scholars. For the rest, the agreement is complete but for Plato's omission of the purely "eristic" argument that "you cannot communicate a thing to another, and yet retain it yourself." This is, of course, a general argument against the possibility of communicating any kind of accomplishment by teaching; the thesis which it goes to prove is *ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔστι διδάσκειν*, and it does not say much for the intelligence of our author that he should have served it up as a special argument against the teachability of *ἀρετή* and *σοφία*. Apart from this the arguments of the *Protagoras* (319 e ff.) and *Meno* may be summarised thus. (1) If *ἀρετή* could be taught, the heroes of history would have instructed their sons in it, either personally or by the aid of carefully selected professionals. That they have not done so is shown by the case of Pericles, to which the *Meno* adds those of Thucydides, Themistocles, and Aristides (93 b-94 c). (2) There is no generally recognised class of professional teachers of *ἀρετή* (*Meno* 89 e). (3) The *σοφισταί* who claim to be such a class do no good at all to their pupils, (*Meno* 92 a, the anti-sophistic argument of Anytus). These are precisely the arguments (3) (2) (4) of the *δισσοὶ λόγοι*. Argument (5), that a man may distinguish himself in *ἀρετή* and *σοφία* without having attended the instructions of a *σοφιστής*, dismissed by the writer of the *δισσοὶ λόγοι* as "very silly," is similarly considered in Plato by Protagoras more carefully, *Protagoras* 327 ff. So with the counter-arguments in favour of the teachability of virtue. The point that there *are* professional teachers of it, viz. the *σοφισταί*, is made both in the *Protagoras* (328 a) and in the *Meno* (91-92). The appeal to an original difference in capacity (*φύσις*) as explaining why one man may attend the discourse of the *σοφιστής* without profit, while another may exhibit a high degree of *ἀρετή* without the help of a *σοφιστής*, and without being able to impart his own excellence to another, is prominent in

Protagoras' defence of his own profession (*Protagoras* 327 ff.), and is provisionally accepted in the *Meno* as the explanation of the existence of men who are ἀγαθοὶ ἄνευ διδασχῆς. The illustration of unconscious learning of things from the social *milieu* independently of formal instruction by the analogy of the way in which a child learns to speak the language of the society in which it grows up recurs, and is developed with much force, at *Protagoras* 327 e. We may fairly draw the conclusion that the arguments put by Plato into the mouths of the speakers in the *Protagoras* and *Meno* are throughout no inventions of his own. They belong to a body of well-recognised fifth-century arguments *pro* and *contra* on the τόπος, πότερον διδασκὸν ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετή, and there is no reason why they should not have been canvassed, as Plato says they were, between Protagoras, the first person to make the teaching of ἀρετή his professional calling, and Socrates. The popularisation of dialectical argumentation by Zeno, and the interest awakened by the appearance of Protagoras as a paid professor of the art of living, are enough of themselves to account for the development in the latter half of the century of a well-recognised and, as we may say, "classical" body of grounds for and against the teachability of σοφία and ἀρετή. To ascribe the invention of these grounds to the fourth century, the age of the permanent schools of Plato and Isocrates, is a pure anachronism. The very existence of the schools implies that for thinking men the question "can virtue be taught?" had clearly found an answer. We must not be misled on this point by the fact that Aristotle propounds the same issue, as though it were still unsolved, in the *Ethics*. What this means is not that the debate was still going on in the days of the Lyceum, but merely that, with his usual dependence on the Platonic tradition, Aristotle thinks it part of his duty as a lecturer to take up any problem of importance raised in the Platonic text and to define his attitude to it, precisely as many a teacher of philosophy to-day looks on himself as bound in honour to discuss, e.g., views about number and continuity which have definitely

become obsolete because he finds them playing a part in Kant's doctrine of the *Schematism of the Categories*.

The extraordinarily close resemblances with which we have just dealt may raise the further question whether our author must not have been actually acquainted with the criticisms of Socrates on the Protagorean doctrines, either at first hand or by report. There would, of course, be no impossibility in the supposition that he may himself have been one of the more commonplace members of the Megarian group of dialecticians with whom Socrates had close personal relations, and thus may have actually heard from the lips of Socrates the arguments in which he shows so close an approximation to the *Meno* and *Protagoras*. But I cannot see that the inference is in any way necessary. We are not obliged to suppose that the arguments employed by Socrates against Protagoras and the claims of "sophistry" to reckon as a genuine τέχνη are put forward by Plato as the invention of his hero. Socrates was perfectly at liberty to avail himself of any generally recognised ἀπορία on the subject, and to call on Protagoras to solve them if he could. And there is one consideration which, to my own mind, makes for the view that the difficulties raised in the *Protagoras* are not of Socrates' making. If we compare them with the reasons given in the *Gorgias* for refusing the name of τέχνη to the sophists' skill, we shall be struck at once by a difference of tone between the two dialogues. The criticisms of the *Protagoras* are all based on empirical observations of a decidedly obvious kind, and there is no fundamental principle common to them all by which they are converted into a logical unity. They emphatically do not form, as they should do, and as the superficial author of the *δισσοὶ λόγοι* says they do, a whole having "beginning, middle, and end." But this is exactly what the polemic of the *Gorgias* is. It is a sustained argument based on the conception of a τέχνη as the knowledge of demonstrable and connected truths relating to a well-defined object or "whole of discourse." The argument is worked out by the systematic application of what we know to have been the

Socratic method of classification *κατὰ γένη*, and couched in the mathematical form which Plato regularly ascribes to Socrates. Whoever will take the pains to contrast the refutation of the claims of *ῥητορική* to be a *τέχνη* as given in the *Gorgias*, (and it must be remembered that the argument is expressly stated to be equally fatal to *σοφιστική*), with the comparatively rough-and-ready popular declamations of Socrates and Protagoras in the *Protagoras*, will, I think, be inclined to admit that the probability is that the whole series of arguments on both sides of the question whether virtue can be taught, as rehearsed in that dialogue and in the *Meno*, belong to the common-places of fifth-century rhetoric, like Pindar's everlasting moralisings on the theme *τὸ φυᾷ κράτιστον ἅπαν*, or Hippolytus' devotion to a mistress who accepts only the offerings of those *ἄλλοις διδασκὸν μηδέν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει | τὸ σωφρονεῖν εἴληχεν ἐς τὰ πάνθ' ὁμῶς*.

I take it, then, that the agreement between the arguments canvassed in the *δισσοὶ λόγοι* and those of the Platonic *Protagoras* and *Meno* is not of itself enough to prove actual dependence of the former work on Socratic influence. What it does prove is the dramatic exactitude with which Plato has reproduced for us the manner of thought and speech of the philosophical circles of the generation before his own.

There is still, of course, an interesting possibility left open, as to which I have said nothing. * What if the unknown author of the *δισσοὶ λόγοι* should be actually borrowing the arguments of his antinomy from the Platonic dialogues themselves? Since, as we have seen, the work cannot be much later in date than the death of Socrates, and may possibly be even a little earlier, such a supposition would require us to assign exceedingly early dates to the *Protagoras* and *Meno*, and therefore, if the majority of scholars are right in seeing allusions to the *Gorgias* in the *Meno*, to the *Gorgias* also. We should, in fact, have to assume that all three dialogues were written and circulated almost immediately after the death of Socrates. (Since

both the threats of Anytus in the *Meno* and the warnings of Callicles in the *Gorgias* presuppose in the reader a knowledge of the fate which actually overtook Socrates, neither dialogue can be supposed to belong to a date *before* 399. The *Protagoras*, on the other hand, contains nothing which might not have been written during the life-time of its hero.) There is nothing, so far as I can see, to exclude the possibility of so early a date for the three dialogues, and there is at least one piece of evidence which might be urged in favour of it. I mean the well-known passage of the seventh *Epistle* in which the statement of the *Republic* that mankind will never cease from their troubles unless kings become philosophers or philosophers kings is quoted as coming from an "eulogy on genuine philosophy" composed before Plato's first visit to Sicily.¹ Whether the author of the *Epistle* is Plato or an immediate disciple, in either case this statement means that the *Republic*, in which the words in question occur in the very context described, was already composed as early as the year of the King's Peace, and this must mean that the *Protagoras*, the *Gorgias*, and its pendant the *Meno*, should be assigned to a date some years earlier. We are thus thrown back for the *Gorgias* on a date very little later than the death of Socrates, while, apart from the mere a priori probability that it was the trial and death of Socrates which gave the first impulse to the publication of *λόγοι Σωκρατικοί*, there is no valid reason for denying that a number of the earlier Platonic dialogues may have been circulated while the master was still alive, as the traditional anecdotes preserved by Diogenes Laertius presuppose. On the other side, we have nothing beyond the existence of supposed allusions in the *Gorgias* to the existence of the Academy as an organized

¹ *Ep.* vii. 326 α λέγειν τε ἡμαγκάσθην, ἐπαινῶν τὴν ὀρθὴν φιλοσοφίαν, ὡς ἐκ ταύτης ἔστιν τὰ τε πολιτικὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν πάντα κατιδεῖν * κακῶν οὖν οὐ λήξειν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα γένη πρὶν ἂν ᾗ τὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων ὀρθῶς γε καὶ ἀληθῶς γένος εἰς ἀρχὰς ἔλθῃ τὰς πολιτικὰς ἢ τὸ τῶν δυναστευόντων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐκ τινος μοίρας θείας ὄντως φιλοσοφήσῃ. The passages alluded to are, of course, *Republic* 473 d, 501 e. That the allusion is to a published "work" is made clear by the words ἐπαινῶν τὴν ὀρθὴν φιλοσοφίαν.

body. But it is at least open to question whether the supposed allusions are not all due to misinterpretation. Thus, to take the most plausible instance of all, when Callicles describes the kind of life from which he wishes to dissuade Socrates as τὸν λοιπὸν βίον βιώναι μετὰ μειρακίων ἐν γωνίαις τριῶν ἢ τεττάρων ψιθυρίζοντα (*Gorgias* 485 d), one is tempted at first to think the language singularly inappropriate to the case of Socrates, whose figure was daily familiar in the streets, the agora, and the palaestrae, and to fancy that the shaft is really aimed at the president of the nascent Academy. But we may change our minds when we remember Xenophon's description of the ἐταῖροι of Socrates as sharing a common table,¹ Plato's picture of the relations of Socrates with the Pythagorean and Eleatic coteries, and Aristophanes' exhibition of the φροντιστήριον. These representations are only intelligible on the assumption that there was such an inner ring of disciples as the language of the *Gorgias* presupposes, and it is to the more intimate communications of Socrates with the members of this little group—we know their names with tolerable completeness from the *Phaedo*—that Callicles means to allude. Hence I see no reason to think that the *Gorgias* contains any references to the establishment of the Academy, or requires to be dated late enough to admit of any.²

¹ See *Memorabilia*, bk. iii. c. 14, where the anecdotes are unintelligible except on the supposition that the συνδειπνοῦντες are the intimate Socratic circle, and that the common repast is their regular habit.

² I lay no stress on the bitterness of tone shown in the attack of the dialogue on the democracy and its leaders. This has sometimes been explained by supposing that the dialogue, being composed almost immediately after the death of Socrates, reflects the feelings of Plato when the loss of his master was still fresh. Such views ignore the all-important point that the anti-democratic diatribes of the *Gorgias* and *Republic* are given by Plato not as his own but as those of Socrates, and that the δημοκρατία assailed throughout is that of the Periclean age, a state of society which passed away, never to recur, before Plato was well past the years of adolescence. In a subsequent essay I shall try to show that there is every reason to believe that the *Gorgias* and *Republic* do faithfully represent the opinion of Socrates at the end of his life on the great era of Athenian imperialistic expansion through which he had lived as youth and man, and which, in reality, came to its inevitable end when the Athenian forces surrendered to Gylippus at Syracuse.

The argument of the *δισσοὶ λόγοι* now wanders to a topic which, at first sight, does not seem to have any connection with the contention that antinomies may be raised about all subjects of discourse, though we must remember that, since the beginning of the work is probably lost, we do not know what the author's main thesis really is, nor how large a part the assertion that two *λόγοι* can be put forward about everything may have been related to it. If we possessed his own statement of his intention, the transition might be found to be less abrupt than it looks. He begins with a formal attack on the system of appointment to offices by lot, always regarded in antiquity as the outward symbol of *δημοκρατία*. The method, he says, is neither rational nor democratic. His points are (1) that no one would dream of allotting the tasks of his household servants in such a way; (2) that it would be absurd to make an artisan follow a calling which he had received by lot in preference to one which he understands (*ἐπίσταται*); (3) that it would be equally foolish to select the performers in a musical contest, or in war, by lot, since it would often happen that an *αὐλητής* would thus be required to play the *κιθάρα*, a hoplite to serve in the cavalry, etc. Moreover, (4) the system is undemocratic because, where offices are disposed of by lot, a *μισόδαμος* stands an equal chance of appointment with a loyal democrat. To ensure democratic rule it would be better for the *δᾶμος* to *elect* men of known devotion to itself to all positions of trust, putting each of them over the department for which his special abilities mark him out. The argument is thus, on one side at least, thoroughly Socratic in spirit. *ἐπιστήμη*, expert knowledge, is demanded as the indispensable qualification for the exercise of all administrative functions; a man is only to be allowed to undertake work which he knows how to do better than anyone else. But the further insistence on loyalty to the *δᾶμος* as the second necessary qualification cannot be called equally Socratic or Platonic. *εὐνοία* towards the governed is, indeed, insisted on vigorously enough in the *Republic* as a fundamental note in the character of a

"guardian," but this devotion to the best interests of the whole πόλις is something quite different from the party spirit denoted by the phrase εὖνους τῶι δήμῳ. Socrates and Plato were no lovers of the Athenian δῆμος and had no sentimental illusions as to its merits. Their maxim, as we know, was that so long as the best and wisest bear rule in the best interests of the whole πόλις, it matters nothing whether the δῆμος likes their rule or not; the all-important thing is that the "man at the helm" should be a true navigator *secundum artem*, not whether he was elected to take command by the crew. Our author would appear to be writing for a community in which it is taken for granted that loyalty is loyalty to the δᾶμος, and treason the same thing as μισοδαμία. We may infer, then, that he is himself a citizen and writes for an audience of citizens of a Doric-speaking democracy.

What is more to our present purpose is the very close agreement of the illustrations used to show the unwisdom of the use of the lot with those ascribed to Socrates by Xenophon¹ and Aristotle.² In particular, the words of our author, τῶντὸν δὲ καὶ ἐν ἀγῶσι τᾶς μωσικᾶς διακλαρώσαι τὼς ἀγωνιστὰς καὶ ὃ τι χ' ἕκαστος λάχῃ ἀγωνίζεσθαι· αὐλητὰς κιθαρίζει τυχόν καὶ κιθαρωιδὸς αὐλήσει, are so manifestly an expanded statement of what Aristotle calls the "Socratic" criticism of the use of the "bean," that the recurrence of the αὐλητής in the example as given here, as well as in the Xenophontic passage, seems to me a very strong confirmation of my previous suggestion that ἀθλητάς in the Aristotelian passage is a corruption of αὐλητάς.

The further argument that the use of the lot defeats its own object by giving the oligarchical partisan as good a chance of appointment as anyone else, and is therefore contrary to the spirit of a δημοκρατία, recurs in Isocrates,

¹ *Memorabilia* i. 2. 9 λέγων ὡς μῶρον εἴη τοὺς μὲν τῆς πόλεως ἀρχοντας ἀπὸ κνᾶμου καθιστάναι, κυβερνήτην δὲ μηδὲνα θέλειν χρῆσθαι κναμεντῶι μηδὲ τέκτονι μηδ' αὐλητῇ, μηδ' ἐπ' ἄλλα τοιαῦτα.

² *Rhetoric* 1393 b 4 παραβολὴ δὲ τὰ Σωκρατικά, οἷον εἰ τις λέγοι ὅτι οὐ δεῖ κληρωτοὺς ἀρχειν. ὅμοιον γὰρ ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τις τοὺς ἀθλητὰς (!) κληροῖν μὴ οἱ δύνανται ἀγωνίζεσθαι ἀλλ' οἱ ἂν λάχωσιν, κτλ.

Areopagiticus 23 ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῇ κληρώσει τὴν τύχην βραβεύσειν καὶ πολλάκις λήψεσθαι τὰς ἀρχὰς τοὺς ὀλιγαρχίας ἐπιθυμοῦντας. And one may note, as an indication of the sources from which such criticisms come, that Isocrates has immediately before "conveyed" for his own purpose the thought of Socrates in the *Gorgias* about the significance of the γεωμετρικὴ ἰσότης, *Areopagiticus* 21 δυοῖν ἰσοτήτοιν νομιζομέναιν εἶναι, καὶ τῆς μὲν ταῦτον ἅπασιν ἀπονεμούσης τῆς δὲ τὸ προσήκον ἐκάστοις, οὐκ ἠγνόουν (sc. Solon and Cleisthenes) τὴν χρησιμωτέραν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν ἀξιοῦσαν τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ τοὺς πονηροὺς ἀπεδοκίμαζον ὥς οὐ δικαίαν οὔσαν, τὴν δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἕκαστον τιμῶσαν [καὶ κολλάζουσιν] προσηροῦντο καὶ διὰ ταύτης ὥκουν τὴν πόλιν. §§ 25–26, in which the older democracy is praised because of its comparative lack of ambitious candidates for office, are probably equally reminiscent of the Socratic theory of the unwillingness of the "best" men to rule (cf. § 25 χαλεπώτερον ἦν ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς χρόνοις εὐρεῖν τοὺς βουλομένους ἄρχειν ἢ νῦν τοὺς μηδὲν δεομένους· οὐ γὰρ ἐμπορίαν ἀλλὰ λειτουργίαν ἐνόμιζον εἶναι τὴν τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμέλειαν). All this criticism of the ways and methods of the Periclean democracy comes pretty obviously from one source. It represents the kind of view current towards the end of the Peloponnesian war among the "intellectuals" of Athens, so far as they did not belong to the party of violent reaction which got and abused its chances after the capitulation of the city. On the connection of Socrates with this party—the party of Theramenes as we may call it—I hope to have more to say in a subsequent essay.

The next section of the *δισσοὶ λόγοι* is sufficiently striking to deserve quotation as a whole. Its manifest object is to support the peculiarly Socratic view, attested by Xenophon no less than by Plato, of the identity of the dialectician and the statesman, by the familiar Socratic argument that he who understands the theory of anything must be the most efficient practitioner. "I hold that it belongs to the same man and to the same art to be able

to converse with brevity (*κατὰ βραχὺ διαλέγεσθαι*¹), and to know the truth of things (*τὰν ἀλάθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων*), and to know how to give judgment rightly (*δικάζειν ὀρθῶς*), and to be able to make orations to the public (*δαμαγορεῖν*), and to know the arts of discourse, and to teach about the nature of all things,² how they are and how they came to be. And first, how should one who knows about the nature of all things be unable <to teach the city>³ to act rightly about everything? Again, he who knows the arts of discourse will also know how to discourse aright about everything. For he who is to speak aright must speak about things he knows (*ἐπίσταται*). So he will know about everything. For he knows the arts of all discourses, and all discourses are about all things that are. And he who is to know how to speak rightly must know the things about which he speaks, and teach the city aright to do the good things but hinder it somehow from doing the bad. And since he knows these things, he will know their opposites⁴ also, for he will know everything. For these things (i.e., I suppose, the "opposites") are the same things

¹ Compare the boasts of Protagoras in Plato and Socrates' ironical allusions to them. *Protagoras* 329 b Πρωταγόρας δὲ ὅδε ἱκανὸς μὲν μακροῦς λόγους καὶ καλοὺς εἰπεῖν, ὡς αὐτὰ δηλοῖ, ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ ἐρωτηθεὶς ἀποκρίνασθαι κατὰ βραχὺ κτλ.; 335 b-c σὺ μὲν γάρ, ὡς λέγεται περὶ σοῦ, φῆις δὲ καὶ αὐτός, καὶ ἐν μακρολογίαι καὶ ἐν βραχυλογίαι οἷός τε εἰ συνουσίας ποιεῖσθαι—σοφὸς γὰρ εἶ—ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ μακρὰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατος; 336 a-d, and the similar profession of Gorgias (*Gorgias* 449 b-c). That *κατὰ βραχὺ* in our passage similarly refers to the question-and-answer method of "dialectic" as contrasted with the continuous *ἐπίδειξις* of rhetoric is made certain by the *ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι* of its concluding clause.

² It is not quite clear how much the words *τὰν τῶν ἀπάντων φύσιν* are meant to cover. They should strictly include the whole of the *περὶ φύσεως ἱστορία*. In the context they seem to mean "all the circumstances" which arise in political life, but the clause *ὡς ἔχει καὶ ὡς ἐγένετο*, as well as the next remark that *τοὶ λόγοι πάντες περὶ πάντων τῶν ἐκόντων ἐντι*, calls for the wider reference. It looks as if the author were carelessly adapting to his immediate purposes a general principle of which he does not quite see the scope.

³ *τὰν πόλιν διδάσκειν* is an insertion of Diels' which is justified by the recurrence of the words in the further development of the argument.

⁴ *τὰ ἕτερα τοῦτων*. The principle implied is that expressed by Aristotle in the form that there is *μία ἐπιστήμη τῶν ἐναντίων*. That this is really Socratic is shown by the constant appeals to it throughout *Republic* i.

in the whole (ἔστι γὰρ ταῦτά τῶν πάντων τῆνα),¹ and he will *do* what is needed with reference to the same thing when called upon. If he *knows* how to play the flute, he will always be able to play the flute if it is necessary to do so. And he who knows how to plead a case at law (δικάζεσθαι) must have a right knowledge of justice, for it is *that* with which law-suits are concerned. And knowing this he will also know its opposite, and the things other than <these>. And he needs also to know all the laws, so if he does not know the facts he will not know the laws either.² For it is the same man who knows the laws in music and who knows music, and he who does not know music does not know the law either. It is an easy inference that he who knows the truth about things knows

¹ I do not feel quite sure about the meaning of the writer, but I take the sense to be that the reason why there is "one science of opposites" is that "in the whole" opposites are identical, according to the Heraclitean doctrine of which we have found traces in the δισσοὶ λόγοι. Hence since "in the whole" e.g. good and evil are the same thing, knowledge of the good is necessarily knowledge of the evil also.

² The argument is that the true dicast must know the *laws*; but if he does not know τὰ πράγματα, he cannot know the laws. The force of the analogy from μουσική seems to be that you cannot be μουσικός unless you know the laws which have to be observed in constructing a melody. But these laws depend upon certain πράγματα or objective realities, viz. the mathematical ratios corresponding to the fundamental intervals in the musical scale. To know the "laws" of μουσική and to know these πράγματα is all one. Similarly the "laws" in accord with which a just verdict should be given rest upon the real objective character of τὸ δίκαιον. If you do not know what τὸ δίκαιον—αὐτὸ δ' ἔστι δικαιοσύνη in Platonic phrase—is, you cannot really know the laws in accordance with which you ought to absolve or condemn. The reasoning seems to be directed against the view that we do not and cannot know the φύσις of τὸ δίκαιον, we only know the varying νόμοι or "conventions" as to what is just which prevail in different communities. On this theory a decision which is in accord with the νόμοι of a given πόλις is a "just" decision relatively to that πόλις, and a man who knows the "conventions" prevailing at Athens may therefore give a decision which is "conventionally" just, without knowing or caring what is "absolutely" or "naturally" just. The writer is arguing by implication that the "conventions" of society are founded on a real objective distinction between the δίκαιον and the ἀδίκον, and therefore if you do not know the πρᾶγμα in question, in other words the φύσις or εἶδος of the "just," you can no more give a just decision than you could compose a melody without knowing the fundamental harmonic intervals.

everything. And then <he is able to converse> briefly too about everything <if> he is called on to answer a question. So then he must know everything."

The reasoning here is superficial enough, but what should interest us is that its purport is to establish the identity of the *διαλεκτικός*, the man who can play the game of question and answer, at once with the *περὶ πάντα εἰδώς* or philosopher, and with the man who can do everything, particularly give political advice (*δημηγορεῖν*), *secundum artem*. The conclusion therefore is that the *διαλεκτικός* is the true philosopher, and the true philosopher is also the true statesman and *ρήτωρ*. The position, as it is needless to point out, is the same as that expressed by Plato in the demand that philosophers, as the masters of the art of dialectic, shall be kings, and by Xenophon in the claim which he puts into the mouth of Socrates that dialectic makes men "fit to bear rule." The appearance of the idea in the *δισσοὶ λόγοι* seems thus to be a clear indication of Socratic influence.

In the few remaining lines of the fragment the writer passes on to the discussion of the value of a good memory, and the illustration of the ways in which memory may be aided by the formation of artificial associations. The connection of this topic with what has gone before is not obvious, but the passage is interesting as recalling the mnemonic art of Hippias, who figures in both Xenophon and Plato as standing in a rather closer relation to Socrates than any of the other famous "sophists."¹

Our general result, then, would seem to be that the

¹ Apart from the curious specimen of mnemonics, there is a further point of contact with Hippias, as Diels notes, in the conception of the master of the art of discourse (*αἱ τῶν λόγων τέχναι*), as being also a polymath and an authority *περὶ φύσιος τῶν ἀπάντων*. Cf. *Protagoras* 337 d, where Hippias speaks to the assembled "sophists" as persons who know *τὴν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων*, and the foregoing sentences in which he extols *φύσις* at the expense of *νόμος*. And note that Plato there makes Hippias dwell on the "brevity" required for dialogue much as our writer does. We must therefore probably recognise an influence of Hippias as well as of Socrates on our unknown author. That the author is not Hippias himself seems clear from the difference in style between the *δισσοὶ λόγοι* and Plato's imitation of

δισσοὶ λόγοι, written possibly before the death of Socrates and at the latest in the very earliest years of the fourth century, shows unmistakable traces of Socratic influence, and must be seriously reckoned with in any attempt to reconstruct the history of Greek thought in the generation immediately anterior to Plato. In particular, it seems to show that the identification of the dialectician with the statesman, (in other words, the theory of the philosopherring,) and the beginnings of the doctrine of εἶδη are pre-Platonic, and presumably therefore due to Socrates and his circle. The repeated correspondences with some early Platonic dialogues, notably the *Protagoras*, and with points burlesqued in the *Clouds* of Aristophanes, further serve to confirm our contention that Plato's picture of Socrates and his circle is in the main historically much more accurate than it is now usual to suppose. The writer gives clear indications of belonging to the class of semi-Eleatic thinkers represented for us in the Socratic circle by Euclides and his Megarian associates. In the mutilated condition in which his work has been preserved all safe indications of his ultimate object have been lost, and it is as a mere conjecture that I would suggest that his purpose in constructing his antinomies may have been to reinforce the Eleatic doctrine that τὰ πολλά, the contents of the world of sensible experience, are unknowable, and that no belief about them is any truer than its contradictory.

Hippias. Moreover, the λόγοι are obviously not an "epideixis" by a travelling professor, but, as Diels says, *Schulvorträge*: I would add that there is no evidence that Hippias ever used a Doric dialect, and that all the probabilities are against it. He seems to have written in Attic, as most persons who had anything to say naturally did in the latter part of the fifth century. The statement that Socrates was more closely connected with Hippias than with other "sophists" is based upon the marked difference of tone between the *Hippias* i. and ii. of Plato and the *Protagoras* and *Gorgias*. Socrates does not treat Hippias with the formal politeness which he reserves for the other distinguished foreign savants, but with a familiarity which would be ill-mannered if it did not rest on fairly close acquaintance. That Xenophon, who says nothing of the interviews between Socrates and Protagoras or Gorgias, should have given a whole chapter to Hippias (*Memorabilia* iv. 4), points in the same direction.

IV

THE *PHRONTISTERION*

IN the first essay of the present collection I have tried to show how much may be learned by a right use of Plato's *Phaedo* about the *vie intime* of Socrates and his connection with the Pythagorean societies in which "philosophy" was pursued as a way of redemption from the "body of death" into everlasting life. By the tragedy of the *Phaedo* I now wish to set the splendid comic burlesque of the *Clouds*, and to show how very exactly the one confirms the other, and how ridiculously Aristophanes has misconceived his function if the currently accepted view of Socrates as primarily a commonplace moralist of the market-place is veritable history. For if the *Clouds* is really a genuine caricature, by the hand of a master in the art, of the hero of the *Phaedo*, we ought to be able to trace in it, with due allowance for the distortion which it is the business of the caricaturist to effect, the very lineaments which we see glorified by the approach of martyrdom in the *Phaedo*. If we can do so, all serious doubt as to the historical character of Plato's account of his master's pursuits and mental history should be dispelled, and for this reason the play of Aristophanes, if it can be trusted at all, is one of the most precious of all documents for the study of the development of Greek philosophical thought. This is a fact which has already been recognised by some writers on Socraticism, notably in Italy,¹ but is not, so far as I know, adequately appreciated among ourselves. We are still too much in the habit of taking it for granted that the "Socrates" of

¹ See the Postscript to the present Essay.

Aristophanes is not so much a caricature, and a life-like caricature, of a notable personality as a fancy-picture in which all the ludicrous or objectionable features of the "new learning" have been combined, with an entire disregard for historical fact. The play, we are commonly told, is a general attack on the "sophists," and by "sophists" the exponents of this view mean, not what the word really signified in the Attic of Aristophanes' time, pretenders to specialist knowledge of any and every kind, but what it has been made to mean for us, more especially by the influence of Grote, the travelling professors of the arts of persuasive speech. Its protagonist is no real individual man, but a sort of composite photograph in which the features of all the leading peripatetic professors are ingeniously blended. Even Dr. Verrall, who has shown so brilliantly how much may be learned from the *Frogs* about the historical personality and habits of Euripides, has thought it necessary to dismiss the "Socrates" of the *Clouds* as no true caricature with the remark (as we shall see, a mistaken one,) that in all probability Socrates was not well enough known in 423, when the play was produced, for wanton disregard of verisimilitude in the comic picture to be detected or resented by the mass of Athenian playgoers.¹ If this were true, the work would, of course, lose all its value for the student of Plato and of philosophy. I propose, however, to show in detail that it is not true, and that the *Clouds*, when carefully read, so exactly confirms the statements of the *Phaedo* as to the entourage of Socrates and his early associations with the science of the previous generation, as to leave little doubt that the Platonic representation is curiously exact even down to matters of detail. To be more precise, I undertake to give reasons for holding that the play is not directed at all against the "sophists" in the sense in which that word is commonly understood in English, but against a specific group of persons who combined scientific research with *ἄσκησις*, the quest of salvation from the body, that is, against the

¹ *Euripides the Rationalist*, p. 106, note 1.

very circle whose portraits have been drawn from the point of view of a sympathizer in the *Phaedo*. I think, moreover, that I can make it clear that the brunt of the attack is specifically directed against the conception of "dialectic" as the universal science, and the dialectician as the true statesman which we have come to connect more particularly with the Platonic *Republic*.

But, to begin with, I must deal with one or two considerations of a general nature which seem to me fatal to the view that the burlesque of Aristophanes is aimed at a mere type, not, as all genuine caricature should be, at the exhibition, with the proper exaggerations and distortions, of a perfectly individual character.

In the first place, then, it is obvious that baseless misrepresentation, which a spectator or reader can detect for what it is, must be fatal to the popular success of a caricature, a consideration which Aristophanes, of all men, cannot be supposed to have ignored. To succeed at all with any public—and, after all, the comedian's first object is to succeed, to "catch on"—caricature must be, or must be believed by the public to be, like its original. And the likeness must be such that there can be no possible doubt in the mind of the public as to the person aimed at. To exhibit to a public who were familiar with the personality of the actual Socrates a mere composite portrait in which the various features of half a dozen different "sophists"—Diogenes, Archelaus, Protagoras, Prodicus—are thrown together, and the label "Socrates" affixed to the result, would have been as feeble a jest as it would be to-day to exhibit a character made up of traits drawn from the members of five or six different Cabinets under the name of Asquith or Balfour. It would have been to court failure.¹ Hence, as Dr. Verrall has seen, it is essential to

¹ I may be reminded that the *Clouds* did in fact prove a failure. That it did not fail because the caricature of Socrates was a bad one will be made apparent in the course of the present essay. It will be my object to show that Aristophanes is only speaking the truth when he calls particular attention to the minute care which he has lavished on the work he not unreasonably extols as the best of his comedies (*Clouds* 522 καὶ ταύτην

the theory I am combating to assume that the personality of Socrates *was* almost an unknown quantity when the *Clouds* was exhibited. That this assumption is entirely false can, I submit, be shown both by external and by internal evidence. As for the external evidence, to be drawn from the chronological assumptions tacitly made in the Platonic dialogues, it has figured already in part in a preceding essay on the "impiety" of Socrates, and I will merely remind my reader here that it is taken for granted in the *Charmides* that the public activity of Socrates among the *νέοι* had attracted attention as early as the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, while a combination of the data afforded by different dialogues shows, as I shall shortly show, that the famous oracle of the Pythia, from which Plato himself dates the notoriety of Socrates as a public character, must be placed earlier still. Thus we may take it as certain that Socrates and his doings were perfectly familiar to the general public of Athens years before the production of the *Clouds*, not to mention that, on Plato's showing at least, Socrates had been a prominent figure in the narrower circle of the "wits" who gathered round Pericles and Aspasia for a still longer period. Hence the possibility that Aristophanes (who, according to the *Symposium*, was on personally friendly terms with the philosopher,) should have failed in his caricature, either from want of adequate acquaintance with its object or from carelessness bred of the knowledge that his audience would not be able to detect bad work, seems to me definitely excluded.

The internal evidence of the play itself is to the same effect. For one thing, we may reasonably take it for granted that Aristophanes, as a man of sense, would not have endangered the popularity of his play by selecting as

σοφώτατ' ἔχειν τῶν ἐμῶν κωμωιδιῶν). It would be much nearer the truth to say, as the poet himself suggests, that the play failed because the caricature was too good and thorough to be fully appreciated by an audience which preferred its high comedy diluted by farcical horseplay and bawdry. Further proof that Socrates was sufficiently well known in 423 to be a suitable butt for comedy is afforded by the fact that the rival play of Amipsias, the *Κόννος*, also dealt with him and his circle.

its leading figure a person of whom little was known and in whom no one but the "intellectuals" took much interest. If Aristophanes meant to attack the "new learning" at all, it was obviously his business to attack it in the person of some one who was generally known as one of its chief representatives, and in whom his audience was interested. Further, the main idea of the play clearly is that Socrates and his "notion-shop" were, in point of fact, so universally known that a country bumpkin who wished his son to get a training in "cuteness" would at once think of Socrates and his friends as the natural quarter in which to apply.¹ If the Athenians of 423 scarcely knew of Socrates at all and took little interest in his doings, how could Strepsiades be represented as taking it for granted that the *φροντιστήριον* was the proper school to which to take his lad? Moreover, and this is to me personally a very significant point, there is no internal evidence that the *Clouds* is meant as an attack on the popular teachers of Rhetoric at all. In almost every point of importance the character ascribed to Socrates and his *μαθηταί* throughout the play is ludicrously in contrast with all that we know of Protagoras, Prodicus, and their likes. They were fashionable men who moved in the highest circles, made large sums by their profession, and addressed themselves specially to the youth of the wealthy and well-born class; it was not the small farmers and shopkeepers who made up the *δῆμος*, but the high-born and leisured *μισόδημοι* whose sons sought to buy the secret of success from Protagoras or Gorgias or Thrasymachus, and it is in this fact, as Plato plainly hints in the *Gorgias* and *Meno*, that we must look for the real cause of the unpopularity of "sophists" with the *δῆμος*.

The *φροντισταί* of the *Clouds*, on the other hand, like

¹ *Clouds* 94. Strepsiades at once knows where to take his son as soon as he has got his promise to be put to school. *ψυχῶν σοφῶν τοῦτ' ἐστὶ φροντιστήριον* κτλ. (Note the intentional *équivoque* in *ψυχῶν*: Behold yon gathering-place of wisest *spirits*: Sieh da den Sammelplatz gelehrter *Geister*.) The fame of Socrates and his friends is thus perfectly well known to a mere bumpkin. It is equally familiar to the lad himself, 102 *τοὺς ἀλαζόνας | τοὺς ὠχρίωντας, τοὺς ἀνυποδότητους λέγεις, | ὧν ὁ κακοδαίμων Σωκράτης καὶ Χαιρεφῶν.*

the Socrates of the *Apology*, live *ἐν μυρίαί πενίαι*, and cannot be sure of a dinner from one day to the next (*Clouds* 175). The instructions of Socrates are not given in the *salon* of a great man like Callias, the son of Hipponicus, nor in a handsome palaestra, but in his own dingy and ruinous house. His typical pupil is not a young fashionable, but the ragged and fleasy Chaerephon (*ib.* 156, 503), elsewhere, as we have seen, laughed at by the poet as a specimen of the Orphic seekers after salvation, the *ἡμιθνήτες* of Aristophanes, the "practitioners of dying" of the *Phaedo*. It is true that the special trick of which "Socrates" is said to keep the secret is that art of making "the worse case appear the better" in which all the Professors of Rhetoric, from Protagoras downwards, were believed to deal, but to judge from the performances of the two *λόγοι* themselves, as well as from the behaviour of Strepsiades and Phidippides after their course of attendance at the school, the particular way of performing the trick taught in the *φροντιστήριον* is not that of plausible oratory, but that of verbal quibbling and captious questioning which, as we saw in the last essay, goes back to the paradoxes of "Master Yea-and-Nay of Elea." In a word, what is parodied is not the "art" of Protagoras and Gorgias, but the very "dialectic," or, as an enemy would call it, the "eristic" which Plato represents as characteristic of Socrates and his Eleatic and Pythagorean friends, and as always proving fatal by its novelty to the rhetoricians of established reputation who venture to enter the lists against it.

It is perhaps worth while to note that the very word *σοφιστής* hardly occurs in the play at all, and never in the sense of "professional teacher of plausible oratory"—a singular fact, if the main object of the comedy is to use Socrates as a burlesque on the great masters of that accomplishment.¹ On the other hand, there is another name

¹ To be exact, the name *σοφισταί* is found four times. At 359 Socrates is said to be one of the *μετεωροσοφισταί*, which does not mean a "sophist" at all in the sense in which we have unfortunately come to use the word, but an astronomer and cosmologist like Thales (cf. *Clouds* 180, where Socrates is

under which Socrates and his intimates are repeatedly held up to derision, and that name is *φροντισταί*, "notionists,"

spoken of as a second and greater Thales), or Anaxagoras; at 331 the "Clouds" are said to provide support for a herd of *σοφισταί*, though here again these "sophists" are more precisely described in the following lines as "seers" (with a special reference to Lampon), "writers of medical compendia" (*ιατροτέχναις*, i.e. persons like the composers of such Hippocratean works as the *περί διαίτης*, *περί αέρων*, *υδάτων*, *τόπων*, *περί τέχνης*, *περί ἀνθρώπου φύσιος*, and the like), "dithyrambic poets," and "astronomical quacks" (*μετεωροφέναικας*, a jeer which, in the light of the parabasis, may be supposed to be specially aimed at Meton and his reform of the Calendar). Thus the *μετεωροσοφισταί* seem to be persons who, whether as poets or as men of science, claim to be peculiarly acquainted with the "things aloft," and may therefore reasonably be said to make their living out of the "weather"; all reference to the popular teachers of Rhetoric is excluded by the nature of the case. At 1111 Socrates undertakes to make Phidippides *σοφιστήν δεξιόν*, which, if we may judge from the event, he does by teaching him the trick of "eristic," and at 1309 Strepsiades is called *τοῦτον τὸν σοφιστήν*, apparently with reference to the exhibition of "eristic" which he has just given at the expense of his creditor. All the instances seem to show that the "sophistry" against which the *Clouds* is directed is something quite different in kind from the art of Protagoras and Gorgias, and exactly reminiscent of the very gift of "dialectic" which is made so prominent in Plato's portrait of Socrates. The passages which show that *ὁ φροντιστής* must have been a current nickname, presumably derived from the constant recurrence of the notion of *φρόνησις* in the daily discourses of Socrates, are too numerous to require exhaustive quotation here.

With regard to Protagoras in particular, it will become more evident than ever that he can hardly be particularly aimed at in the *Clouds* when we consider that he was, in all probability, dead when the play was exhibited. The current chronology, which has been confused by the tale of his prosecution for impiety, places his death either about 415 or about 411, but this is entirely inconsistent with the notices given in Plato. From *Protagoras* 317 c we learn that he was already an elderly man at the imaginary date of the gathering in the house of Callias, (i.e., as we shall shortly see, not much later, if at all, than 440 B.C.), and that he was a full generation older than Socrates, Prodicus, and Hippias (*καίτοι πολλά γε ἔτη ἤδη εἰμι ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὰ σύμπαντα πολλά μοι ἔστιν—οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ πάντων ἂν ὑμῶν καθ' ἡλικίαν πατὴρ εἴην*). This, of course, does not mean merely that it would have been just physically possible for Protagoras to have been a father at the date of Socrates' birth, but that he was a man of the previous generation—i.e. roughly some thirty years older, as the *καθ' ἡλικίαν* implies. Protagoras and his contemporaries, it is meant, were grown men when Socrates and his *ἡλικες* were children). The same thing is implied at 320 c when Protagoras proposes to expound his views in a "story," as an old man talking to young people may do without impropriety. *πότερον ὑμῖν, ὡς πρεσβύτεροι νεωτέρους, μῦθον λέγων ἐπιδείξω κτλ.* Such a proceeding would be an intolerable piece of arrogance in a speaker addressing men only some fifteen or sixteen years younger than him-

"botherationists," "minute philosophers." So his abode is the *φροντιστήριον* or "factory of notions," the problems upon which he sets his scholars to work are *φροντίδες*,

self; in an old man talking with persons who were babies when he was in his prime it is graceful and natural. Thus the birth of Protagoras must be put back to somewhere about 500 B.C., and, in complete accordance with Plato's assertion that he was already well on in years when he disputed with Socrates in the house of Callias, he must be supposed for the purposes of the dialogue to be somewhere about sixty. This accounts, again, for the way in which he addresses Socrates at the end of the dialogue as a young man of promise who may yet distinguish himself, 361 e *οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι εἰ τῶν ἐλλογίμων γένοιτο ἀνδρῶν ἐπὶ σοφίαι*. These are not the words of a man of forty-five to a man of thirty. As to the date of his death, we have really no trustworthy statement except that of Plato in the *Meno* 91 e, that he lived to be about seventy. Plato's words, *οἶμαι γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν ἑγγύς καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα ἔτη γεγονότα*, require us to suppose that the exact number of years was, if anything, rather less than seventy, and we thus get 430 B.C. as the probable latest date for his death. This fits in well with the immediately following observation of the *Meno* that his reputation remains undiminished *ἔτι εἰς τὴν ἡμέραν ταυτηνὴν*, which would be absurd if supposed to be spoken within little more than ten years after the event to which they refer.

These results appear to me no less certain that they are inconsistent with the story of the prosecution for impiety. The falsehood of this tale, which had been already discerned by Mr. St. George Stock in his edition of the *Meno*, has been so thoroughly established by Professor Burnet that we may hope in another generation or so to see it expunged even from the text-books of the history of Greek philosophy.

The current chronology, which brings down the birth of Protagoras to about 485-480, seems to rest on nothing but one of the usual Alexandrian combinations. Protagoras was known to have been one of the commissioners employed by Pericles for the establishment of the important colony of Thurii in 444 (Heraclides of Pontus *ap.* Diogenes Laertius viii. 50). Now the foundation of Thurii, like the fall of Sardis, was a favourite date with the Alexandrians in fixing the *ἀκμὴ* of persons for whom no more exact data were available. The assumption that the *ἀκμὴ* of Protagoras coincided with this most important event in his recorded career, taken together with Plato's express assertion that he was just under seventy when he died, at once gives 484-415 as his dates of birth and death. But it is absurd to prefer such a transparent combination to the clear and consistent indications of the *Protagoras*. The theory which brings him down to 480-411 seems to rest on nothing better than the tale that his "accuser" was Pythodorus, "one of the 400," i.e. a member of the very class from whom the admirers and pupils of the "sophists" were recruited! (Cf. Aristophanes, *Frogs* 967, for the "moderate reactionaries" of 411 as the "disciples" of the "sophistic" poet, Euripides.) The case of Protagoras is thus similar to that of Lysias whose traditional date has notoriously been got wrong in consequence of the fixing of his *ἀκμὴ* by reference to the foundation of Thurii.

"notions,"¹ and the changes are rung on *φροντίζειν* and its cognates until the modern reader, whatever may have been the feelings of the ancient spectator, grows weary of the word. The only reasonable explanation of this "damnable iteration" is, in fact, that the nickname is no invention of the poet's, but a popular term of derision already familiar to the audience as specially appropriate to Socrates and his friends, and adopted as a catchword by the poet precisely because, being so familiar, it might be counted on to raise a laugh at the minimum expense of brains. Fortunately we have the evidence of Plato, and perhaps also of Xenophon, to confirm this conclusion.² All this shows that

¹ The keynote of the play is struck in the opening exposition at l. 75 when Strepsiades ends his recollections with the remark *νῦν οὖν ὅλην τὴν νύκτα φροντίζων ὁδοῦ*, | *μὲν ἦν δαίμωνίως ὑπερφνῶ*. If I read the poet aright, this is an intentional hint to the audience that the coming piece is to deal with the humours of the *φροντισταί* and their *φροντιστήριον*. For a single example of a passage which is only intelligible on the view that the point lies in the reiteration of a jest already familiar to the audience, cf. 227 ff.—

οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε
ἐξηῦρον ὀρθῶς τὰ μετέωρα πράγματα,
εἰ μὴ κρεμάσας τὸ νόημα καὶ τὴν φροντίδα
λεπτὴν καταμείξας εἰς τὸν ὅμοιον ἀέρα.
εἰ δ' ὦν χαμαὶ τᾶν κατῶθεν ἐσκόπουν,
οὐκ ἂν ποθ' ἦν ἦν· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλ' ἢ γῆ βίαι
ἔλκει πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν ἱμάδα τῆς φροντίδος.

² Plato's testimony to the existence of a long-standing popular joke about Socrates as a *φροντιστής* will be found in *Symposium* 220 c, where, when Socrates falls into one of his trances, the word goes round the camp before Potidaea that *Σωκράτης φροντίζων ἔστηκεν*. Unless the nickname had already been in existence there would have been no point in this camp jest. The joke lay in the fact that the *φροντιστής* was at work in the open and not, as usual, in the seclusion of his "factory." There was an opportunity to watch the whole process of the making of a *φροντίς*. So it is given in the *Apology*, 18 b, as a summary of the popular view of Socrates, *ὡς ἔστιν τις Σωκράτης σοφὸς ἀνὴρ, τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστής κτλ.* Xenophon's allusion occurs in *Symposium* vi. 6, where the Syracusan *maitre de ballet* attacks Socrates with the words *ἄρα σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ φροντιστής ἐπικαλούμενος*; It might be maintained that Xenophon is here merely reproducing a nickname which had been fixed on Socrates by the *Clouds* itself, since the speaker's jibe about the "geometry" by which Socrates is said to measure the jump of a flea seems to be an allusion to *Clouds* 144 ff. But comparison with the Platonic passage suggests rather that both the nickname and (?) the joke about the

the object of the *Clouds* is not to attack "sophists" at all, but to burlesque a group of "faddists" gathered round a particular individual with whose mental and physical peculiarities the spectators are assumed to be well acquainted, and who is depicted not as a "sophist," but rather as what we should call a needy and tolerably dishonest "crank." Besides being interested in science in a fantastic fashion, which should recall to an English reader Swift's ridicule of Newton and the Royal Society, the person caricatured has an educational system which reminds us at more points than one of the programme laid down for the philosopherring of the *Republic*, and is specially skilled in the controversial use of what, with Plato before us, we at once recognise as the Socratic *elenchus*. Socrates and his dialectic are thus presumed to be well known to the Athenian public of 423. That this assumption precisely agrees with that habitually made by Plato follows at once from the following considerations. The opening of the *Charmides* assumes that Socrates was already a familiar figure in the palaestrae and gymnasia, and in the habit of practising the *elenchus* on the youths who congregated there as early as the beginning

flea are popular pleasantries which Aristophanes found ready to his hand. So again the remark made by Strepsiades at l. 190, in his amiable desire to save the labour of the geologizing disciples whom he supposes to be looking for truffles, *μη νυν τοῦτό γε φροντίζετε*, is singularly flat unless *φροντίζειν* was already applied in a derisive sense to the supposed researches of Socrates and his friends. The same result follows from the consideration that Amipsias' Κόννος actually had a chorus of *φροντισταί*, as we see from the remark of Athenaeus about Protagoras, 'Αμειψίας δ' ἐν τῷ Κόννῳ . . . οὐ καταριθμεῖ αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ τῶν φροντιστῶν χόρῳ. Athenaeus draws from this the conclusion that Protagoras must have been absent from Athens in 423, or he would have figured among the *φροντισταί*. The real reasons for his non-appearance are (a) that he was not a *φροντιστής* at all, and (b) that he was pretty certainly dead years before. I will add one further consideration. Apart from the existence of some such popular "slang" nickname, the very choice of the words *φροντίζειν*, *φροντίς*, *φροντιστής* as the catch-words of the play would be a little perplexing. For the primary literary sense of *φροντίζειν* in classical Greek, as the lexicons will show, is simply to be "anxious" or "worried" about a thing. Compare the phrases οὐδὲν φροντίζω, "I don't care a curse," σὸ φροντίς Ἰπποκλείδῃ, "I don't give a damn," or such a passage as Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 102, ἐλπίς ἀμύνει φροντίδ' ἀπληστον, "imagination wards off my insatiate anxiety," and the like.

of the Peloponnesian war. For we are expressly told there that on his return from Potidaea he went straight "after so long an interval" (οἷον διὰ χρόνου ἀφινγμένος) to his "accustomed haunts" (συνήθεις διατριβάς).¹ The *Symposium* suggests an even earlier date for the beginning of that self-imposed mission to the Athenian people of which we hear so much in the *Apology*. We learn there that Alcibiades, who was of military age when the war began, and served, like Socrates, at Potidaea, had already been impressed by the philosopher's discourses at a time when he was a mere boy, and apparently only just old enough to be allowed to go about without a παιδαγωγός.² So, again, Socrates appears in the rôle of a mentor of youth in the *Protagoras*, the imaginary date of which must be some time before the outbreak of the war, as the great gathering of "sophists" is scarcely conceivable except in a time of general peace. (Hippias, for instance, could scarcely be so comfortable in Athens as the tone of his speech implies that he is, if Elis had been at the moment a member of a confederacy with which Athens was at war. Alcibiades, too, is described as only just showing marks of puberty. As puberty was commonly supposed to occur in the male at fourteen, and Alcibiades cannot have been much younger than twenty when he served at Potidaea, this points to a date not more than a year or two after 440, and possibly a little earlier.³)

¹ *Charmides* 153 a. That Socrates is far from being new to his mission is further indicated *ib. d* by the words αὐθις ἐγὼ αὐτοῖς ἀνθρώτων τὰ τῆδε, περὶ φιλοσοφίας ὅπως ἔχει τανῦν, περὶ τε τῶν νέων.

² The whole story told by Alcibiades in praise of the continence of Socrates implies, of course, that the narrator was under the age of puberty at the time of the incidents mentioned, and for his extreme youth cf. 217 a πρὸ τοῦ οὐκ εἰσθῶς ἀνευ ἀκολούθου μόνος μετ' αὐτοῦ γίγνεσθαι. Yet even at this early date Socrates was so well known that Alcibiades could think it an εὐτύχημα θαυμαστόν to "hear all that he knew."

³ Cf. *Protagoras* 337 d. The eulogy of Athens would be inconceivable in the mouth of a speaker whose πατρίς was at the very moment engaged in a crusade against Athens on behalf of Greek freedom. For the age of Alcibiades at the date assumed see 309 a, where he is called ἀνὴρ and said to be πώγωνος ἤδη ὑποπιμπλάμενος. It is a minor point that Pericles is assumed to be still living, and apparently in the height of his renown (319 e-320 a Περικλῆς, ὁ τούτῳ τῶν νεανίσκων πατήρ, . . . ἃ δ' αὐτὸς σοφός ἐστιν οὔτε αὐτὸς παιδεύει

Stating the case in the least favourable terms for my own theory, we may fairly say that Plato consistently assumes that the public mission of Socrates began not later than some time between 440 and 435, and possibly earlier. This of itself would be enough to show that Socrates must have been a most familiar figure long before the *Clouds* was put on the stage, and that to exhibit a pretended burlesque of him which could not be recognised as accurate in its fundamental points would have been to expose oneself to certain and merited failure. But there is still more behind.

Every one knows that, according to the *Apology*, Socrates began his missionary career in consequence of the famous answer of the Pythia to Chaerephon's question, Is there anyone wiser than Socrates? That the oracle quoted by Plato was actually given has sometimes been questioned, but is, I venture to think, certain. According to Plato, Socrates not merely made the story a prominent point in his defence before the judges, but actually called, or offered to call, the brother of the deceased Chaerephon to give evidence of the fact. (I do not appeal for confirmation to the appearance of the story in the *Apology* of Xenophon, since that work, genuine or not, is manifestly itself largely dependent on the *Apology* and *Phaedo*.) But, apart from any question of external confirmation, the truth of the narrative is guaranteed by the very fact that Plato makes Socrates propose to put in evidence.¹ Unless Socrates really did tell the story at his trial and offer to prove it by witnesses, it is unintelligible why Plato should make him do so. The tale itself might pass muster as a mere ingenious

κτλ.). The passage about Alcibiades, in particular, seems quite decisive, and it would be idle to argue against it from dates based on conjectures as to the year of the death of Hipponicus, or of the production of Pherocrates' *Αγροί*.

¹ *Apology* 21 a. Note that in 23 c it is assumed that it was only as a further consequence of Socrates' public appearances as a cross-questioner of eminent men that the *νέοι* began to gather round him. Note also that it is emphatically *not* these *νέοι* (who, as Socrates explains, were members of rich and leisured households), but an entirely different "set," beggarly ascetics and "cranks" of the type of Chaerephon the ghost-raiser (i.e. Orphic-Pythagorean followers of φιλοσοφία) who figure in the *Clouds* as *μαθηταί*.

fiction, but not the absurdity of saying that witnesses to it were produced if every one of the spectators of the scene could testify that no such witnesses had been called. But now, assuming the truth of Plato's story, let us observe what we can infer from it. There has been a good deal of foolish speculation about the matter, but one simple inference is unavoidable. If the managers of the Delphic oracle assured Chaerephon on the faith of Apollo that Socrates was the wisest of men, we may be sure they knew well enough that Chaerephon already thought him so. The really interesting point about the incident is not so much the answer of the god (which is explicable enough), but the fact that the question was put. The raising of it implies that in circles where an interest was taken in σοφία Socrates already had so high a reputation that the question whether he had any living superior could be asked of Apollo without absurdity.

Thus the *Apology* makes it clear that Socrates had already a high and assured reputation in certain circles interested in φιλοσοφία even before the date we have been led to assume for his appearance as a general cross-questioner of all sorts and conditions of men. This, of course, fits in with what Plato tells us in the *Phaedo* of his master's early enthusiasm for the subject called περὶ φύσεως ἱστορία, and in the *Parmenides* of the impression made and received in his encounter with the great Eleatic dialecticians, and is absolutely irreconcilable with the still too common conception of him as an αὐτοδίδακτος, a self-trained man with no more knowledge of the science of the past than might be picked up incidentally by turning over books on a vendor's stall, and standing in no particular relations with his predecessors in the quest for "wisdom." For the moment I propose to use these results merely to show how incredible it is that the Athenian citizens of the year 423 could have been expected by Aristophanes to applaud a caricature of Socrates which was not carefully modelled after the truth.

We have thus every reason to suppose that the picture

of Socrates in the *Clouds* is a careful and elaborate piece of art, a distortion into the grotesque of a figure with which both the poet and the audience upon whom the success or failure of his comedy depended were familiarly acquainted, and we may reasonably expect to recover by close study of the caricature the main features of its original no less confidently than, as Dr. Verrall has shown, we can do the same thing in the case of the Aristophanic "Euripides." Indeed, we might go so far as to suggest that we have better ground for confidence in the case of the earlier play, since the poet takes special credit to himself in the *parabasis* for the exceptional art shown in its composition, and invites the spectators to show their taste by appreciating that art adequately, a piece of self-praise which would be oddly out of place if the leading personage of the drama bore no close resemblance to his acknowledged prototype.¹ Hence, if it can be shown that the leading features in the caricature exactly correspond with traits of the character and history of Socrates as delineated by Plato, the last vestige of reasonable suspicion that the Platonic portrait is unhistorical will be removed, and we shall be prepared to treat the occasional passages of autobiography which the dialogues put into the mouth of Socrates as authentic records of the highest importance. Accordingly, I invite attention to the following series of coincidences between Aristophanes and Plato.

(1) To consider first a matter which affects our whole conception of the general character of the *πραγματεία* of Socrates. The Socrates of Aristophanes, though a well-known figure in the streets and places of public resort,² is

¹ Aristophanes, *Clouds* 521 ὡς ὑμᾶς ἡγοῦμενος εἶναι θεατὰς δεξιόδους (not likely, then, to be imposed on) | καὶ ταύτην σοφώτατ' ἔχειν τῶν ἐμῶν κωμωιδιῶν. We must remember that our *Clouds* is a second edition, and may therefore be supposed to have had the benefit of a thorough critical revision.

² This conclusion again is supported by the *Protagoras*. In that dialogue Protagoras and Socrates are represented as already personally known to each other, as appears from the fact that Protagoras addresses Socrates by name, though he had neither introduced himself nor been named by any member of the company (316 c ὁρθῶς, ἔφη, προμηθεύη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ). Since Protagoras has only just arrived at Athens, and Socrates had not been aware of his

moreover the centre of a narrower special circle whose appearance testifies to the mortification of the flesh, and who are engaged in studies of an abstruse kind which make no appeal to the "man in the street." He is no mere clever conversationalist and dialectical fencer with politicians, poets, craftsmen, and chance comers generally, but a teacher with *μαθηταί*, who are represented in the play as living in his house and carrying on their studies there. If we had no description of Socrates to compare with this except that of Xenophon, we might be inclined to suspect Aristophanes of reckless misrepresentation, though even Xenophon incidentally reveals in a single passage the suggestive fact that Socrates was connected with a society of some kind which, like the *μαθηταί* in the *φροντιστήριον*, had a common dining-table (*Mem.* iii. 14. 1). But when we turn to Plato we find the Aristophanic account amply confirmed. Socrates does, no doubt, find his way into all companies, and contrives to compel all manner of men, high and low, to give account of their spiritual state, but he has also a special circle with whom he is connected in a more intimate manner. He discourses with them, as he does not with the multitude at large, of the deep things of the philosophic life, and of his own intimate experiences, and they regard

presence until informed by Hippocrates, the acquaintance must have been made on that previous visit of Protagoras to Athens which took place, as we are told at 310 e, when Hippocrates, who is now a young man of means, was a mere child. 310 e also takes it for granted that Socrates already knows Protagoras, since Hippocrates asks Socrates for an introduction to the great man expressly on the ground that he has never yet personally met him, *οὐδὲ ἑώρακα Πρωταγόραν πώποτε οὐδ' ἀκήκοα οὐδέν*. It must then have been on this former occasion that Protagoras had formed the high expectation of Socrates' future distinction which he had already expressed to "many" (*πρὸς πολλοὺς δὴ εἶρηκα ὅτι ὦν ἐντυγχάνω πολὺ μάλιστα ἀγαμαί σέ, 361 e*). Thus Socrates was already a prominent figure among the rising "wits" at a time of which we can only say roughly that it must have been some years before he had reached the age of thirty. This, of course, fits in exactly with the glimpses given by the *Phaedo* and *Parmenides* of the tastes and pursuits of Socrates in his early manhood.

I owe the view taken above of the significance of the oracle given to Chaerephon in the first instance to conversation with Professor Burnet, who must not, however, be held responsible for my combination of it with other data.

his passing from them in the prison much as the "sons of the prophets" did the taking away of Elijah. They are the "we" in whose name Socrates talks in the *Phaedo*, the "we" who are always speaking of "beauty itself," "justice itself," "piety itself," and "setting the seal" of the expression "what it is itself" (αὐτὸ ὃ ἐστὶ) on such concepts in their "questions and answers" (*Phaedo* 75 d), and with whom the reality of such entities is what the reality of the "thinking thing" was for Descartes, the standard or criterion of all other reality (*ib.* 77 a). They are sharply distinguished from the more general public to whom Socrates addresses himself in obedience to the mandate of Delphi by the fact that they are not to be satisfied with arguments from analogy, the ἐπακτικοὶ λόγοι which Aristotle thought so characteristic of Socrates, but require to be convinced by "demonstration based upon an adequate initial postulate" (92 d). In their eyes the reality of "beauty itself," and the other εἶδη, is such an ἀξία ὑπόθεσις, and it is with reference to them that these concepts are called ἐκείνα τὰ πολυθρύλητα, "those much-talked-of entities" (100 b).¹ Primarily these persons, as we meet them in the *Phaedo*, are not so much μαθηταί as comrades of Socrates, Pythagorean μαθηταί of Philolaus, and scholars of the Eleatics from Megara. But even among the younger men who might properly be called μαθηταί we seem to come across a few who stand in something of the same kind of special relation to the master. Plato's brother Glaucon is one of them, for all his love of dogs and sport, and this explains why, in the tenth book of the *Republic*, Socrates can include him among the "we" who are "accustomed" to posit an εἶδος for each class of things which are called by a common name, and to say that it is this ἰδέα which the workman imitates when he makes a bed or a table (*Republic* 596 a, b, where note the repeated insistence on the fact that the theory is one which "we" are "accustomed" to maintain, τῆς εἰωθυίας

¹ See the illuminating discussion of these passages in Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*,² pp. 354-356.

μεθόδου . . . εἰώθαμεν τίθεσθαι . . . εἰώθαμεν λέγειν). This, too, is, no doubt, why Adimantus, who had been the respondent in the earlier part of *Republic* vi., becomes silent as soon as the topic of the *ιδέα τἀγαθοῦ* is raised, and leaves Glaucon to carry on the discussion about the Good, the different grades of reality and cognition, and the principles of scientific education, and does not intervene again until at 548 d we reach the more popular subject of the imperfect types of personal and national character.¹

¹ Adimantus, in fact, belongs to the general public, outside the specially Socratic circle. This point is at once made clear and accounted for by the *Apology*. At *Apology* 34 a, Socrates proposes to call Adimantus as a witness to prove that Plato, for one, has not been "corrupted" by association with him. This, of course, implies that Adimantus was not himself one of the band of *νέοι* who were in constant attendance on Socrates, since otherwise his evidence would have been worthless. It implies further that Adimantus was considerably older than the other two, and stood, as we say, *in loco parentis* to them. (Plato was apparently the youngest of the three, since the apparent date assumed for the discussions of the *Republic* is 411 B.C., and Glaucon is already at that date a young man with dogs and horses, whereas Plato was then a mere lad, not yet even an *ἐφηβος*.) I call attention to the point because it disposes of the fanciful theory that the choice of Glaucon as chief respondent in the profoundest parts of the *Republic* is due to his character as an *ἐρωτικός*. Do these facts explain the curious point that in the opening scene of the dialogue Adimantus is found in company with Polemarchus, like his brother Lysias a partisan of the *δῆμος*? Considering the known politics of Plato's relatives, we should hardly have expected to find Adimantus associating so familiarly with persons "on the wrong side." But, as an older man, he may well have kept a cooler head than the young bloods of the family (including Plato, who describes himself in *Epist.* vii. 324 d as originally enthusiastic for the revolution of 404: *ωἰήθην γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐκ τινος ἀδίκου βίου ἐπὶ δίκαιον τρόπον ἀγοντας διοικήσειν δὴ τὴν πόλιν, ὥστε αὐτοῖς σφόδρα προσείχον τὸν νοῦν τί πράξειεν*), and more alive to the advantage of having friends in both parties. He may, in fact, have belonged rather to the party of Theramenes than to that of Critias. (From Xenophon, *Mem.* iii. 6, where Socrates, from friendship to Plato, intervenes to prevent Glaucon from making himself ridiculous in public life, it would seem at first as though Glaucon were younger than Plato. For he is said there to have come forward as a politician "before he was twenty," and the tradition was that Plato "heard" Socrates at the age of twenty. If this is correct, Glaucon must have been at least a year or two younger. But Xenophon may have fallen into some error about the age of Glaucon; or, again, the anonymous tradition of the age at which Plato "heard" Socrates may be mistaken; or, finally, the "hearing" may refer to the beginning of a period of intimate discipleship which had been preceded by a considerable time of more external connection with Socrates as one of the interested and admiring *νέοι*. At any rate, it seems rash to

It is this inner circle of Socratic men who are represented in the *Clouds*, which takes no account of the *public* applications of the Socratic *elenchus*, as the *μαθηταί* who live with their teacher in the *φροντιστήριον*. In view of Xenophon's description of their common meals this description of them as living in the house of Socrates, much like the Fellows of a College, cannot be said to go beyond the bounds of fair and legitimate caricature.

(2) To come now to some details. I have already pointed out that it is taken for granted in the preliminary exposition of the drama that the *φροντιστήριον* and its inhabitants are perfectly familiar to the dullest Athenian peasant.¹ Both Strepsiades and his son apparently know a good deal about the reputed mysterious lore and odd ways of Socrates and Chaerephon and the other inmates. And two points, perhaps, fall to be specially noted. The only *φροντιστής* specified by name, other than Socrates, is Chaerephon. To "grow exactly like Chaerephon" is held out as the highest prize of faithful attendance in the school. Chaerephon is, in fact, the standing butt of the poet. And the particular facts about him which are singled out for ridicule are two, his "mortified" appearance, and his connection with "spiritist" lore and necromancy.² Chaerephon

discredit the very definite representations of *Republic* i. on no better grounds than the combination of Xenophon with the statement about the age at which Plato "heard" Socrates. The language of Plato himself (*Ep.* vii. 324 e) certainly suggests that his connection with Socrates was no new thing in the year 404.)

¹ Is it too fanciful to see in the nightly *φροντις* of Strepsiades an allusion to the nightly meditations of Phaedra, elsewhere burlesqued by our poet, *ἦδη ποτ' ἄλλως νυκτὸς ἐν μακρῷ χρόνῳ | θνητῶν ἐφρόντισ' ἦε διέφθαρται βίος* (*Hippol.* 375-6)? So Strepsiades had been awake all night reflecting on the impending ruin of *his* *βίος*.

² For the first, cf., besides the tale about the flea, 503-4 *οὐδὲν διόλσεις Χαιρεφῶντος τὴν φύσιν*.—οἱμοὶ κακοδαίμων ἡμιθνής γενήσομαι. For the second, I must refer again to the passage from the *Birds* already dealt with in Essay I. It may be significant also both that Xenophon is so silent about a man who had clearly been one of the best known of the *φροντισταί*, and that when he incidentally breaks through his silence it is to class Chaerephon with Simmias, Cebes, and Phaedo, and others who associated with Socrates purely "for their souls' health," that they might become *καλοὶ κάγαθοί* in the Socratic sense (*Mem.* i. 2. 48). I take this to mean that he, too, was one of

thus figures as an example of the kind of φιλόσοφοι of whom we read in the *Phaedo* that the πολλοί are only too ready to admit their claim to be persons who οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι (ib. 64 a). Indeed, I would not be too sure that the passage does not contain a side glance at Aristophanes, as the person who had given the most famous literary expression to this popular estimate of the βίος φιλόσοφος. We do not hear anything of Chaerephon in the *Phaedo*, but the reason is, as we learn from the *Apology*, that he had finished his course between the return of the exiles from Piraeus and the trial of Socrates. We shall thus be not far wrong if we put

the Pythagorizing seekers after salvation. Hence, perhaps, his selection as the companion of Socrates in so thoroughly Pythagorean and Orphic a dialogue as the *Gorgias*. The only other references of Xenophon to Chaerephon are insignificant. From *Mem.* ii. 3 we learn that there had once been ill-feeling between him and his brother Chaerechrates, and in the *Apology* the story of the Delphian oracle is repeated from the Platonic *Apology*. Hermogenes, who is another figure in Xenophon's list, also figures among the company present at the death of Socrates, and so, of course, does Crito. This leaves only Chaerecrates, out of the whole list, unaccounted for. As we learn from Xenophon that he was the younger of the brothers, and is thus presumably the witness called by Socrates to the facts about the oracle, the silence of Plato about him is curious. Perhaps the explanation may be that the dissension was too deep-seated to be appeased even by the intervention of Socrates, and led to a separation between Chaerecrates and the rest of the group. Or he may have been dead too, and the brother of the *Apology* may be a different one. It is, however, suggestive that Xenophon says nothing of the success of Socrates' attempt at a reconciliation. The leanings of Hermogenes are indicated by his delight with the derivation, called by Plato "Orphic," of σῶμα from σώζειν, as though the body were the "prison-house" in which the soul is "reserved" for the day of judgment (*Cratylus* 400 c). One may fairly conjecture that Xenophon's whole list of persons, who, unlike Alcibiades and Critias, associated with Socrates for the simple purpose of becoming καλοὶ καγαθοί, is made up of sympathizers with Orphic and Pythagorean ideas and practices, and, in fact, that this list, the group of intimates in the *Phaedo* and the μαθηταὶ of the *Clouds*, are identical, when allowance has been made for the changes in personnel brought about by the lapse of a quarter of a century. Phidippides and his father do not propose to join it; like Alcibiades and Critias, in Xenophon, they mean to stay in the school only long enough to get hold of the art of success in the *elenchus*, and then to return to the "world," and Strepsiades is exceedingly impatient at the magnitude of the preliminary routine through which Socrates insists on putting him. But Socrates is throughout no mere professor of the two λόγοι, he is first and foremost the head of a permanent body of μαθηταί,

down the men who figure in Aristophanes as Socrates' fellow-members of an "impious" Orphic or semi-Orphic "conventicle," half a "church" and half a "hell-fire club," like that of Cinesias and his *κακοδαιμονισταί*.

To proceed a few lines further. The very first words of the *μαθητής* who opens the door to Strepsiades throw an absolutely startling light on one of the most familiar passages in Plato. He complains that, by the untimely noise, *φροντίδ' ἐξήμβλωκας ἐξηυρημένην*, "you have caused the miscarriage of a notion" (137). In a language so chary of its metaphors as the Attic of the fifth century, such an expression is much more vigorous and unnatural than it would, unfortunately, be in a language like our own, which has been debased by the journalistic style of which the abuse of metaphor and the inability to say a simple thing in simple words are so familiar a symptom. Yet, even in English, the phrase strikes one as a very extraordinary way of saying "you have interrupted our studies." We should at least put down a man who expressed himself after this fashion to an intruder as an "original," given to the use of remarkably picturesque phraseology.¹ We have, therefore, the right to assume that the violent metaphor is employed for a definite purpose, and the suspicion is raised almost to certainty when we

organized with common studies and meals, and even religious rites, exactly like a Pythagorean *ὀμακίον*. I have already shown that this is also the Platonic account, and it is of supreme importance that Xenophon should be found unconsciously revealing the same thing. The *συνδειπνοῦντες*, of whom mention has already been made, are, no doubt, the members of the *ὀμακίον*.

¹ As an instance of the way in which unusually picturesque metaphor, even in English, sometimes produces this impression, I may mention having heard it recorded as a striking thing in a west-country village once visited by Tennyson that the poet had been heard to complain of some neglect of his comfort as "awaking a dormant cold." The inhabitants commented on this as a piece of diction only permissible in a poet with an established reputation, who might thus be supposed free to take liberties with words.

Is there any parody of the *ἐχεμυθία* ascribed to the Pythagoreans in the absolute stillness demanded, as it would appear, for the conception and birth of a *φροντίς*?

find the poet calling attention to it by making Strepsiades repeat it, obviously as something out-of-the-way which had touched his curiosity, in the next line but one, ἀλλ' εἰπέ μοι τὸ πρῶγμα τοῦ ξημβλωμένον (139). The only natural explanation consistent with the belief that Aristophanes is a man of ordinary sense is that the phrase would tickle the audience, precisely because it would be recognised as characteristic of Socrates and his φροντιστήριον, just as we could infer from the text of the *Critic* that Lord Burleigh's sagacious and consequential "nod" was already traditional in the eighteenth century. Now, according to Plato, as we all know, Socrates did describe himself as a practitioner of the art of spiritual midwifery, one whose function it was to bring the ripening thoughts of his young friends to the birth, and actually spoke in this connection, as his pupil is made to speak in Aristophanes of the "miscarriage" of a concept.¹

We can, I think, draw a still more important inference from this luckily preserved jest. The famous description in the *Theaetetus* of the pains of the soul which is "in travail" with a thought to which it cannot of itself, without aid, give expression, at once leads us to put a question which the *Theaetetus* does not answer. Who, or what, is the "only begetter" of that which the teeming soul carries in its womb? The answer has to be sought in the well-known description of the impulse towards τόκος ἐν καλῶι which the Socrates of the *Symposium* (206 c ff.) ascribes to Diotima. The thoughts which Socrates helps into the world by his dialectic are the offspring of intercommunion between earnest and ardent minds. The close correspondence between the language of this part of Diotima's speech and that of the *Theaetetus* should forbid our doubting that we are dealing throughout with the same theory.² But this

¹ *Theaetetus* 148 e ff. The double use of the phrase by Aristophanes shows that the metaphor must have been so common on the lips of Socrates that it could be counted on to raise a laugh when put into the mouth of a μαθητής whose devotion leads him to copy his teacher's pet catch-words.]

² Compare particularly the references in the *Symposium* to the throes of intellectual delivery, 206 d πολλὰ ἢ πτοίησις γέγονε περὶ τὸ καλὸν διὰ τὸ

means further that the whole so-called doctrine of "Platonic love," with its identification of the impulse of the lover and the philosopher, so well known to us from the *Symposium*, the *Phaedrus*, and the hymn of the sixth book of the *Republic*, which forms, as we might say, an epithalamium for the soul that has met its Bridegroom, is, in its inception at least, not primarily Platonic at all, but belongs to that paradoxical and heavenly lover, Socrates. And we thus find ground for believing that the presentation of Socrates in the first-named¹ dialogue is strictly historical, and that

μεγάλης ὥδινος ἀπολύειν τὸν ἔχοντα, and to the possibility that one's intellectual offspring may turn out to be a mere "semblance" of truth, *Symp.* 212 a τίκειν οὐκ εἰδῶλα ἀρετῆς, ἅτε οὐκ εἰδῶλου ἐφαπτομένῳ, ἀλλὰ ἀληθῆ, ἅτε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἐφαπτομένῳ, *Theaet.* 150 b ἐντοτε μὲν εἰδῶλα τίκειν, ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἀληθινά, *Rep.* vi. 490 a ἀπολογησόμεθα, ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ὃν πεφυκὼς εἴη ἀμιλλᾶσθαι ὃ γε ὅντως φιλομαθῆς, καὶ οὐκ . . . ἀπολήγοι τοῦ ἔρωτος, πρῶν . . . γεννήσας νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν, γνοίη τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ζῶν καὶ τρέφοιτο καὶ οὕτω λήγοι ὥδινος, πρῶν δ' οὐ. The careful reader will note for himself that this notion of the *ἑρὸς γάμος* of Mind with What Is haunts the whole of the *Republic*, exactly as the thought of the *sponsa Christi* has haunted the devout imagination of later ages. The source of the doctrine is not far to seek. As we might expect from Diotima, we are in the region of the "mysteries" throughout her discourse. The *ἑρὸς γάμος* supplied unscrupulous Christian Fathers with much of their worst scandal against Hellenism (in spite of the fact that it remains to this day as an article of the Creed), and Eros himself is a characteristically Orphic figure.

¹ I speak specially of the *Symposium*, because the case of the *Phaedrus* is partly different, inasmuch as it is largely taken up with a subtle polemic against Isocrates, and his attempt to divorce the art of getting hold of effective "points of view" and putting them into neat antithetical phrases from the knowledge of man and of life. I have urged some further reasons for regarding the *Symposium* picture of Socrates, in particular, to be singularly accurate in two papers in recent numbers of *Mind* (N.S. 69, 74), "A Note on Plato's Vision of the Ideas," and a critical review of Mr. R. G. Bury's recent edition of the dialogue. On the Orphic connections of the doctrine of Eros, it is sufficient to remark that in Plato it is always connected with the "wheel of birth," and that Aristotle specially marks the point when he suggests Hesiod or Parmenides as the author of the theory of the cosmic significance of sexual attraction further worked out by Empedocles. It is strictly in order that the *Hippolytus*, a play with an Orphic *καθάρσις* as its hero, should lament the general disregard of the godhead of *ἔρως* (τὸν τὰς Ἀφροδίτας φιλάτων θαλάμων κληιδούχον οὐ σεβίζομεν). I would, in fact, suggest that whenever *ἔρως*, the *ὄργια*, and Orpheus meet us in Plato, we are in the immediate presence of "St. Socrates." A point which must not be overlooked is that the spiritualisation of the doctrine of *ἔρως* into the

if Plato has there seen fit to make him discourse in a high poetic strain very different from the homely tone he was accustomed to use in his daily talk of "fullers and shoemakers and carpenters," it is because he did discourse so when the audience and the occasion were fit.

I am afraid I shall try the reader's patience intolerably, but I have even now not quite done with the matter of the *φροντίς* which miscarried. In the lines which follow, after a caution against "telling tales out of school,"¹ the

conception of a "holy marriage" of the soul with its Divine Bridegroom τὸ δὲ is hardly likely to have come from any thinker who was not himself by temperament an *ἐρωτικός*. This is a familiar feature of Socrates, but we have no real evidence as to its presence in Plato. As for the epigrams ascribed to him, even if they are to be taken as expressing personal feeling at all, there are grave reasons for suspecting the authenticity of those which bear on the point. The beautiful lines on Phaedrus and Alexis, as Professor Burnet reminds me, betray themselves by the use of the name Ἀλεξίς ("Alick"), since Alexander is a specifically non-Attic name, not likely to have been borne by an Athenian lad before Macedonian times. I would add that the name Phaedrus probably comes from the Platonic dialogues, as does also that of Agathon in the lines translated by Shelley (cf. Diogenes Laertius iii. 29). The author probably remembered that the famous Agathon figures as the host in the great "erotic dialogue," and is also mentioned as an *ἐρώμενος* at *Protagoras* 315 e, while Phaedrus delivers one of the discourses on Eros in the *Symposium*, and also discusses the subject with Socrates in the *Phaedrus*. Neither could have been an *ἐρώμενος* of Plato for reasons of chronology, and that there should have been a Phaedrus and an Agathon who are prominent in the chief "erotic discourses," and also a later pair of the same names who were *ἐρώμενοι* of Plato, is too incredible a coincidence. The epigrams on Aster and that on Dion prove nothing at all. I need hardly add that these remarks are not meant to cast any aspersion on the indubitable "purity" of Socrates. The habit of reading an evil sense into all classical references to παιδεραστία is part of the price we have to pay for coming to Greek literature full of prejudices derived from the corruptions of Imperial Rome.

As for the attempts to extract an admission that Plato is passing beyond the limits of his master's doctrines from the words of Diotima at *Symp.* 209 e ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐρωτικά ἴσως, ὦ Σώκρατες, κὰν σὺ μνησθῇς· τὰ δὲ τέλεια καὶ ἐποπτικά, ὧν ἕνεκα καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν . . . οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ οἷός τ' ἂν εἶη, they seem to me futile. The sense is merely that one must not be too confident that any mere man can attain to the full revelation of the beatific vision.

¹ 140 ἀλλ' οὐ θέμις πλὴν τοῖσι μαθηταῖσιν λέγειν, 143 λέξω· νομίμαι δὲ ταῦτα χρὴ μυστήρια. The school preserves a *disciplina arcani*, and its inquiries are religious secrets. This points to the conclusion that the brotherhood forms a *θιασος* or "conventicle," and, as we shall shortly see, Strepsiades is formally inducted into it by a regular rite of initiation. Thus we get another glimpse

μαθητής proceeds to explain what the unfortunate conceit was. It was a device for measuring a flea's jump in terms of the length of its own foot. That is, we have mentioned at the very first introduction of the school of φροντισταί, as a specimen of the kind of thing in which Socrates was supposed to be interested, the solution of a mathematical problem from the study known as *περὶ φύσεως ἱστορία*, the very subject of which Socrates tells us in the *Phaedo* he had, in early life, been an enthusiastic votary, though the significance of such a statement has been so generally overlooked that a clever modern writer has been led by a misunderstanding of Aristotle into the remarkable observation that "he only knew enough" of it "to hate it."¹ The

of Socrates in what I believe to be his true character as a member of a regular "church," and so the conclusions of our essay on the ἀσέβεια Σωκράτους are again confirmed.

¹ *Phaedo* 96 a. For further evidence of the interest of Socrates in such matters see the curious passage of Xenophon, *Symposium* 7. 4, where Socrates propounds as subjects of interest such questions as *τί ποτε ὁ μὲν λόγος διὰ τὸ λαμπρὸν φλόγα ἔχειν φῶς παρέχει, τὸ δὲ χαλκεῖον λαμπρὸν ὃν φῶς μὲν οὐ ποιεῖ, ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ ἄλλα ἐμφαινόμενα παρέχεται, καὶ πῶς τὸ μὲν ἔλαιον ὑγρὸν ὃν αὖξει τὴν φλόγα, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ, ὅτι ὑγρὸν ἐστὶ, κατασβέννυσσι τὸ πῦρ*. These are, of course, regular problems about φύσις; the various opinions on the first point still form a special section of the *Placita*, *περὶ κατοπτρικῶν ἐμφάσεων*. The passage of the *Phaedo* implies that physical science was still known at Athens by the old name *περὶ φύσεως ἱστορία* as late as 399 B.C. This is connected with an interesting piece of linguistic history. There is every reason to believe that the words *φιλοσοφία*, *φιλόσοφος*, *φιλοσοφεῖν* were first specialised in meaning by the Pythagoreans, and not improbably by Pythagoras himself. Originally they had probably not meant more than their derivation implies, fondness for getting information and cultivating one's intelligence. With the Pythagoreans *φιλοσοφία* acquired the meaning of the pursuit of science as a means to "salvation," or deliverance from rebirth, a sense in which it is most conspicuously used by Plato in the *Phaedo* and *Gorgias*, though the same associations will be found to colour his employment of *φιλοσοφία* and its cognates wherever they recur (e.g. in the *Phaedrus*, and throughout the parts of the *Republic* which deal with the philosopher-kings, who are quite as much "saints" as men of science). It is only less prominent in Aristotle. (For the proofs of all this see Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*,² p. 321, and the references given there.) Also, I think, the lexicons will make it clear that the specialised sense of the words was first made current in Attic by the immediate disciples of Socrates themselves. The whole group of words is absent from Aristophanes. Neither *φιλοσοφία* nor *φιλόσοφος* seems to occur in Attic prose before the time of Plato. In the one famous passage where the verb *φιλοσοφεῖν* occurs (the *φιλοσοφοῦμεν*

jest of Aristophanes does not, of course, by itself *prove* that Socrates had really interested himself in mathematical problems, but it does prove that his fellow-citizens believed that he had done, and is so far a confirmation of the assumption made in the *Phaedo*, *Republic*, and *Meno*, and the rather reluctant admission of Xenophon, that he had some advanced knowledge of these "useless" sciences.¹ And it is worthy of notice that Aristophanes has thought it worth while to echo what looks like a *terminus technicus*

ἀνευ μαλακίας of the funeral speech of Pericles, Thuc. ii. 40) the antithesis with *φιλοκαλούμεν* shows that it is used (exactly as by Herodotus in his narrative of Solon and Croesus) in the general sense, "we cultivate our intelligence." Then we suddenly find the words becoming part of the current vocabulary just at the end of the fifth century. *φιλοσοφείν* occurs at least once, though in no very exalted sense, in Lysias, himself a connection of Socrates and his friends, [Lys.] viii. 11 *καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ὤμην φιλοσοφούντας αὐτοὺς περὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἀντιλέγειν τὸν ἐναντίον λόγον· οἱ δ' ἄρα οὐκ ἀντέλεγον ἀλλ' ἀντέπραττον*. (The speech, however, appears to be both spurious and late.) Lys. xxiv. 10 *εἰκὸς γάρ, ὡ βουλὴ, πάντας τοὺς ἔχοντας τι δυστόχημα τοῦτο ζητεῖν καὶ τοῦτο φιλοσοφεῖν, ὅπως ὡς ἀλυπτότατα μεταχειρίζονται τὸ συμβεβηκὸς πάθος* ("all who suffer from an infirmity set their intelligence at work to devise a way of making it as bearable as they can"). Then the whole group of words are familiar in the Socratics and their contemporary Isocrates. The natural inference is that it was through the Socratic circle that the high significance put on these words by the Pythagoreans made its way into literary Attic, and this, like so many other things, points to the view that Socrates stood in a very intimate relation with the Pythagorean succession. In any case the application of the name "philosophers" to the early cosmologists as a body is a misnomer. Those of them, at any rate, who were exempt from Pythagorean influences did not describe themselves or their studies by the names *φιλόσοφοι*, *φιλοσοφία*, as the frequenters of Socrates' *φροντιστήριον* undoubtedly did. And what others called them, as we see from the references to them in Hippocrates, was *σοφισταί*. The "modern writer" referred to is Dr. Benn, in his *Philosophy of Greece*, p. 173. His language is based, I suppose, on Aristotle, *Met.* A 987 b 2, which only means that Socrates did not "specialise" on *φύσις*, *φύσις* formed no part of his *πραγματεία*.

¹ *Meno* 82 c ff., *Phaedo* 92 d, where Simmias, wishing to illustrate the danger of trusting to arguments from analogy, appeals to "geometry" as a field in which he and his friends are quite at home. That this represents a peculiarly "Platonic" view of inference, and amounts to something like conscious criticism of the "inductive methods" of the "historical Socrates," as is held by Natorp and others, is a mere assumption resting on what I hope I have shown to be the mistaken theory that Aristotle is our primary source of information about the philosopher.

of the science, perverting it, as his business was, into nonsense. The line which Socrates measures is described at 152 as τὸ χωρίον, a regular term of Pythagorean geometry, misused here for comic effect, as χωρίον never means "distance," but always "area" or "rectangle" (literally "field"), as it does in the famous problem of the *Meno*.¹ So the verb in ἀνεμέτρει τὸ χωρίον is also a word of art. ἀναμετρέειν is properly to estimate the size of an area, to "demeasure" or "measure out," and the whole phrase means "he computed the area of the rectangle," an expression intended to produce all the greater impression on Strepsiades that he does not understand it.

A little farther down (177) we find Socrates again as a mathematician, drawing figures with a compass in the ashes, exactly as he does in Plato for the instruction of Meno and his servant. That such διαγράμματα are familiar things to Socrates and his circle is further seen from the way in which they are mentioned without any explanation, and the danger of blind confidence in them pointed out in the *Phaedo* and *Cratylus*.²

I would even venture to add that when we take all the passages which have just been referred to as evidence for the interest of Socrates in geometry together, we may perhaps feel justified in guessing that the story about the flea is not the invention of Aristophanes at all, but a current popular jest which the great comedian thought good enough to appropriate. At least, it is brought up again in Xenophon's *Symposium*, along with the charge of studying things "on high," in a way which suggests reproduction of popular gossip rather than direct literary

¹ 82 b, c, d, 83 a, 87 a al. See also Burnet, *op. cit.* p. 115, note 2.

² *Phaedo* 92 d, 73 b, where αἶψα τινὰ ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα is referred to as a proceeding which needs no explanation; *Cratylus* 436 d οὐδὲν ἀποπον, ὥσπερ τῶν διαγραμμάτων ἐνίοτε τοῦ πρώτου μικροῦ καὶ ἀδήλου ψεύδους γενομένου, τὰ λοιπὰ πάμπολλα ἤδη ὄντα ἐπόμενα ὁμολογεῖν ἀλλήλοις. Even Xenophon admits Socrates' familiarity with such διαγράμματα, though the admission is fatal to his theory that Socrates took the vulgar utilitarian view of such matters, *Mem.* iv. 7. 3 τὸ δὲ μέχρι τῶν δυσσυνέτων διαγραμμάτων γεωμετρῶν μανθάνειν ἀπεδοκίμαζεν . . . καίτοι οὐκ ἀπειρός γε αὐτῶν ἦν.

allusion.¹ This is, however, a minor point of no real significance. It is more interesting to observe that the immediate effect of the disclosures of the μαθητής is to convince Strepsiades that Athens can boast of another and a greater—Thales. (τί δὴτ' ἐκείνον τὸν Θαλὴν θαυμάζομεν; 180.) The point of the comparison is, of course, that Thales was popularly credited with a number of remarkable applications of mathematics to problems of practical life.²

According to Strepsiades, all these performances are now thrown into the shade by the ingenuity of Socrates, who stole the means of providing a dinner for his society under the pretence of demonstrating a theorem with the help of the compasses. This is "applied mathematics" of a kind which appealed to the mind of an Athenian *petit bourgeois*, or a Xenophon.

We pass on a little farther, and are introduced to the interior of the factory. The pupils of Socrates are "discovered" in a variety of strange postures, "searching the gloom below Tartarus," and making astronomical observations, and some of them carrying on both researches at once. In passing one might observe that the interests in astronomy and in the secrets of the underground world are similarly combined in the myth of the *Phaëdo*, which offers us at once a general scheme of the οὐρανός and a curious account of the subterranean rivers, and implies,

¹ Xenophon, *op. cit.* 6. 8 εἰπέ μοι πόσους ψύλλα πόδας ἐμοῦ ἀπέχει· ταῦτα γὰρ σέ φασι γεωμετεῖν. If this is not a cruder form of a jest which Aristophanes has improved *more suo*, I can only say that Xenophon's appreciation of the poet's wit must have been very defective.

² For a concise account of the supposed facts see Burnet, *op. cit.* 44-46, and for a similar reference to Thales as the standing type of the great mathematician in Aristophanes, *Birds* 1009 ἄνθρωπος Θαλῆς ("the fellow's another Newton"), said of Meton.

I am surprised to find that Diels infers from Proclus, *In Euclid.* 250. 20 ff., that Proclus, and possibly Eudemus, had seen a mathematical work purporting to be by Thales (*Vorsokratiker*,² ii. 2, p. vi.). All that Proclus says in the passage is that Thales is said to have enunciated i. 5, using the old expression "like angles" instead of the more exact later equivalent "equal angles." If either Proclus or his authority had seen a work believed to be by Thales, I cannot understand how this notice should be introduced by a λέγεται.

therefore, a curiosity about both on the part of the group of students to whom the tale is related.¹

That Aristophanes means quite seriously to represent the Socratic circle as scientific men engaged in mathematical study comes out again at l. 213, where the jest lies in Strepsiades' misunderstanding of a technical term of geometry, *παπατέταται*, properly used of a figure "erected on" or "applied to" a given straight line as its base. It is worth while to note, once more, that the term is put into the mouth of Socrates by Plato.²

(3) We see, then, that even before Socrates appears on, or rather over, the stage, Aristophanes has prepared us to expect that he will prove to be in the direct line of

¹ It may be said that the myth of the *Phaedo* proves nothing, since it is, of course, of Plato's own construction. But the real question is not whether Socrates actually related a myth of this kind in the prison, but whether Plato is offending against verisimilitude in saying that he did. He was free to compose a myth for his hero, but he was not free, as a literary artist, to invent a narrative of the last day of Socrates' life in which all the conversation turned upon topics notoriously beyond the ken of the Socratic circle.

² *Meno* 87 a, the well-known illustration of the nature of an hypothesis, *εἰ μὲν ἔστιν τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον τοιοῦτον, ὅσον παρὰ τὴν δοθείσαν αὐτοῦ γραμμὴν παρατείναντα ἐλλείπειν τοιοῦτω χωρίῳ, ὅσον ἂν αὐτὸ τὸ παρατεταμένον ᾖ κτλ.*, sc. "if this rectangle is such that when one applies it to the given straight line of it (i.e. apparently to the diameter of the circle of which Socrates is speaking), it is deficient by a rectangle similar to itself" (see the explanation of the passage given by M. Cantor, *Geschichte der Mathematik*, i. 187 [ed. 1]). *παρατείνειν* thus means literally to "lay out" a given area along a given base-line, just as *ἐνταθῆναι* in the same passage means "to be laid out in," "inscribed in" the circle. The problem is a case of the more general one of the *ἐλλειψις*, which we know to have been studied by the Pythagoreans, and of which there are numerous examples in the constructions of Euclid ii. (see Zeuthen, *Histoire des mathématiques*, 37 ff.). Euclid's words for the processes are *παραβάλλειν* = *παρατείνειν*, *ἐγγράφειν* = *ἐντέλλειν*. Strepsiades, of course, takes the "laying out" in a painful metaphorical sense. In a crude map, such as that in the *φροντιστήριον* would be, Euboea would be represented as almost exactly rectangular, and this gives all the more point to the jest. Attica and Euboea look roughly like a triangle *plus* a rectangle "applied" to one of its sides.

I ought to have observed on l. 152 that the fact that *ἀναμετρεῖν* or *ἀναμετρεῖσθαι*, as well as *χωρίον*, is a technicality, explains the point in *Birds* 1020, where Peithetaerus says to Meton *οὐκ ἀναμετρήσεις σαντὸν ἀπὶ ὧν ἀλλαχῇ*; Meton is dismissed with a word borrowed from his own *τέχνη*. The *μαθητής* is presumably playing with Strepsiades much as the Squire did with Moses Primrose.

succession of the Greek men of science, the astronomers and geometers, a new and greater Thales, whereas nothing has dropped from the lips of the *μαθητής* which could suggest that he is to be put up as a typical representative of so different a class of men as the brilliant Professors of Rhetoric. It is notorious that the expectations thus raised are fulfilled, and that "Socrates," on his first introduction to us, is depicted as primarily a propounder of eccentric ideas about biology and cosmology, and next as a heretic, like the "Euripides" of the *Frogs*, who has his own "private mint" of divinities. (The absence of any reference to so admirably suitable a subject for burlesque as the *δαιμόνιον σημεῖον* may perhaps yield some support to my view that the "sign" had nothing to do with the imputation of impiety.) It is, as we know, the custom to say that this representation is not fair caricature but mere baseless fiction, and to appeal for proof of this assertion to Xenophon and the *Apology* of Plato. But I think the supposed evidence will be found inadequate to support the conclusion. Even Xenophon admits, as we have seen, that Socrates "knew something" about the higher mathematics,¹

¹ For the "higher mathematics" see *Mem.* iv. 7. 3 οὐκ ἀπειρός γε αὐτῶν ἦν (with reference to the *διαγράμματα* of geometry), 5 καίτοι οὐδὲ τούτων γε ἀνήκοος ἦν (of speculative astronomy); for the arguments against Anaxagoras, which are much more redolent of Xenophon himself than of Socrates, *ib.* 6-9; for the interest in the writings of the "wise men of the past," *ib.* i. 6. 14 καὶ τοὺς θησαυροὺς τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν οὓς ἐκεῖνοι κατέλιπον ἐν βιβλίοις γράψαντες, ἀνελίστων κοινῇ σὺν τοῖς φίλοις διέρχομαι. It is not quite clear whom Xenophon has in mind. *παλαιός*, *πάλαι* do not of themselves imply very remote antiquity, and often need to be rendered in English by words like "some while since." Thus Demosthenes, in 343, speaks of the rebuilding of the Long Walls by Conon, only half a century before, as the work of *Κόνων ὁ παλαιός*. Hence Xenophon's phrase might quite well cover the works of men like Parmenides whom Socrates had actually seen in his youth. It is not likely that he means the early physicists, since, according to him, they were not *σοφοί* but *ἀνόητοι*. I suspect that the "friends" are Simmias and Cebes and their associates, and that the books referred to are really Orphic. Hesiod and Parmenides would, of course, come in under this head as they do in Plato, *Symposium* 195 c, where they are cited as authorities for *παλαιὰ πράγματα πολλὰ καὶ βίαια* about the gods. For the "hoary antiquity" popularly ascribed to Orphic literature cf. Euripides, *Hippolytus* 954 πολλῶν γραμμάτων τιμῶν καπνοῦς, and *Alcestitis* 967 Θρήσσαις ἐν σάνισιν τὰς Ὀρφεία κατέ-

that he was a student of the "treasure houses" of the writings of the "sages of the past," and that he knew enough about the system of Anaxagoras in particular to argue against it in some detail. The evidence of the *Apology* of Plato, again, is usually unconsciously perverted. What Socrates really says there is (a) that he can "make neither head nor tail of" the nonsense which has been put into his mouth by Aristophanes, and is not responsible for it (it being, of course, the business of the caricaturist to make his "Professor" talk nonsense); (b) that his judges must know that he had never been heard to hold public discourse on these matters of cosmology;¹ (c) that it is absurd to ascribe to him doctrines which every one knew to be the time-honoured theories of Anaxagoras, and which are, besides, "singular" (*ἄτοπα*).² All this is quite compatible

γραψεν | γῆρυς, where the reference to *σανίδες* implies the enormous antiquity of the "spells" in question.

¹ This is really an ingenious evasion of the issue, since the evidence appealed to, that of "common fame," proves nothing as to the ideas which were ventilated *inside* the *φροντιστήριον*.

² *Apology* 19 b-d, 26 e. Note that in the former passage Socrates seems to distinguish between certain misrepresentations which he definitely traces to the caricatures of the comic poets, and others of which he does not mention the source. He says that his judges have "seen him in the comedy of Aristophanes" talking a deal of nonsense of which he can make nothing (as, in fact, Aristophanes means that it shall be unintelligible), and appeals to their own personal knowledge of him in reply to this burlesque. Then he goes on, as if he were no longer dealing with Aristophanes and his comedy at all, to say that they may have heard from "some one" (19 d) that he makes a living by "educating men," like Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias, and that this also is false. Thus he seems to discriminate between the charges of Aristophanes and that of "educating men for a fee," which, as Plato's Protagoras explains, was the conduct disliked in the class we call "sophists." It will be noted that although in the *Clouds* Strepsiades expects to pay a fee to Socrates (98), and offers to follow the well-known practice introduced by Protagoras, and better it, by swearing to pay whatever is asked of him (245), Socrates asks no fee of him, and never even alludes to the matter. That his coat and shoes vanish after initiation (856 ff.), apparently as a perquisite, is another matter. Aristophanes in point of fact never makes the accusation of "educating men for a living" against Socrates at all; i.e. he does not attack him as a "sophist," but, as we shall see directly, for "impiety" connected with the study of "things aloft." Apparently "Socrates" is only too ready to teach his blasphemies gratis to anyone whom he can get hold of.

with the view that Socrates at one period of his life had taken a much greater interest in cosmology than he did in his later days (which is exactly what Plato asserts in the *Phaedo*), and even that, though he never regaled the public of the streets with speculations in mathematical and physical science, he may to the end have been less reserved towards that group of more intimate friends who appear in the *Clouds* as the *μαθηταί* and in the *Phaedo* as witnesses of his last hours. And even in the *Apology*, where a more absolute disclaimer would have stood him in better stead, Plato is careful to make him speak with respect of "science." He has not a word to say against it; he merely disclaims any pretensions to it on his own part, and protests against having the ideas of thirty or forty years past brought forward as personal theories of his own; that is all.¹ What is more to the point is the curious piece of autobiography introduced into the *Phaedo*. The whole narrative rests on the assertion that Socrates had begun as an enthusiast for "what they call investigation about φύσις," and had made himself thoroughly at home with a variety of cosmological theories. It was precisely the discrepancy between the various theories, and the inability of their originators to establish them by valid demonstration from "axioms worthy of acceptance," which led him in later life to turn away from a study of which he had once expected so much. Though this narrative reveals much which we could never have suspected if we had only the statements of the *Apology* to guide us, it is entirely consistent with the truth of those statements, when they are not unwarrantably stretched beyond their plain literal meaning, and equally so with the accuracy of the general picture of Socrates drawn by Aristophanes.

In fact, as I shall now proceed to show, there is a very singular coincidence between Aristophanes and Plato.

¹ 19 c οὐκ ὡς ἀτιμάζων λέγω τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην εἰ τις περὶ τούτων σοφός ἐστι κτλ. Plato himself might have said as much, since he also held that cosmology is no ἐπιστήμη, but a "likely story." Contrast the extravagant language of Xenophon, *Mem.* iv. 7. 6.

The very systems to which special reference is made in the *Phaedo* as having engaged the attention of Socrates in early life, are precisely those whose conceptions and technical phrases are placed in the mouth of the protagonist of the *Clouds*. As we can further show by considerations of chronology, they are also just the particular systems which would inevitably attract special attention during the early manhood of the real Socrates. Hence the confirmation of Plato's narrative by an earlier and quite independent witness actually proves, with as much rigour as can fairly be expected in the establishment of facts of this kind, that one part, at least, of what Plato tells us in the *Phaedo*, the account of the studies by which Socrates was led to desert the dogmatic empiricism of the cosmologists for his own peculiar method of *σκέψις ἐν λόγοις*, is the plain historical truth, and it follows at once that, unless conclusive grounds can be produced to the contrary, it is only reasonable to presume the equal truth of the rest of the narrative which describes the new way of thinking finally adopted by Socrates. I proceed to the examination of the evidence, merely remarking that an obvious, though often overlooked, consequence of the rehabilitation of Plato's story is that the activity of the so-called "sophists," the popular "educators of men," counts for little or nothing as a factor in determining the mental development of Socrates. If Plato is a witness of truth, it was not dissatisfaction with the "scepticism," or even with the ethical superficiality of Protagoras or Gorgias, but disappointment with the failure of cosmology, which gave birth to Socraticism. And this position is borne out by the Platonic dialogues in general, and notably by the *Apology*. As Plato represents the facts, Socrates was, as no member of the intellectual circle at Athens could well avoid being, brought occasionally into contact with the prominent personalities of the "sophistic movement," and exercised his dialectic on them, precisely as he did on politicians, poets, craftsmen and others, but his relations with them went no farther.¹ He was neither a

¹ The "sophists" are not even mentioned in the *Apology* among the

product, nor, except incidentally, an antagonist of the movement, and, in fact, stood in no very close relation with it. His real place in the succession of Greek thinkers

classes which furnished Socrates with his victims, who are described as being made up of (1) politicians, (2) poets, (3) artisans (*Apology* 21-23). If what we may call the "ministry" of Socrates had been in any special way directed against "sophists" and their admirers, it is surely incredible that the fact should be ignored in his defence. One of the accusations brought by Meletus was precisely that of "educating men and taking a fee for doing so," that is, of being himself a "sophist" in the newer sense which came to be put on the word in consequence of the success of Protagoras. Plato's language at *Protagoras* 316 b,c seems to mean that the specialisation of meaning by which *σοφιστής* came to stand for a "trainer of men" was actually introduced for the first time by Protagoras himself. On the current theory of the nature of Socrates' mission in life, he could hardly have failed to make the obvious reply to his accusers, "I appeal to every one present to bear witness that 'trainers of men' are the very class against whom my whole life has been a continuous protest, and whom I have always singled out for exposure."

To avoid misconceptions, let it be pointed out once for all that the word *σοφιστής* in fifth-century literature has two senses, an earlier and more general, and a later and more special. In the wider sense a *σοφιστής* is anyone who possesses a *τέχνη* or profession, rising above that of the ordinary artisan, and requiring special professional knowledge. In this sense, men of science, poets, sculptors, physicians, are all *σοφισταί*, and there is nothing invidious in calling them so. It may be found in Herodotus, the Hippocratic writers, Xenophon, Aristophanes, no less than in Plato, and includes, of course, those old cosmologists and biologists whom we most incorrectly call the "pre-Socratic" philosophers. To give one or two examples: every one remembers how Herodotus speaks of Pythagoras as "far from the weakest of the *σοφισταί*," meaning that he was an eminent man of science. So Simplicius (*Comm. in Physica*, 151. 30 ff.) tells us that Diogenes of Apollonia spoke of the pluralistic *φυσιολόγοι* as *σοφισταί* in the book which he wrote against them. Aristophanes gives the name to oracle-mongers like Lampon, medical writers, dithyrambic poets and astronomers (*Clouds* 331). Xenophon (*Mem.* i. 1. 11) speaks of that which the "sophists"—i.e. the cosmologists—call the *κόσμος* (ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος). Plato (*Hippias Maj.* 281 c, d) makes Socrates speak of the "profession of you *σοφισταί*" in a way which, taken in the context, implies that Pittacus, Bias, Thales, and the whole Ionian succession down to Anaxagoras are included in the reference.

At the same time the word was acquiring the narrower sense of a paid professional "trainer of men," and, as I have said, it would appear that it was first appropriated in this special sense by Protagoras. Hence Xenophon says that Socrates defined the *σοφιστής* as a person who prostitutes his "wisdom," or "mystery," by selling it to any chance comer (*Mem.* i. 6. 13 καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὡσαύτως τοὺς μὲν ἀργυρίου τῷ βουλομένῳ πωλοῦντας σοφιστὰς ἀποκαλοῦσιν. The underlying idea is that a true *σοφός* would only bestow his *σοφία* on a successor who had been tried and tested and found worthy to inherit it. One's "mystery" must not be cast down like a pearl

is a problem on which these Essays seek to throw some light, but it is not that of an outcome of, or a reaction against, the development initiated by Protagoras.

We may now turn to the text of the *Phaedo* and attempt to single out points for comparison with Aristophanes. At 96 b of that dialogue Socrates not merely tells us that "when a young man" he had aspired to the *σοφία* called "investigation of φύσις," but specifies in detail some of the conflicting theories which he found current. The questions he specially mentions are these.¹ "Is the production of living creatures due, as some persons used to say, to a certain fermentation of the hot and the cold?" "Do we think with our blood, or with air or with fire?" "Or is it the brain which discharges the functions of sensation, and so indirectly those of memory, belief, and knowledge?" He adds that he was further interested in the constitution of the "heaven" and the earth (τὰ περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν πάθη 96 c), and farther on gives, as specimens of the cosmological problems thus indicated, the questions of the shape and position of the earth, and the motions of the heavenly bodies.² A little lower down still we have, as further examples of the theories with which he familiarised himself, the doctrines that the earth is kept at rest by the rotatory motion (δίνη) of the "heaven," or, again, that it rests "like a broad tub" on a base of air.³

There are one or two general observations which are at once suggested by this passage. The problems mentioned are obviously those which are thought of as likely to be specially

before swine). When I say that the "Socrates" of the *Clouds* is not a "sophist," I am, of course, using the word in this second sense, which coincides exactly with the meaning put on the word by modern writers. We must further distinguish a third sense, familiar from Plato's "dialectical" dialogues and from Aristotle's *Topics*, in which the *σοφιστής* is one who abuses the dialectic of Zeno and Socrates for filthy lucre.

¹ *Phaedo* 96 b. I have followed here the text indicated by our MSS., ἐπειδὴν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν σηπεδόνα τινὰ λαμβάνη. Burnet in his first edition of the text obelizes ψυχρὸν, Schanz omits the whole clause καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν, Sprengel suggests ὑγρὸν. My reason for retaining ψυχρὸν will be apparent immediately. (In the last edition of his text Burnet has rightly withdrawn his obelus.)

² *Phaedo* 97 d-98 a.

³ *Phaedo* 99 b.

prominent in the philosophical circles to which Plato's hero found himself introduced in early youth. It is therefore very important to note that they are very different from those which Plato represents as exercising the minds of young men nearer in time to his own generation. Such questions as whether "virtue" can be known and taught, whether the virtues are one or many, whether there can be an "art of governing," above all, whether knowledge is the same as sense-perception—in a word, all the issues which the activity of the "sophists" brought into prominence during the life-time of Socrates, are "conspicuous by their absence." This means that Protagoras had not yet come into his full fame, and that his *'Αλήθεια* was as yet either unwritten or little known. On the other hand, the prominence given to biological and psychophysical questions shows that we are concerned with a time not long before the birth of "sophistic," when, thanks to the development of medicine, biology was beginning to displace cosmology as the fashionable subject of scientific interest. The assumed state of science, then, is precisely that which we know to have existed at the very period when Socrates, who was born about 470, would be a young man, and which was to be seriously modified in the next twenty years by the increasing fame of Protagoras and his art of "training men." This means that Plato's narrative can be intended neither as an account of his own early development,¹ nor as a purely generalised account of the progress of a soul towards philosophy. It is given in good faith as the spiritual history of Socrates himself, and constructed with definite reference to the peculiar stage of "higher culture" which Greek thought had reached about 450 B.C. This comes out even more clearly when we go on to refer the various

¹ So taken, it would not only be at variance with the famous passages in which Aristotle professes to describe the mental development of Plato (*Met.* A 987 a 32 ff., and its counterpart in M 1078 b 12 ff., where Plato must at least be included among "those who said that there are *ἰδέαι*"), but with the seventh Platonic letter, since it ignores the passionate interest in public affairs which Plato there speaks of as so decisive for the development of his own mind (*Ep.* vii. 324 c ff.).

theories enumerated to their authors. The doctrine that the production of living creatures is due to a "fermentation" of the "hot" and the "cold" is recognisable at once as that of Archelaus,¹ the Athenian disciple of Anaxagoras, whom there is abundant evidence for regarding as the actual teacher of Socrates.² As for the question what it is "with which we think," the view that it is the blood goes back, of course, to Empedocles' αἷμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἐστι νόημα, a point which must not be forgotten when we come to consider the evidence for Socrates' acquaintance with the Italian-Sicilian scientific tradition which was subsequently so important for its influence upon Plato; as for the suggestion that it is "fire," it may or may not imply

¹ See what is said in Hippolytus i. 9 (*Doxographi Graeci* 564 = Diels, *Vorsokratiker*,² i. 324) περὶ δὲ ζώων φησὶν, ὅτι θερμαινόμενης τῆς γῆς τὸ πρῶτον ἐν τῷ κάτω μέρει, ὅπου τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐμίσχεται, ἀνεφαίνετο τὰ τε ἄλλα ζῶα πολλὰ καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἅπαντα τὴν αὐτὴν διαίταν ἔχοντα ἐκ τῆς ἰλὸς τρεφόμενα. (The last clause explains the συντρέφεται of the *Phaedo*.) Of course, the general idea of the emergence of living beings from a primitive "slime" goes back to the oldest days of Ionian science, but the verbal coincidences seem to show that Plato is thinking specially of the version of the matter given by Archelaus.

² Archelaus as the teacher of Socrates.—The fact is asserted by Diogenes (ii. 16), Suidas s.v. Ἀρχέλαος, Porphyry, *Hist. Phil.* Fr. 12, and Simplicius (*Phys.* 27. 23). See Diels, *Vorsokratiker*,² i. 323-4. From Simplicius we see that the ultimate authority for all these statements was Theophrastus. This means that the story formed part of the Academic tradition about Socrates, and this puts its truth beyond reasonable doubt. The calumny of Aristoxenus, who called Socrates the παιδικά (in an injurious sense) of Archelaus, and the story of Ion of Chios (Diogenes ii. 22) that Socrates accompanied Archelaus on the expedition against Samos (441/440), imply a known connection between the two men as their foundation. This well attested association of Socrates with Archelaus explains why his early studies should have taken the line described by Plato. A curious point is that Plato says nothing of any personal meeting of Socrates with Anaxagoras. He only makes him "hear" some one (no doubt Archelaus) reading from the book of Anaxagoras. Yet the fact that they should not have met is so surprising that we cannot suppose it to be an invention on Plato's part. An author who was willing to sacrifice truth to literary and historical plausibility would certainly have described Socrates as hearing Anaxagoras expound his views in person. This makes it all the more likely that Plato is not inventing when he says that Socrates *did* meet Parmenides and Zeno. A minor point of interest is that it seems to be implied that the book of Anaxagoras was in existence (though possibly not in general circulation, since Archelaus may have been specially favoured with an early copy of it) while Socrates was still νέος.

actual study of Heraclitus. Socrates might know of it from the mysterious Hippasus who, as Professor Burnet puts it, forms the connecting link between the Pythagoreans and Heraclitus, or, more probably, from the contemporary Heracliteans, whom we gather from the *Cratylus*, and from Aristotle's notices of Cratylus, to have existed at Athens as a sect as late as the boyhood of Plato. Much more important are the suggestions that we think by means of "air" or with our brains, since it was just the combination of these two views (the one derived ultimately from Anaximenes, and the other from Alcmaeon,) which constituted the peculiar theory of Diogenes of Apollonia, the "latest of the physicists," according to which sensation and thought are due to the action of the "air within the body" on the brain.¹

Now, Plato's account, as has been already pointed out by Professor Burnet and others, is strikingly supported by the quite independent evidence of Aristophanes. For the two special biological doctrines which are picked out for ridicule in the *Clouds* are (1) the doctrine that moisture is injurious to thought, which can only work freely when one's "notions" are allowed to mingle freely with their "kindred air," and (2) the doctrine that the great physical phenomena are due to an *αἰθέριος δῖνος*, a "whirligig of the heavens." As we all know, the first of these is the property of Diogenes, while the other comes from Anaxagoras and Archelaus.²

¹ For this view see the fragment numbered 5 by Diels (*Vorsokratiker*,²i. 335), *καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τὸ τὴν νόησιν ἔχον εἶναι ὁ ἀήρ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων κτλ.*, and the account of Diogenes in Theophrastus *de Sensibus* 39-45 (*Doxographi* 510-512). We get a further reference to this at *Clouds* 763 ἀποχάλα (this is, perhaps, an Orphic touch, reminiscent of the *δεσμωτήριον*) *τὴν φροντίδ' εἰς τὸν ἀέρα*, and it is from Diogenes, too, that "Socrates" has learned to swear by "respiration, chaos, and air" as his great gods (627).

² The theory of the bad effect of moisture, which is a corollary of the view that we think with the air in the brain, is implied in Diogenes, Fr. 5, where we are told that the "air within" is colder than that in the region of the sun, but warmer than that which surrounds us. It is fully expounded by Theophrastus (*de Sensibus* 44-45) as follows. "The air with which we think is pure and dry, for moisture hinders intelligence. . . . That this is so is illustrated by the fact that other animals are of inferior intelligence. For they breathe in the air from the earth and adopt a moister nutriment. . . . This is also the reason why children are so thoughtless. For they have a great deal of moisture, and so <the air> cannot pass throughout their bodies

Traces of Anaxagorean doctrine seem also to be present in the account which "Socrates" is made to give Strepsiades of thunder and lightning.¹ We might even, perhaps, be inclined to find an allusion to the same theories in the elaborate quibbling about the description of the day of new moon as *ἔνη καὶ νέα*, when we remember that Plato himself tells us that the "Anaxagoreans" had taught the doctrine that the moon shines by reflected light as a novelty at Athens.² Thus Aristophanes and Plato seem to be in complete agreement about the interest taken by Socrates, at some time in his life, in physical questions, and also as to the particular physical systems with which he was most closely acquainted.

(4) Moreover, and this is a point of fundamental importance, the Socrates of the dialogues, particularly of the *Phaedo* and *Gorgias*, has what we may call a mystical, as well as a scientific, side to his character. He is one of a group but is excreted in the region of the breast, whence they are dull and thoughtless." That Aristophanes is really referring to this in the passage where "Socrates" explains that he philosophizes in mid-air in order to keep his notions fine by mingling them with the driest air (*Clouds* 227-234) is, of course, shown by his use of the non-Attic *ικμάς*, which is familiar in the medical writers and is quoted from Diogenes by Theophrastus, for Attic *ὕγρότης* or *τὸ ὑγρόν*.

The *αἰθέριος δῖνος* of 380 is just that *περιχώρησις* or "revolution," set up by *νοῦς*, of which Anaxagoras speaks in Fr. 12 (Diels) as the efficient cause of the *κόσμος*. That the doctrine of the *περιχώρησις* reached Socrates through Archelaus may perhaps be inferred from the fact that Plato speaks of the book of Anaxagoras as apparently not known to Socrates until he had already made considerable acquaintance with the theories of the *φυσικοί*.

¹ *Clouds* 382-407 should be compared with *Placita* iii. 3. 4 (*Doxographi* 368), noting specially the coincidence between l. 404, *ὅταν εἰς ταύτας ἀνεμος ξηρὸς μετεωρισθεὶς κατακλεισθῇ*, and the text of the *Placita*, *ὅταν τὸ θερμὸν εἰς τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐμπέσῃ (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν αἰθέριον μέρος εἰς ἀερῶδες) κτλ.*, though the explanation of *βροπτή* as due to the enclosure of moisture in the clouds (l. 376) must come from another source, perhaps the theory of Diogenes, for which see *Placita* iii. 3. 8.

² *Clouds* 1179 ff. Plato, *Cratylus* 409 a *ἔοικε* (sc. the name *Σελήνη*) *δηλοῦντι παλαιότερον δ' ἐκείνος νεωστὶ ἔλεγεν, ὅτι ἡ σελήνη ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου ἔχει τὸ φῶς. . . . ὃ νέον δὲ πον καὶ ἔνον αἰεὶ ἐστὶ περὶ τὴν σελήνην τοῦτο τὸ φῶς, εἰπερ ἀληθὴ οἱ Ἀναξαγόρειοι λέγουσιν.* The context seems to suggest that the "Anaxagoreans" had made some prominent use of the expression *ἐνη καὶ νέα* in expounding the "novel" theory. Perhaps one may guess that the pretended derivation of *σελήνη* from *σελας*, *ἐνον*, *νέον*, really belongs to them.

who are seeking redemption from the body. He is fond of speaking of the philosopher's life as a daily dying, and describing it in language borrowed from the Eleusinian and Orphic initiations. Another point connected with this side of his character is that he is subject to inexplicable lapses into a state of trance or ecstasy, such as that which overtook him on his way to Agathon's banquet, or that which held him spellbound for a day and a night before Potidaea. He is known to cherish beliefs about the immortal soul and the judgment to come, when the soul will stand before the judge naked of its "chiton of strange flesh,"¹ and he is suspected of replacing the familiar gods of the city by mysterious secret divinities of his own. There is not one of these points which has escaped the eye of the caricaturist. In the *Clouds*, his associates are *φροντισταί*, and *φροντίς*, as we saw in the first Essay, is a word charged with religious meaning; their proceedings are *μυστήρια* (143), holy secrets which must not be spoken of before the uninitiated, just like the vision of the *αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν* in the *Symposium* (210 a ff.) and the *Phaedrus* (250 ff.).

Nay, we may go even farther; the *Clouds* actually makes prominent both parts of the accusation which was to prove fatal to Socrates a quarter of a century later. Its hero is both a contemptuous rejecter of the tutelary divinities of the city of Athens and a devotee of *καινὰ δαιμόνια*, who are, naturally enough, figures connected with his cosmological studies. The conventicle of *φροντισταί* has a religious organisation, and the first proceedings taken on the arrival of a new pupil are intended to admit him, like a candidate for baptism, into this religious community. The very first piece of information which "Socrates" bestows on Strepsiades is that "the gods" are not "legal tender" in the *φροντιστήριον*. *πολὺς θεὸς ὁμεί σύ; πρῶτον γὰρ θεὸς | ἡμῖν νόμισμ' οὐκ ἔστι* (l. 247). The first piece of

¹ Cf. *Gorgias* 523 c "ἀμπεχόμενοι γάρ," ἔφη, "οἱ κρινόμενοι κρίνονται· ζῶντες γὰρ κρίνονται, . . . εἰς ἔπειτα γυμνοὺς κριτέον, . . . τεθνεώτας γὰρ δεῖ κρίνειν" with Empedocles, Fr. 126 (Diels), *σαρκῶν ἀλλογνώτι περιστέλλουσα χιτῶνι*.

instruction imparted to him is to be the true knowledge of "things divine," τὰ θεῖα πράγματα (250), and the first reward of his discipleship is "communion with the Clouds, our deities" (252-258). Before he can be admitted to behold these gods or to matriculate as a pupil, he has to undergo a burlesque initiatory rite of θρόνωσις (254 ff.), and to reject the traditional deities and all their works (365), a renunciation which he actually performs (423), exactly as nowadays a person to be baptized formally bids defiance to the devil and all his works.¹ Even the occasional trances appear not to escape notice, since the story of Socrates and the lizard appears to be a comic version of them.² The actual entrance into the φροντιστήριον is accompanied by further rites intended to recall the preparations for the descent of a mystic into the realm of Hades. (Elsewhere, as I have sufficiently observed already, Aristophanes gives us a remarkable picture of Socrates and the inevitable Chaerephon as necromancers, which would be pointless unless the φροντισταί were generally reputed to be persons with mysterious views about the soul and the unseen world.³)

¹ The ritual, too, is like our own. The hierophant propounds the formula to which the candidate has to express adhesion by a response. ἄλλο τι δὴτ' οὐδὲν νομίζεις ἢ θεὸν οὐδένα πλὴν ἅπερ ἡμεῖς, | τὸ Χάος τοῦτ' καὶ τὰς Νεφέλας καὶ τὴν γλῶτταν, τρία ταῦτ'; | — οὐδ' ἂν διαλεχθῇην γ' ἀτεχνῶς τοῖς ἄλλοις, οὐδ' ἂν ἀπαντῶν, | οὐδ' ἂν θύσαιμ', οὐδ' ἂν σπείσαιμ', οὐδ' ἐπιθῇην λιβανωτῶν (423-426). Thus the religious exclusiveness of the precept "thou shalt have no other gods" makes its appearance as a peculiarity of the sect, and we understand better what was meant by the accusation Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ ὅς ἢ πόλιν νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων. As for "Socrates'" own gods, Χάος is, of course, an Orphic figure, the others, Air, the Clouds, Anapnoë, are a travesty of the doctrine of Diogenes that "Air" is omniscient and divine.

² *Clouds* 169-174. I think we have here a recognisable parody of such a scene as that described in the *Symposium* 174 d.

³ *Clouds* 255. Strepsiades is seated on the ἱερὸς σκίμπος (note the definite article) and ritually crowned, and it is explained that this ceremony has to be performed on all who are to be "initiated," ταῦτα πάντα τοῖς τελουμένοις | ἡμεῖς ποιοῦμεν. "Matriculation" into the school is thus equivalent to admission into a religious "congregation" or "order," a thought which is constantly present in Plato, with whom the φιλόσοφος is regularly spoken of as μύστης, ἐπόπτης, βάκχος, etc. Next, the invocation of Air, Aether, and the Clouds is preceded, just as in the great mysteries, by the proclamation of a solemn religious silence, εὐφημεῖν χρὴ τὸν πρεσβύτερον καὶ τῆς εὐχῆς ἐπακούειν, (263). Then follows the prayer of invocation and the actual descent or

Nor is it forgotten that the "poms and vanities of this wicked world" must also be forsaken for a life of mortification.¹ The character of the society as a religious sect is thus thrown into the strongest relief, and the conclusions of our first Essay, arrived at on entirely independent evidence, receive new and startling confirmation. Could more proof be wanted that the *φροντισταί* of the *Clouds* are no other than the *φιλόσοφοι* of the *Phaedo* and *Gorgias* as seen by a master in the art of detecting and exaggerating human oddities and frailties? Or could anything be more ridiculous than to exhibit admission into the "school" of Socrates as involving this tremendous religious solemnity, if "Socrates" is meant as a caricature of the professional "sophists"? Whether Socrates was an actual member of a religious *θίασος* or not, it is clear to me that Aristophanes thought he was, and assumed that his audience would think so too. His whole tone is exactly that which a Royalist satirist of the seventeenth century might have taken in attacking the beliefs and character of the Puritan "godly."

Epiphany of the *Clouds*, with the result that the candidate becomes an *ἐπόπτης*, 322 ff. ὥστ', εἰ πως ἔστιν, ἰδεῖν αὐτὰς ἤδη φανερώς ἐπιθυμῶ κτλ. The entrance into the *φροντιστήριον* reminds Strepsiades so strongly of the descent into the cave of Trophonius that he asks for the regular "honey-cake" which the visitors took with them as a defence against the real or imaginary serpents who infested the cavern. For the experiences of those who made the descent see Pausanias, ix. 39. 4, and Plutarch, *de Genio Socratis*, 21-22, with Dr. Frazer's commentary on the former passage. The close connection of the rites with Orphic beliefs is shown by what Pausanias tells us of the two waters of Oblivion and Memory of which the consultant had to drink. Aristophanes, in fact, means to suggest the *καταβάσεις εἰς Αἴδου* associated with the legends of Orpheus and Pythagoras. Entrance to the school of the ascetics who "die daily" is, in fact, a "descent into hell." The thought reappears as a piece of genuine Socraticism in Plato's famous apologue of the Cave, as Professor Stewart has ably shown in his treatment of the matter in *The Myths of Plato*. The wit of the apologue lies largely in its being an answer to criticisms like those of Aristophanes and the πολλοί on the *ἡμιθυήτες*. The philosopher is the only man who does not dwell in the cave. He is already "risen," and only redescends voluntarily to preach the opening of the prison to them that are bound.

¹ *Clouds* 414 εἰ μνήμων εἰ καὶ φροντιστὴς καὶ τὸ ταλαίπωρον ἔνεστιν | ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ μὴ κάμνεις μὴθ' ἐστὼς μὴτε βαδίζων, | μὴτε ῥιγῶν ἀχθεὶ λίαν, μὴτ' ἀριστῶν ἐπιθυμείς, | οἶνον τ' ἀπέχει καὶ γυμνασίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνοήτων. The aspirant is, in fact, to live the life of a *καθαρός* or "saint."

(5) I do not know whether the next suggestion I have to offer will be scouted as fanciful, but it seems worth while to make it, if only to learn how it will be received. We have seen already that both the final suppression of the *δίκαιος λόγος* and the performances of Phidippides after he has passed through the factory are parodies of the Socratic dialectic.¹ This suggests the question whether the attempted education of Strepsiades may not also be a burlesque of some recognisable features in the paedagogical procedure of the Platonic Socrates. And I am inclined to think the answer ought to be in the affirmative. The end to be achieved by a course in the *φροντιστήριον*, as we are expressly told by the "Clouds" themselves, is efficiency as a director of public affairs.² In other words, what is promised is that the pupil shall acquire that "art of statesmanship," or "royal" art which Socrates, both in Plato and in Xenophon, regards as the highest form of human wisdom. And the preliminary steps in the attempted training of Strepsiades are no less reminiscent of the educational theory of the *Republic*. In the first place, just as Plato's Socrates is always insisting that the first business of the philosopher is "in accord with the inscription of Delphi to know himself," so Aristophanes' "Socrates" first calls on Strepsiades to exhibit this self-knowledge. He is to expose his soul to the scrutiny of its physician in order that the physician may decide on the kind of treatment indicated;³ and the preliminary steps to it are represented

¹ The two *λόγοι* are not really a touch borrowed from Protagoras; they are a true feature of the Socratic circle. The Socrates of the *Phaedo* speaks of *ἀντιλογικοί* as well-known characters, and we have found in the *δισσοὶ λόγοι*, which appeared to show unmistakable marks of acquaintance with Socrates, an excellent specimen of the kind of thing Aristophanes means to parody by the exhibition of the just and unjust "arguments." As I have argued in the last Essay, the person really responsible for such antithetic *λόγοι* is Zeno.

² *Clouds* 431 ἄλλ' ἔσται σοι τοῦτο παρ' ἡμῶν · ὥστε τὸ λοιπὸν γ' ἀπὸ τοῦδ' ἐν τῷ δήμῳ γνώμας οὐδεὶς νικήσει πλείονας ἢ σύ. Cf. 464-467.

³ 478 ἄγε δὴ, κάτειπέ μοι σὺ τὸν σαντοῦ τρόπον, | ἵν' αὐτὸν εἰδῶς ὅστις ἐστὶ μηχανὰς | ἤδη π' ἐπὶ τοῦτοισι πρὸς σέ καιρὰς προσφέρω. Cf. Plato, *Charmides* 156 b, c; Protagoras 352 a.

as the study of musical rhythms and grammar, and practice in the discovery of "conceits" (*φροντίδες*), which apparently involves practice in logical classification.¹ The whole con-

¹ *Clouds* 741-2 περιφρόνει τὰ πράγματα, | ὁρθῶς διαιρῶν καὶ σκοπῶν. It is hard not to think that διαιρῶν and σκοπῶν are meant to be echoes of actual Socratic catchwords. Compare the stress which even the Xenophontic Socrates lays on the importance of classification, precisely as a means to the "art royal," *Mem.* iv. 5. 11 τοῖς ἐγκρατέσι μόνον ἔξεστι σκοπεῖν τὰ κράτιστα τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ προαιρεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀπέχεσθαι. *ib.* 12 ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι ὀνομασθῆναι ἐκ τοῦ συνιόντος κοινῇ βουλευέσθαι διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα . . . ἐκ τούτου γὰρ γίγνεσθαι ἄνδρας ἀρίστους τε καὶ ἡγεμονικωτάτους καὶ διαλεκτικωτάτους. That we are here dealing with an actual saying of Socrates, made possibly half in jest (for the derivation can scarcely have been serious), seems to me to follow from the exact parallel in Plato, *Sophistes* 253 e, where dialectic is identified with the power ἥ τε κοινωνεῖν ἑκαστα δύναται καὶ δπη μὴ διακρίνειν κατὰ γένος ἐπίστασθαι.

For the exercises on rhythms see *Clouds* 647 ταχύ γ' ἂν δύναιο μάθαι περὶ ῥυθμῶν. It is curious to note the correspondence of *Republic* 400 b with what follows in Aristophanes, οἶμαι δὲ με ἀκηκοέναι οὐ σαφῶς ἐνόημι τέ τινα ὀνομάζοντος αὐτοῦ σύνθετον καὶ δάκτυλον καὶ ἡρώιον γε κτλ., *Clouds* 650 ἐπαύονθ' ὁποῖός ἐστι τῶν ῥυθμῶν | κατ' ἐνόημι, χῶποίος αὐ κατὰ δάκτυλον. Both Plato's and Aristophanes' Socrates have clearly been to the school of Damon. For the reality which is burlesqued in the lesson on genders compare the numerous humorous allusions in Plato to Socrates' attendance on the "one-drachma discourse" of Prodicus (e.g. *Cratylus* 384 b). If there is anything at all in my suggestion it gives a death-blow to the, in my opinion, already sufficiently discredited fancy of an earlier edition of the *Republic* in which the scheme for the training of the philosopher-kings was not included. That Socrates really had some such conception of the statesman who governs by a τέχνη as that which forms the basis of the *Republic* seems to me clearly indicated in the passage quoted above from Xenophon, where training in dialectic is said to make men "fitter to command." I would invite any reader to judge for himself whether the first six chapters of *Memorabilia* iii., especially the conversation with Glaucón in c. 6, do not give the impression that Xenophon is trying to expound the theory of the πολιτικὴ τέχνη, but has understood it so imperfectly as to confound the "art royal" with mere knowledge of political statistics.

One might also add that the coincidence between the views on deference to parental authority held by Phidippides after his training in the φροντιστήριον (*Clouds* 1399-1446) with those which Xenophon tells us were attributed to Socrates by the κατήγορος (*Mem.* i. 2. 49 ff.) cannot be a mere accident. Xenophon's attempt to explain away these caustic sayings, the genuineness of which he does not dispute, does no credit to his intelligence. Aristophanes has hit the nail on the head. Granted that the right way of looking at things is that of the Attic shopkeeper or small farmer, Socrates, as we know him from Plato, is exactly the sort of being represented in the *Clouds*.

ception of what goes on in the *φροντιστήριον* thus strikes one as full of shafts aimed at an educational principle identical with that of *Republic* vi.-vii., the employment of "science" as a means to the mastery of the *πολιτικὴ τέχνη*. The ideal of the scientific statesman is, of course, necessarily degraded for the purpose of burlesque into that of an invariably successful demagogue, just as the *μαθήματα* by which he is educated are identified with such pedantries as the objection to calling a cock and a hen bird by the same name "fowl," but I cannot resist the impression that it is one and the same original which has inspired the portrait of the *Republic* and the caricature of the *Clouds*.

So we may note a coincidence with the *Theaetetus*. In Plato, Socrates can give birth to no ideas of his own. He professes merely the art of helping other men's thoughts into the world and testing their soundness. So in the *Clouds*, Strepsiades is called on to devise *φροντίδες* for himself, not to receive them ready-formed from an instructor. *ἐκφρόντισόν τι τῶν σεαυτοῦ πραγμάτων* (695). *οὗτος, τί ποιεῖς; οὐχὶ φροντίζεις;—ἐγώ; | νῆ τὸν Ποσειδῶ.—καὶ τί δῆτ' ἐφρόντισας;* (723-724). *οὐκ ἐγκαλυψάμενος ταχέως τι φροντιεῖς;* (735). At 737 "Socrates" positively refuses to assist in the process, *αὐτὸς ὃ τι βούλει πρῶτος ἐξευρὼν λέγε*. So 740 *ἴθι νυν, καλύπτου καὶ σχάσας τὴν φροντίδα | λεπτήν κατὰ μικρὸν περιφρόνει τὰ πράγματα*. The sole function "Socrates" takes on himself is that of examining the merits of Strepsiades' *φροντίδες* after they have been formed (746-783). Here again is an agreement which I cannot regard as the result of accident. Another admirable hit occurs at 841 where Phidippides is promised, as a first result of a course under "Socrates," self-knowledge, the knowledge on which the Socrates of Xenophon and Plato is always insisting, *γνώσει δὲ σαυτὸν ὡς ἀμαθὴς εἶ καὶ παχύς*.

I may add a few points which have been passed over as of minor importance. The *φροντιστήριον* not only possesses a map (*γῆς περίοδος*), but apparently also an orrery. At least, this is suggested by 200-201 where Strepsiades asks, manifestly about some strange object which has caught his

eye, πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, τί γὰρ τὰδ' ἐστίν; εἰπέ μοι, and gets the reply ἀστρονομία μὲν αὕτη. Perhaps it is not too extravagant to suppose that the κρεμάθρα of "Socrates" itself is a burlesque on some real simple apparatus which could be fixed on a roof for the purpose of observing the stars. In illustration of the point that it is really the Socratic elenchus against which the poet's shafts are aimed, I might have quoted 320-321 καὶ λεπτολογεῖν ἤδη ζητεῖ καὶ περὶ καπνοῦ στενολεσχεῖν, | καὶ γνωμιδίῳ γνώμην νύξας' ἐτέρῳι λόγῳ ἀντιλογῆσαι. At 853 Phidippides contemptuously speaks of the φροντισταί as γηγενεῖς, a name which, as we at once remember, Plato gives to the materialists in the famous passage about the γυγαντομαχία in the *Sophistes*. In both cases, the immediate suggestion of the word seems to be "atheists," "godless" persons. (The other explanation mentioned in the Aristophanic scholia that the φροντισταί are called γηγενεῖς because of their unwholesome pallor, as though they had always lived in cellars, is unlikely. γηγενεῖς elsewhere are always thought of as rough and brutal "sons of earth," who would be likely to be the reverse of pallid.) Is it possible that in Aristophanes there is a second reference, apart from the obvious allusion to the impiety of the Giants and Titans? In the myth of Dionysus Zagreus, it was the Titans who devoured Dionysus, and the possibility of the Orphic votarist achieving his aim of union with the Deity rests on the fact that mankind are sprung from the ashes of the Titans and still retain the divine substance within them. This is why the βᾶκχος, as the result of his purifications and mysteries, becomes one with Bacchus himself. The age to which the legend can be traced back is uncertain, but if it was known to Aristophanes there is a double point in his application of the word γηγενεῖς to the devotees of the conventicle which meets in the φροντιστήριον. A more important point seems to me suggested by the finale of the play. May we not regard it as probable that Aristophanes had in mind the suppression of the Pythagoreans and the burning of their συνέδρια in Italy when he represented the penitent Strepsiades as

"burning in" Socrates and his disciples? If we may, this gives us another hint of a resemblance intended by the poet between the Pythagoreans and the worshippers of Air, Respiration, and the Clouds.

I do not for a moment suppose that I have exhausted the list of points of contact between Aristophanes and Plato, nor is it necessary for my purpose to do so. What has been said, unless it is all baseless fancy, seems enough to show that the account given of Socrates in the dialogues is surprisingly like the caricature of him produced by the great comedian in Plato's boyhood, so much so that the two representations reciprocally confirm one another in a way which compels us to believe that the *Clouds* is a historical document of the first rank, and that Plato's description of the entourage, interests, and early life of Socrates rests, in all its main points, on a genuinely historical basis.

Let us recapitulate one or two of the main results which emerge from the present study.

(1) Socrates stood from the first in very close relation with the last of his predecessors the *φυσικοί*, particularly with Anaxagoras and Archelaus, the last of the Ionian succession, and with Diogenes, who combined a physical monism like that of Anaximenes with special biological and medical interests which connect him with the Italian medical school of Crotona, and so with Pythagoreanism.

(2) He possessed mathematical attainments of an advanced kind, another link with Pythagorean science.

(3) He formed the centre, or at least a central figure, in a group of permanently connected intimates whom Plato calls *φιλόσοφοι*, and Aristophanes *φροντισταί*. The peculiarity of the group, which had a common table, was that it was composed of men who were at once students of mathematics and physics, and devotees of a private religion of an ascetic type, based on mystical conceptions about the soul and the world to come. The group was thus at once a scientific "school" and a religious *θίασος*. All that we are told about it indicates that it was an Orphic-Pythagorean community of some kind. Its members were, probably with

truth, regarded as unbelievers in the official gods of the πόλις of Athens.

(4) The Socratic ideal in education was to arrive at an art of statesmanship, only attainable by the study of dialectic. Dialectic is an art of invincibility in argument, an art of the successful use of the *elenchus*. The preparation for it includes an encyclopaedic study of language, rhythm, metre, "things aloft."

(5) It is characteristic, however, that Socrates has no ready-made knowledge to impart. His pupils have to do their own thinking; their minds must become pregnant with *φροντίδες* without his assistance. What he does do is by skilful employment of question and answer to help the disciple's thoughts to birth, and to test their value when born.

(6) Self-knowledge is, with him, the most important knowledge of all.

POSTSCRIPT

I have purposely kept myself until recently from studying the essay of Chiappelli, *Il Naturalismo di Socrate e le prime Nubi d' Aristofane* (Rome, 1886), in order to work out my own views, as far as possible, independently and without prepossessions. It is therefore my duty to put it on record here that a considerable number of the Aristophanic passages which I have used in the foregoing Essay were properly collected by Chiappelli and correctly interpreted as showing that Socrates in 423 B.C. was known to his fellow-citizens as a student of the natural sciences. I am also glad to find that my suggestion as to the finale of the comedy being based on the burning of the Pythagorean *συνέδρια* is not a new one, having been, according to Chiappelli, put forward as long ago as 1856 by Göttling in the *Berichte der Sächsischen Gesellschaft*. It is another matter whether Chiappelli is right in holding that the original *Clouds* depicted Socrates merely as an eccentric but harmless pedant, and that the passages which represent him as a "corrupter of youth" and a devotee of strange cults were one and all introduced in an uncompleted revision of the play which was unknown to Plato when he composed the *Apology* and *Symposium*. The notion of the "conventicle" seems to me so inseparable from the whole general conception of the *φροντιστήριον*, that a play from which it was entirely absent would be something far too different from our comedy to be the original basis of it; and it is certain that the original *Clouds*

did represent Socrates as the chief figure of a band of *φροντισταί*, and that the contemporary *Connus* of Ameipsias depicted him in the same light. Nor do I see how, as a matter of dramatic construction, the play could possibly have been, originally, devoid of the episode of the education of Phidippides (according to a suggestion of Koechly, which, says Chiappelli, would be a splendid confirmation of his own views). We have already seen that the rôle of cross-examiner of promising *νέοι* had been assumed by Socrates long before the date of the original *Clouds*, and that his fondness for the part was notorious as early at least as the campaign before Potidaea. A *νέος* whose education was to be mismanaged by Socrates is therefore an indispensable figure in a telling burlesque of him dating from the year 423. And one may further ask whether we are to suppose that Phidippides did not appear in the original *Clouds* at all, or that he did appear but not as a freshman of the *φροντιστήριον*. If he did appear, what other conceivable part can have been assigned to him? If he did not appear, the "first *Clouds*" must have been so radically different in construction from the extant version that it is idle to dream of reconstructing it. Koechly's speculation would, I am sure, find little favour with a jury of intelligent theatre-goers. Hence it seems to me that Chiappelli and the writers on whom he relies assume a much more complete reconstruction of the original *Clouds* than the facts warrant us in accepting. For instance, we may believe the statement that the scene of the actual duel between the two *λόγοι* did not appear in the acted play without drawing the conclusion that the accusation of the prologue, according to which the *κρείττων* and the *ἥττων λόγος* are kept on the premises in the *φροντιστήριον*, must have been added in the reconstruction, or that there was nothing in the acted version to support the view that Socrates depraved young men by familiarising them with the "worse argument." In fact, as I have already urged, Socrates, as known to us from Plato, had been notoriously perplexing the *νέοι* with his dialectic for the best part of ten years when Aristophanes put him on the stage, and this must not be forgotten when we try to form an opinion about the contents of the "first *Clouds*."

I think, moreover, that Chiappelli goes farther than is warranted by the text of Plato when he infers from the *Apology* that Socrates was only ridiculed in the acted *Clouds* as an astronomical crank. It is true that the Socrates of Plato does not say that he had been attacked as a "corrupter of youth," *ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμωδίᾳ*; but he does say (*Apology* 18 b) that the same ancient accusers who called him a *σοφὸς ἀνὴρ*, *τά τε μετέωρα φροντιστής*, καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς πάντα ἀνεξιτηκώς, also said that he made *τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω*, where the reference, as the allusion to the study of *τὰ ὑπὸ τῆς γῆς* shows, is to the acted *Clouds*. It should also be noted that, whereas the reply to Anytus and Meletus does not begin until 24 b, Socrates already disposes of the charge that he is a paid professional

"educator of men" at 19 d ff. This then was also a part of the outstanding accusation brought against him by the comic poets, not, as Chiappelli seems to think, a matter which could not have been alleged in the original *Clouds*. Though, even in our present version, as I have shown, Aristophanes does not actually venture to charge Socrates with taking fees; he only hints at the possibility by representing Strepsiades as expecting to have to pay. Chiappelli is, I think, definitely wrong in asserting that any fee is taken from Strepsiades in the play as it stands; the loss of his coat and shoes is better explained by the view that they were perquisites of the disciples who would take part in the initiatory rite by which he is matriculated. (It was the rule that visitors to the cave of Trophonius wore the linen "chiton" and special shoes, Pausanias ix. 39.) Chiappelli misses the point of this performance altogether. What troubles Strepsiades is not merely the dirt and squalor of the schoolroom, but the suspicious resemblance of his position on the *ἔρως σκίμπος* to that of a person undergoing a ceremonial process of consecration to the *χθόνιοι θεοί* (257), or preparing for the "descent into hell" (508). It is a weakness of Chiappelli's whole discussion that he entirely overlooks the mystical and religious character which belongs to the *φροντιστήριον* all through the play. The squalor of the members is a fundamental feature in the picture. It is the burlesque version of the life of the *φιλόσοφος*, of which the *Phædo* and *Gorgias* give us the serious counterpart.

In a word, I see no evidence for holding that the *Clouds* ever existed in a form in which the presentation of Socrates differed in any important respect from that which we possess. The rehandling of the play is sufficiently accounted for by the comparative failure of the acting version, and we may well suppose that the brilliant idea of the introduction of the two *λόγοι* in person was an afterthought which commended itself to the poet on its own merits without agreeing with Chiappelli that Aristophanes, who had originally treated Socrates as a harmless pedant, came afterwards to view him as a moral pest. I do not myself find any evidence in the existing play that Aristophanes felt any serious hostility to Socrates, any more than I can see in the *Frogs*, to which Chiappelli appeals as a parallel case, any evidence that the representation of Euripides as a corrupter of morals is meant to be taken in earnest.

V

THE WORDS εἶδος, ἰδέα IN PRE-PLATONIC LITERATURE

PLATO, as we all know, represents Socrates in many of his dialogues as habitually expounding the doctrine that the true objects of scientific knowledge, and consequently the supreme realities of the objective world, are not sensible things, but certain ἰδέαι, εἶδη, or, as Locke would have said, "real essences" which are indiscernible by sense-perception, and apprehended only by a kind of non-sensuous perception of the intellect, μόνῳ θεατὰ νῶι. And it is to be noticed that he ascribes this doctrine to Socrates as one which he had maintained from a very early time in his mental history. In the *Phaedo* the doctrine is repeatedly spoken of as one recognised as fundamental not only by Socrates but by a whole group of his Eleatic and Pythagorean friends, in fact by the whole circle who were present at his death, as is shown by the repeated assertion that it is what "we" are accustomed to believe, the assumption which "we" regularly make when we "put the seal of ὁ ἔστι" on a term, and so forth. The passages have been already quoted with exact references in preceding essays, so that there is no need to reproduce the list of them here. Similarly, in the *Parmenides*, where Socrates is represented as an exceedingly young man, Socrates is said to have expounded the same doctrine to Parmenides and Zeno, and, what is more remarkable, they are assumed to have understood its meaning from the very first. They are represented as

being in doubt as to the range of objects which are included among these εἶδη; they have to ask, e.g., whether Socrates believes not only in εἶδη answering to the concepts of the ideal "norms" of mathematics, ethics, and aesthetics, but also in εἶδη of the physical elements and the beings formed out of their compounds (πῦρ, ὕδωρ, ἄνθρωπος, 130 c), and of apparently formless aggregates of matter such as θρίξ, πηλός, ῥύπος; and Socrates himself feels some difficulty about the matter (130 c-d). They also raise subtle difficulties about the nature of the relation between the εἶδη and the sensible things which, according to the doctrine of the Platonic Socrates, get a secondary and derivative kind of existence from "participating" in these εἶδη, "having communion with" them, exhibiting their "presence." The one question they do not think of asking is what an εἶδος or ἰδέα is. This they are presumed to understand perfectly from the outset. Similarly the doctrine is assumed to be known and accepted by the Locrian astronomer Timaeus, and he, too, though no member of the familiar Socratic group, but a Pythagorean from Magna Graecia, represents it as something universally believed in by a community, presumably the Pythagorean circle to which he belongs. (*Timaeus* 51 c μάλιστα ἐκάστοτε εἶναι τί φαμεν εἶδος ἐκάστου νοητόν, τὸ δ' οὐδὲν ἄρ' ἦν πλὴν λόγος;) To be sure, it is almost universally asserted that this representation is unhistorical, and that Plato is merely making Socrates the mouthpiece of a doctrine which he well knew himself to have invented, and for which he had himself devised the characteristic technical nomenclature, much as the Alexandrian author of the *Wisdom of Solomon* and the Palestinian author of *Ecclesiastes* put thoughts demonstrably borrowed from Greek literature and philosophy into the mouth of the "son of David, king over Israel in Jerusalem"; though the theory still leaves it a mystery why Plato should have carried the fiction so far as to include the Pythagoreans of Magna Graecia among the "we" to whom he ascribes his doctrine, and why Aristotle should have accepted the fiction so readily that he habitually treats

Platonism as Pythagoreanism with a few peculiar modifications.

I have already tried to show that the evidence of Aristotle, which is commonly supposed to justify this theory of the *εἶδη* as a Platonic novelty, is regularly misinterpreted. The object of the present Essay is to support the arguments which carry back the doctrine to Socrates himself, and still earlier, by an examination of the use of the words *εἶδος*, *ἰδέα* in Greek prose, outside the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, and to show both what was the original meaning of the words, and how they acquired certain definite technical senses in the science of the fifth century. Thus, for our purposes, the following classes of literature require to be considered: (1) the ordinary non-philosophical writings of the fifth and early fourth centuries, both historical and oratorical, (2) the remains of Pythagorean mathematics, (3) the remains of the early rhetoricians, (4) the medical writers. The basis from which I shall argue is what I believe to be a complete list of all occurrences of the terms in question in Greek prose literature, exclusive of Plato and Aristotle themselves, down to the death of Alexander the Great; and I believe that, with this material before me, I shall be able to show that *εἶδος*, *ἰδέα*, wherever they occur in any but a most primitive sense, have a meaning due to their significance in Pythagorean geometry, that it is this geometrical sense which has given rise to the technical meanings in which we find the words employed in medicine and rhetoric, and, though on this part of the question I shall content myself with a few hints, that it supplies the key to the Platonic doctrine itself. If we can establish the point that *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* were already familiar scientific conceptions in the fifth century, and that they occur in the medical writers in particular in a sense hardly distinguishable from that of Plato's earlier dialogues, we shall have gone a long way towards rehabilitating the veracity of Plato's assumption that belief in *εἶδη* was characteristic of Socrates, and incidentally towards answering the question, Where, then, does the originality of Plato come in? There

are, in particular, certain prejudices which I believe to be very common in the minds of Plato's readers which I shall endeavour to remove altogether. The chief of these is the ingrained notion that *εἶδος* began by meaning a "kind" or "class," and that Plato thus derived *his* theories about *εἶδη* from this sense of the word by "hypostatizing" the "common nature" of a "class" into a transcendent object. As against this very frequently expressed view, I shall try to show that the meaning "real essence" is the primary, the meaning "logical class" the secondary and derivative, and that this is so certain that it is worth while to raise the question whether, in *Plato*, *εἶδος* ever really means *class* at all. Properly, as I shall contend, the *εἶδος* of a thing means the same as its *φύσις*, in all the various senses in which *φύσις* is a term of fifth-century science, and that this is what explains both the correlation of *εἶδος* and significant *ὄνομα* which we find constantly in Plato, and most prominently in the *Cratylus*, and the habitual use of such expressions as *τὸ τοῦ σώματος εἶδος*, *ψυχῆς εἶδος*, and the like, as mere periphrases for *σῶμα*, *ψυχή*, and so forth. I must apologize for a certain degree of apparent incoherence in the arrangement of the following pages. It is due partly to the difficulty inherent in what, so far as I know, is the first attempt to digest the whole of the material, partly to the necessity of making an artificial separation between, e.g., historians, physicians, *φυσικοί*, who in reality belong to the same age and employ the same vocabulary.

I may best begin, I think, with establishing a point of some importance, which is only too generally overlooked. *εἶδος* and *ιδέα* are, as we shall see reason to hold, not common words at all in the vocabulary of Attic prose. The best proof of this—the facts will be presented in detail later—is their almost entire absence from Xenophon and from the language of Attic forensic and political oratory, as well as from that of Aristophanes. There is every reason to suspect that both terms are an importation from the technical terminology of Ionian science, primarily, no doubt, from medicine, and to a lesser extent from rhetoric. The

instances in Thucydides, the only Attic non-professional writer who makes much use of the words, will be found, I think, to bear out this suggestion. But, so far as the words did actually occur in everyday non-professional Attic, it seems clear that the sense of εἶδος at least was "body" or "physique"—"body," that is, in the special sense of the human body. The importance of this is that it shows that, in current language, the word implied no contrast of "reality" with appearance; it did not mean "what really is" as contrasted with "what seems to be," nor yet "what a thing looks like" as contrasted with what it is. Both these senses, which we find constantly in the language of science, must then, presumably, have been drawn from some other source than the vocabulary of current Attic. And I believe it will not be hard to show that this "other source" is the technical terminology of Ionian science.

To establish my point sufficiently for my immediate purpose, I will cite one passage from Aristotle and another from Plato. In the chapter of the *Poetics* which deals with the removal of alleged difficulties in Homer by proper punctuation and exegesis, we are told that some students found such a difficulty in the statement that Dolon εἶδος μὲν ἔην κακός, and Aristotle proposes to remove it by the suggestion that Homer is here using a γλῶττα, or unfamiliar dialectical word. He does not mean that Dolon was "ill-formed," but that he had an ugly face. In support of his view he remarks that the *Cretans* use the word εὐειδής in the sense of εὐπρόσωπος, "handsome" (*Poet.* 1461 a 12 καὶ τὸν Δόλωνα . . . οὐ τὸ σῶμα ἀσύμμετρον ἀλλὰ τὸ πρόσωπον αἰσχρόν, τὸ γὰρ εὐειδὲς οἱ Κρήτες <τὸ add. Bywater> εὐπρόσωπον καλοῦσι). The implication is, of course, that in the current Attic εὐειδής never meant "handsome"; it would be immediately assumed by an ordinary reader that κακός τὸ εἶδος meant not "ugly to look at," but "deformed of body," unless you explained that there is a little-known dialect in which εὐειδής means what the world at large calls εὐπρόσωπος. That is, εἶδος in current Greek means the *body* or *physique* as a whole.

The same point comes out in Plato, *Protagoras* 352 a, where Socrates says that if you had to judge from a man's εἶδος of his state of health or fitness for some particular work, you would not be content to look at his face and hands, you would tell him to strip and show his chest and back (ἰδὼν τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἀκρὰς εἴποι, Ἴθι δὴ μοι ἀποκαλύψας καὶ τὰ στήθη καὶ τὸ μετάφρενον ἐπιδείξον, ἵνα ἐπισκέψωμαι σαφέστερον). Another curious illustration of the same point may be found at *Timaeus* 66 d, where we are told that smells have no εἶδη (περὶ δὲ δὴ τὴν τῶν μυκτῆρων δύναμιν, εἶδη μὲν οὐκ ἔνι). This might, at first sight, seem to mean simply that we cannot make a systematic classification of smells as we can of colours, tones, and tastes, a fact familiar to all students of psychology. But it really means a great deal more, since Timaeus goes on to explain that the reason why there are no εἶδη of smells is simply that a thing is only odoriferous while it is passing from the liquid to the gaseous state, or vice versa; when it has definitely assumed the structure characteristic of "air" or "water" it no longer gives off a smell. The sense is, then, that odoriferous objects have no such definite molecular structure as is assigned by Timaeus to the Empedoclean elements, they only become odoriferous in the passage from one definite structure to another. It is the definite and regular geometrical structure assumed by Timaeus for the corpuscles of the "elements" which is denoted here by the word εἶδος. I make these introductory remarks simply as illustrating the error of the supposition that the εἶδος, ἰδέα of the Platonic philosophy have been derived from the use in which these words are mere verbals of ἰδεῖν (so that, e.g., καλὸς τὴν ἰδέαν is simply equivalent to καλὸς ἰδεῖν). This would be contrary to the whole spirit of the Platonic doctrine, in which the εἶδος of anything is precisely the one underlying reality as opposed to its many imperfect "appearances" or manifestations.

Premising thus much, I pass to consider the examples of both words in

Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, and the orators,

setting aside for the present Isocrates, who falls to be treated rather as a theorist on style and rhetoric than as an "orator."

Herodotus

i. 8 καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος τῆς γυναικὸς ὑπερεπαινέων ("extravagantly belauding his wife's *figure*," εἶδος in the sense attested by Aristotle as the current one, "physique," not "beauty of face," since Candaules insisted on exhibiting his wife naked to prove his point); *ib.* οὐ γάρ σε δοκέω πείθεσθαι μοι λέγοντι περὶ τοῦ εἶδους τῆς γυναικὸς.

i. 80 κάμηλον ἵππος φοβέεται καὶ οὐκ ἀνέχεται οὔτε τὴν ἰδέην αὐτῆς ὁρέων κτλ. (the horse is afraid of the camel and cannot endure the sight of its *figure*).

i. 94 ἐξευρηθῆναι δὴ ὦν τότε καὶ τῶν κύβων . . . καὶ τῶν ἀλλέων πασέων παιγνίων τὰ εἶδεα (the figures, shapes, of all sorts of toys).

i. 196 ὅσοι δὲ τοῦ δήμου ἔσκον ἐπίγαμοι, οὗτοι δὲ εἶδους μὲν οὐδὲν ἐδέοντο χρηστοῦ (demanded no *comeliness* in their wives).

i. 199 ὅσαι μὲν νυν εἰδεός τε ἐπαμμέναι εἰσὶ καὶ μεγάθεος (the possessors of a fine and stately *physique*).

i. 203 φύλλα τοιῷσδε ἰδέης (leaves with this *specific property*, a sense of the word which we shall find not uncommon in the scientific writers).

ii. 53 ὅθεν δὲ ἐγένοντο ἕκαστος τῶν θεῶν . . . ὁκοῖοί τε τινες τὰ εἶδεα (and what were their *figures*).

ib. Homer and Hesiod are responsible for the popular theology, τιμάς τε καὶ τέχνας διελόντες καὶ εἶδεα αὐτῶν (sc. τῶν θεῶν) σημῆναντες (εἶδεα again = their figures, their bodily forms, not their features).

ii. 69 κροκοδείλους δὲ Ἴωνες ὠνόμασαν, εἰκάζοντες αὐτῶν τὰ εἶδεα τοῖσι παρὰ σφίσι γιγνομένοισι κροκοδείλοισι.

ii. 71 (of the hippopotami) φύσιν δὲ παρέχονται ἰδέης τοιῷνδε, where φύσις ἰδέης is a periphrasis for ἰδέην, "their figure is as follows."

ii. 76 εἶδος δὲ τῆς μὲν ἰβίος τόδε, "the figure of the ibis is as follows"; *ib.* τῶν μὲν δὴ μελαινέων . . . ἥδε ἰδέη.

ii. 92 κηρίω σφηκῶν ιδέην ὁμοιοτάτην ("in figure like a wasp's nest").

iii. 24 ἐξομοιούντες τὸ εἶδος ἐς τὸ δυνατόν (reproducing the living *body* as carefully as they can).

iii. 61 ἀδελφεὸς . . . οἰκῶς μάλιστα τὸ εἶδος Σμέρδι τῶι Κύρου, . . . ἦν τε δὴ ὅμοιος εἶδος τῶι Σμέρδι. (The likeness meant is, of course, of physique in general, not merely of features, though this is included.)

iii. 102 εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὁμοιότατοι (the fabulous Indian ants are very similar in body, or figure, to Greek ants).

iii. 103 τὸ μὲν δὴ εἶδος ὁκοῖόν τι ἔχει ἢ κάμηλος . . . οὐ συγγράφω. (I give no description of the camel's form.)

iii. 107 ὅφιος ὑπόπτεροι, σμικροὶ τὰ μεγάθεα, ποικίλοι τὰ εἶδεα.

iv. 109 οὐδὲν τὴν ιδέην ὅμοιοι οὐδὲ τὸ χρῶμα (they differ both in their physique and in their complexion).

iv. 129 τῶν τε ὄνων ἢ φωνὴ καὶ τῶν ἡμιόνων τὸ εἶδος (the braying of the asses and the figure of the mules); *ib.* ἄτε οὔτε ἀκούσαντες πρότερον φωνῆς τοιαύτης οὔτε ἰδόντες [τὸ] εἶδος.

iv. 185 ὁ δὲ ἄλς αὐτόθι καὶ λευκὸς καὶ πορφυρέος τὸ εἶδος ὀρύσσεται (εἶδος here very exceptionally used of the colour of a thing, where in Attic one would say λευκὸς ἰδεῖν).

vi. 61 εἰσαν γάρ μιν τὸ εἶδος φλαύρην ἢ τροφὸς αὐτῆς, . . . ὁρώσα τοὺς γονέας συμφορὴν τὸ εἶδος αὐτῆς ποιουμένους κτλ.; *ib.* ἀπὸ μὲν δὴ ταύτης τῆς ἡμέρης μεταπεσεῖν τὸ εἶδος. (The language is meant to include comeliness of form as well as beauty of feature.)

vi. 100 μετεπέμποντο μὲν Ἀθηναίους, ἐφρόνεον δὲ διφασίας ιδέας ("had a divided policy," a mere periphrasis for δίχα ἐφρόνεον).

vi. 119 (τὸ φρέαρ) τὸ παρέχεται τριφασίας ιδέας. (The meaning seems to be "supplies three different *bodies*," as the three ιδέαι are said to be bitumen, salt, and oil.)

vi. 127 πλούτῳ καὶ εἶδει προφέρων Ἀθηναίων. (As in other cases where εἶδος refers to physical beauty, we

must be careful to bear in mind that mere handsomeness of face is only a small part of what is meant. Our way of tacitly connecting *κάλλος* specially with the face could only have arisen among a people like ourselves among whom it is customary for men, as well as for women, to keep the body concealed. To a Greek, accustomed to the free exposure of the male form, such one-sided emphasis on the facial features as the chief element in beauty would be scarcely possible. This is my justification for treating *εἶδος* where it means "body's beauty" as falling under the sense of "human body.")

vii. 70 *διαλλάσσουντες εἶδος μὲν οὐδὲν τοῖσι ἑτέροισι, φωνὴν δὲ καὶ τρίχωμα μόνον.* (They differ no whit in body from the others, but only in their language and the fashion of their hair.)

viii. 105 *ὅπως γὰρ κτήσαιο παῖδας εἶδεος ἐπαμμένους* (cf. i. 199 above).

viii. 113 *ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων συμμάχων ἐξελέγετο κατ' ὀλίγους, τοῖσι εἶδεά τε ὑπῆρχε διαλέγων* κτλ. (Mardonius, of course, selected not the best-looking, but the strongest men, men of exceptional physique.)

If my list is complete, *εἶδος* occurs altogether twenty-four times, *ιδέη* eight. The words seem to be exactly synonymous. *εἶδος* occurs once in the sense of the "shapes" or "figures" of inanimate things; once, most unusually, with reference to the colour of an inanimate thing; seven times of the figure of animals; fourteen times of the human body, figure, physique; twice of the (anthropomorphic) figure ascribed to the gods. *ιδέη* occurs in the sense of the figure or physique of an animal three times; of the human physique once; once apparently in the general sense of "body," "physical substance"; once with the meaning of *proprium*, characteristic property, and once, in the phrase *ἐφρόνεον διφασίας ιδέας*, in a mere periphrasis for a numeral adverb, "were minded in two ways."

Thucydides

i. 109 καὶ αὐτοῖς πολλαὶ ιδέαι πολέμων κατέστησαν,
 "many phases of war," "war in many shapes."

ii. 19 πᾶσαν ιδέαν πειράσαντες οὐκ ἐδύναντο ἐλεῖν,
 "they failed to take it, though they tried every scheme of capture."

ii. 41 λέγω τὴν τε πᾶσαν πόλιν τῆς Ἑλλάδος παίδευσιν εἶναι καὶ καθ' ἑκαστον δοκεῖν ἄν μοι τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνδρα παρ' ἡμῶν ἐπὶ πλείστ' ἂν εἶδη καὶ μετὰ χαρίτων μάλιστ' ἂν εὐτραπέλως τὸ σῶμα αὐταρκες παρέχεσθαι, "I maintain that our city as a whole is a school for Hellas, and that, in my judgment, it is easier among ourselves than anywhere else for the individual citizen to exhibit a bodily training which fits him for the most graceful performance of the most various parts," ἐπὶ πλείστα εἶδη being almost equivalent to "in the most various directions," "to the most various purposes," and εἶδη thus about synonymous with σχήματα, "shapes," "modes," "guises" of activity, the strictly original meaning of the word.

ii. 50 γενόμενον γὰρ κρεῖσσον λόγου τὸ εἶδος τῆς νόσου . . . ἐν τῷιδε ἐδήλωσε μάλιστα ἄλλο τι ὢν ἢ τῶν ξυντρόφων τι. I am not quite sure how to classify this example, except that τὸ εἶδος τῆς ν. does not mean the "look" nor yet the "kind" of the malady. On the whole, I think it a case in which, as often in the medical writers, εἶδος means φύσις, "real essence," with the result that τὸ εἶδος τῆς ν. is about equivalent in sense to ἡ νόσος.

ii. 51 τὸ μὲν οὖν νόσημα . . . τοιοῦτον ἦν ἐπὶ πᾶν τὴν ιδέαν (introductory to the account of the main symptoms of the plague of Athens). The general character of the disease was as aforesaid. ιδέα seems to mean, as εἶδος often does in the medical writers, the *symptoms* of the disease regarded collectively. This meaning would come naturally from the literal one of "look," "appearance."

ii. 77 (siege of Potidaea). When the allies found Potidaea impregnable, they tried to fire it, before finally resolving on a blockade, πᾶσαν γὰρ δὴ ιδέαν ἐπενόουν, εἴ

πως σφίσιν ἄνευ δαπάνης καὶ πολιορκίας προσαχθείη, "for, to be sure, they considered every device to win the city without the expense of a blockade." *πάσαν ιδέα*ν is here little more than a periphrasis for *πάντα*, and the sense of *ιδέα* appears to be simply "phase," "guise," "appearance."

iii. 62 *ἡμεῖς δὲ μηδίσαι μὲν αὐτοὺς οὐ φαμέν διότι οὐδ' Ἀθηναίους, τῇ μέντοι αὐτῇ ιδέαι ὕστερον ἰόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἑλλήνας μόνους αὖ Βοιωτῶν ἀττικίσαι. καίτοι σκέψασθε ἐν οἴῳ εἶδει ἑκάτεροι ἡμῶν τοῦτο ἔπραξαν.* "Our reply is that the reason why they did not take sides with the Medes is that the Athenians did not do so. But when Athens attacked Hellas with the same *purpose*, they were the only Boeotians who took the Attic side. But consider what was the *situation* in which each of the two parties before you acted thus." Here *ιδέα* seems to mean "pretext," a sense immediately derived from that of "appearance." *εἶδος* below clearly means the "appearance," "situation," of affairs generally.

iii. 81 *πάσά τε ιδέα κατέστη θανάτου*, not "every kind of death," but "death in all its shapes."

iii. 82 *καὶ ἐπέπεσε πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ κατὰ στάσιν ταῖς πόλεσι, γιγνόμενα μὲν καὶ αἰεὶ ἐσόμενα, ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ᾖ, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἡσυχαιτέρα καὶ τοῖς εἶδεσι διηλλαγμένα, ὥς ἂν ἕκασται αἱ μεταβολαὶ τῶν ξυντυχῶν ἐφιστῶνται*, "consequences of civil strife, such as occur and always will occur while human nature is what it is, but are more or less violent, and *vary in the shape they assume*, according to the particular situation" (*εἶδος* in the simple sense of the "shape" things wear. The meaning "kind" is excluded by the context).

iii. 83 *πάσα ιδέα κατέστη κακοτροπίας*, "villainy in all its guises."

iii. 98 *πάσά τε ιδέα κατέστη τῆς φυγῆς καὶ τοῦ ὀλέθρου τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων*, "a general flight and destruction of the Athenian forces ensued." (*πάσα ιδέα* κτλ. = flight and destruction in all their *phases*, as in the instances given just above, a sense of *ιδέα* exactly the reverse of that which is characteristic for Plato and his

fellow-Socratics. The repeated combination with *κατέστη*, itself a word of medicine, indicates that Thucydides has probably derived this use of the word from the Ionian medical writers.)

iii. 112 *καὶ ἐς πᾶσαν ἰδέαν χωρήσαντες τῆς φυγῆς ἐτράποντό τινες*, "fled in every way they could" (not "kinds." There is only one *kind* of *φυγή*).

iv. 55 *ξυνεστῶτες παρὰ τὴν ὑπαρχούσαν σφῶν ἰδέαν τῆς παρασκευῆς ναυτικῶι ἀγῶνι, καὶ τούτῳ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους*, "finding themselves involved in naval operations which lay outside their traditional *policy*," etc.

vi. 4 *δρεπανοειδὲς τὴν ἰδέαν τὸ χωρίον ἐστί*, "its geometrical *shape* is that of a sickle."

vi. 76 *τῇ δὲ αὐτῇ ἰδέαι ἐκείνῳ τε ἔσχον καὶ τὰ νῦν πειρῶνται*, "their attempts here are conceived in the same spirit as their captures there" (*ἰδέα* = pretext, *policy*).

vi. 77 *ὁρῶντες αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος τρεπομένους ὥστε τοὺς μὲν λόγοις ἡμῶν διστάναι, τοὺς δὲ ξυμμάχων ἐλπίδι ἐκπολεμοῦν πρὸς ἀλλήλους κτλ.*, "when we see them taking to the *policy* of alienating some of our friends by argument, etc." The underlying notion again is "look" or "appearance" of affairs.

vii. 29 *ἰδέα πᾶσα καθειστήκει ὀλέθρου*, "slaughter in all its shapes," is exactly similar to the passages already quoted from ii. 98 and elsewhere.

vii. 81 *ἐνόμιζον καὶ ὥς ταύτῃ τῇ ἰδέαι καταδαμασάμενοι λήψεσθαι αὐτούς*, "would overpower and capture them even by these tactics" (*ταύτῃ τῇ ἰδέαι* little more than a periphrasis for *ταύτῃ*).

viii. 56 *Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ . . . τρέπεται ἐπὶ τοιόνδε εἶδος ὥστε τὸν Τισσαφέρην ὡς μέγιστα αἰτοῦντα παρὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων μὴ ξυμβῆναι*. This is exactly similar to vi. 77.

"A. betakes himself to a *policy* such that . . ." So again, viii. 90 *οἱ δὲ τῶν τετρακοσίων μάλιστα ἐναντίοι ὄντες τῷ τοιούτῳ εἶδει*, "the leading opponents of such a *policy*."

Thus we have *ἰδέα* used fourteen times, *εἶδος* seven times. There seems to be no difference in the sense of the two words, but we may note that it is always *ἰδέα* which is

used as the subject to *καταστήναι*. Both *ιδέα* and *εἶδος* appear as mere verbal periphrases. The sense "physique" does not occur with either word, though the still more general meaning of "bodily shape," of which the other is logically a specification, does. The meaning "class," "sort" is never required. Thus, as a "first vintage" from the particulars, we may say that Thucydides uses the words in two senses: (1) "phase," "manifestation," "fashion," i.e. the special form under which a universal such as "death," "wickedness" is found in a particular case; (2) "policy," "plan," a meaning apparently derived from the former. Neither meaning bears the slightest resemblance to the sense regularly attached to the words in Plato, "what a thing *really* is," the single reality as opposed to the variety of its "appearances," nor to the sense "sort," "kind." The philosophic sense thus presumably does not come from the vocabulary of early Attic prose. The repeated conjunction *πᾶσα ἰδέα τινὸς κατέστη* points to a borrowing by Thucydides from the language of medicine.

For completeness' sake, I will add the following examples from early Attic.

Aristophanes

Clouds 288 ἀλλ' ἀποσεισάμεναι νέφος ὄμβριον | ἀθανάτας ἰδέας, ἐπιδώμεθα | τηλεσκόπῳ ὄμματι γαῖαν. (ἀθανάτας ἰδέας is "our immortal forms," i.e. the female figures which are represented in the play as the *vera corpora* of the Clouds. The example then belongs to the sense "(human) body.")

ib. 546 οὐδ' ὑμᾶς ζητῶ ἑξαπατᾶν δις καὶ τρὶς ταῦτ' εἰσάγων, | ἀλλ' αἰεὶ καινὰς ἰδέας εἰσφέρων σόφιζομαι. (καινὰς ἰδέας, new "figures" or "shows," with special reference to the actual "figures," such as the sausage-seller of the *Knights*.)

Birds 993 τίς δ' ἰδέα βουλεύματος | τίς ἢ πίνουα; (ἰδέα βουλεύματος, not much more than a periphrasis, as we might say, "what's the *shape* of your notion?")

ib. 1000 αὐτίκα γὰρ ἀήρ ἐστι τὴν ιδέαν ὅλως | κατὰ πνιγέα μάλιστα, "the air is much like an oven in its shape."

Thesmophoriazusae 266 ἀνὴρ μὲν ἡμῖν οὕτως καὶ δὴ γυνή | τό γ' εἶδος, "our man's transformed to a woman already in his figure." Follows an injunction to speak in a soft and womanish voice.

ib. 436 πάσας δ' εἰδέας (so MSS. Rav., ιδέας edd.) ἐξήτασεν. If the text is correct, the sense is obscure; but the reference seems to be either to the rhetorical σχήματα λέξεως of Gorgias or to the σχήματα τῆς διανοίας of the later rhetoric, so that the meaning would be "tropes" (itself, as we shall see, a sense borrowed from geometry).

Plutus 316 ἀλλ' εἰα νῦν τῶν σκωμμάτων ἀπαλλαγέντες ἤδη | ὑμεῖς ἐπ' ἄλλ' εἶδος τρέπεσθ'. (ἐπ' ἄλλο εἶδος means, as a scholiast says, εἰς ἄλλην ὁδὸν τινα, to another "style" or "line" of composition. The sense is strictly the geometrical one, "pattern.")

ib. 558-9 ποῦ Πλούτου παρέχω βελτίονας ἀνδρας | καὶ τὴν γνώμην καὶ τὴν ιδέαν, "better in mind and body too."

Frogs 384 ἄγε νυν ἑτέραν ὕμνων ιδέαν τὴν καρποφόρον βασιλείαν | Δήμητρα θεὰν ἐπικοσμοῦντες | ζαθέοις μολπαῖς κελαδεῖτε (literally "in a fresh pattern of song," the rhythm being thought of as a geometrical structure, exactly like those we use to show changes of metre). Or possibly all that is meant is "a fresh song," i.e. one on a new subject, ἑτέραν ὕμνων ιδέαν meaning no more than ἕτερον ὕμνον, though this is less likely.

Antiphon the Orator. I can find no instance of εἶδος, ιδέα, or the frequent Platonic equivalent μορφή, in the speeches or extant fragments, a fact which of itself suggests that the words were not widely current, outside the technical vocabulary of science, in the Attic of the fifth century.

[*Xenophon*] Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία. (Text of L. Dindorf.)

§ 10. The δῆμος of Athens dress no better than slaves and μέτοικοι, καὶ τὰ εἶδη οὐδὲν βελτίους εἰσὶ, "their physique is not a whit better."

The earlier Sophistic

The remains of the earlier "sophists" may also be taken into account here as evidence for the Attic prose of the period 450–400 B.C. My references are to Diels, *Vorsokratiker*,² ii. 1, and for *Gorgias*, *Antisthenes*, *Alcidamas*, to Blass's text.

Protagoras περὶ θεῶν (Diels ii. 1. 537), περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι οὐθ' ὥς εἰσὶν οὐθ' ὥς οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐθ' ὁποιοῖ τινες ἰδέαν, "nor what their figures (or bodies) are like."

Gorgias (ap. Plutarch, *De mulierum virtute* 242 f, Diels ii. 1. 561) κομψότερος μὲν ὁ Γοργίας φαίνεται κελεύων μὴ τὸ εἶδος ἀλλὰ τὴν δόξαν εἶναι πολλοῖς γνώριμον τῆς γυναικός, "a woman's fame, not her person, should be widely known."

Encomium Helenae 12. If Blass is right in emending the corrupt τὸ γὰρ τῆς πειθοῦς ἐξῆν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς καὶ τοι εἰ ἀνάγκη ὁ εἰδὼς κτλ. to τὸ γὰρ τῆς πειθοῦς εἶδος ἔχει μὲν ὄνομα ἐναντίον ἀνάγκῃ, τὸ τῆς π. εἶδος will be a mere periphrasis for ἡ πειθώ, like Shakespeare's "quality of mercy" or the common tragic periphrases with δέμας, κára (τοῦ μὲν δέμας, τοῦ μὲν κára = ἐμέ, and the like). The words are not found elsewhere in the remains of Gorgias.

Antisthenes. Neither word is found in the two extant ἐπιδείξεις of Antisthenes.

Prodicus. Neither word is found in the remains, which, however, include hardly anything beyond the "Choice of Heracles" preserved by Xenophon. The same remark applies to the scanty remains of Hippias, and Plato seems to avoid using the words in his imitations of Protagoras, Prodicus, and Hippias.

Further, neither word occurs in the extant fragments of Thrasymachus, Critias, or Antiphon the "sophist," except in one remark ascribed to Critias (Diels ii. 1. 627) where εἶδος is used in the sense of (human) physique, ὅτι κάλλιστον εἶδος ἐν τοῖς ἄρρεσι τὸ θῆλυ.

Anonymus Iamblichi (i.e. the unknown writer on ethics, large fragments from whom have been unearthed by Blass in the *Protrepticus* of Iamblichus, and who appears from

his style to be a "sophist" of the time of the Peloponnesian war. (See for the text Diels ii. 1. 629-635.) *εἶδος*, *ιδέα*, *μορφή* are all absent.

Alcidamas. It is striking that neither term is found in the *κατὰ σοφιστῶν*, an attack on the composers of written *ἐπιδείξεις*, since the mention of *εἶδη* or *ιδέαι λόγων* would appear so natural in such a context. In the *Odyseus* ascribed to the same author we have in § 10 *πέμποντες διὰ τοιούτου εἶδους*, "by means of such a device," a phrase similar to several already quoted from Thucydides. But the work, though comparatively early, is probably spurious (see Blass's *Antiphon*, p. xxvii), and not to be quoted for the usage of pre-Platonic Attic.

I may next take into account the language of Xenophon and the orators, always reserving for special consideration Isocrates, who is not properly reckoned as an orator at all, but as a teacher of prose composition, and in whom the technical rhetorical sense of *ιδέα*, *εἶδος* is naturally common enough.

Xenophon

Memorabilia. Xenophon, of course, knows of the importance attached by Socrates to correct classification, and attributes to him a derivation of *διαλεκτική* from *διαλέγειν*, to sort, or lay apart, as we have already seen. But it is remarkable that the actual word *ιδέα* never occurs in the *Memorabilia*, and *εἶδος* appears (three times in all) only in the one curious chapter (iii. 10) where Socrates is represented as discussing characterisation in art with a painter and a sculptor, and then in the most literal sense.

§ 2 *τά γε καλὰ εἶδη ἀφομοιοῦντες*, § 7 *τοῖς τῶν ζώντων εἶδεσιν ἀπεικάζων τὸ ἔργον ζωτικωτέρους ποιεῖς φαίνεσθαι τοὺς ἀνδρίαντας*, § 8 *δεῖ . . . τὸν ἀνδριαντοποιὸν τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα τῷ εἶδει προσεικάζειν*.

Symposium. We have three instances of *εἶδος*, all in the sense either of body (human) or physique.

viii. 25 *ὁ μὲν τῷ εἶδει τὸν νοῦν προσέχων*, *ib.* 26 *ὁ*

τοῦ εἶδους ἐπαρκῶν ἄρξει τοῦ ἐραστοῦ, *ib.* 36 τὸν τῶι εἶδει τοῦ ἐρωμένου χρώμενον. In all these instances "beauty" would be a just permissible rendering, but "body" is the only word which a really careful translator would use.

Oeconomicus. No example, so far as I know.¹

Hellenica. Only three examples, so far as I know, all in the sense of (human) body or physique.

iii. 1. 14 ἀπέκτεινε δὲ καὶ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτῆς, τό τε εἶδος ὄντα πάγκαλον καὶ ἐτῶν ὄντα ὡς ἐπτακαίδεκα.

iii. 2. 17 ὁ Δερκυλίδας λαβὼν τοὺς κρατίστους τὰ εἶδη τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἰππέων καὶ πεζῶν προῆλθε ("advanced with the men of the strongest *bodies*").

iii. 3. 5 οὗτος (sc. Cinadon) δ' ἦν καὶ τὸ εἶδος νεανίσκος καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εὖρωστος (of youthful *body* and vigorous mind).

Anabasis ii. 3. 16 ἐνταῦθα καὶ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον τοῦ φοίνικος πρῶτον ἔφαγον οἱ στρατιῶται, καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ἐθαύμασαν τό τε εἶδος καὶ τὴν ιδιότητα τῆς ἡδονῆς, "were surprised by its shape and its singular taste." (Note the survival of this old sense of ἡδονή.) This seems to be the only instance in the whole *Anabasis*.

Cyropaedia i. 2. 1 φῦναι δὲ ὁ Κῦρος λέγεται καὶ αἰδεταί ἔτι καὶ νῦν ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων εἶδος μὲν κάλλιστος,

¹ The entire absence of any reference to the εἶδη from Xenophon's Socratic books is not so startling as it looks. If the conception of εἶδη is, as I shall argue, primarily Pythagorean, Xenophon is only adhering to his regular policy of protecting his master's memory by preserving silence about all that connected him with a mysterious and suspected "sect." Moreover, it is quite possible that Xenophon knew nothing about the matter. He never saw Socrates after his departure for the army of Cyrus, and the *Anabasis* makes it clear that he was quite a young man at that date. (His patron Proxenus was only thirty, and Xenophon was presumably younger still.) Taking this and the general superficiality of his character into account, we may fairly suppose that Socrates did not exactly take Xenophon into his inmost confidence, and that one reason why he has so little to tell about his master's beliefs is that he knew very little of them. He says he had actually been present at a great many of the conversations he reports, but then he says he had heard Socrates talk about the battle of Cunaxa. Further, we do not know how much even of what he may have heard he has mangled because he could not understand it.

ψυχὴν δὲ φιλανθρωπότατος. εἶδος, like *μορφή* in the next sentence, means *body* as opposed to mind.

iv. 5. 57 ὁ δὲ ἐκλεξάμενος αὐτῶν τοὺς τὰ εἶδη βελτίστους ἔλεγεν κτλ. εἶδος again = body ("those of the finest physique").

v. 1. 6 νῦν μέντοι ἐξαιρούμεν ἀνδρί σε, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι, οὔτε τὸ εἶδος ἐκείνου χείροني ὄντι οὔτε τὴν γνώμην οὔτε δύναμιν ἥττω ἔχοντι ("inferior neither in *body* nor in mind nor in estate").

viii. 2. 6. (In a household ordered on the Socratic principle of specialisation of function, so that the baker has nothing to do but bake loaves) καὶ μηδὲ τούτους παντοδαπούς, ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ ἂν ἐν εἶδος εὐδοκιμοῦν παρέχειν, the work will be better done than anywhere else. εἶδος here might mean "shape," but it is more likely, perhaps, that it means "sort," "kind." If so, it is the only example of this sense in Xenophon.

Hiero. No case of *ιδέα* or *εἶδος*.

Agesilaus. No case of either word.

Hipparchicus. No case of either word.

Respublica Lacedaemoniorum. No example.

De Vectigalibus. No example.

Apologia. No example.

De Re Equestri. One case of *εἶδος* with reference to the physique of a horse, 1. 17 εἶδος μὲν δὴ πώλου οὕτω δοκιμάζοντες μάλιστα ἂν ἡμῖν δοκοῦσι τυγχάνειν εὐποδος καὶ ἰσχυροῦ καὶ εὐσάρκου καὶ εὐσχήμονος καὶ εὐμεγέθους.

Cyngeticus. We have the following cases of *εἶδος*.

2. 3 χρὴ δὲ τὸν μὲν ἀρκυωρὸν εἶναι . . . τὴν ἡλικίαν περὶ ἔτη εἴκοσι, τὸ δὲ εἶδος ἐλαφρόν, ἰσχυρόν, ψυχὴν δὲ ἱκανόν, "he must be about twenty years old, strong and light in *body* and adequately endowed in mind."

3. 3 αἱ δὲ σκληραὶ τὰ εἶδη χαλεπῶς ἀπὸ τῶν κυνηγεσιῶν ἀπαλλάττουσι, "dogs of stiff and stubborn *build* are badly used up in hunting." (L. & S. rightly class this among passages in which *σκληρός* is used of the body, as the opposite of *ύγρός*, supple, lithe.)

3. 11 οἷας δὲ δεῖ εἶναι τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους τὰ τε εἶδη

καὶ τὰ ἄλλα φράσω, "what they should be like in physique, and in other points."

4. 2 καὶ ἐὰν ὧσι τοιαῦται αἱ κύνες, ἔσονται ἰσχυραὶ τὰ εἶδη, ἐλαφραὶ, σύμμετροι, ποδώκεες, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν προσώπων φαιδραὶ καὶ εὖστομοι. (Note the implied antithesis between points of *body* and peculiarities of *face*.)

4. 6 μετὰ δὲ τοῦ εἶδους καὶ τοῦ ἔργου τούτου εὐψυχοὶ ἔστωσαν καὶ εὐποδες καὶ εὐρινες καὶ εὐτριχες, "besides having the points of *body* and method of working described, the dogs should be high-spirited, swift of foot, keen of scent, and should have a good coat."

7. 7 ἐπειδὴν ὁ λαγὼς εὐρίσκηται, ἐὰν μὲν καλαὶ ὧσι πρὸς τὸν δρόμον τὰ εἶδη, μὴ ἀνιέναι εὐθύς, "when the hare has been started, if their bodies are well suited for coursing, they should not be unleashed at once."

7. 8 ἐὰν γὰρ ὁμόθεν καλὰς τὰ εἶδη οὔσας καὶ εὐψύχους πρὸς τὸν δρόμον ἐπιλύη, ὀρώσαι τὸν λαγὼ ἐντεινόμεναι ῥήγνυνται. εἶδη again = their bodies as opposed to their *ψυχή*.

9. 7 τῷ αὐτῷ εἶδει πρὸς αὐτοὺς χρῆσθαι τῆς θήρας, "the same fashion or disposition" of the chase, εἶδος exactly synonymous with σχῆμα, and meaning something like the geometrical or topographical arrangement adopted.

Thus we may say generally that *ἰδέα* is not a word of Xenophon's vocabulary; *εἶδος* is relatively unfamiliar, and always means "body" (except in the *Cynegeticus*, almost always the human body) save in two cases, in one of which it means quite literally a "plan" or "diagram" (σχῆμα), and in the other, apparently, "sort," "kind." The contrast in usage between Thucydides and Xenophon seems to me strongly to support the view at which I have hinted that the word, except in the sense of "body," was non-Attic, and is in Athenian literature a loan-word from Ionian science, (by which I mean, of course, science written in the Ionic dialect, independently of the place of its origin). We note, in particular, the absence of the sense *εἶδος* = *γένος* = "sort," "class." Further investigation will, I hope, show that this is one of the latest meanings to be acquired, and

only arose under the influence of the Academy. If this is true, it will follow that, so far from the εἶδη of Plato having been reached by the "reification of concepts," the notion of a "species" or "class" was obtained by the conceptualising away of Socratic εἶδη.

To take the orators next. For the sake of completeness, I give all the instances from Andocides to Hyperides. (Antiphon has been already disposed of, and Isocrates shall receive special treatment later on.)

Andocides

De Mysteriorum 100 πραττόμενος δ' οὐ πολὺ ἀργύριον ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰσχίστοις ἔργοις ἔζης (i.e. as a κίναϊδος), καὶ ταῦτα οὕτως μοχθηρὸς ὢν τὴν ιδέα, "you led the life of a hired prostitute, and a mighty sorry one at that." ιδέα here again = body or physique, and the meaning is not merely that he was ugly of face, but a miserable creature altogether.

Lysias

Only one instance in a speech of more than dubious authenticity.

[ii.] 4 πλέον γὰρ ἐδόκουν (sc. the Amazons) τῶν ἀνδρῶν ταῖς ψυχαῖς διαφέρειν ἢ ταῖς ιδέαις ἐλλείπειν: ιδέαις meaning here "bodies," with the usual contrast to ψυχαί.

Isaeus, like *Antiphon* and the genuine *Lysias*, has no example of either word.

Aeschines

From *Aeschines* we have the following examples.

i. 116 δύο δέ μοι τῆς κατηγορίας εἶδη λείπεται ἐφ' οἷς ἐμavτόν τ' εἰπεῖν εὐχομαι τοῖς θεοῖς πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως ὥς προήρημαι. The following section shows that the two εἶδη are a προδιήγησις or "anticipatory rehearsal" of the line of defence expected to be taken by *Demosthenes* and the other speakers for *Timarchus*, and a παράκλησις τῶν πολιτῶν πρὸς ἀρετήν. εἶδη, then, means here "formal constituents" of the speech, and is nearly

equivalent to *μέρη*. The nearest Platonic parallel is the famous *εἶδη ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ* of the *Republic*, which are also called indifferently *μέρη* or *μόρια*. See Professor Bywater's note on the similar use of the word in Aristotle, *Poetics* 1449 a 7, where the present passage should have been given as an apposite parallel.

i. 134 τοὺς μὲν νιεῖς . . . ἅπαντες εὐχεσθε οἱ μέλλοντες παιδοποιεῖσθαι καλοὺς κάγαθοὺς τὰς ιδέας φύναι. *ιδέα* = body, *physique*.

ii. 194 τούτῳ γὰρ παρίασιν ἐκ τριῶν εἰδῶν συνήγοροι, "supporters drawn from three classes," a clear instance of *εἶδος* = "kind." The whole speech is marked by familiarity with the ideas and language of the "sophistic" schools of composition.

iii. 47 εἶπε προελθὼν . . . Κτησιφῶν ἄλλους τέ τινας λόγους καὶ τοὺς πρὸς Δημοσθένην αὐτῷ συγκειμένους ἐρεῖν περὶ τε τῆς ἐντεύξεως τῆς Φιλίππου καὶ τῆς ιδέας αὐτοῦ κτλ., i.e. about his *personality*, or, more strictly, his bodily presence, his *physique*.

iii. 29 ἔστι γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς εἶδη τρία, "there are three *classes* of officials." It is then explained that these are (1) officials formally appointed by lot or election, (2) superintendents of public works, and all persons who "have any affair of State in their hands for more than a month," (3) any others who are entitled to the *ἡγεμονία δικαστηρίων*. Thus the rare sense "class" is here unmistakable.

Demosthenes

In the whole collection I only find two instances.

xix. 233 εἰ δέ τις ὢν ἐφ' ἡλικίας ἐτέρου βελτίων τὴν *ιδέαν*, i.e. of better *physique*.

xxiv. 192 ἔστιν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δύο εἶδη, περὶ ὧν εἰς οἱ νόμοι κατὰ πάσας τὰς πόλεις. There are two sorts of matters with which the laws of all cities deal. The two *εἶδη* are then described as *νόμοι περὶ τῶν ιδίων* and *νόμοι περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ δημόσιον*. The sense is thus "class," "kind," "sort."

Lycurgus } Not one of these three orators ever uses
Dinarchus } *ιδέα*, *εἶδος*, or their equivalents *σχῆμα* and
Hyperides } *μορφή*.

(*σχῆμα* occurs once in the *ῥῆσις* from Euripides' *Erechtheus* quoted by Lycurgus, ἀλλ' ἔμοιγ' εἴη τέκνα | <ᾠ> καὶ μάχοιτο καὶ μετ' ἀνδράσιν πρέποι, | μὴ σχήματ' ἄλλως ἐν πόλει πεφυκότα, sc. not mere "figure-heads," mere "outward shows of man," and *εἶδος* once in the long quotation from Tyrtaeus, αἰσχύνει δὲ γένος, κατὰ δ' ἀγλαὸν εἶδος ἐλέγχει, with the meaning of *body*, "he brings shame on his family and belies his own splendid bulk of manhood.")

Thus the two words are only found nine times in the whole bulk of what we may call the work-a-day forensic and political oratory of Athens, and one of these instances ought really to be discounted, as it comes from the worthless declamation handed down to us as the *Ἐπιτάφιος* of Lysias. This, of itself, would go far to sustain my suggestion that these words formed no part of the "live" vocabulary of Athenian life, even late in the fourth century, and that we must regard them, where they are found, as importations from non-Attic scientific literature.

We note, further, that in this handful of instances the words always mean *body* or *physique*, except in one passage of Demosthenes and one of Aeschines, where it has the sense of "class" or "kind," and one where it means "formal constituent." This again bears out my assertion that *εἶδος*, *ιδέα* did not begin by meaning "class" or "sort," but that this purely logical sense arose from the watering down of the metaphysical meaning of the words for which we have chiefly to thank Aristotle. I may put this point in another way. *γένος* and *εἶδος* are primarily words with implications as diverse as their derivations; the one means "family," the other "body." The equation *γένος* = *εἶδος* is an outcome, not a datum, of the Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy, and one may doubt whether, even in Aristotle, the equation is quite complete. It certainly is not so in any logical system which maintains, as that of Aristotle

does, that there are *infimae species* incapable of further logical division.

I would note, too, that of our nine (or eight) examples five come from the three speeches of Aeschines. When we remember that Aeschines repeatedly boasts of possessing a *παιδεία* which raises him above the level of his opponents, and particularly of the *ἀπαίδευτος* Demosthenes, this recurrence of a technical term of rhetorical art lends some colour to the traditions preserved in the "lives" of the orators, which make Aeschines a member of the school of Isocrates, and perhaps of the Academy, while they assert that Demosthenes had never been able to pay the fees demanded by Isocrates. The whole style, of which Demosthenes is the most brilliant exponent, with its love of vigorous and vulgar metaphors and colloquialisms, goes to negative the belief of later ages that he had ever been one of the Academy, and his politics are also decidedly of the wrong colour. It is not to an Academician of the age of Xenocrates and Phocion that we should naturally look for the attempt to revive the "demagogy" of Pericles and Cleon. (The story that Isocrates declined to educate Demosthenes on "reduced terms" is further confirmed in one vital point by the contemporary author of the speech against Lacritus, who mentions "*the* thousand drachmas" as the well-known fee charged by Isocrates for his regular course, [Demosthenes] xxxv. 42.) It would follow, of course, that the story of Demosthenes about the poverty and low station of Aeschines' parents is, what an Athenian audience probably took it to be, pure romance, and that the account which Aeschines gives of his own parentage is probably, in the main, true.

So far, then, we seem to have reached the following results, at least provisionally:—

(1) *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* were not common words in the vocabulary of fifth- or even of fourth-century Attic. The one sense in which they were commonly understood by persons outside the scientific schools, which had their own technical vocabulary, was "body" or "physique," most

usually with an implied restriction to the human body. Since then Plato habitually assumes that the words bore a philosophical signification, which he cannot have invented for himself; since he treats it as something which his readers quite understand for themselves, we are forced to suppose that he derived the terms from the technical language of pre-existing fifth-century science.

(2) We have also seen already that the words could be used, as terms which an intelligent reader would understand, in the following senses: (a) geometrical "figure," (b) the symptomatology of a disease, (c) a formal constitutive element in a speech (such as the *ἀγών*, the *διάλυσις τῶν ὑποψιῶν*, the *προδιήγησις*, or anticipatory rehearsal of the coming speech on the other side, and the like), (d) a "trope" or rhetorical artificial ornament either of language or of "thought," (e) a "class" or "kind." The word had thus acquired a technical sense in geometry, in medicine, in rhetoric, in logic. The problem is now to discover, if we can, from which of these senses the rest follow as natural derivatives—i.e. we must trace the history of the words as a technicality backwards. If we do so, we shall in the end be, for the first time, in a position to answer the question whether it is likely that Plato committed a literary blunder in ascribing certain senses of the words to Socrates and his companions.

We may begin by considering rhetoric, on the ground that it is notoriously a younger science than medicine or geometry.

I will, therefore, next attempt to give a list of the occurrences of our two words in Isocrates, with some discussion as to the meanings they bear. I shall follow, throughout, the text of Blass as issued in the Teubner series.

Isocrates

We have the following cases, and the list is, I trust, complete.

ii. 34 ἀστεῖος εἶναι πειρῶ καὶ σεμνός . . . δεῖ δὲ

χρησθαι μὲν ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς ἰδέαις ταύταις, τὴν δὲ συμφορὰν τὴν ἑκατέραι προσοῦσαν διαφεύγειν. Try to combine affability with dignity; but, while exhibiting both manners, avoid the inconveniences which attach to either. ἰδέαι here does not, of course, mean "kinds," but much more literally "ways of bearing oneself," a sense not far removed from the popular one.

ii. 48 δεῖ τοὺς βουλομένους ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ γράφειν τι κεχαρισμένον τοῖς πολλοῖς μὴ τοὺς ὠφελιμωτάτους τῶν λόγων ζητεῖν ἀλλὰ τοὺς μυθωδεστάτους . . . διὸ καὶ τὴν Ὅμηρον ποίησιν καὶ τοὺς πρῶτον εὐρόντας τραγωιδίαν ἄξιον θαυμάζειν, ὅτι κατιδόντες τὴν φύσιν τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς ἰδέαις ταύταις κατεχρήσαντο πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν. Homer and the discoverers of tragedy are to be commended for their judicious combination of the two "styles of composition," sound exhortation, and the telling of exciting marvels. ἰδέα then = a "fashion" or "style" of writing, a sense which, as we shall find, is a natural extension of that of a "figure" of rhetoric. We should say *genre*.

iii. 30 εὐρήσομεν τὰς μὴ μετεχούσας τούτων τῶν ἰδεῶν (sc. σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης) μεγάλων κακῶν αἰτίας οὔσας. This looks like an echo of the Socratic-Platonic language about εἶδη and μέθεξις, and I should suppose that it probably is so, though we might, but for the tell-tale word μετεχούσας, take it to mean merely that "temperance" and "justice" are two "modes" or "appearances" in which virtue presents itself to us.

iii. 44 χρὴ δὲ δοκιμάζειν τὰς ἀρετὰς οὐκ ἐν ταῖς αὐταῖς ἰδέαις ἀπάσας, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν δικαιοσύνην ἐν ταῖς ἀπορίαις, τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην ἐν ταῖς δυναστείαις, τὴν δ' ἐγκράτειαν ἐν ταῖς τῶν νεωτέρων ἡλικίαις. ἐγὼ τοίνυν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς καιροῖς φανήσομαι πείραν τῆς ἐμαντοῦ φύσεως δεδωκώς. A man's various virtues should not be judged of in the same *situations*. His justice should be measured by his behaviour in needy circumstances, his temperance by his conduct when in power, his command of his passions by his behaviour in youth. ἰδέαι is thus all but synonymous with καιροί, and means the different phases or aspects which a man's

affairs present. We have found some similar examples in Thucydides.

iv. 7 εἰ μὲν μηδαμῶς ἄλλως οἶόν τ' ἦν δηλοῦν τὰς αὐτὰς πράξεις ἀλλ' ἢ διὰ μιᾶς ἰδέας, εἶχεν ἂν τις ὑπολαβεῖν, ὥς περιέρχον ἐστι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐκείνοις λέγοντα πάλιν ἐνοχλεῖν τοῖς ἀκούουσιν. If the same matters could only be treated of in one and the same manner, it might reasonably be thought superfluous to try the patience of the audience again by a speech in the same style as those of former orators. ἰδέα clearly means "style," "manner," "fashion" of selecting the topics and setting them off to advantage.

v. 143 ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἰλόμην ἀποσχέσθαι τῆς τοιαύτης ἰδέας, to abstain from such a style (sc. τοῦ λόγου), i.e. from an eulogistic comparison of Philip with his predecessors.

ix. 9 καὶ περὶ τούτων δηλῶσαι μὴ μόνον τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὀνόμασιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ξένοις, τὰ δὲ καινοῖς, τὰ δὲ μεταφοραῖς, καὶ μηδὲν παραλιπεῖν ἀλλὰ πᾶσι τοῖς εἶδεσι διαποικίλαι τὴν ποίησιν. To diversify one's composition with all the stylistic embellishments, such as those mentioned above, the use of novel or dialectical words for those current in everyday life, the use of metaphors. εἶδη has here the technical meaning of stylistic "graces," including apparently not only the famous σχήματα of Gorgias, but any other linguistic ornaments by which one's diction may be heightened and lifted above the level of ordinary life. Isocrates goes on to argue, in effect, that his task is harder than that of a poet because you cannot make a free use of such embellishments in prose.

(The passage has been discussed at length at p. 151 of Professor Bywater's *Aristotle on the Art of Poetry*. Professor Bywater gives a different interpretation, which I am, with all respect, forced to believe mistaken. He understands τοῖς εἶδεσι to mean τοῖς εἶδεσι τῶν ὀνομάτων, "every kind of name." If the passage stood alone, this might perhaps pass muster, but compare xv. 74 (quoted below) for the use of εἶδος as equivalent to σχῆμα λέξεως. Besides, a metaphor is more naturally spoken of as a "figure of speech" than as a

"kind of name." And surely Isocrates means to include among the advantages of the poet a good deal more than his freedom to use "every kind of name." He means rather "all the resources of a heightened diction." We shall, however, find at xv. 280 a clear instance of *εἶδος* = "class," "kind.")

x. 11. (It is easy enough to make an impression by defending a paradox, however devoid its advocate may be of rhetorical accomplishments.) *οἱ δὲ κοινοὶ καὶ πιστοὶ καὶ τούτοις ὅμοιοι τῶν λόγων διὰ πολλῶν ἰδεῶν καὶ καιρῶν δυσκαταμαθήτων εὐρίσκονται τε καὶ λέγονται.* I.e. if you are to make a reputation by discourses on sensible topics with no paradoxical nonsense about them, in a word, by arguments which appeal to common-sense, you will need to show unusual mastery of the *tropes* and devices of rhetoric.

x. 15. (Gorgias had proposed to deliver an encomium on Helen, but managed his discourse so badly that it was rather a mere excuse for her than an eulogy.) *ἔστι δ' οὐκ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἰδεῶν οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν [ἔργων] ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τοῦναντίον· ἀπολογεῖσθαι μὲν γὰρ προσήκει περὶ τῶν ἀδικεῖν αἰτίαν ἔχόντων, ἐπαινεῖν δὲ τοὺς ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ τινὶ διαφέροντας.* The matter and manner which would be appropriate in a "speech for the defendant" is out of place in an eulogy on admitted excellence. In both this and the last passage *ἰδέαι* means *ἰδέαι λόγων*, "styles of discourse." Hence in the first of the two, *ἰδέαι* is conjoined with *καιροί*: it is in the choice of the appropriate tone for the various parts of his discourse, and in the observation of due proportion and strict relevancy in the handling of the topics selected, that the skill of the rhetorician is shown.

x. 54 *τῶν δὲ κάλλους ἀπεστερημένων οὐδὲν εὐρήσομεν ἀγαπώμενον ἀλλὰ πάντα καταφρονούμενα, πλὴν ὅσα ταύτης τῆς ἰδέας κεκοινώνηκε.* Here again the language seems anticipatory of Platonic phraseology; *ἰδέα* for once seems to stand for the self-identical object denoted by the name *κάλλος*, the *αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι καλόν*, and *κοινωνία* is one of the technical terms in Plato for the relation between such an *αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι* and its partial embodiments. Hence,

if, as I think Blass has proved, the *Helena* really belongs to a date about 390, the passage may be used to show that the characteristic language of the theory of εἶδη was known to Isocrates little more than ten years after the death of Socrates. Believing, as I do, that the *Republic* was written before the King's Peace of 388/7, I am not surprised at this; but, if a fact, it is enough to show, irrespective of any theory as to the dates of the Platonic dialogues, that the theory cannot have been invented by Plato; it must have been in existence for a fairly long time before Isocrates could use its technicalities as current literary coin. The same remark applies equally to

x. 58 τοσαύτη δ' εὐσεβείαι καὶ προνοίαι χρώμεθα περὶ τὴν ἰδέαν τὴν τοιαύτην (sc. τὸ κάλλος) κτλ., where, as when Plato speaks of the αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ εἶδη, the natural English translation would be simply "thing," and the pretentious bad English "entity."¹

xī. 33 ὥστ' οὐ μόνον τῆς ἀληθείας αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἰδέας ὅλης, δι' ἧς εὐλογεῖν δεῖ, φαίνει διημαρτηκώς. You, says Isocrates to Polycrates, have not merely failed to prove the truth of your statements about Busiris, but have shown your ignorance of the style appropriate to an eulogy. ἰδέα means ἰδέα λόγων, the style appropriate to a certain literary genre.

xīi. 2. Isocrates describes his own discourses as πολλῶν μὲν ἐνθυμημάτων γέμοντας, οὐκ ὀλίγων δ' ἀντιθέσεων καὶ παρισώσεων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἰδεῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς ῥητορείαις διαλαμπουσῶν. We see from this the origin of the various rhetorical senses of ἰδέα of which we meet so many examples in this author. Primarily it means an artificial arrangement of words or clauses adopted by the professional rhetors for the purpose of raising the style of their ἐπιδείξεις above that of ordinary life. The ἰδέαι of rhetoric are, to begin with, strictly "figures of diction" (σχήματα λέξεως), and begin with the famous σχήματα or artificial verbal tricks of

¹ It should be observed that the whole context (*Helena* 54-58) presents strong affinities with the doctrine of ἔρως expounded by Plato, which we have already seen reason to regard as thoroughly Socratic.

Gorgias, antithesis, parallelism, pariosis, and homoeoteleuton. The extension of the word to artificial embellishments of a less mechanical kind, the rhetorical question, effective aposiopesis, and the like (σχήματα διανοίας), was easy and obvious, and *ιδέα* in the sense of the general "style" appropriate to a given composition (eulogy, invective, and the like) seems to be merely the collective use of the same word. Isocrates, as our examples show, extends the word to cover not only the *Γοργία σχήματα*, or "figures" proper, but stylistic foppery of every kind, and can thus distinguish, e.g., the *ιδέαι* proper in an "apology" from those suitable for an eulogy.¹

xii. 132 ἐγὼ δὲ φημὶ τὰς μὲν ιδέας τῶν πολιτειῶν τρεῖς εἶναι μόνας, ὀλιγαρχίαν, δημοκρατίαν, μοναρχίαν. The object of the passage is to argue that men in general are wrong in confusing "aristocracy" with a government ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, and reckoning it as a fourth *ιδέα πολιτείας*. Whatever be the apparent constitution of a πόλις, if it places its best men in office and obeys them, it is in spirit an ἀριστοκρατία. (See the whole context 131–134.) Hence the *ιδέαι τῶν πολιτειῶν* are contrasted with the *φύσεις καὶ δυνάμεις τῶν πολιτειῶν* of 134 as form with substance, or letter with spirit. So the sense is "I maintain that the outward forms of government are three only, rule by the many, rule by the few, rule by one." The addition of "rule by the best" to the list rests on a cross-division, and Isocrates is urging that the constitution maintained from

¹ On the *σχήματα* of Gorgias see specially Blass, *Attische Beredsamkeit*,² i. 63 ff. It is important to note that Gorgias was not only a Sicilian, but, according to a tradition which seems fairly authenticated, a personal disciple of Empedocles, and that the name *ιδέαι* was given to Empedocles' four "roots of things" by Philistion. Hence we may reasonably look to a connection with Pythagorean science, through Empedocles, for the original meaning of *ιδέαι* or *σχήματα* (the words are equivalent) as a term of rhetoric. And we see at once what the connection of thought must have been. The original *σχήματα* of Gorgias were quite literally "patterns," "shapes," "diagrams" for the arrangement of the words of a κῶλον or the κῶλα of a "period." When we employ, as Gorgias, I imagine, himself did, a diagram to exhibit the nature of a chiasmus or a *παρίσσωσις*, or to show the parallelism between the κῶλα of a *περίοδος*, we are instinctively going back to the primary sense of the phrase "a figure of speech."

the time of Theseus to that of Pisistratus was in *form* "rule by the many," but in substantial fact "rule by the best." We have an opposition of *ιδέα* and *φύσις*, not, as in Plato, an identification of them.¹

xiii. 16 *φημὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ τῶν μὲν ἰδεῶν ἐξ ὧν τοὺς λόγους ἅπαντας καὶ λέγομεν καὶ συντίθεμεν, λαβεῖν τὴν ἐπιστήμην οὐκ εἶναι τῶν πάνυ χαλεπῶν, ἣν τις αὐτὸν παραδῶι μὴ τοῖς ῥαιδίως ὑπισχνουμένοις ἀλλὰ τοῖς εἰδόσι τι περὶ αὐτῶν. ἰδέαι λόγων* here, as in other cases, includes both the *σχήματα* of Gorgias, and, more generally, the variety of "manners," "styles" taught by the authors of the rhetorical *τέχναι* as appropriate to the different conditions in which a speech may be delivered. The same things are described immediately below as *τὰ εἶδη τῶν λόγων* (xiii. 17), and the point is that it is easy to learn how many and what these *εἶδη* are; but to judge correctly how they should be combined, and how the result may be conveyed in language at once graceful and appropriate to the circumstances, requires not merely the use of a handbook, but natural capacity, careful practice, and training by a master who, like Isocrates, is a model in such matters.

xv. 11 *τοσοῦτον οὖν μῆκος λόγου συνιδεῖν καὶ τοσαύτας ἰδέας καὶ τοσοῦτον ἀλλήλων ἀφεστῶσας συναρμόσαι καὶ συναγαγεῖν . . . οὐ πάνυ μικρὸν ἦν ἔργον.* What is meant by the "numerous *ιδέαι λόγων*" is shown by the preceding remark that the work contains "some things proper to be said before a dicastery, others which are not fitting for such pleadings but exhibit a frank picture of philosophy and its results, and something too which may be serviceable to younger men who feel the impulse towards learning and cultivation," *ἓνα μὲν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ πρέποντα ῥηθῆναι, τὰ δὲ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς τοιούτους ἀγῶνας οὐχ*

¹ The whole passage reads like an effusion of petty spite against the Academy and the memory of Plato (which is insulted more than once quite gratuitously in the course of the pamphlet). It was Plato who had notoriously reckoned *ἀριστοκρατία* as a fifth form of government by the side of the inferior *τέτταρα εἶδη* (*Republic* 544 a, and cf. *Politicus* 301). For other impudent attacks on Plato and the Academy in the brochure see §§ 5, 9, 16, 26 111.

ἀρμόττοντα, περὶ δὲ φιλοσοφίας πεπαρρησιασμένα καὶ δεδηλωκότα τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς· ἔστι δέ τι καὶ τοιοῦτον, ὃ τῶν νεωτέρων τοῖς ἐπὶ τὰ μαθήματα καὶ τὴν παιδείαν ὀρμῶσιν ἀκούσασιν ἂν συνενέγκοι. The work thus exhibits three *ιδέαι*, or "manners" of composition and construction, those appropriate to a real λόγος δικανικός or forensic pleading, to a discourse on the worth of philosophy (this, I suppose, would be a λόγος ἐπιδεικτικός), and to a λόγος προτρεπτικός.¹ Precisely similar is

xv. 46 εἴη δ' ἂν οὐ μικρὸν ἔργον, εἰ πάσας τις τὰς ιδέας τὰς τῶν λόγων ἐξαριθμεῖν ἐπιχειρήσειεν, where the *ιδέαι* in question have just been called *τρόποι τῶν λόγων* and partially enumerated. The list includes genealogies (τὰ γένη τὰ τῶν ἡμιθέων), expositions of the poets, *Socratic dialogues* (ἐρωτήσεις καὶ ἀποκρίσεις), besides the line to which Isocrates claims to have devoted himself, "political discourses," and the forensic pleadings which he professes to despise.² We get the word again in a narrower sense

¹ Thus the only recognised branch of oratory in which the "speech," according to its author, is not a model of all excellence, is the λόγος συμβουλευτικός. It would have been inconsistent with the general plan of the work to introduce this branch of discourse, unless, indeed, isolated bits of counsel to the seriously minded "young men" can be taken as coming under this head.

It is amusing to see how Isocrates' rancorous hatred of Plato and the Academy breaks out in the very opening words of the *περὶ ἀντιδόσεως*. He complains bitterly of the insults of "some of the sophists" who had dared to call him a writer of speeches for the law-courts. This, he observes with his usual vanity, is as absurd as to call Phidias a "mudder" (*κοροπλάθος*), or Zeuxis a sign-painter. We seem to have here a reference to the well-known passage, *Euthydemus* 304 d, where an unnamed critic of Socrates, who has long been reasonably identified with Isocrates, is described as *ἀνὴρ οἰόμενος πάνυ εἶναι σοφός, τούτων τις τῶν περὶ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια δεινῶν* (a perfectly correct description of Isocrates' position at the time when the dialogue was written, before his assumption of the part of Heaven-sent political adviser to civilisation at large). The offence, such as it was, was probably more than a generation old when the *Antidosis* was written, but Isocrates had neither forgotten nor forgiven it. We must make some allowance for his annoyance at the appearance of Aristotle as a professional rival just at the very time when the pamphlet was being composed. So Blass, *Attische Beredsamkeit*,² ii. 60.

² As far as the words go, *ἐρωτήσεις καὶ ἀποκρίσεις* might mean no more than the bits of feigned dialogue with the *ἀντίδικος* which were a regular part of the

immediately below in xv. 47, where we are told that "political" discourses are more akin to poetry than forensic pleadings in virtue of their more poetic and varied diction, their weighty and moral reflections, and the more brilliant and various *ιδέαι* which pervade them. *ἔτι δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις ιδέαις ἐπιφανεστέραις καὶ πλείοσιν ὅλον τὸν λόγον διοικοῦσιν*. *ιδέαι* seems to stand here for "embellishments" of the kinds introduced by Gorgias, antitheses, *παρισώσεις*, assonances, and the like.

xv. 74 *οὐ μόνον μικροῖς μέρεσιν ἀλλ' ὅλοις εἶδεσι προειλόμην χρῆσθαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς*. *εἶδη* seems to have the meaning of *εἶδη λόγων* in the wider sense. Isocrates has just represented himself as reciting long extracts from the *Panegyricus*, *De Pace*, and *Πρὸς Νικοκλέα* before an imaginary jury. He then says, in effect, that he has put before the audience not mere "snippets" (*μικρὰ μέρη*) from his works, but complete specimens of his performances in the recognised departments of oratory. And, in fact, the speeches, or rather pamphlets, which he selects are a *λόγος πολιτικός*, the *De Pace*, a *λόγος ἐπιδεικτικός*, the *Panegyricus*, and a *λόγος παραινετικός*, the address to Nicocles. He has carefully avoided making any quotations from his *λόγοι δικανικοί* in pursuance of his regular habit of concealing the fact that he had begun life as an ordinary *λογογράφος*.

xv. 183. Isocrates is here, apparently in dependence on the *Gorgias* of Plato, instituting a parallel between the arts of the *παιδοτρίβης* and the "philosopher" (i.e. the teacher of the art of effective pamphleteering). In the course of the comparison he says *ἐπειδὴν γὰρ λάβωσι μαθητάς, οἱ μὲν παιδοτρίβαι τὰ σχήματα τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀγωνίαν εἰρημένα τοὺς φοιτῶντας διδάσκουσιν, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ὄντες τὰς ιδέας ἀπάσας, αἷς ὁ λόγος τυγχάνει χρώμενος, διεξέρχονται τοῖς μαθηταῖς*. From the

rhetorician's stock-in-trade. The context, however, shows that Isocrates means to describe not something which might appear in a "discourse" of any and every kind, but a substantive branch of literature which can be nothing but the *Σωκρατικά*.

parallel with the teachers of athletes we see that the meaning is that just as the latter begin their course by explaining the several "positions" or "figures" employed in wrestling or fence, so the "philosopher" opens his instruction by acquainting his pupils with the several "styles" or "manners" which can be used in oratory. He then goes on to observe that in both cases the knowledge of the way in which the various "positions" must be combined in dealing with an actual situation depends less on theory than on practice and experience. The verbal antithesis between the *σχήματα* of the one art and the *ιδέαι* of the other shows that what is in his mind in the first instance is the *σχήματα λέξεως* of Gorgias, and that he is conscious of the metaphor underlying the phrase; but the context proves that this is only part of his meaning. The *ιδέαι* of this passage will also include the various *parts* or "constitutive elements" of a discourse, each of which will require its own proper "manner," the *προοίμιον*, the *διήγησις*, the counter-attack on the opponent, the concluding appeal to the judges, and so forth. E.g. such a "figure of thought" as the feigned cross-examination of the *ἀντίδικος*, or the rhetorical self-question, will be appropriate in one of these divisions but not equally so in another. What is meant here, then, is the different "manners" which have to be skilfully combined in the successful composition of an actual address.

xv. 280 τὰ μὲν εἰκότα καὶ τὰ τεκμήρια καὶ πᾶν τὸ τῶν πίστεων εἶδος τοῦτο μόνον ὠφελεῖ τὸ μέρος, ἐφ' ὧπερ ἂν αὐτῶν ἕκαστον τύχηι ῥηθέν. τὸ τῶν πίστεων εἶδος is little more than an equivalent for *πᾶσαι αἱ πίστεις*, but since two kinds of such *πίστεις* are enumerated, I think we should render literally "the whole kind of thing of which *εἰκότα* and *τεκμήρια* are examples," "confirmation in general." This may then be taken as a case, and the only case, in Isocrates in which *εἶδος* = class, sort, kind. It has nothing to do with the Platonic sense, "what a thing really is."

Epist. vi. 8 εἴθισμαι γὰρ λέγειν πρὸς τοὺς περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν τὴν ἡμετέραν διατρίβοντας, ὅτι τοῦτο πρῶτον

δεῖ σκέψασθαι, τί τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τοῖς τοῦ λόγου μέρεσι διαπρακτέον ἐστίν· ἐπειδὴν δὲ τοῦθ' εὖρωμεν καὶ διακριβώσωμεθα, ζητητέον εἶναι φημι τὰς ιδέας, δι' ὧν ταῦτ' ἐξεργασθήσεται καὶ λήψεται τέλος, ὅπερ ὑπεθέμεθα. "I am in the habit of telling students of my philosophy that the first thing to be considered is the end to be achieved by a discourse, or by its several parts; it is only after a precise determination of this question that we have to discover the *figures* (i.e. whether of language or "thought") by which our purpose may be achieved and completed."

The following points seem to emerge as results of this examination:—

(1) It is noticeable that common as the words εἶδος, ιδέα are in Isocrates' accounts of his theory of composition, they are entirely absent from his early *λογοὶ δικανικοί*, a plain proof that he regards them as technical terms belonging to the *art* of composition.¹

(2) The words are completely synonymous. They occur twenty-two times in all. In one case ιδέα means the way in which a man "carries himself." This would properly fall under the only sense current in ordinary Attic, "physique." In one it seems certainly to mean "class"; in one, "situation," "state of affairs"; in three the context seems to show that, as in Plato, it stands for an αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶδος, a determinate φύσις or "real essence." There are fifteen cases in which the meaning is ιδέα or σχῆμα λόγου,

¹ Compare the remarks of Blass, *Attische Beredsamkeit*,² ii. 100, "Was dieser εἶδη oder ιδέαι seiner Reden nennt, sind die Elemente, aus deren Mischung jede Rede sich bildet, entsprechend den σχήματα in den Gymnastik und von begrenzter, wenn auch nicht kleiner Zahl, so dass ein Wissen und ein Lehren derselben möglich ist. Man wird dabei bald an die sieben εἶδη des Anaximenes (i.e. the older contemporary and rival of Aristotle, author of the so-called *Rhetoric to Alexander*) . . . bald an die εἶδη und τόποι (oder στοιχεῖα) des Aristoteles erinnert; denn der Ausdruck εἶδος besagt dem Isocrates alles und nichts, und es heisst so die ganze Gattung von Reden wie die Species, und ferner das Enthymem und die Figur, je nach Umständen." On the special sense of εἶδος = σχῆμα λέξεως see also *ib.* p. 106.

The allusion to στοιχεῖα is very happy, since we shall see that in medicine too the meaning of εἶδος has been largely determined by the attempt to bring the Empedoclean theory of the "four roots" into harmony with Pythagorean mathematics.

which may mean either (*a*) an artificial construction of words (*σχῆμα λέξεως*), or (*b*) a rhetorically effective turn given to the thought expressed (*σχῆμα διανοίας*), or (*c*) the "style or manner" appropriate to a literary *genre* as a whole. In the one remaining case, that of the *εἶδη πολιτειῶν*, the immediate sense might be "figure," "shape," but is probably not "class."

(3) The origin of this rhetorical use of *ιδέα* and *εἶδος* is pretty certainly found in the *σχήματα* of Gorgias, which were so called precisely because they could be exhibited as actual "arrangements" or "diagrams." Isocrates thus becomes an important witness to the conclusion I am trying to establish, that *εἶδος* and *ιδέα* were known technical terms before Plato began to write, and that they came primarily from the vocabulary of mathematics.

I will next consider the uses of the words in the medical writers of the fifth and early fourth centuries whose writings constitute the so-called "works" of Hippocrates. It will not be necessary for my purpose to enter into any discussions about the real authorship of this extensive literature, and I will only make one general remark upon it. Among the Hippocratic tracts the most superficial observation detects two great classes. There are some which are guides and textbooks of purely empirical medicine, and either ignore the general theories of the cosmologists and speculative biologists, or actually denounce the connection between medicine and speculation as harmful to the advance of the healing art. It is generally recognised that these works represent the tradition of the school of Cos, and that it is among them that we must look for the genuine treatises of the great Hippocrates. There is another class in which medicine is treated as an integral part of the biology and cosmology of the *σοφισταί*, and in which speculative theories about the *φύσις* of the human body and of the *κόσμος* are explicitly upheld. For the most part the works of this class exhibit traces of the theories of Alcmaeon, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Diogenes, but

above all of Empedocles. This means that their authors belong to a school who were actively preoccupied in making a connection between human biology and the older science of cosmology. As we know now, this school was specially connected with Italian Pythagoreanism, and this accounts for the exceptional prominence of the theories of Empedocles, an Orphic and follower of the Pythagorean way of life, in their writings.¹ We shall find that it is from this class of Hippocratean works that the most significant examples of *ιδέα*, *εἶδος*, in a sense closely akin to the Platonic, are drawn. Thus our study will bring us round to the conclusion that the notion of *εἶδη* has come into medicine, no less than into rhetoric, from the geometry of the Pythagoreans.

As to the text of my citations, I have followed Kühlewein for the two volumes which are all that has appeared of his projected edition. For everything else I have had to fall back upon Kühn, whom I have had to reproduce with all his uncritical sham Ionic, only correcting an occasional very obvious blunder in the text, and removing one or two specially preposterous "Ionic" forms which might be felt by the reader as positive eyesores. I hope it will be understood that my quotations do not represent a Greek which I personally suppose any scientific man to have been capable of writing. Kühlewein is quoted by volume and section, Kühn by volume and page. I must apologise for the wearisomeness of the next few pages, but it seemed worth while to try and make the list of Hippocratean examples complete.

¹ See Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*,² pp. 234, 340. The recent discovery that Philolaus was one of these "eclectic" medical theorists is of special importance, since it accounts for some part at least of the prominence given to biological and medical questions in the "autobiographical" sections of the *Phaedo*, as well as for the fundamental principle of the Socratic-Platonic-Aristotelian ethics that virtue = the health of the soul = *σωσιμότης* in the soul, which thus turns out to be an application of the medical theories of the school of Crotona about the causes of disease. The existence of this Pythagorean medical school also explains why it is that the sense-physiology of the *Timaeus* mainly follows Empedocles and Diogenes. It is because these writers themselves are ultimately so dependent on Alcmaeon; Timaeus, in fact, represents exactly the trend of physiological thought which we should expect from a Pythagorean contemporary of Socrates and Philolaus.

Περὶ ἀρχαίης ἰητρικῆς (a work indispensable to the serious student of the theories about ὑποθέσεις expounded in the *Phaedo*).

Kühlewein i. 7 τί δὴ τοῦτο (the discovery of rules of diet and hygiene for the sick) ἐκείνου (the older discovery of a distinctively human diet) διαφέρει ἀλλ' ἢ [πλέον] τό γ' εἶδος καὶ ὅτι ποικιλώτερον καὶ πλείονος πρηγματῆς, ἀρχὴ δὲ ἐκείνη ἢ πρότερον γενομένη; How does this differ from that except in its appearance, and in being a more complicated discovery which demands more application? εἶδος here seems, as often, to mean *appearance* as contrasted with real fact.

12 χαλεπὸν δὲ τοιαύτης ἀκριβείης εὐούσης περὶ τὴν τέχνην τυγχάνειν αἰεὶ τοῦ ἀτρεκεστάτου. πολλὰ δὲ εἶδεα κατ' ἰητρικὴν ἐς τοσαύτην ἀκρίβειαν ἤκει, περὶ ὧν εἰρήσεται. The meaning seems to be, "since such finish is required of the art of medicine, it is no easy thing always to hit on the most unailing treatment. Yet many branches of the art have been brought to this pitch of exactitude." εἶδεα would then mean "constituent parts," "departments," like Plato's εἶδη ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ and Aristotle's εἶδη of tragedy.

15 ἀπορέω δ' ἔγωγε, οἱ τὸν λόγον ἐκείνον λέγοντες καὶ ἄγοντες ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ὁδοῦ ἐπὶ ὑπόθεσιν τὴν τέχνην τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον θεραπεύουσι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὥσπερ ὑποτίθενται. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν αὐτοῖς, οἶμαι, ἐξηρημένον αὐτό τι ἐφ' ἐωυτοῦ θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ ξηρὸν ἢ ὑγρὸν μηδενὶ ἄλλω εἶδει κοινωνέον. ἀλλ' οἶμαι ἔγωγε ταῦτα βρώματα καὶ πόματα αὐτοῖσι ὑπάρχειν οἷσι πάντες χρεώμεθα. "I really cannot understand in what fashion those who hold this theory, and in this way make the medical art depend on some philosophical doctrine, are going to base their treatment of their patients on their philosophy. For, I take it, they have not discovered anything which, by itself, is hot or cold, moist or dry, and shares in no other εἶδος. No, I take it, they can only avail themselves of the same forms of solid and liquid nutriment which are at the service of the rest of us."

The Περὶ ἀρχαίης ἰητρικῆς is, as I have already hinted,

of the first importance for the whole history of Greek Philosophy, so important indeed that no one who has not made a study of it should be esteemed competent to speak or write on the subject. It supplies us with the key not only to the conception of "hypotheses" which is fundamental for the understanding of the *Phaedo* and *Republic*, but also to the Platonic conception of the connection of pleasure and pain with ἀναπλήρωσις and κένωσις, and to the "Aristotelian" doctrine of the "mean." But no passage in the work is so important as the lines now before us. Of themselves they are sufficient to destroy the whole current theory of the origin of the "doctrine of εἶδη." For they show that the terms εἶδος, αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ (Plato's αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό), κοινωνία already had a known and definite meaning in the medical science of the fifth century. In other words, the technical phrases of the *Phaedo* are not Plato's invention but belong to fifth-century science, and science of a kind with which we have already found that Socrates was familiar. Exactly what the phrases mean may be briefly explained thus. The writer, who shows his knowledge of the work of Empedocles by his repeated reference to just those four "opposites" which correspond most closely to the four Empedoclean "roots," is arguing against physicians who try to base a doctrine of diet on one of the philosophical theories (the ὑποθέσεις he calls them) about the elementary "body" or "bodies" of which man and other things are made. To these cosmological theories about the primary body or bodies he gives the name ὑποθέσεις, clearly a technical term in this sense, and his illustrations show that it is specially the Empedoclean ὑπόθεσις, that man, and everything else, is made of four such "roots," with which he is specially concerned. His own object is to show that medical knowledge has grown and will continue to grow best when it is based on careful knowledge of empirical facts, and unencumbered by any speculations about the ultimate forms of body. He argues, therefore, against those who insist on treating Empedoclean cosmology as a proper basis for medicine, that you cannot,

in actually prescribing for a sick man, order him to take "something hot" or "something cold." That is, you cannot prescribe a diet which consists of absolutely pure "elementary" matter. You have to prescribe just one or more of the articles with which we are all familiar, and none of these is a pure *εἶδος*; none of them is an "element" with a single specific property, "hot," "cold," etc.; all of them are compounds and therefore exhibit a "combination" of "opposites" (a *κοινωνία* of *εἶδη*). For, as he goes on to say, if you prescribe "something heating," your patient will at once ask "*what* thing?" and the moment you specify the "heating thing," you find that to be "heating" is not its only characteristic. It may be *θερμὸν καὶ στρυφνόν* or *θερμὸν καὶ πλαδαρόν* or *θερμὸν ἄραδον ἔχον*; it will never be merely *θερμόν*.¹ If we ask exactly how we are to translate *εἶδος* in this connection, the answer is instructive. As the example shows, *θερμόν*, *ψυχρόν*, and the rest of the "opposites" are *εἶδη*, but also, each of these "opposites" is looked on, in the fashion of Empedocles or Anaxagoras, as a substantial *thing*, not as an attribute of some still more ultimate body. The discussion belongs to the time after the criticism of Parmenides and Zeno had destroyed, for men who could think, the old notion of a single primary body, but before anyone had clearly grasped the notion that a thing could be real without being a body.² Hence *εἶδος* here means at once an ultimately simple *body*, and an ultimately simple sense-quality, and is, as for Plato, an exact equivalent of *φύσις*. The conception of the things of the actual world as constituted by a *κοινωνία* of several *εἶδη* is, in fact, exactly that which Plato ascribes to Socrates,

¹ Compare the exactly similar argument of Anaxagoras (*πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἐκ μὴ τριχὸς γένοιτο θρίξ καὶ σὰρξ ἐκ μὴ σαρκός*; *Fr.* 10, Diels), where the facts of nutrition are employed in exactly the same way against the belief in a finite number of simple "elements."

² As Professor Burnet has shown, exactly the same ambiguity affects Anaxagoras' use of the word *χρήματα*. It is wrong in principle to ask if the *πάντα χρήματα* which are "*in* all things" are simple bodies or simple qualities. The distinction had not yet been felt. *τὸ θερμόν* is at once what we should call a simple "quality," and a simple body which is a "bearer" of the quality.

except that it has not yet been suggested that the simple "reals" are incorporeal.

19 πέσσεσθαι δὲ καὶ μεταβάλλειν καὶ λεπτύνεσθαι τε καὶ παχύνεσθαι ἐς χυμῶν εἶδος δι' ἄλλων εἰδέων καὶ παντοίων . . . πάντων δὲ τούτων ἥκιστα προσήκει θερμῶι ἢ ψυχρῶι πάσχειν. οὔτε γὰρ ἂν τοῦτό γε σαπείη οὔτε παχυνθείη. Virtually ἐς χυμῶν εἶδος seems to be no more than a periphrasis for ἐς χυμόν, but the full sense is, I think, the characteristic "structure" or "pattern" presented by χυμοί and similar secretions, so that the expression, and, in the end, all the other periphrases of the kind, would result from the attempt, to be considered later on, to identify the various kinds of different bodies with different types of geometrical construction. I have already referred to a striking example of this to be found at Plato, *Timaeus* 66 d, where smells are said to have no εἶδη because they only arise from bodies which have lost one definite structure and not yet acquired another. Hence τὸ τῶν ὁσμῶν πᾶν ἡμιγενές (is a half-formed thing) εἶδει δ' οὐδενὶ συμβέβηκεν συμμετρίᾳ πρὸς τό τινα σχεῖν ὁσμήν, i.e. the structure of an *element* is not connected with any particular odour.

23 πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα καὶ ἔσω καὶ ἔξω τοῦ σώματος εἶδεα σχημάτων, ἃ μεγάλα ἀλλήλων διαφέρει πρὸς τὰ παθήματα καὶ νοσέοντι καὶ ὑγιαίνοντι. The examples given are variations in the size of the head, thickness of the neck, its length, shape of the belly, width of the chest. The combination εἶδεα σχημάτων seems a curious pleonasm for σχήματα, unless the words are to be taken in the most literal sense, "appearances of structure." On the whole, the expression seems to me to be purely pleonastic, both εἶδεα and σχήματα meaning "configurations."

ib. εἰ γλυκὺς χυμὸς ἐὼν μεταβάλλοι ἐς ἄλλο εἶδος, μὴ ἀπὸ συγκρήσιος ἀλλὰ αὐτὸς ἐξιστάμενος, ποῖός τις ἂν πρῶτος γένοιτο, πικρὸς ἢ ἀλμυρὸς ἢ στρυφνὸς ἢ ὀξύς; οἶμαι μὲν, ὀξύς. Here the meaning appears to be quite definitely "characteristic structure," and the question is, "What structure would ὁ γλυκὺς χυμὸς assume first of all

if spontaneously converted, without combination with an alien *χυμός*, into a different 'stuff'?" The answer is that "the sweet" would, in the first instance, become "the sour."

Thus we seem to discern behind the uses of the word in the *Περὶ ἀρχαίης ἰητρικῆς* the general meaning of "structure," passing into that of "element" or "simple real," in virtue of the assumption that every distinct simple quality corresponds with a definite geometrical structure. This is just what we should expect from the author's polemical interest in the attempt to connect medical theory and practice with the Empedoclean theory of the "four roots." (See especially § 20 for the special prominence given to Empedocles among the theorists, whose speculations must not be allowed to influence the practical physician, and, on the whole subject, Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*,² pp. 234-235, 349.)

Περὶ ἀέρων ὑδάτων τόπων. The work yields no fresh result for our special inquiry, though it contains much which is, on other grounds, highly valuable to the student of Plato. *ἰδέα* occurs once, and *εἶδος* nineteen times. In the one instance of *ἰδέα* the meaning seems to be "bodily shape." Eighteen of the cases of *εἶδος* fall under the same head; the nineteenth is apparently to be rendered "characteristic stage" in the course of a disorder. Here are the details.

§ 3 (Kühlewein) *ἥτις μὲν πόλις πρὸς τὰ πνεύματα κείται τὰ θερμά . . . ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει . . . τὰ τε εἶδεα ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν ἀπονώτερα εἶναι· ἐσθίειν δ' οὐκ ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι οὐδὲ πίνειν.* *εἶδεα* = the *physique*, *constitutions* of the inhabitants (not, of course, their "features," as the reference to appetite, etc., shows).

5 *τὰ τε εἶδεα τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐχροά τε καὶ ἀνθηρά ἐστί μαλλον ἢ ἄλληι ἢν μή τις νοῦσος κωλύη.*

10 *τὰς δὲ δυσεντερίας εἰκός ἐστι γίνεσθαι καὶ τῇσι γυναιξὶ καὶ τοῖς εἶδεσι τοῖς ὑγροτάτοις* (sc. the persons who have most moisture in their constitutions).

11 *τὰ τε γὰρ νοσεύματα μάλιστα ἐν ταύτῃσι τῇσιν ἡμέρησιν κρίνεται. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀποφθίνει, τὰ δὲ λήγει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα μεθίσταται ἐς ἕτερον εἶδος καὶ ἐτέρην*

κατάστασιν. (The context shows that the meaning is "and the rest pass into a different phase." εἶδος = a distinct stage in an illness marked by special symptoms, a sense derivative from that of "shape," "structure." I have already remarked on κατάστασις as a medical term in connection with Thucydides' frequent conjunction of ἰδέα with καταστήναι.)

12 τοὺς τε ἀνθρώπους εὐτραφέας εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα καὶ τὰ εἶδεα καλλίστους καὶ μεγέθεα μεγίστους καὶ ἥκιστα διαφόρους ἐς τὰ τε εἶδεα αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ μεγέθεα ("well-grown and finely formed, and presenting only slight diversities of physique and stature").

13 ἣν δὲ διαφόροι ἔωσι (sc. αἱ ὥραι) μέγα σφέων αὐτέων, διαφοραὶ καὶ πλείονες γίνονται τοῖς εἶδεσι. (The differences are, of course, in constitution, not in features.)

15 διὰ ταύτας δὴ τὰς προφάσιας, (for these reasons) τὰ εἶδεα ἀπηλλαγμένα τῶν λοιπῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔχουσιν οἱ Φασιηνοί. (The peculiarities mentioned are great stature, grossness of bulk, pallor, deep voice, sluggishness.)

19 διότι καὶ τὰ εἶδεα ὅμοιοι αὐτοῖς ἐωντοῖς εἰσι.

ιβ. διὰ ταύτας τὰς ἀνάγκας τὰ εἶδεα αὐτῶν παχέα ἐστὶ καὶ σαρκώδεα κτλ. ("their bodies are fat and fleshy").

ιβ. διὰ πιμελήν τε καὶ ψιλὴν τὴν σάρκα τὰ [τε] εἶδεα ἔοικεν ἀλλήλοισι κτλ.

20 τὰ δὲ θήλεα θαυμαστὸν οἶον ροικὰ ἐστὶ καὶ βλαδέα τὰ εἶδεα.

23 διότι τὰ εἶδεα διηλλάχθαι νομίζω τῶν Εὐρωπαϊῶν μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν Ἀσιηνῶν καὶ τὰ μεγέθεα διαφορώτατα αὐτὰ ἐωντοῖς εἶναι κατὰ πόλιν ἐκάστην. (εἶδεα here is synonymous with μορφαί in the previous sentence, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν γένος τὸ ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ διάφορον αὐτὸ ἐωντῶι ἐστὶ καὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ κατὰ τὰς μορφάς. There is more variation among the nations of Europe than among those of Asia, both in constitution and in size, because the climatic conditions are so much more variable.)

24 ἐνταῦθα εἰκὸς εἶδεα μεγάλα εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τὸ ταλαίπωρον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον εὖ πεφυκότα (fine physiques, well adapted to endure fatigue and to face danger).

ιβ. ἀνάγκη τὰ τοιαῦτα εἶδεα προγαστότερα καὶ σπληνώδεα εἶναι.

ιβ. εἰεν ἂν εἶδεα μεγάλοι καὶ ἐωντοῖσι παραπλήσιοι.

ιβ. ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ χώρῃ τὰ εἶδεα εἰκὸς [τε] σκληρά τε εἶναι καὶ ἔντονα κτλ.

ιβ. ἐκεῖ καὶ τὰ εἶδεα καὶ τὰ ἥθεα καὶ τὰς φύσεως εὐρήσεις πλείστον διαφερούσας.

ιβ. εὐρήσεις γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῆς χώρας τῇ φύσει ἀκολουθέοντα καὶ τὰ εἶδεα τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τοὺς τρόπους (as a general rule, men's bodily and mental characters correspond to the nature of the district in which they live).

ιβ. αἱ μὲν ἐναντιώταται φύσιές τε καὶ ιδέαι ἔχουσιν οὕτως (these are the most markedly contrasted examples of physique and constitution).

Thus we note that the meaning of εἶδος, ιδέα in every case but one is *body* or bodily constitution. In no case does it mean "sort," and in no case "features" or "countenance."

Περὶ διαίτης ὁξέων. I find only a single instance of εἶδος and none of ιδέα.

43 ὅσα τε ἡμέων ἢ φύσις καὶ ἢ ἕξις ἐκάστοισιν ἐκτεκνοῖ πάθεα καὶ εἶδεα παντοῖα, where the εἶδεα seem to mean the outward and visible *symptoms* by which the presence of a πάθος or morbid condition is diagnosed. (In passing, let me call attention to the use of the word ποιότης in § 62 as a technical term for the "specific" character of a potion. The word is therefore not invented by Plato in the *Theaetetus*, as has often been thought, but taken over, like so much of his phraseology, from the technical language of medicine and given a more extended meaning.)

Περὶ διαίτης ὁξέων (νόθα). I note one instance of ιδέα in the sense of a visible *symptom* of disease.

39 ἢ δὲ τοῦ ιδρώτος ιδέα κοινὸν ἀπάντων: the symptom of sweating (or (?) the appearance of a sweat) is common to them all.

Προγνωστικόν. I find no instance of εἶδος or ιδέα.

Ἐπιδημίων α'. There are two instances of εἶδος.

19 ἐκ δὲ τῶν καμνόντων ἀπέθνησκον μάλιστα μειράκια,

νέοι, ἀκμάζοντες, λεῖοι, ὑπολευκόχρωτες, ἰθύτριχες, μελανότριχες, μελανόφθαλμοι, οἱ εἰκῇ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ράιθυμον βεβιωκότες, ἰσχνόφωνοι, τρηχύφωνοι, τραυλοί, ὀργίλοι. καὶ γυναῖκες πλείσται ἐκ τούτου τοῦ εἶδους ἀπέθνησκον.

A careless translator would be tempted to render the last words, "and most of the women who died were of this sort." But the analogy of previously cited passages shows us that the real sense is "most of the women who died were also of this habit of body." εἶδος, as usual, properly means *body*, then a given constitution or "habit of body," "physique," and so, eventually, "type." Passages like the one before us are interesting because they show how the word finally reached the sense of "class," "sort" by passing from the original sense of "body" or "bodily figure" through that of "type." The special application of this to our present subject lies in the fact that the εἶδος of the *Phaedo* and *Republic* is only a specialisation of the meaning "type" or "typical structure." The εἶδη finally become "classes" only as a result of a philosophical criticism which denies the real existence of "types" or παραδείγματα ἐν τῇ φύσει. The linguistic history of the word is enough of itself to refute the theory that Socrates began by talking of "classes," which were then converted by Plato into objective types. It is also fatal to the view that the εἶδος as a παράδειγμα is characteristic of Plato's "second theory," for the meaning παράδειγμα is current in the fifth century; the εἶδος which is not a παράδειγμα is an invention of Aristotle, as far as philosophy is concerned.

20 καὶ διεσώζοντο πάντες, οὓς κἀγὼ οἶδα, οἷσιν αἱ ὑποστροφᾶι διὰ τοῦ εἶδους τούτου γενοίατο. There was a recovery in every case coming under my personal knowledge in which the fever recurred *with these symptoms* (lit. "in this figure").

Ἐπιδημίων γ'. I only note the following examples.

3 ἐκάστου δὲ τῶν ὑπογεγραμμένων εἰδέων ἦσαν οἱ κάμνοντες καὶ ἔθνησκον πολλοί. The patients all exhibited the *symptoms* described, and the deaths were numerous. (εἰδέων is a descriptive genitive, and the rendering "were of

the classes described" is excluded, since what has gone before is an enumeration not of classes of patients but of the collective symptoms of the disorder: *φωναὶ κακούμεναι, καῦσοι φρενιτικοί, στόματα ἀφθώδεα* κτλ.)

12 πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πυρετῶν ἐπεδήμησεν εἶδεα, τριταίων, τεταρταίων, νυκτερινῶν, συνεχέων, μακρῶν, πεπλανημένων, ἀσωδέων, ἀκαταστάτων. The meaning here is, of course, "types," and it is one of the few cases in Hippocrates where we could translate by "classes" without sensible detriment to the author's meaning.

14 εἶδος δὲ τῶν φθινωδέων ἦν τὸ λεῖον, τὸ ὑπόλευκον, τὸ φακῶδες, τὸ ὑπέρυθρον, τὸ χαροπὸν, λευκοφλεγματῖαι, πτερυγώδες: the "symptoms," "bodily peculiarities," were etc.

Περὶ τῶν ἐν κεφαλῇ τρωμάτων, Kühlewein, vol. ii.

5 ιδέαι δὲ τῆς φλάσιος πλείους γίνονται . . . ἀλλ' οὐ τούτων τῶν ιδεῶν οὐδεμίαν ἔστιν ἰδόντα τοῖσιν ὀφθαλμοῖσι γινῶναι ὁκοίη τίς ἐστιν τὴν ιδέην καὶ ὁκόση τις τὸ μέγεθος. *ιδέην* plainly means "shape," "geometrical figure."

6 ἐσφλᾶται δὲ τὸ ὀστέον πολλὰς ιδέας, καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ πλέον τοῦ ὀστέου καὶ ἐπ' ἔλασσον καὶ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἐς βαθύτερον κάτω καὶ ἥσσόν τι καὶ ἐπιπολαιότερον. Meaning as before.

7 ἐν δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ ἐκάστωι (in each sort of wound) πλείονες ιδέαι γίνονται. καὶ περὶ μὲν φλάσιός τε καὶ ῥωγμῆς (a contusion which is also accompanied by a fracture), κῆν ἄμφω ταῦτα προσγένηται τῇ ἔδρῃ καὶ ἦν φλάσις μούνη γένηται, ἥδη πέφρασται ὅτι πολλαὶ ιδέαι γίνονται καὶ τῆς φλάσιος καὶ τῆς ῥωγμῆς. ἡ δὲ ἔδρη αὐτὴ ἐφ' ἐωυτῆς γίνεται μακροτέρη καὶ βραχυτέρη, ἐοῦσα καὶ καμπυλωτέρη καὶ ἰθυτέρη καὶ κυκλοτερής· καὶ πολλὰ ἄλλαι ιδέαι τοῦ τοιούτου τρόπου, ὁκοῖον ἂν τι καὶ τὸ στόμα τοῦ βέλεος ἦι. As the last words show, the meaning of *ιδέαι* throughout is "shapes," "figures," which the bruise or fracture may present. The writer's own word for "sort," "class" appears to be *τρόπος*. I have noted no case of *εἶδος* in the treatise.

Κατ' ἡτρεῖον, Kühlewein, vol. ii.

3 αὐγῆς μὲν οὖν δύο εἶδεα, τὸ μὲν κοινόν, τὸ δὲ τεχνητόν, "two kinds" of illumination, "natural and artificial."

ιβ. ὡς δὲ δεῖ σώζῃται καὶ σχῆμα καὶ εἶδος τοῦ χειριζομένου ἐν παρέξει, ἐν χειρισμῶι, ἐν τῇ ἔπειτα ἔξει. The patient's position is to be such that the proper shape and figure of the member to be treated is maintained as he prepares himself for treatment, during the treatment and after treatment. εἶδος thus means quite literally the "figure," "shape" of the member to be operated on, σχῆμα referring perhaps to its position relatively to the rest of the body.

7 ἐπιδέσιος δύο εἶδεα, εἰργασμένον καὶ ἐργαζόμενον.

ιβ. τὰ δὲ εἶδεα, ἀπλόον, σκέπαρνον, σιμόν, ὀφθαλμὸς καὶ ῥόμβος καὶ ἡμίτομον. ἀρμόζον τὸ εἶδος τῶι εἶδει καὶ τῶι πάθει τοῦ ἐπιδεομένου. In the last sentence εἶδος means, of course, the shape of the bandage. Several technical names for these different shapes are enumerated, and it is added that the bandage selected must be determined by the shape of the injured part and the character of the injury. The meaning of the other sentence is that there are two *points* to be considered in bandaging an injury; the bandaging must be quickly and painlessly done, and the bandage must answer its purpose after it is on. I find it very hard to bring this instance under any of the accepted senses of εἶδος, unless we render "figure" much in the sense in which we speak of "figures" in a dance. "In making a bandage there are two figures."

8 ἀγαθῶς δὲ δύο εἶδεα τοῦ ἐπιδεομένου· ἰσχύος μὲν ἢ πιέξει ἢ πλήθει ὀθονίων. The sense seems to be that there are two ways of making a good bandage, either to make the pressure very great or to use a large number of ligatures. εἶδεα will then mean "figures," "ways of construction."

19. (A bandage must be so constructed that it keeps the bandaged member "in position" in spite of the movements of the body.) ἡ ἐπίδεσις ὡς ἐν τῶι αὐτῶι σχήματι ἦι, διαφυλάσσειν. κεφάλαια σχημάτων ἔθεα, φύσεις ἐκάστου τῶν μελέων· τὰ δ' εἶδεα ἐκ τοῦ τρέχειν, ὁδοιορεῖν, ἐστάναι, κατακεῖσθαι ἐκ τοῦ ἔργου, ἐκ τοῦ ἀφείσθαι. Thus the

εἶδεα of this passage seem to mean the different "figures" or "positions" assumed by the bandaged member as the patient goes through the routine of his bodily life.

Περὶ ἀγμῶν. I find no instance of either word.

Περὶ ἀρθρῶν ἐμβολῆς, Kühlewein ii.

27 ὅλη δὲ ἡ χεὶρ ὀλισθάνει ἢ ἔσω ἢ ἔξω ἢ ἔνθα ἢ ἔνθα . . . τούτοις κατατάσις ἰσχυρὴ ποιητέη, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐξέχον ἀπωθεῖν, τὸ δ' ἕτερον ἀντωθεῖν, δύο εἶδεα ἅμα ἐς τοῦπίσω καὶ ἐς τὸ πλάγιον ἢ χερσὶν ἐπὶ τραπέζης ἢ πτέρνῃ. I.e. the physician who is treating a dislocated hand must push it in two directions at once, so that *εἶδεα* means "figures" of motion like those of dancing, fencing, etc. The sense is thus ultimately that of geometrical figures.

34 ἀλλ' οὐ βούλομαι ἀποπλανᾶν τὸν λόγον, ἐν ἄλλοις γὰρ εἶδεσι νοσημάτων περὶ τούτων εἴρηται. I will not wander from the immediate point, as the matter (the anatomy of the under-jaw) has been described in a different context. *εἶδεα νοσημάτων* no doubt means literally "figures of disorders," i.e. descriptions of their symptomatology, but we lose nothing by rendering merely "kinds."

Μοχλικόν, Kühlewein ii.

1 εἶδος κονδυλῶδες ἔχον ἐπιμυλίδα (of knobby shape).

iv. εἶδος ραιβοειδέστατον τῶν ζώων· στενότατος γὰρ ταύτῃ ἀνθρώπος ἐπ' ὄγκον.

6 ἀκρώμιον ἀποσπασθέν· τὸ μὲν εἶδος φαίνεται οἶόν περ ὤμου ἐκπεσόντος.

In all these three cases, *εἶδος* means "shape," "geometrical figure."

All the rest of my quotations will be taken from Kühn and given by volume and page.

I may first give the list, a longish one, of works in which I find no instance of *ιδέα* or *εἶδος*. It comprises

Περὶ ἐπταμήνου.

Περὶ ἐλκῶν.

Περὶ ἐπικυήσιος.

Περὶ αἱμορροίδων.

Περὶ ὑγρῶν χρήσιος.

Περὶ ἀνατομῆς.

Ἐπιδημίων α', ε', ζ.

Περὶ ὀκταμήνου.

Περὶ παρθενίων.

Περὶ ἐνυπνίων.

Γυναικείων α'.

Περὶ νούσων α', β', γ'.

Περὶ παθῶν.

Περὶ συρίγγων.

Περὶ γυναικείης φύσιος. Περὶ ἐκτομῆς ἐμβρύου.

Περὶ ὄψιος.

Ἀφορισμοί.

Truly a formidable list. A general consequence of importance which follows from the total absence of the words in all these works, contrasted with their presence in those which either expound cosmological systems or, like the *Περὶ ἀρχαίης ἱητρικῆς*, enter into the polemic against them, is that the words do not belong, except in a current non-technical sense, to the language of the "working medical man," who is concerned solely with the practical cure of disease and has no speculative theories of φύσις at the back of his mind. The persons who make play with them are the speculative philosophers, the Hegels and Schellings of their day, to whom medicine is not interesting for its own sake, or as a profession by which they have to live, but as a field in which they can give free scope for their love of *Naturphilosophie* and propound undemonstrable theories about the number and nature of the ultimate kinds of body, and support them by biological analogy. What this means is that εἶδος and ἰδέα have got into medicine out of "what they call" *περὶ φύσεως ἱστορία*.

Περὶ τέχνης (Kühn, vol. i.).

i. 7 οὐδεμία ἐστὶν (sc. τέχνη) ἥ γε ἔκ τινος εἶδους οὐκ ὁράται, οἶμαι δ' ἔγωγε καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῆς (sic, l. αὐτὰς) διὰ τὰ εἶδεα λαβεῖν. ἄλογον γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ εἶδεα ἡγεῖσθαι βλαστάνειν, καὶ ἀδύνατον. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὀνόματα φύσιος νομοθετήματά ἐστι, τὰ δὲ εἶδεα οὐ νομοθετήματα ἀλλὰ βλαστήματα. The writer is, as we see, deeply influenced by the antithesis of νόμος and φύσις, and is also an adherent of the Eleatic doctrine of Being, for he says just before τὰ μὲν ἑόντα αἰεὶ ὁράται καὶ γινώσκεται, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἑόντα οὔτε ὁράται οὔτε γινώσκεται. It is clear here that εἶδεα means simply the real things or bodies which are the objects studied by a science. The argument is directed against the view that the things which some or all of the sciences study exist only νόμῳ, "subjectively," and not φύσει. He argues that the

technical vocabulary of a science does not create the objects corresponding to the names; it is in dependence on the objects that the names have been created. (E.g. mathematics in this view, does not deal with mere names or symbols, but with real things, and the names have only obtained currency because there was something with a determinate character to be named. Thus we shall catch the meaning if we say that taking *φύσις* as a collective name for bodily reality, the only kind of reality known to the early men of science before the rise of atomism), the *εἶδος* are the individual constituents of which *φύσις* is the *σύνολον*. The implied contrast between *εἶδος* which exist *φύσις* and names which exist only *νόμος* would be preserved if we rendered *εἶδος* "real essences."

Ι 9 τὸ μὲν καὶ τῆς τύχης εἶδος ψάλλον οὐκ ἡβουλήθησαν θεμελιωθῆναι ἐν οἷ τῆς τέχνης ἐπέτρεψαν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς· ὥστε τῆς μὲν ἐς τὴν τύχην ἀναφορῆς ἀπηλλαγμένοι εἰσὶ, τῆς μὲντοι ἐς τὴν τέχνην οὐκ ἀπηλλαγμένοι· ἐν οἷ γὰρ ἐπέτρεψαν καὶ ἐπίστευσαν αὐτῇ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐν τούτοις αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἐσκεύαστο καὶ τὴν δύναμιν περανθέντος τοῦ ἔργου ἔργασαν. Here again *εἶδος* is about equivalent to *οὐσία* or *φύσις*, the objective reality corresponding to and denoted by a significant name. Thus τὸ τῆς τύχης or τὸ τῆς τέχνης *εἶδος* are periphrases for *ἡ τύχη*, *ἡ τέχνη*.

Ι 11 τῶν δὲ δὴ φαίνονται τῶν ἰητρῶν οἱ μάλιστα ἐκτακόμενοι καὶ διαιτήμασιν ἰώμενοι καὶ ἄλλοισί τε εἶδεσιν ἃ οὐκ ἂν τις φαίη, μὴ ὅτι ἰητρὸς ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἰδιώτης ἀνεκιστήμων ἀκούσας, μὴ οὐ τῆς τέχνης εἶναι. (*εἶδεσι* = things, substances.)

Ἰ. ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν τε φυομένων καὶ τῶν ποιομένων ἔρεστι τὰ εἶδεα τῶν θεραπειῶν καὶ τῶν φαρμάκων. *εἶδεα* here means not "kinds," but rather "natures," "substances with a specific healing virtue." This is clear from the context. The author's contention is that medicine is not a thing of haphazard but a genuine *τέχνη* or profession. He is meeting the objection that cures may be effected without professional treatment. To this he rejoins that even such a cure is due not to τὸ αὐτόματον, blind

accident, but to the fact that the man who recovers in this way has unintentionally made use of an article, e.g. of diet, containing the very *εἶδεα*, "specifics," to use the nearest English equivalent, which medicine seeks systematically to discover. For every disorder there are certain determinate "specifics," and to recover from it you must employ them, whether by medical advice or by accident. Recovery from a disease is something which has definite and assignable causes; for τὸ αὐτόματον is an empty name without an οὐσία, "thing," "real essence," "body," corresponding to it. τὸ δὲ αὐτόματον οὐ φαίνεται οὐσίην ἔχον οὐδεμίην ἀλλ' ἢ ὄνομα μόνον, but medicine ἐν τοῖς διὰ τι προνοούμενοισι φαίνεται τε καὶ φανείται ἔτι οὐσίην ἔχουσα. Thus the *εἶδεα* sought by medicine are the healing "substances" or "specifics" contained in plants, minerals, etc. Very interesting is the connection, indicated by the passages just quoted from the *Περὶ τέχνης*, and confirmed by others from other medical works which will be produced immediately, between the conception of an *εἶδος* and the *νόμος-φύσις* antithesis. The point is simply this: *εἶδος* is what corresponds on the side of *φύσις* to *ὄνομα* on the side of *νόμος*. *εἶδεα* are *ex parte rei* what *ὀνόματα* are *ex parte intellectus*. Hence, on the assumption that every name is the name of something, that there are not, or in a properly constructed language ought not to be, any names for the *μὴ εἶναι* of which Parmenides had taught that we cannot even speak significantly,¹ the existence of *ὀνόματα* becomes in itself

¹ Parmenides, Fr. 4 (Diels) οὐτε γὰρ ἂν γνῶις τό γε μὴ εἶναι (οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστόν), | οὐτε φράσαις. Fr. 8 τὴν μὲν εἶναι ἀνόητον ἀνώνυμον (οὐ γὰρ ἀληθὴς | ἔστιν ὁδός.) . . . | μορφὰς γὰρ κατέθεντο δύο γνώμας ὀνομάζειν, | τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεῶν ἔστιν κτλ. *μορφή* in the poem of Parmenides means exactly what we find *εἶδος* meaning in the passages under our notice, "ultimate bodily reality," "material substance." Through Empedocles, and no doubt others, this equivalence has passed to Plato and Aristotle, with whom *μορφή* is constantly used as identical with what they call *εἶδος*. When we bear in mind that *μορφή* also means primarily "figure," the use of the word in Parmenides adds considerable strength to the evidence in favour of the view that his polemic is directed against the dualism of the Pythagorean geometrical philosophers. His complaint is that their theory requires them to treat "space" as a body out of which things are made by the action of something else (τὰντ' αὖ δ' ἐκρίναντο δέμας καὶ σήματ' ἔθεντο | χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων κτλ.).

evidence of the existence of the corresponding *εἶδεα*. Hence we get the equation $\epsilonἶδος = οὐσία = φύσις$ (in the sense in which we can speak of the *φύσις* of an individual thing, as contrasted with the collective *φύσις* which is the aggregate of all things) = "real essence." This explains at once (1) why, in the mouths of cosmologists and biologists who are also pluralists, the *εἶδεα* regularly mean the ultimate simple "elements" of body, and (2) why, in our more developed terminology, which distinguishes "thing" from "property," we often have to translate by "specific" or "distinctive" property.

Περὶ φύσιος ἀνθρώπου (Kühn's pages).

i. 350. The physicians who say that man is "one thing" (i.e. biologists like Diogenes of Apollonia who are also monists in their cosmology), say further *καὶ τοῦτο ἐν ἔδν μεταλλάσσειν τὴν ιδέην καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἀναγκαζόμενον ὑπὸ τε τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ, καὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρὸν καὶ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν καὶ παντοῖόν τι ἄλλο*. They say that this "one thing" changes its "character and quality" under the stress of heat and cold. *ιδέη* thus means here the "form" or "nature" of the supposed "one thing." The underlying sense is "shape," but the word is taken in a wider sense to signify any of the supposed ultimate qualitative "opposites" of the Ionian hylozoism. In the hands of the pluralists, of course, these "opposites" become ultimate "substances" or simple bodies. This explains why *εἶδος* and *ιδέα* can sometimes mean what a thing really is as opposed to the "forms" in which it appears to us, sometimes, as so often in Thucydides, the variety of "guises" or "aspects" themselves. To a pluralist the recognition, e.g., of "air" as an *εἶδος* means that it is an ultimate "element"; a monist, if he holds that air is the primary body, has also to hold that air somehow presents

With regard to the reading *κατέθεντο γνώμας ὀνομάζειν*, it must be remembered that *γνώμη* in fifth-century Greek is "mind" as opposed to *εἶδος*, "body." We have seen plenty of instances of this in the course of the present Essay. Hence *γνώμας κατέθεντο ὀνομάζειν* means simply "have decided in their minds," "have made up their minds," to speak of. Parmenides' contention is that one of the two *μορφαί* only exists *νόμῳ*, has no objective *φύσις*, and therefore can have no true *ὄνομα*, since every *ὄνομα* is *ὀνομαῖος*.

itself to our notice under an infinite plurality of "phases." Hence when a pluralist speaks of *εἶδη* we have usually to render the word by "bodies" or "things"; when a monist talks of them, as he cannot really do without inconsistency, we have to introduce from a more developed philosophy the notion of specific qualities or determinations of what is, after all, one and the same "thing" or "substance."

ib. νῦν δὲ πολλά (sc. ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος). πολλά γάρ εἰσιν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἔόντα, ἃ ὁκόταν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων παρὰ φύσιν θερμαίνηται τε καὶ ψύχεται καὶ ξηραίνεται τε καὶ ὑγραίνεται, νούσους τίκτει. ὥστε πολλαὶ μὲν ἰδέαι τῶν νοσημάτων, πολλή δὲ καὶ ἡ ἴησις αὐτέων ἐστίν. ἀξιώ δὲ ἔγωγε τὸν φάσκοντα αἷμα εἶναι μόνον τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἄλλο μηδὲν δεικνύναι αὐτὸν μὴ μεταλλάσσοντα τὴν ἰδέην μηδὲ γίνεσθαι παντοῖον ἄλλ' ἢ ὥρην τινα τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ἢ τῆς ἡλικίης τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐν ᾧ αἷμα ἐνὲν φαίνεται μόνον ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. That is, the writer adopts the Empedoclean theory of the "four roots" of things. Man is made not of blood only but of three other *ιδέαι* or "elements" (that this is meant is shown by the enumeration of four elementary activities and no more). If the monists who say that the human body is made only of blood were right, they should be able to point to some stage in human development in which the body exists simply in the form and with the properties of blood. Thus *μὴ μεταλλάσσοντα τὴν ἰδέην* means "without transformation of substance," "untransubstantiated." I think that the *πολλαὶ ἰδέαι τῶν νοσημάτων* must be rendered in a similar fashion, "there are many substances in which disease arises," i.e. disease is not necessarily "diseased state of the blood." If we translate "there is more than one kind of disease," the argument loses its cogency, since even if the body consisted only of blood, it would not follow that there can be only one kind of disease of the blood; for it might be, e.g., either over-heated or over-cooled.

i. 354 (On the four "temperaments") καὶ τούτων πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ τὸν νόμον τὰ ὀνόματα διωρίσθαι φημι καὶ

οὐδενὶ αὐτέων ταὐτὸ οὐνομα εἶναι· ἔπειτα τὰς ἰδέας κατὰ φύσιν κεχωρίσθαι καὶ οὔτε τὸ φλέγμα οὐδὲν εἰκέναι τῷ αἵματι οὔτε τὸ αἷμα τῇ χολῇ, οὔτε τὴν χολὴν τῷ φλέγματι. πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἰκότα εἴη ταῦτα ἀλλήλοισιν; ὦν οὔτε τὰ χρώματα ὅμοια φαίνεται προσορώμενα, οὔτε τῇ χειρὶ ψαύοντι ὅμοια δοκέει εἶναι; οὔτε γὰρ θερμὰ ὁμοίως ἐστὶν οὔτε ψυχρὰ οὔτε ξηρὰ οὔτε ὑγρά. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν ὅτι τοσοῦτον διήλλακται ἀλλήλων τὴν ἰδέην τε καὶ τὴν δύναμιν μὴ ἐν αὐτὰ εἶναι. To a student of Plato, this passage is one of the most illuminating in the whole Hippocratean corpus. We see from it (1) that there is an exact correspondence between the antithesis φύσις-νόμος and the antithesis ἰδέα-ὄνομα. In fact we have a regular ἀναλογία, ἰδέα : φύσις : : ὄνομα : νόμος. For the writer's object is to prove that man "is many things" both κατὰ νόμον and κατὰ φύσιν, "in name and in objective fact." You prove the first point by showing that there are different names for different constituents of the human body. (This implies, of course, that every name is a "name of something," "what is not cannot even be named," and further, if you think it out, that each of the names appealed to, αἷμα, φλέγμα, etc., is simple and indefinable, since otherwise they might all prove to be synonyms, or all of them but one might be further specific determinations of the remaining one. If, e.g., φλέγμα is a synonym for αἷμα, or if it can be defined as αἱμά πως ἔχον, the author's argument to show that "man is many" κατὰ νόμον falls to the ground. Hence our passage throws a flood of light on Plato's *Cratylus*, where it is also maintained that in a scientific language there would be an exact correspondence of names and εἶδη, and proves, moreover, that Plato is guilty of no anachronism in assuming that Socrates might have discussed such a question as the right employment of names with Cratylus and Hermogenes. It also throws light on the connection of the views ascribed to Antisthenes about definition with earlier thought in a way which shows how far they were from being mere personal eccentricities.)

(2) When we come to the further proof that "man is

many" *κατὰ φύσιν* we see that this is proved by the argument that the various sensible properties of *φλέγμα*, *χολή*, *αἷμα* are all different. Ergo they are distinct *ιδέαι*. Thus the *ιδέη* means that which is not directly perceptible itself, but reveals its nature to us through its sensible properties, a "substance," "monad," or "thing-in-itself," and *φύσις* or Nature at large is simply the aggregate of such *εἶδη*. The "specific" qualities of these *ιδέαι* are what the writer calls their *δυνάμεις*, their ways of affecting other things, and particularly the human organs of sense. Thus at the end of the passage, where *φλέγμα*, *χολή*, *αἷμα* are said to be "separated" *κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν*, *κατὰ φύσιν* means the same thing as *ιδέην* in the former expression *καὶ τὴν ιδέην καὶ τὴν φύσιν*. The *φύσις* or *ιδέη* is the "thing" or "substance," the *δυνάμεις* are its perceived "characters," and we have *ιδέη* in a sense exactly equivalent to Locke's "real essence."

This conception of the correspondence of the antitheses *ιδέη-ὄνομα* and *φύσις-νόμος* further helps us to understand why the atomists called atoms, which, unlike the sensible qualities of things, exist *φύσει*, by the name of *ιδέαι*. Merely as an illustration of the indispensability of a fair knowledge of fifth-century medicine to the student of Greek Philosophy, I would call attention to a point which does not bear directly on the present investigation. Just as in Aristotle's theory of the elements, we find in the *Περὶ φύσιος ἀνθρώπου* a constant recurrence of the notion that each of the *ιδέαι* which make up the human body corresponds with a binary combination of the fundamental Ionian opposites. *αἷμα*, like air in Aristotle, is moist and hot; *φλέγμα*, like water, is moist and cold; *μέλαινα χολή*, like fire, is dry and hot; *ξανθὴ χολή*, like earth, dry and cold. Hence we get a regular table of correspondence between the "seasons" and the constituents of the organism:—

| | | | |
|----------|------|------------|--------------|
| { χειμὼν | ἔαρ | θέρος | φθινόπωρον |
| { φλέγμα | αἷμα | ξανθὴ χολή | μέλαινα χολή |

The underlying idea is, of course, that of the intimate

correspondence of macrocosm and microcosm. (Kühn i. 357-359.)

i. 361 τὸ δὲ ξύμπαν γινῶσθαι δεῖ τὸν ἰατρὸν ἐναντίον ἵστασθαι τοῖσι κατεστέωσι καὶ νοσήμασι καὶ εἶδεσι καὶ ὄρησι καὶ ἡλικίησι καὶ τὰ συντείνοντα λύειν καὶ τὰ λελυμένα συντείνειν. In this statement of the fundamental principle of "allopathic" medicine, εἶδεσι clearly means again the alleged "four substances" composing the human body. The physician's duty is to produce "restoration of the bodily equilibrium" by supplying the defect, and purging away the excess of any one of the four. (For the writer's adherence to Alcmaeon's doctrine of *ισονομία* as the basis of health see what immediately precedes the words quoted.)

i. 362 ἃ δὲ καταμαθόντε μεταβάλλειν, καὶ σκεψάμενον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὴν φύσιν τὴν τε ἡλικίην καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν ὥρην τοῦ ἔτους καὶ τῆς νόσου τὸν τρόπον τὴν θεραπείαν ποιέεσθαι, ποτὲ μὲν ἀφαιρόντα ποτὲ δὲ προστιθέντα, ὥσπερ μοι καὶ πάλαι εἴρηται πρὸς ἐκάστας τῶν ἡλικιών καὶ τῶν ὥρων καὶ τῶν ιδέων (? εἰδέων) καὶ τῶν νόσων, ἔν τε τῇσι φαρμακίησι προτρέπεσθαι καὶ ἐν τοῖσι διαιτήμασιν. εἶδος here apparently means simply "habit of body," "individual constitution."

i. 369 οἱ πλείστοι τῶν πυρετῶν γίνονται ἀπὸ χολῆς. εἶδεα δὲ σφέων εἰσὶ τέσσαρα . . . ὀνόματα δ' αὐτέοισιν ἐστὶ σύνοχος, ἀμφημερινός, τριταῖος, τεταρταῖος. Here we have a case in which, though the antithesis with ὀνόματα is kept up, εἶδεα seems to mean no more than "types," and might be adequately rendered "sorts," though the actual metaphor is, no doubt, geometrical, "figures."

Περὶ γυνῆς.

i. 374 εἰσὶ δὲ τέσσαρες ιδέαι τοῦ ὑγροῦ, αἷμα, χολή, ὕδωρ καὶ φλέγμα. τοσαύτας γὰρ ιδέας ἔχει συμφυέας ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἐωυτῷ καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων αἱ νόσοι γίνονται ἢ αἱ ἐκ νόσων διακρίσεις. The second ιδέαι clearly means "substances," "primary constituents of the body." The first may bear the same sense, if we regard τοῦ ὑγροῦ as a descriptive genitive, "substances of the moist <kind>,"

but appears rather to mean "figures," i.e. types of moisture (genitive of material).

i. 382 ἐπὴν δὲ τί οἱ νόσημα προσπέσῃ καὶ τοῦ ὑγροῦ αὐτῷ, ἀφ' οὗ τὸ σπέρμα γίνεταί, τέσσαρες ἰδέαι ἐοῦσαι ὁκόσαι ἐν φύσει ὑπῆρξαν, τὴν γονὴν οὐχ ὅλην παρέχουσιν, ἀσθενέστερον (? ἀσθενεστέραν) δὲ τὸ καὶ τὸ πεπηρωμένον, οὐ θῶμα δέ μοι δοκεῖ καὶ περωθῆναι καθάπερ ὁ τοκεύς. "When a man has been attacked by a disease, and the four ἰδέαι of the moist (the four which were originally in his organism) do not supply the semen whole and entire, but one or another is injured and therefore enfeebled (or (?)) is injured and therefore contributes the semen in an enfeebled condition), then I think it quite natural that <the offspring> should exhibit the same injury as the father." Here the ἰδέαι are clearly to be thought of as four *bodies* or constituents of the organism, "the four moist constituents."

Περὶ φύσιος παιδίου.

i. 394 ἦν δὲ μὴ ὑγαίνειν ἢ γυνὴ μὴδὲ μέλλει ὑγαίνειν, χωρεῖ ἢ κάθαρσις ἐλάττων καὶ εἶδος πονηροτέρη. We should say "the discharge is diminished in quantity and inferior in quality," but the writer had probably no distinct notion of quality, and means rather "and is of inferior stuff" (εἶδος = body).

i. 397 ὁκόταν δὲ διαρθρωθῇ τὸ παιδίον (the embryo), τὰ εἶδεα τῶν μελέων, αὐξομένου αὐτοῦ τά τε ὅστέα ἐπισκληρότατα γίνεταί καὶ κοιλαίνεται. εἶδεα here apparently = the shapes, figures, structure of the limbs.¹

i. 402 καὶ ὅταν ἀφίκηται εἰς τὰς μήτρας ἰδέην ἰσχεῖ τοῦ γάλακτος καὶ τὸ παιδίον ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐπαυρίσκεται ὀλίγον. The meaning is not "it takes on the appearance of milk," but "it acquires the peculiar character of milk." The case belongs to the sense of ἰδέη = φύσις, what a thing is in its real nature, and the meaning would be fairly rendered by "is converted into the substance of milk." (The point of the passage is that the formation of the milk is much

¹ Kühn places the comma after αὐτοῦ and has no stop after μελέων. This, I think, suggests a false construction. In general I have found it necessary to modify his erratic punctuation, but have been careful to make no change affecting grammar or sense without due warning.

earlier than its *appearance* in the breasts, which only takes place at birth.)

Περὶ σαρκῶν. I may call attention to the interesting initial statement of the writer's cosmological theory which appears to be a conflation, not very thoroughly thought out, of the special theories of Empedocles with the old Milesian view of a single primary body. Thus he begins by saying, in genuine Milesian style, (i. 424) *δοκέει δέ μοι δ καλέομεν θερμὸν ἀθάνατόν τε εἶναι καὶ νοεῖν πάντα καὶ ὀρῆν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ εἰδέναι πάντα καὶ τὰ ὄντα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα ἔσσεσθαι*. This is pretty pure Heracliteanism, but in what follows he gives an account of the formation of the οὐρανός which agrees in its main details with Empedocles.

i. 426 *ὁκόσα δὲ ἐτύγχανε κολλωδέστερα ἔοντα* (more viscous) *καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ μετέχοντα, ταῦτα δὲ θερμαινόμενα οὐκ ἡδύνατο ἐκκαυθῆναι οὐδὲ μὴν τοῦ ὑγροῦ γενέσθαι· διὰ τοῦτο ἰδέην ἀλλοιοτέρην ἔλαβε τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἐγένετο νεῦρα στερεά*. *ἰδέη* here then means φύσις, *bodily substance*.

i. 435 *ἣ δὲ τροφή ἐπειδὴν ἀφίκεται* (sc. *εἰς τὰ ἔντερα*), *ἕκαστον τοιαύτην ἀπέδωκε τὴν ἰδέην ἐκάστου ὁκοῖα περ ἦν*. The text seems to me to require some simple correction such as *ἐκάστωι* for *ἐκάστον*, but the sense clearly is that food as we digest it is converted into the several substances composing the body, all of which are thus nourished by it. *ἰδέη* thus = φύσις, *bodily substance*.

Of the many interesting features of this eclectic treatise I will only remark that it ends with a long passage on the vital significance of the week of 7 days, intended to show that *ὁ αἰὼν ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἑπταήμερος*. For (1) the embryo is fully formed in 7 days after conception; (2) death follows on a 7-days' course of starvation; (3) a 7-months' child will live, and 7 months = 30×7 days; an 8-months' child never lives, but a child born after 9 months and 10 odd days will live, and 9 months + 10 days = 40×7 days; (4) the critical periods in fevers occur at intervals of whole or half weeks, in a tertian on the 11th day, that is after $7 + 3\frac{1}{2}$ days, in a quartan on the 18th (after $2 \times 7 +$

3½ days). And severe wounds begin to inflame on the 4th day, i.e. after 3½ days, while the inflammation subsides either on the 14th or on the 18th day. (5) The permanent teeth are acquired in 7 years, i.e. 7 × 360 days. The prominence given to these speculations about the significance of the 7-days' period shows, of course, that we are on Pythagorean ground. There is much more of the same kind of thing in the *Περὶ ἐπταμήνου*, with which I will not concern myself further in this place than to throw out the hint that the *ἁρμονία*, of which we read at i. 452, as determining the days after conception to which the physician must pay special attention, seems to be identical with that used by Timaeus in his account of the generation of the soul of the world.

Περὶ καρδίας.

i. 487 *περίβολον δ' ἔχει παχὺν καὶ βόθρον ἐμβεβόθρωται τὸ εἶδος εἵκελον ὄλμωι.* "It has a thick wall and is hollowed into a cavity of the *shape* of a mortar."

Περὶ ἀδένων.

i. 492 *τὸ εἶδος λευκὴ καὶ οἶον φλέγμα, ἐπαφομένωι δὲ οἶον εἶρλα*—i.e. the *stuff, matter*, of a gland.

Περὶ ὀστέων φύσιος.

i. 504 *καὶ εἶδος καρδίας οἱ νεφροὶ ἔχουσι καὶ οὗτοι κοιλιώδεις.* The meaning is again clearly "stuff" or "matter." The Latin version in Kühn oddly has *foramen*!

i. 512 *τὰ ὀστέα τῶι σώματι στάσιν καὶ ὀρθότητα καὶ εἶδος παρέχονται.* εἶδος = shape.

Περὶ φυσῶν.

i. 571 *δοκέει μὲν οὖν τὰ νουσήματα οὐδὲν ἀλλήλοισιν εἰκέναι . . . ἔστι δὲ μία τῶν νουσέων ἀπασῶν καὶ ἰδέη καὶ αἰτίη ἡ αὐτή. τίς δὲ ἔστιν αὕτη διὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος λόγου φράσαι πειρήσομαι. τὰ γὰρ σώματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἀπὸ τρισσέων τροφῶν τρέφονται. ἔστι δὲ τῇσι τροφῇσι ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα, σῖτα, ποτά, πνεύματα. πνεύματα δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐν τοῖσι σώμασι φύσαι καλέονται, τὰ δὲ ἔξω τοῦ σώματος ἀήρ. . . .* (In what follows it is stated that air fills τὸ μεταξὺ γῆς τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ, and that the sun, moon, and stars move through

this air, τῷ γὰρ πυρὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τροφή; air is likewise τῆς γῆς ὄχημα, precisely as with Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Democritus and Euripides.¹ The meaning of the statement that the ἰδέη of all disorders is one is that the *substance* or *matter* is one and the same in them all, viz. the πνεῦμα or "air in the body," which has suffered some derangement. Thus ἰδέη and αἰτία are very nearly synonymous in this context, and we are told

i. 572 τοῖσι δ' αὖ θνητοῖσιν οὗτος αἰτιός τοῦ τε βίου καὶ τῶν νοσέων ταῖσι νοσέουσι. (The word for "class," "kind" is throughout ἔθνος, as e.g. on i. 574, where men are said to be one ἔθνος of ζῶια. I may also in passing note that συναίτια, μεταίτια are carefully used for "subsidiary" or "concomitant causes," so that the distinction drawn between "cause" and "necessary conditions" in the *Phaedo*, like so much else that has been hastily pronounced to be Platonic "development," really belongs to the medical science of the fifth century, e.g. i. 586 φύσα is the principal cause of epilepsy, as of all disease, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα συναίτια καὶ μεταίτια.)

Περὶ ἱερῆς νόσου.

i. 592 ἄνθρωποι βίου δεόμενοι πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα τεχνέονται καὶ ποικίλλουσιν ἔς τε τᾶλλα πάντα καὶ ἐς τὴν νοῦσον ταύτην, ἐκάστωι εἶδει τοῦ πάθεος θεῶι τὴν αἰτίην προστιθέντες. The context shows that ἐκάστωι εἶδει means "for each *symptom* of the disease" (not "for each kind." The εἶδεα are all present together in a concrete case of epilepsy, the falling, e.g., is one εἶδος, the foaming at the mouth another. Men ascribe each of these symptoms to the agency of some particular god. The "Mother" sends one of them, Poseidon another, Apollo a third, Ares and Hecate yet others).

i. 608. When the νότος blows ἅπαντα ταῦτα (all things which contain τὸ ὑγρόν) . . . αἰσθάνεται τοῦ νότου καὶ διαλλάσσει τὴν μορφὴν εἰς ἕτερον εἶδος. μορφή = εἶδος = φύσις, "they all change their *substance* into a new one."

¹ *Troïades* 884 ὦ γῆς ὄχημα κάπῃ γῆς ἔχων ἔδραν. | ὅστις ποτ' εἰ σὺ, δυστόπαστος εἰδέναι.

Περὶ διαίτης ὑγιεινῆς.

i. 618 τοῖς δὲ εἶδεσι τοῖσι σαρκώδεσι καὶ μαλθακοῖσι καὶ ἐρυθροῖσι συμφέρει δὴ τὸν πλείονα χρόνον τοῦ ἐνι-
αυτοῦ ξηροτέροισι διαιτήμασι χρέεσθαι, ὑγρὴ γὰρ ἡ φύσις
τῶν εἰδέων τούτων. Cf. just below, καὶ τοῖσι νέοισι τῶν
σωμάτων συμφέρει μαλακωτέροισι τε καὶ ὑγροτέροισι χρέε-
σθαι τοῖσι διαιτήμασιν . . . δεῖ δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἡλικίην καὶ τὴν
ὥρην καὶ τὸ ἔθος καὶ τὴν χώραν καὶ τὰ εἶδεα τὰ διαιτήματα
ποιέεσθαι. εἶδος thus = body, constitution. So again

i. 623 γίνεται δὲ ὁ τρόπος οὗτος τῆς διαρρόης τῶν
σωμάτων τοῖσι πυκνοσάρκοισι μάλιστα, ὁκόταν ἀναγ-
κάξηται ὁ ἄνθρωπος κρηφαγέειν τῆς φύσιος ὑπαρχούσης
τοιαύτης . . . τὰ δὲ ἀραιότερα τῶν εἰδέων καὶ δασύτερα
καὶ τὴν κρηφαγίην δέχεται καὶ τὰς ταλαιπωρίας μᾶλλον
ὑπομένει, where εἶδος, σῶμα, φύσις are all used as
synonyms in the sense of *bodies*, or constitutions.

Περὶ διαίτης α'.

i. 631 οὕτω δὲ τούτων ἐχόντων, πολλὰς καὶ παντο-
δαπὰς ἰδέας ἀποκρίνονται ἀπ' ἀλλήλων καὶ σπερμάτων
καὶ ζώων, οὐδὲν ὅμοιον ἀλλήλοισιν οὔτε τὴν ὄψιν οὔτε
τὴν δύναμιν, where the last clause shows that ἰδέαι means
"bodies" which differ in "appearance and in qualities."

i. 645 κεραμεῖς τὸν τροχὸν δινέουσι καὶ οὔτε πρόσω
οὔτε ὀπίσω προχωρεῖ· ἀμφοτέρωσε ἄγει. τοῦ ὅλον ἀπο-
μίμημα τῆς περιφορῆς. (So far I have followed the
reconstruction of Diels, as Kühn's text is so corrupt as
to be unintelligible. The passage then proceeds) ἐν δὲ
τῷ αὐτῷ ἐργάζονται εἶδη περιφερομένων (but read περι-
φερομένῳ) παντοδαπά. "As the wheel revolves they
fashion all kinds of images (or figures) on it."¹

Περὶ διαίτης β'.

i. 703 τὰ μὲν οὖν εἶδεα τῶν κόπων τοιαυτά ἐστίν,
ἡ δὲ δύναμις αὐτῶν ὧδε ἔχει. Reference to what has
gone before shows that εἶδεα as contrasted with δυνάμεις
is about equivalent to "causes."²

¹ Diels, who gives this passage at *Vorsokratiker*² i. 1. 85, of course with the
necessary correction of *περιφερομένων* to *περιφερομένῳ*, omits the word *εἶδη*.

² Perhaps I had better give the full quotation: i. pp. 702-3 *περὶ
δὲ κόπων τῶν ἐν τοῖσι σώμασιν ἐγγινομένων ὧδε ἔχει, οἱ μὲν ἀγύμναστοι*

Περὶ διαίτης γ'.

i. 716 ἐπὶ ταῦτα δὴ τὰ εἶδεα ἐπέξειμι καὶ δείξω ὅκοῖα γίνεται τοῖσιν ἀνθρώποισιν ὑγιαίνειν δοκέουσι καὶ ἐσθίουσι τε ἡδέως, ποτεῖν τε δυναμένοισι καὶ σώματος καὶ χρώματος ἱκανῶς ἔχουσιν. The εἶδεα meant here are the different "types" of disorder which may, from inattention to diet and exercise, attack men who "seem to be in good health, have a relish for their food, are equal to hard work, and sound of constitution and complexion."¹

τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπὸ παντὸς κοπιῶσι πάθος, οὐδὲν γὰρ τοῦ σώματος διατεκνύηται πρὸς αἰδένα πάθος. τὰ δὲ γυμνασμένα τῶν σωμάτων ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνεθίστων πάθος κοπιᾷ. τὰ δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν συνήθων γυμνασίων κοπιᾷ, ὑπερβολῇ χρησάμενα. τὰ μὲν οὖν εἶδεα κτλ.

This is clearly not a classification of the kinds of *κόποι*, but an enumeration of the *causes* by which *κόποι* is induced, followed by an account of its "symptoms" or "effects" (*δυνάμεις*). Given the notion that the geometrical structure of a body is the underlying reality from which its sensible "effects" flow, this equation of *εἶδος* with *αἰρία*, which we find again in a more developed form in the theory of the *αἰρία* expounded by Socrates in the *Phaedo*, is an obvious and inevitable consequence.

¹ As an illustration of the light thrown by the medical writers on Plato, I may refer in passing to a point of great interest which does not directly bear on the meaning of *εἶδος*. The reader of *Περὶ διαίτης γ'* cannot fail to be struck by two interesting features of the book. It is addressed not to physicians but to the general public, and is, in fact, a manual intended to be used by the non-professional man in the regulation of his diet and exercise to suit the different seasons. Also it is intended to be specially serviceable to the working man, the artisan or farmer or shopkeeper, who must be content with simple and easily practicable rules which will not interfere with regular attention to business. For the unemployed rich, who can afford to make "fussing" about their bodily condition the chief concern of life, the author explains that he could provide a much more elaborate discipline: i. 716 οἱσι δὲ ταῦτα παρεσκεύασται καὶ διέγνωσται ὅτι οὐδὲν ὀφελὸς ἐστὶ οὔτε χρημάτων οὔτε σώματος οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὸς ἄτερ τῆς ὑγίειας, πρὸς τούτους ἐστὶ μοι διαίτα ἐξευρημένη ὡς ἀνυστὸν πρὸς τὸ ἀληθέστατον τῶν δυνατῶν προηγμένη. These more precise rules are not the immediate subject of the book, yet the careful regulations actually laid down for men who must work for their living strike the modern mind as meticulous. This shows two things, (1) that there was a class of well-to-do men in the fifth century who did make the maintenance of bodily condition by attention to an elaborate regimen the be-all and end-all of existence; (2) that even the working part of the public took sufficient interest in the subject of *διαίτα* to buy works like our author's, and to practise what we should consider a curiously thorough self-regulation about diet, exercise, and "hygiene" generally. It is the former class of valetudinarians whom Plato is proposing to get rid of in *Republic* iii. And if we understand that his working-men may be supposed in general to possess such

Περὶ τροφῆς.

Kühn ii. 17 τροφή καὶ τροφῆς εἶδος μία καὶ πολλαί. μία μὲν ἦι γένος ἓν, εἶδος δὲ ὑγρότητι καὶ ξηρότητι καὶ ἐν τουτέοισιν ιδέαι καὶ πόσον ἐστὶ καὶ ἐς τίνα καὶ ἐς τοσαῦτα.

ib. καὶ τὴν μὲν ιδίην ιδέην ἐξεβλάστησε (sc. ἡ τροφή) τὴν δὲ προτέρην ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ τὰς προτέρας ἐξημαύρωσε.

The meaning of εἶδος, ιδέα seems again to be "substance" with a specific quality or *virtus* of its own. Thus the sense of the second passage is that, for instance, τὸ ὑγρόν when taken into the system increases the amount of τὸ ὑγρόν already existing there, and, in some cases, also diminishes the amount of τὸ ξηρόν by converting it into its own substance.

ii. 22 γάλα τροφή οἷσι γάλα τροφή κατὰ φύσιν ἄλλοισι δὲ οὐχί . . . καὶ σάρκες καὶ ἄλλαι ιδέαι τροφῆς πολλαί. The meaning is obviously nutritious *bodies*, bodies which provide τροφή. I.e. there are certain parts of the body, or rather certain organic substances, which are of the same kind as milk. A milk diet will increase the quantity of these substances in the body, and of these only, and so on with meat or bread.

Περὶ τόπων τῶν κατὰ ἄνθρωπον.

ii. 145 ἡ δὲ ἰητρικὴ ὀλιγόκαιρός ἐστιν, καὶ ὅς τοῦτο ἐπίσταται ἐκείνο καθέστηκεν, καὶ ἐπίσταται τὰ εἶδεα καὶ τὰ μὴ εἶδεα, ἃ μὴ ἐστὶν ἐν ἰητρικῇ ὁ καιρὸς γινῶναι, ὅτι τὰ ὑποχωρήματα οὐχ ὑποχωρητικὰ γίνονται, καὶ τᾶλλα ὅτι ὑπεναντία ἐστίν. καὶ ὑπεναντιώτατα οὐχ ὑπεναντιώτατα. ὁ δὲ καιρὸς ὅδ' ἐστὶ, τὰ σίτα προσφέρειν ὅσων μέλλει τὸ σῶμα προσφερομένων τὸ πλήθος κρατεῖν. The εἶδεα, as I take it, mean once more the "bodies" which, in virtue of their specific "properties," provide some τροφή for the works as the *Περὶ διαίτης* γ', and to regulate their lives by them, we can see that they would only be likely to require a physician in rare cases, such as accidents requiring surgical treatment or attacks of an epidemic. The "kill-or-cure" method which Plato seems to be proposing in the *Republic* is thus very much less brutal, and much more in accord with our own notions about the proper management of health than it looks to be, or than commentators who have not troubled to read their Hippocrates have supposed it to be. His tacit assumption all through is that ordinary ailments will be avoided by intelligent self-regulation.

special "stuffs" of kindred kind found in the organism, τὰ μὴ εἶδεα bodies of an alien kind, unrepresented in the organism, and therefore incapable of being τροφή to any of its constituents.¹

Περὶ νούσων δ'.

ii. 324 ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἡ γυνή καὶ ὁ ἀνὴρ τέσσαρας ἰδέας ὑγροῦ ἐν τῷ σώματι ἀφ' ὧν νοῦσοι γίνονται . . . αὗται δὲ αἱ ἰδέαι εἰσὶ φλέγμα, αἷμα, χολή, καὶ ὕδρωψ . . . καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὸ ζῷον ἐγένετο κατὰ τοὺς τοκῆς, τσαύτας ἰδέας ὑγροῦ ὑγινοῦ τε καὶ νοσηροῦ ἔχει ἐν ἑωυτῷ, ἀποφανέω δὲ ὁκόσα ἐν ἐκάστῃ τουτέων τῶν ἰδέων καὶ πλείω καὶ ἐλάσσω ἐν τῷ σώματι γίνεται. ἰδέαι thus = materials, "four moist substances." (The whole theory of health as due to *ισονομία*, and the connection of *ισονομία* with pleasure and pain, is then worked out in a way which coincides with the doctrine of the *Philebus* and *Timaeus*. Eg. we feel pleasure when the passages of the veins are filled with an element that is deficient in the body. Thus when there is not enough of τὸ ὑγρόν in the body, τότε ἰμείρεται ἄνθρωπος ἢ φαγέειν ἢ πίνειν τοιοῦτον ὃ τήν τε μοίρην ἐκείνην ἐπιπλήσει καὶ ἰσώσει τῇσι ἄλλῃσι, ii. 338.) The whole work deserves to be read as an illustration of the medical applications of the notion of a motion of ἀντιπερίσταςις, and of the view that the predominance of any one of the four forms of τὸ ὑγρόν over the rest is always the cause of a disease. The author is not very early as he criticizes the views of "former physicians." In connection with Plato, with whom he agrees in so many of his views, it may be noted that at 373-4 he rejects the notion that drink enters the *lungs*, on the ground that, if it did, we could neither breathe nor speak when the lungs were full of drink.

¹ A curious light is thrown on the history of an important group of words by a passage like ii. 141 *ἱγρικήν οὐ δυνατόν ἐστι ταχὺ μαθεῖν διὰ τὸδε, ὅτι ἀδύνατόν ἐστι καθεστῆκεν ἐν αὐτῇ σόφισμα γενέσθαι*, where *σόφισμα* means a "universal rule" or "law." Success in practice depends so entirely on the particulars of the patient's constitution and the circumstances of the attack that no simple universal law can be given for the treatment of a case; rules always require to be modified to suit the special circumstances, and there is thus no way of dispensing with individual study of the individual "case." Hence long experience is required to make a man a good physician.

Besides, our food would not be duly digested, and we can easily satisfy ourselves that highly aperient medicines do not make their way into the lungs. He admits that the belief (which is ascribed to Timaeus by Plato, *Timaeus* 70 c, and is therefore, no doubt, that of the Italian Pythagoreans) is very general. ii. 376 πολλοὶ κάρτα τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ ποτὸν δοκέουσιν εἰς τὸν πλεύμονα χωρεῖν. (Note the way in which πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων is used apparently as a designation of the Pythagorean theorists, just as Parmenides regularly alludes to them as βροτοί.)

379 αὐται αἱ τρεῖς ἰδέαι τῶν νοσημάτων ἀπὸ τοῦ ὕδρωπος. ἰδέαι apparently means "figures," and hence *phases, forms*.

Περὶ τῶν ἐντὸς παθῶν.

ii. 463 περὶ δὲ τοῦ φλέγματος τὰς αὐτὰς γνώμας ἔχω ἅς καὶ περὶ χολῆς, καὶ φημι τὰς ἰδέας αὐτοῦ πολλὰς εἶναι, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπιδήμιόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ νεώτατον. ἰδέαι = its *figures*, its outward manifestations, the disorders, or perhaps rather *symptoms* of disorder, to which it gives rise.

ii. 465 (λευκὸν φλέγμα) βαρύνει τὸν ἄνθρωπον μᾶλλον καὶ ἰδέην ἀλλοίην ἔχειν τοῦ ἐπιδημίου δοκεῖται ὡχροτέρην. (ἰδέη = φύσις, structure, constitution, composition.)

Γυναικίων β'.

ii. 799 πειρῆσθαι προστιθέναι τῶν προσθέτων τῆς πιάλου δαιδὸς πιωτάτης, χρίσμα δὲ λίπα ἔστω, ποιέειν δὲ μήκος μὲν δακτύλων ἕξ, πλήθος δὲ πέντε ἢ ἕξ, εἶδος δὲ ἕξουρα, . . . τὸ δὲ παχύτερον εἶναι ὁκόσον δάκτυλος ὁ λιχανός, καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὅμοιον τῷ δακτύλῳ ἕξ ἄκρου λεπτότατον. (εἶδος = shape, geometrical form.) So ii. 800 μόλυβδον ἵκελον ἐξελάσαντα ποιῆσαι τὸ εἶδος τῷ δαίδῳ τῷ παχυτάτῳ.

Περὶ ἀφόρων (Kühn vol. iii.).

iii. 25 ἀρωμάτων παντοδαπῶν εἶδη ὅτι εὐωδεστάτων καὶ ξηροτάτων κόψας. The meaning here may be "stuffs," "materials," but we can, for once, render by "sorts" without harm to the sense.

Ἐπιδημίων β'.

iii. 429 τοιοῦτον τῆς νόσου καὶ ἐκάστης καταστάσιος πρὸς ἀλλήλας ὅταν μὴ τι νεωτεροποιηθῇ ἐν τῷ ἄνω εἶδει.

(The meaning is unclear, but to me τὸ ἄνω εἶδος seems to mean "what is above us," i.e. the "heaven," literally "the body over our heads."²)

III 445 ἴσα τῶν εἶδει διαχωρήματα διὰ παντὸς κακόν (of the same symptoms).³

III 446 καίτοι ὑπερπύλλα ἔστιν οἷσι τὰς ἰσάτα ἦν, τῶι ἐν ψύχει κείσθαι ὑπερβλημένον· ὥς ἐλαπὶ μὲν τὸ ψῦχος, θέλει δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος ἐξ προσαγωγῆς ἔστι μᾶλλον κτλ.⁵

5 III 620 φωνὴ οἷα γίνεται ὀργιζομένοις ἦν τοιαύτη ἢ μὴ ὀργιζομένων φύσει ἦ, καὶ ἄμματα οἷα ἂν ἦ φύσει <μὴ> παραχῶδες οἷα ὅταν ὀργίζονται οἱ μὴ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ τᾶλλα κατὰ λόγον τῶν νόσων, οἷον τὸ φθινῶδες ποιεῖ τὸ εἶδος, ἦν τοιοῦτος φύσει ὑπάρξει, ἐς τοιοῦτον νόσημα παρίσται, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως.

The sentence again seems to require some correction. Perhaps it would be sufficient to omit the first ἦ. In the following clause the text of Kühn gives an ungrammatical ὅταν ὀργίζονται for ὀργίζονται. The sense there is that phthisical persons constitutionally exhibit peculiarities of the voice and features which, in the healthy, would be

² The passage is specially concerned with diseases peculiar to the season of autumn, and the general meaning of the words quoted is that the course of such diseases is as has just been described unless the weather is abnormal and unseasonable. In an abnormal autumn the disorders may exhibit different symptoms, or present a different succession of stages, as the writer goes on to say, εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλως ταῦτα (sc. τὰ ἐν τῷ ἄνω εἶδει) καταστάσεις ἂν ἄρχοι. Hence my rendering, "the body which is over our heads."

³ The reference is strictly to the evacuations of the patients, "the evacuations were of the same character (as those already described), and gave an unfavourable prognosis."

⁵ I do not follow either the grammar or the sense of the passage as given by Kühn. The general sense is that certain obstinate cases of diarrhoea among the writer's patients were unexpectedly relieved by sleeping on cold bedding. He seems to be saying, "there were many cases in which this proceeding was beneficial"; τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος then means τοῦτο τὸ σχῆμα, "this arrangement," "disposition," "management of affairs" (literally "figure"), and θέλει ἐκ προσαγωγῆς seems to mean, perhaps, "produces warmth gradually." The ἔστι of the text cannot be translated. The Latin version in Kühn absurdly tries to make grammar by taking θέλει as a dative (calido vero quidquid huiusce est generis, sensim magis procedit). I venture provisionally to regard ἔστι as an error for ἐτι, and to place a full stop after μᾶλλον, though I suspect that the real error goes deeper.

signs of anger, and οἶον τὸ φθινῶδες ποιέει τὸ εἶδος means "the symptoms due to a phthisical constitution." (Unless, as the Latin translation assumes, εἶδος is accusative, when the sense would be "the symptoms which make up the phthisical appearance.")

We may, I think, draw the following conclusions from the preceding list.

εἶδος, ἰδέη scarcely occur at all in those Hippocratican writings which may be properly called textbooks of empirical medicine. They are much more common in the works, many of them apparently intended for a curious general public rather than for the specialist, which aim at attaching medicine, through biology, to the general speculations about the structure of the κόσμος in which what we loosely call early Greek "philosophy" originated. In these works, over and above the common current sense of "living body," "physique," "constitution," we find both words frequently used in a sense which shows that they mean more particularly the primary bodies which are, as we should say, the "elements" of which both the human organism and the organism of the κόσμος are made up. When thus used, the word often appears to take on the associations we should connect with such terms as "monad," "thing-in-itself," "real essence," "simple real," and the εἶδη or ἰδέαι thus conceived are from time to time contrasted, apparently as not directly perceptible, with the δυνάμεις or specific properties which they exert on other things, especially on the human sense-organs, and which are perceptible to the eye, the hand, and the other organs of sensation. In connection with this metaphysical meaning of the word, we find the notion of such an εἶδος or ultimate form of body as existing "all by itself," in a state of, so to say, chemical isolation, αὐτὸ ἐπὶ ἑωυτοῦ, and the contrasted notion of a κοινωνία εἰδέων in which a "real" is found in composition with others, and here we seem to recognise the germs of the doctrine ascribed by Plato to Socrates of the εἶδη and of μέθεξις in εἶδη as the mode of being of all other things. εἶδος in this sense is, as I have said, that of

which φύσις in its collective signification is the aggregate, the objective counterpart of ὄνομα, the thing denoted by a simple well-defined name, and the antithesis between εἶδος and ὄνομα thus corresponds exactly with that between φύσις and νόμος. We might, in fact, say that νόμος is the collective to ὄνομα, just as φύσις is the collective to εἶδος. The examples of such εἶδη which meet us are sometimes the old Milesian "opposites," τὸ θερμόν, τὸ ψυχρόν, τὸ ξηρόν, τὸ ὑγρόν, and the rest, sometimes the Empedoclean "elements," themselves in reality no more than a selection from the "opposites," definitely conceived as bodies. Now here, as it appears to me, we have clear indications of the way in which the belief in εἶδη, which appears full-blown in a work like the *Phaedo*, has grown up. Under the Eleatic criticism of Milesianism the original single φύσις τῶν εὐόντων has been transformed into a belief in several simple bodies which are of the nature of metaphysical "reals" or "things-in-themselves," and of which the composite "things" of the world of everyday life are the "appearances." From this to the doctrine of εἶδη described in the *Phaedo* is really only a single step. The great originality of that theory, as it appears to me, does not lie in the conception of the εἶδος or of the "participation of things in it." The very terminology of the medical men who were endeavouring to adjust their doctrine to the new theories provides us with precisely the language which Plato's Socrates employs to set forth his convictions. Nor is it any novelty when we find him insisting on the contrast between the eternal being of the εἶδη and the transitory character of everything else. For this is the very language of Empedocles, who tells us in verses too familiar to quote that what we are accustomed to look on as the "things" of the world around us are mere transitory combinations of the only things that really endure, the "roots" of all things. The great and imperishable thought of the *Phaedo* is that there are "reals," and those the most important of all, which are *immaterial*; there is an εἶδος or φύσις of τὸ καλόν and τὸ ἀγαθόν no less than of the "hot" or the "cold," and it is precisely with these

εἶδη which are invisible, not merely because our eyes are defective or the bodies we see always composite, but because their nature is spiritual and can only be spiritually discerned, that φιλοσοφία has chiefly to do. It is in this sense, in the sense that Socrates was occupied in the discernment of the εἶδη of the things which are unseen, that I should understand the well-known statement of Aristotle that his πραγματεία was concerned with τὰ ἡθικά, the affairs of a man's soul, and not with φύσις in the Aristotelian sense, the world of that which is born and dies.

And there is another, apparently opposite sense, in which we find medical writers, most of whom must have been the contemporaries of Socrates, speaking of ἰδέαι and εἶδη. Sometimes, at least, they mean the collective variety of the symptoms presented by a disease, as distinguished from the one hidden source of the mischief. Yet these two senses of the words, though they seem at first sight to be as sharply distinguished as "reality" and "appearance," can manifestly be seen to be developments from a single original. Given the sense εἶδος, a "figure" or "body" in geometry, which we have also found as the origin of εἶδος, ἰδέα, "trope," "figure of diction," in rhetoric, we can see at once how the word can become specialised in two apparently opposite directions. It will readily come to mean the variety of shapes or phases presented by a thing which remains in its fundamental "real essence" one and the same in spite of the appearance of endless variety. (Compare, for a passing illustration of a similar transition in the meaning of a synonym of εἶδος, the constant use of μορφή for the *accidental* variations in the manifestation of what is in truth selfsame at the core. Thus contrast πολλῶν ὀνομάτων μορφή μία, one "verum corpus" under many changing names, where μορφή is opposed as that which is φύσει to the ὀνόματα, which are only τῶι ἀνθρωπείῳ νόμῳ, with πολλὰ μορφαὶ τῶν δαιμονίων, where the μορφαί are the illusions, the δαιμόνιον the mysterious "reality," which is "behind the veil.") On the other hand, given the existence of a mathematical philosophy

which finds the "real essence" or *fons emanationis* of all bodies in their geometrical structure, and given also a pluralism which demands that the things of the everyday world shall be regarded as composites of several such ultimate "bodies," the way at once lies open for the conception ascribed by Plato to the fifth-century Pythagorean astronomer Timaeus, and illustrated by so great a host of passages in the Hippocratean writings, of the *εἶδος* as the reality of which all that our senses reveal forms the *δυνάμεις* or "effects." And with this conception we are on the very verge of the "ideal theory" in the form in which Plato ascribes it to Socrates and his Eleatic and Pythagorean friends. Pythagoras, Parmenides, Empedocles, Socrates thus appear as the successive terms of a single development guided throughout by a single thought.

One further stage in our journey backward from the terminology of current speech in the fourth century still remains to be taken. We have to consider, side by side with the medical writers of the fifth century, the "sophists" or cosmologists who were their contemporaries and predecessors, and to show, if we can, that the notion expressed by *εἶδος*, *ἰδέα*, *μορφή* came into their thought and language under the influence of Pythagorean mathematics, and our task is complete. The case will be made out if we can show that the notion and the word are absent from the earliest Milesian science, and only begin to make their appearance in systems which we can prove to have been influenced by the development of Pythagoreanism. In great part, our case is already established by the fact that the two fifth-century sciences in which the terms have been found to play a prominent part are Rhetoric and Medicine. For both these sciences are of Italian or Sicilian origin; that is, they come from the very home of Pythagorean ways of thinking, and in both of them the primary meaning "bodily shape," "structure" is still manifestly felt under the specialised senses of *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα*. What we have really still to do is simply to present the negative half of an argument of the type christened by

Mill and his followers the "Joint Method of Agreement and Difference," the proof that *εἶδος*, *ιδέα* are not "words of art" *except* where we have independent evidence of Pythagorean influence. In doing so, I shall take the actual remains of the cosmologists according to the text of Diels in the second edition of his *Vorsokratiker*, and shall, as usual, reason backward from the later to the earlier in time.

We start, then, with the well-established fact that Democritus used the word *ιδέα* of his atoms, and that the terms appear in a different sense in his extant remains. For the first point see Plutarch, *Adv. Colotem* 8 (Diels i.² 1. 362) *τί γὰρ λέγει Δημόκριτος; . . . εἶναι δὲ πάντα τὰς ἀτόμους ἢ ιδέας ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καλουμένας, ἕτερον δὲ μηδέν.* (That the Teubner editor retains the unmeaning *ιδίως* of Wytttenbach against the authority of the MSS. is only one of a thousand proofs of the uncritical character of his work, and the need for a fresh edition of the *Moralia* from a competent hand.)

That Democritus should have used this name for his "monads" is the most natural thing in the world, when we remember that the only properties ascribed to them are purely geometrical, and that his terminology probably came down from Leucippus, who had been an Eleatic, i.e. a member of a sect which, though hostile to Pythagorean science, grew up in the midst of it and lived on controversy with it, and was moreover intimately associated with the religious side of the "Pythagorean life," so that the catalogue of Pythagoreans used by Iamblichus mentions Parmenides and Melissus as adherents of the school, and Iamblichus (*Vit. Pythag.* 104) speaks of Leucippus himself as a pupil of Pythagoras.¹ One may add that Aristotle more than

¹ The statement of Iamblichus is barely credible on chronological grounds, and his carelessness is shown by the fact that he also speaks of Philolaus, Eurytus, Archytas, and Lysis, who belong partly to the age of Socrates, partly to that of Plato, as persons who had been "disciples of Pythagoras in their youth," whereas we know that Pythagoras was of an earlier generation than Heraclitus, and probably than Xenophanes. But it may quite well be the fact that Leucippus, like Parmenides and Empedocles, and probably Zeno and Melissus, followed the "Pythagorean" way of life.

once points out the similarity between the doctrine of the atomists and that of Plato and the Pythagoreans, notably at *de Caelo* Γ 303 a 8, where he says *τρόπον γάρ τινα καὶ οὗτοι πάντα τὰ ὄντα ποιοῦσιν ἀριθμούς καὶ ἐξ ἀριθμῶν· καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ σαφῶς δηλοῦσιν, ὅμως τοῦτο βούλονται λέγειν*. There are other passages in Aristotle and the Aristotelian commentators which strongly suggest that Democritus used the equivalent word *σχήματα* not merely for a fundamental property of the *ἀμερῇ σώματα*, but as a synonym for them. E.g. *de Respiratione* 472 a 14 *εἶναι γὰρ τὸν θάνατον τὴν τῶν τοιούτων σχημάτων ἐκ τοῦ σώματος ἔξοδον ἐκ τῆς τοῦ περιέχοντος ἐκθλίψεως*, where the archaic expression *τὸ περιέχον* suggests strongly that we are dealing with a formal quotation. Of *εἶδος* in the sense of "living body" we seem to find an example in a passage of the *Placita* which has been emended by Diels with the aid of Lactantius, *Placita* v. 19. 6 Δ. *γεγενημένα τὰ ζῶια συστάσει εἰδέων ἀνθρώπων* (so Diels, for the unmeaning letters *εἰδεεναστρων*) *πρῶτον τοῦ ὑγροῦ ζωιογονοῦντος*. A fairly clear case of the use of *σχῆμα* as a synonym for the atom seems to be supplied by Theophrastus, *de caus. plant.* vi. 17. 11 ff. (Diels i.² 1. 383) *ἐπεὶ τὰ γε σχήματα Δημοκρίτου, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη, τεταγμένας ἔχοντα τὰς μορφὰς τεταγμένα καὶ τὰ πάθη, [καίτοι γε οὐκ] ἐχρῆν ποιεῖν*, where the *μορφαί* are said to be possessed by *σχήματα*, exactly as we are more commonly told that *σχῆμα* was one of the three intrinsic properties of the *ἄτομα* or *ἀμερῇ σώματα*.

In the fragments received as genuine by Diels one finds the following cases:—

[6–8]. These fragments are quoted by Sextus from a work with the title *Περὶ ἰδεῶν*. Diels offers us the alternative rendering, "on differences in shape" (i.e. between atoms) and "on figures" (*Gestalten*). I would suggest, however, that our collection of examples from "Hippocrates" leads rather to the supposition that the meaning is simply "on Primary Bodies." The famous passage (Diels, *Fr.* 9) quoted by Sextus to show that all sense-

qualities are subjective belongs really to the same thought. For, as we have found on Hippocratean evidence, εἶδη are just the things which exist φύσει as opposed to the *nomina rerum quae non sunt*, which only exist νόμωι, "as a result of human artifice." Hence to say that colour, taste, temperature and the like are only νόμωι, while ἄτομα and κενόν are φύσει, is, in the language of the period, as much as to say that the latter are εἶδεα. (There is, of course, a certain oxymoron in speaking of the κενόν as an εἶδος, but the atomists were well aware that their thought "μὴ εἶναι is just as much as εἶναι" could not be expressed without paradox. Epicurus' synonym ἡ ἀναφῆς φύσις involves just the same paradox, when we remember that the primary sense of φύσις in Greek cosmology is Body.)

Fr. 11 (Diels) γνώμης δὲ δύο εἰσὶν ἰδέαι, ἡ μὲν γνησίη, ἡ δὲ σκοτίη. There are two forms of thinking, the true-born and the bastard. (The correct translation is silently given by both Diels and Burnet, but it may be as well to point out explicitly that σκοτίη here means exactly what it does in the common σκότιον λέχος. Sense-perception is the bastard brother of true thinking; the two are like the child of the bondwoman and the child of the free-woman in St. Paul's apologue. This point is rightly made by Philo, with whom it is the foundation of his whole exegesis of the story of Ishmael and Isaac.)

141. From Hesychius (where the reference to Democritus is, however, not explicitly given, and we need not suppose that he is the only author whose use of ἰδέα is in question). ἰδέα, ἡ ὁμοιότης, μορφή, εἶδος. καὶ τὸ ἐλάχιστον σῶμα.

167 δίνον ἀπὸ τοῦ παντὸς ἀποκριθῆναι παντοίων εἰδέων (an eddy of atoms of every kind; εἰδέων in the sense of bodies of divers structures).

Diogenes of Apollonia 5 (Diels) ἄτε οὖν πολυτρόπου εἰούσης τῆς ἑτεροιώσιος πολύτροπα καὶ τὰ ζῶια καὶ πολλὰ καὶ οὔτε ἰδέαν ἀλλήλοις εἰκότα οὔτε δίαιταν οὔτε νόησιν κτλ. Diels here renders by *Gestalt*, but the combination with δίαιτα seems to me to suggest rather that the sense

is "body," "constitution," "unlike in body, in habits of life, and in mind."

Anaxagoras 4 (Diels) *χρὴ δοκεῖν ἐνεῖναι πολλά τε καὶ παντοῖα ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς συγκρινομένοις καὶ σπέρματα πάντων χρημάτων καὶ ιδέας παντοίας ἔχοντα καὶ χροιάς καὶ ἡδονάς.* Here the translation "shapes," "forms" seems necessitated by the conjunction with colours and savours. Of the alleged remains of the later *Pythagoreans* I say nothing here, since those of Archytas belong to too late a date for my purpose, and those of Philolaus appear to me to have been finally shown to be spurious by Professor Burnet.

Empedocles. It is of some importance for linguistic history to know that Plato's friend Philistion, who belonged to the Italian medical school on which Empedocles exercised so much influence, called the four "elements" of Empedocles *ιδέαι*. See the quotation from the *Iatrica* of Menon in Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*,² p. 235 n. 2 Φιλιστίων δ' οἶεται ἐκ τεσσάρων ιδεῶν συνεστάναι ἡμᾶς, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐκ τεσσάρων στοιχείων· πυρός, αἰέρος, ὕδατος, γῆς. (The sequel is interesting, as it throws light on the opposition of *εἶδος* and *δύναμις* which we have already found in the medical writers. Each of the *ιδέαι* has one special *δύναμις* or fundamental property, fire being *θερμόν*, air *ψυχρόν*, water *ὑγρόν*, earth *ξηρόν*. Thus the theory is seen to be an attempt to fuse the mathematical theory of body, in which geometrical structure is what distinguishes one body from another (Pythagoreanism), with the old Milesian conception of "opposites." The later version adopted by Aristotle, and on his authority by the Middle Ages, according to which each *στοιχεῖον* is a binary combination of "opposites," is a more refined version of the same kind of view.)

In the remains themselves we have (Diels, *Fr.* 22) the statement that *φιλία* brings together *ἐχθρὰ ἃ πλείστον ἀπ' ἀλλήλων διέχουσι μάλιστα | γέννηι τε κρήσει τε καὶ εἶδεσιν ἐκμακτοῖσι*, where *εἶδεσιν* plainly means "in *figure*," "in *shape*."

In *Fr.* 23 the same process is compared with the work of a painter who reproduces by different mixtures of the same

colours εἶδεα πᾶσιν ἀλιγκία . . ., "trees, and men and women, beasts and birds and fishes and gods." The sense is thus once more "shapes," "bodily appearances."

Closely similar is *Fr.* 35 τῶν δέ τε μισγομένων χεῖτ' ἔθνεα μυρία θνητῶν | παντοίοις ιδέησιν ἀρηρότα, θαῦμα ιδέσθαι, where the meaning is "fashioned with *bodies* of diverse kinds." So again at *Fr.* 71 εἰ δέ τί σοι περὶ τῶνδε λιπόξυλος ἔπλετο πίστις, | πῶς ὕδατος γαίης τε καὶ αἰθέρος ἡελίου τε | κირναμένων εἶδη τε γενοῖατο χροῖά τε θνητῶν κτλ. "If you still doubt how when these things were mingled (i.e. the "elements") the *figures* and tints of mortal things arose."

Fr. 98 ἐκ τῶν αἱμά τε γέντο καὶ ἄλλης εἶδεα σαρκός. Diels translates "the blood and the other kinds of flesh." But apart from what we have proved as to the rarity of εἶδος = species, kind, in fifth-century Greek, there seems to be a gross absurdity in making Empedocles talk of blood as a "kind of flesh." Render rather "blood, and also the stuff of which flesh is made" (the bodies which constitute flesh).

Fr. 115 (from the καθαρμοί). "Daemons" who fall from their high estate must wander thirty thousand seasons φνομένους παντοῖα διὰ χρόνου εἶδεα θνητῶν, "being born, as time wears on, into all manner of mortal *bodies* (or *figures*)."

Fr. 125 ἐκ μὲν γὰρ ζῶων ἐτίθει νεκρὰ εἶδε' ἀμείβων (made the dead from the living, changing their bodies). Thus the words occur seven times in all, and always in the sense of bodily shape or structure, or that simply of body (of an organized living being).

Melissus, *Fr.* 8 (Diels) φαμένοις γὰρ εἶναι πολλὰ καὶ αἰδία καὶ εἶδη τε καὶ ἰσχὺν ἔχοντα, πάντα ἑτεροιοῦσθαι ἡμῖν δοκεῖ καὶ μεταπίπτειν ἐκ τοῦ ἐκάστοτε ὁρῶμενον. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐωρῶμεν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα πολλὰ ὀρθῶς δοκεῖ εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ ἂν μετέπιπτεν, εἰ ἀληθὴ ἦν, ἀλλ' ἦν οἷόν περ ἐδόκει ἕκαστον τούτων. About the translation there cannot be much doubt. Diels and Burnet use almost exactly the same words; the one renders καὶ εἶδη τε καὶ ἰσχὺν ἔχοντα, "and had forms and power of their own," the other "die ihre bestimmten Gestalten und

ihre Festigkeit besässen." But we may ask to what clause of the preceding account of our popular everyday pluralism does the εἶδη ἔχοντα refer? What forms are meant? I think it refers to the "opposites" which we currently believe to be real, τὸ θερμόν, τὸ ψυχρόν, τὸ σκληρόν, τὸ μαλακόν, τὸ ζῶιον, τὸ μὴ ζῶν, and to the three bodies also mentioned, ὕδωρ, γῆ, λίθος. The "belief that these things have εἶδη" will then amount to the conviction that each of them has a definite φύσις or "real essence" of its own, different from those of the others, which persists unchanged against attempts to alter it. (It is this "persistence" which is meant by the ἰσχὺς ascribed to them all.) Melissus then argues that, since all these things appear to change into their opposites, we are involved in hopeless contradiction with ourselves so long as we take the evidence supplied by the senses as an argument against the One of Eleaticism. The argument does not appear to me to be more particularly directed against Anaxagoras than against any form of pluralism. E.g. it would tell just as much against Empedocles' attempt to reconcile the facts of sense with the Eleatic principles, and, taking into account the important influence of Empedocles on the medical science of the period, and the link of connection indicated by the fact that Melissus as well as Empedocles was reckoned as belonging to the Pythagorean succession, I think we may regard the appearance of γῆ and ὕδωρ among the things mistakenly believed to have εἶδη to show that he and his followers are partly in the writer's mind.

Parmenides. Neither ἰδέα, εἶδος, nor σχῆμα occurs in the remains of the poem. μορφή is found once, in the famous passage which begins the account of the "false opinions" of men, μορφὰς γὰρ κατέθεντο δύο γνώμας ὀνομάζειν, | τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεῶν ἐστιν, where it seems to me that μορφή definitely means a "body." For, as we see immediately after, the μορφή which ought *not* to have received a name is "the dark," which early Greek science regularly confuses with empty space. And the whole point of Parmenides' criticism of other thinkers amounts

to this, that their theories compel them to believe in the absurd view that empty space is a body. His reasoning throughout turns on the assumption that if you admit that empty space *is* at all, you must believe that it is a kind of body, as has been well brought out by Professor Burnet. The dialectic of the poem is one sustained exposure of the absurdity, in the proper sense of the word, of this position. Hence I would frankly translate, "they have made up their minds to give names to two bodies, whereof one should not receive a name." Empty space ought not to have a name, because the *ὄνομα* is, as we have so often seen, the representative in the realm of *νόμος*, of an *εἶδος* or "real essence" belonging to *φύσις*. Every name is the name of an *ὄν τι*, and this means, for the age of Parmenides, that it is the name of a body. Where there is no body to be denoted, there is no significant denoting name. Hence with Parmenides himself space has no name; it is merely *μὴ εἶν*, and we may be sure that he would have said of *μὴ εἶν* what Aristotle says of all such negative expressions, that it is *οὐκ ὄνομα*.

Heraclitus. There is no instance of any of the groups of words *ιδέα*, *εἶδος*, *σχῆμα*, *μορφή* in any extant quotation from Heraclitus.

Xenophanes. One instance of *ιδέα*, in a purely non-technical sense, in the famous attack on anthropomorphism. (Diels) *Fr.* 15 ἵπποι μὲν θ' ἵπποισι, βόες δέ τε βουσὶν ὁμοίως | καὶ <κε> θεῶν ιδέας ἔγραφον καὶ σώματ' ἐποιοῦν. Here *ιδέας ἔγραφον* and *σώματ' ἐποιοῦν* seem to mean the same thing, "would have drawn the bodies of the gods" in their own image. Unless, perhaps, *σώματ' ἐποιοῦν* refers specifically to sculpture, as is possible, "would have drawn their likenesses and carved their images."

When all allowance has been made for the scantiness of the remains of the earliest Greek science, two things seem to be clearly shown by our collection of passages. (1) The use of *εἶδος*, *ιδέα*, *σχῆμα*, *μορφή* as scientific technical terms cannot be shown to belong to the earliest stages of Ionian science. On the other hand, one or more

of these words are found in Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Diogenes, and Democritus, in cases which show that they have already come into use as scientific technicalities, and this result is corroborated by their frequent appearance in the fifth-century medical writers. (2) It is also noticeable that both among the philosophers and among the medical writers, so far as one can really distinguish the two classes of authors, the conception of *εἶδη* or *ιδέαι* is most prominent just where, on other grounds, we can assert the presence of an Italian influence. In particular, the *ιδέαι* are specially prominent in the philosophies of Empedocles (in whose school the term became technical for what later usage has taught us to call the four "elements"), Democritus (with whom *ιδέαι* seems to have been the original technical name, presumably inherited from Leucippus, of the "indivisible bodies"), and Socrates, as described by Plato. In every one of these cases the historical connection with Pythagoreanism is beyond dispute. For Empedocles it is established by the inclusion of his name in the ancient catalogue of Pythagorean worthies reproduced by Iamblichus, by the Orphicism of the theological doctrines of the *καθαρμοί*, and more particularly by the important information, supplied by Ammonius, that the god of whom we read in *Fr.* 134 (Diels) that he has not the form and figure of man but is *φρὴν ἱερὴ καὶ ἀθέσφατος, φροντίσι* (note the word, "by his providential care") *κόσμον ἅπαντα καταίσσουσα θεοῖσι*, is Apollo. This means that Empedocles, like Pythagoras and Socrates, followed a version of the Orphic doctrine in which Apollo, and not the more customary Dionysus, was the chief object of worship. The point is all the more significant from the exact correspondence of the language of *Fr.* 134 about "God" with that of *Fr.* 29 about the "sphere" which is constituted when "love" prevails over strife and all things come together into one. For it follows that the "sphere" must be identical with Apollo, and that the whole cosmogony of Empedocles is, in the end, also a theology, the drama of the ever-repeated dismembering and rebirth of a god.

(No doubt the identification of the "sphere" with Apollo would be aided by the popular etymology reproduced in Plato's *Cratylus* where we are told that one possible derivation of the name Apollo is from ἀ- and πολύς, so that the word means "he who is not many," "the One and Only." In view of the fact that the whole object of Orphicism seems to have been the re-establishment of the mystical oneness of the soul with its God, we may fairly assume that this derivation, as well as another there mentioned, according to which the word means either ὁ ἀπολύων, "the deliverer from bondage," or ὁ ἀπολούων, "the washer away of sin," are Orphic or Pythagorean (*Cratylus* 404-405). Important confirmation would be given by Fr. 129, on the unnamed wise man of the Golden Age, if we could be sure that Porphyry and Iamblichus are right in understanding the lines of Pythagoras. It is something in favour of their view that, as Professor Burnet reminds us, it had been held by Timaeus the historian, who had exceptional opportunities of knowing what the local traditions as to the philosopher's meaning were. Of course the reference would be to Pythagoras in one of his earlier incarnations, so that the difficulty raised by Professor Burnet in his first edition does not really exist.)

As for Democritus, we have to remember that his main doctrine goes back to Leucippus, and with it go, probably, the technical terms in which it was expressed. Now Leucippus had certainly been a pupil of the Eleatics, and, according to Theophrastus, of Parmenides himself (κοινωνήσας Παρμενίδῃ τῆς φιλοσοφίας, Simplicius, *Physics* 28. 4). That this is chronologically possible has been pointed out by Burnet, who might have made his case even stronger if he had chosen. For Plato's Eleatic in the *Sophistes*, the assumed date of which is 399, since the conversation is feigned to have happened the very day after Socrates had put in his formal answer to the ἀντωμοσία of his prosecutors (*Theaetetus* 210 d), speaks of his own early recollections of the personal teaching of Parmenides (*Soph.* 237 a Παρμενίδης δὲ ὁ μέγας, ὃ παι, παισὶν ἡμῖν

οὖσιν ἀρχόμενός τε καὶ διὰ τέλους τοῦτο ἀπεμαρτύρατο, πεῖξῃ τε ὥδε ἐκάστοτε λέγων καὶ μετὰ μέτρων). It is clear that Plato here assumes that Parmenides was still active as head of a school in the "stranger's" early youth, and that the "stranger" had repeatedly (ἐκάστοτε) listened to his discourse. And the whole tone of the dialogue is opposed to our assuming that the "stranger" is of an earlier generation than Socrates himself, who also had once met Parmenides in his early life. It follows, then, that unless we reject Plato's chronology altogether, Leucippus, who must have been as old as, or older than, Socrates, to have had Democritus for his disciple, could not have "associated" with the Eleatic philosophers except as a personal associate and scholar of Parmenides. And it is quite certain that no one could have been an associate of Parmenides without being exposed to the influence, in this case a hostile one, of the Pythagoreanism against which the doctrine of the "One" is a reaction. While, as for Socrates, we have already seen that it is precisely to his Pythagorean and Eleatic friends that Plato makes him talk most freely of εἶδη as perfectly well known things in which "we" all believe, and about which "we" are always making assertions.

It should also be further noted that even with Empedocles the "four roots" are beginning to assume the character which they expressly have in Democritus and in the theories ascribed by Plato to the Socratic circle. They are "monads," "things-in-themselves," "metaphysical reals." Even in Empedocles, it is only when "strife" has for the moment completed the dismemberment of the "god" that you find a "root" existing ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, in a state of chemical purity. Everything contained in the world in which organic creatures move and have their being is a compound exhibiting the *κοινωνία* of a plurality of "roots." With Democritus, no less than with Plato, the process is complete. The only things that *are* are the *ιδέαι*, and they are imperceptible; just as Plato says they are *μόνοι θεατὰ νῶι*, so Democritus says that the *γνησίη γνώμη* of which they are the objects only arises when you

transcend the limits of the σκοτή γνώμη of sense (ὅταν ἡ σκοτή μηκέτι δύνηται μήτε ὀρῆν ἐπ' ἔλαττον μήτε ἀκούειν μήτε ὀδμᾶσθαι, μήτε γεύεσθαι μήτε ἐν τῇ ψαύσει αἰσθάνεσθαι, *Fr.* 11, Diels). For Democritus, no less than for Plato, it is true to invert Kant's dictum about the limits of knowledge, and to say "knowledge is only possible where possible experience leaves off." The only difference, but an enormous one, is that Plato always makes the assumption that his εἶδη are not merely "transcendent of sense," but also hyperphysical, ἀσώματα, and can thus put at their very head such entities as τὸ εἶν and τὸ ἀγαθόν.

We may thus, I think, take it as established that εἶδος and ἰδέα, wherever they appear as technical terms, alike in rhetoric, in medicine, and in metaphysics, have acquired their technical character under Pythagorean influence. From the popular sense of "body" (especially used of the living, and still more especially of the living human organism) come alike the applications of the word to supposed ultimate simple bodies, such as the four of Empedocles, to the figures and tropes of rhetoric, and to the hyperphysical "monads"—the word is Plato's own—of the Socratic-Platonic philosophy. How has the derived meaning been obtained in each of these cases? It seems clear, I think, from our review of the evidence that it is through the sense of "bodily structure," the "shape" of a body, as I have tried to show more in detail in the case of the rhetorical ἰδέαι or σχήματα. The link of connection, in the case of the εἶδη which are physical "elements," or "opposites" conceived as primary kinds of "stuff," lies ready to hand in the notion that the δυνάμεις or properties of a body flow in the last resort from its geometrical structure. It only requires the extension of this notion of structure as determining a thing's behaviour to include non-physical entities to lead to the belief in a definite law, order, or structure as constituting the inmost nature of justice, courage, piety or beauty. And that this is the line which Greek thought followed is almost too evident to

call for proof. The proof, if proof is needed, may be supplied by the prominence given in Plato from the *Protagoras* right on to the *Politicus*, *Philebus* and *Laws*, to "number, weight, and measure," or more generally to "computation," λογισμός, as of no less moment for the inner than for the outer life, and by the thought of the "mean" or "right measure" as that on which the health of the soul depends. Now in what sort of school is this identification of structure with the "real essence" of a thing most likely to have arisen? Clearly in one which held that the "choir and furniture of heaven and earth" *are*, strictly speaking, "geometrical figures" with specific modes of construction and nothing more, in a school which held that, as Descartes taught, physical bodies are simply identical with "mathematical bodies," variously figured modes of extension, the very view which Aristotle found so characteristic of the "so-called Pythagoreans" with whose tenets he was acquainted. οἱ δ' ἀριθμοὺς εἶναι φασιν αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα, we are told of them at *Metaphysics* A 987 b 28, and again at 990 a 14 that ἐξ ὧν γὰρ ὑποτίθενται καὶ λέγουσιν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον περὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν λέγουσι σωμάτων ἢ περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν. This puzzled Aristotle immensely, but should cause no amazement to one who has read the *Principia* of Descartes. The Pythagoreans show no distinction between "mathematical figures" and "solid physical bodies," precisely because they held that "physical body" *is* "figured extension" and nothing more, just as Plato and Descartes held the same thing after them.

This is not the place to expound the Pythagorean doctrine itself. For one thing, the task would require not a paragraph or two at the end of an essay, but a whole volume. For another, it can only be adequately accomplished when the Neo-Pythagorean works on mathematics and the Neo-Platonist commentaries on Plato, to mention no other source, have been subjected, with the view of separating the genuine Pythagorean tradition from its later accretions, to a much more rigorous critical analysis

than has yet been applied. And for a third, I agree so thoroughly with Professor Burnet's treatment of Pythagoreanism in the new edition of his book on *Early Greek Philosophy* that I have nothing to add to it or to take away from it in any essential point. But there is one thing which may be said in bringing the present Essay to a close. Whenever we come across εἶδη in Pythagorean documents, new or old, it is in connection with the doctrine that "numbers are the stuff of which things are made"; the εἶδεα are εἶδεα ἀριθμῶν. This seems to me to establish Professor Burnet's main contention that the use of regular geometrical patterns for the exhibition of the laws of series with which we are so familiar from the writings of Platonists and Neo-Pythagoreans of the earliest centuries A.D., is a piece of old Pythagorean symbolism which probably goes back to Pythagoras himself.

Things "are" numbers, then, because they are geometrical figures, and a geometrical figure is precisely an arrangement of units or dots. I do not argue the case, because I think it superfluous to repeat what I regard as work already definitely achieved. But I want to point out that the result throws a great deal of light on Plato's language about the εἶδος as something "separate from," or "transcendent of," the things which "participate in it." There is a particular branch of the theory of numerical series which to this day retains in our text-books on Algebra a name which takes us back to the Pythagorean and Platonic theories discussed by Aristotle. I mean the doctrine of the so-called "figurate numbers"—the very name of which only requires to be translated into Greek to show that they are no other than the εἰδητρικοὶ ἀριθμοί of the *Metaphysics*. The "figurate numbers" are series of integers which have the peculiarity that each term of such an infinite series can be represented by a regular geometrical pattern, an equilateral triangle, a square, a regular polygon, or one of the regular solids. Their algebraical character is given by the statement that the successive numbers of such a series are the sums of 1, 2, 3 . . . n . . . , terms of an arithmetical progression

with 1 as its first term. According as the constant difference between the successive terms of the progression is 1, 2, 3 . . . m . . . , the "pattern" of the resultant series of "figurate" numbers is an equilateral triangle, a square, a regular pentagon . . . Or, to give the general rule for the construction of such "figurate series," the n th term of the series of m -agonal numbers is always $n + \frac{n(n-1)(m-2)}{2}$, a formula which is easily deducible from the account of the "figurate numbers" given by Theon of Smyrna, pp. 36-41 (ed. Hiller).¹

Thus, to take the simplest examples. If we take the "triangular numbers," for which the constant difference of the generating arithmetical progression is 1, we get as our "triangles" the sums of the successive terms of the progression 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 . . . The "triangles" are therefore the series 1, 3, 6, 10, 15, 21 . . . Every term of this series can be exhibited geometrically as an equilateral triangle, thus—

$$\begin{array}{c} \cdot \\ \cdot \cdot \\ \cdot \cdot \cdot \\ \cdot \cdot \cdot \cdot \\ \cdot \cdot \cdot \cdot \cdot \end{array}, \text{ and so on without end.}$$

Or again, taking 2 as constant difference, the generating progression becomes 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 . . . , and the series resulting from the sums of its successive numbers is 1, 4, 9, 16, 25 . . . And every term of this series can be exhibited as a "square."

Now I will not waste the reader's time by the reproduction of the evidence already adduced by Professor Burnet to show that the representation of numerical series in this way by "patterns" or *ειδέα* belongs to the earliest times of Pythagorean mathematics, and that the investigation of the special peculiarities of the simpler "figurate" series had been successfully prosecuted during, if not before, the fifth century. I will merely add to what Professor Burnet has adduced two remarks. The first is that we have a striking illustration of the antiquity of this way of studying

¹ To secure simplicity I consider in this sentence only the case of numbers whose "pattern" is a *plane* "figure."

geometrical figures as patterns which symbolise arithmetical truths in the fact that, down to Neo-Pythagorean times, the technical name for the successive terms of the arithmetical progression by which a "figurate series" is generated was *γνώμονες*. Thus the series of the natural integers were the "gnomons" of the "triangles," that of the odd integers, 1, 3, 5, 7 . . . , the "gnomons" of the "squares," and so on. Professor Burnet has shown how the use of the name may have arisen from special attention to the series of "squares," in which the term added to each "square" to obtain the next has exactly the pattern \sqcup of the astronomical *γνώμων* or "pointer." What I want to point out is that, in practice, the name was given not only to the terms of the progression of odd integers, but to those of any progression which generates a "figurate" number, so that the lexicon is only partly correct when it gives "odd number" as the meaning of *γνώμων* in arithmetic. The precise definition of a *γνώμων* has fortunately been preserved by Iamblichus in his *Introduction to Nicomachus* (p. 58. 19 Pistelli), and it is this: *ὁ αὐξητικὸς ἐκάστου εἶδους τῶν πολυγώνων κατὰ προσθέσιν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος διαφυλάττων*, "the number which by addition increases the same pattern of polygonal number, while preserving that pattern unchanged."¹ That this definition is old, and not the invention of a Neo-Pythagorean, is manifest from the mere fact that in the later terminology the recognised technical name for a geometrical "pattern" or figure is not *εἶδος* but *σχῆμα*. Thus in the text of Nicomachus the very patterns we are considering are

¹ Cf. Theo Smyrnaeus (Hiller 37. 11) *πάντες δὲ οἱ ἐφεξῆς ἀριθμοί, ἀπογεννῶντες τριγώνους ἢ τετραγώνους ἢ πολυγώνους, γνώμονες καλοῦνται*. In point of fact, the generating progressions of the "polygonal numbers" consist alternately of alternately odd and even terms (when the fixed difference of the progression is odd), and of odd terms only (when the fixed difference is even). It might be said that the name *γνώμων* itself was clearly given, in the first instance, to the terms of the progression generating the "square numbers," which are all odd, but the extension to the case of the alternately odd and even natural integers which form the generating progression of the "triangles" must be as old as Pythagoras himself, since it was obviously from a study of the triangular numbers that he discovered that 10 is the *τετρακτὸς par excellence*, the "triangle" of the first four integers.

regularly called *σχήματα*, the exhibition of the "pattern" corresponding to a given number is *σχηματογραφία*, and the drawing of the diagram is *σχηματίζειν*. On the other hand, the very same things are called by Archytas (*Fr.* 4, Diels) *εἶδεα* in a passage where he is expressly insisting upon the priority of *λογιστικά*, arithmetic, over *γεωμετρία*. *ἂ ἐκλείπει αὐτὴ ἡ γεωμετρία καὶ ἀποδείξιας ἡ λογιστικὰ ἐπιτελεῖ καὶ ὁμῶς, εἰ μὲν εἰδέων τεὰ πραγματεία, καὶ τὰ περὶ τοῖς εἶδεσιν*, where the meaning seems clearly to be that, where geometry fails us, *λογιστικά* establishes the results which have to do with the properties (*συμβεβηκότα*) of the *εἶδεα*, "patterns," if there really is a knowledge about such "patterns" at all. So the pre-Christian forger of the fragments of Philolaus still knows (*Fr.* 5, Diels) that the proper name for the "patterns of number" is *εἶδη*, which is also the term regularly used by Aristotle in speaking of them. My other remark is one which is perhaps not capable of direct proof. It is still a disputed question exactly what part Pythagoras played in the discovery of i. 47, except that he is known not to have formulated the general geometrical proof which we find in Euclid. But if we ponder over the statements of Proclus in his commentary on the proposition, we shall, I think, regard it as probable that Pythagoras approached the whole subject as a problem in arithmetic. For Proclus (Friedlein 428) definitely ascribes to Pythagoras the solution of the problem, "given an odd integer a to find two integers b, c such that $a^2 + b^2 = c^2$." The solution for the case in which the given a is even he ascribes to Plato. Since Proclus had the work of Eudemus to draw upon, he is not likely to have been mistaken on a point of this sort, and his narrative (which is repeated by the scholiast on i. 47) strongly suggests that the whole problem was considered by Pythagoras from this arithmetical point of view.

The application with a view to which I have made these remarks is an obvious one. The conception that what we call a "geometrical figure" is properly an *εἶδος ἀριθμοῦ*, a pattern made up of units or points (the Pythagoreans, we

must remember, did not distinguish the two, but called the point and the number 1 indifferently *μονάς*—the definition of the point as *μονὰς ἔχουσα θέσιν*, “a number 1 having position,” which Proclus calls Pythagorean, amounts to an identification rather than to a discrimination), seems to give us the key to the view that the whole *κόσμος* is *ἀριθμός*, or, as Aristotle puts it, that “arithmetical number” is the stuff of which things are made. For, it is assumed, the *δυνάμεις* of all “things” are consequences of their geometrical form, and a geometrical form such as the equilateral triangle is simply the expression of the peculiar properties of the terms of a series of numbers. We can represent 10 in all sorts of ways (e.g. by a row of dots placed in a straight line, by a rectangle with 5 dots in one side and 2 in the other), but its proper form is a triangle. It is only when we represent it as a triangle that we see by inspection what Pythagoras regarded as the fundamental property of 10, that it is the sum of the four first natural integers. In other words, the “patterns” of the figurate numbers (and every integer belongs to some figurate series) exhibit a law of formation in virtue of which we can construct at will an interminable series of terms all exhibiting one and the same law of formation. 10, for instance, is a triangle, in Plato’s language it “partakes of triangularity”; but 10 is not “the triangle,” for it is only one of an interminable series of “triangular numbers” all obeying the same law of formation. Thus the “pattern” is at once “in” the individual terms and beyond them. If we extend this conception beyond the case of numbers and their symbolisation by diagrams, it leads to the view that the “common nature” exhibited by the members of a “class” (to pass over, for our purposes, the modern difficulties which have been raised against admitting the notion of “class” as a logical ultimate) can at once be thought of as something which is “in them,” and yet as an individual entity which is *ἐν ἐπὶ τῶν πολλῶν*, in a word as a Platonic *ἰδέα*. Light is thrown too on the problem which has puzzled so many students why Aristotle should speak of

the Platonic εἶδη as "numbers." The εἶδη ended as numbers, because they had from the first begun as numbers, or laws of number. Just a couple of examples in illustration of this point. The account of the "elements" which Plato puts into the mouth of Timaeus is obviously in keeping with his character as a Pythagorean of the late fifth century, who, as his medical views show, belongs to the sect who tried to bring the new doctrine of Empedocles into harmony with the inherited theories of the school. The "four roots" are accepted, but their differences of quality are traced back to their geometrical structure. Their corpuscles are ultimately built up out of two different types of original triangle. (Hence the non-Empedoclean doctrine that there is only one of the "roots" which cannot be "transmuted" just because its ultimate geometrical structure is unique.) Now we get the difficulty that the corpuscles of the roots correspond to four regular solids. But there is a fifth regular solid, the sphere. Why then, we ask, does not Plato, like Democritus, recognise the sphere as having a corresponding corpuscle? Why is nothing made of spherical molecules? I believe that the answer is that the sphere cannot be constructed out of plane triangles, or, to put the thing in the arithmetical way, "spherical numbers" are not a series which can be generated by a progression. (A "spherical" number was, in fact, one of which the third power ends in the same digit as the original number—e.g. 4 or 9.) Hence, since the law of formation of "spherical" numbers is of a different kind from those of the numbers corresponding to the other regular solids, an entirely new function has to be found for the "sphere." It is the shape of the οὐρανός as a whole, not that of the corpuscles of any of its members. A step farther along the same lines. Aristotle (in *Metaphysics* M 6) is greatly puzzled by the question whether, if the εἶδη are numbers, the units of each εἶδος are commensurable with all the rest, or only with the units in the same εἶδος, or whether one and the same εἶδος may be constituted by units which are incommensurable with each other.

It is only reasonable to assume that he is thinking of a difficulty which had seemed to him to be actually involved in the Platonic philosophy. We can hardly suppose that he is inventing gratuitous ἀπορίαι for the mere pleasure of doing so. If we turn to the physical theories of the *Timaeus* we may possibly find the explanation. For we are there told that the two patterns on which the corpuscles of the "elements" are built up are the isosceles right-angled triangle, and the triangle formed by drawing perpendiculars to the sides of the equilateral triangle from the opposite angular points. Now a triangle is completely determined in everything but absolute magnitude when the relative lengths of its sides are known. We may therefore regard a triangle as a triplet constituted by the three numbers which express the lengths of the sides when one of the sides is taken as the unit of measurement. Thus regarded, Plato's two ultimate constructions can be expressed in terms of number as the triplets $(1, 1, \sqrt{2})$, the isosceles right-angled triangle, and $(1, \sqrt{3}, 2)$, the triangle obtained by the subdivision of the equilateral. Since these numerical triplets are, in the end, the formative constituents of all physical reality, they are of course εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοί. And since one of the elements of each εἶδος is a surd, each εἶδος is constituted by units which are incommensurable with one another. While since $\sqrt{2}$ has not to $\sqrt{3}$ the "proportion of one integer to another," each εἶδος has a constituent which is incommensurable with any of the units of the other. Is it not likely that it is this piece of mathematics which explains Aristotle's apparently gratuitous ἀπορία? That he would be struck by it is all the more likely, since it is given by Timaeus himself as the reason for rejecting the old Milesian doctrine of the convertibility of any "element" into any other to which Aristotle clung, and which he could not have renounced without the ruin of his own peculiar theory about πρώτη ὕλη, according to which whatever is actualised in the shape of one of the "roots" is δυνάμει any one of the others.

Enough, however, of these matters which take us

definitely into the regions of "Platonism" proper, the philosophic construction of Plato's later years. How much of the doctrine of Timaeus is genuine fifth-century Pythagoreanism, and how much is the work of the Academy, it is as yet premature to decide. But this much we may confidently assert, that the remains of fifth-century science show that there is no anachronism in Plato's assumption that Socrates held a doctrine of *εἶδη* such as that expounded in the *Phaedo* and *Republic*, or even that he had, in early life, discussed its difficulties with Parmenides and Zeno. We have found that the conception of a "real essence," and the use of the names *εἶδος*, *ἰδέα*, *σχῆμα*, *μορφή* to denote it, was generally current before the end of the fifth century wherever the influence of Pythagoreanism as modified by the speculation of Empedocles had made itself felt; and to suppose that the admirer of Philolaus, the intimate friend of Cebes and Simmias and Phaedo and Echecrates, knew nothing of such a doctrine is to commit a palpable absurdity. Exactly what part Socrates played in the development from Pythagoreanism and Eleaticism to Platonism we shall probably never know, though I have tried to indicate a conjecture about the matter. But one thing is certain, neither Plato nor Socrates invented the conception of the *εἶδη* as the abiding reality in a world of illusions, and the proper objects of knowledge. One might as well say that Plato invented God when he wrote the *Timaeus*. *ζῆτι ταῦτα κοῦτις οἶδεν ἐξ ὅτου ἴφάνη*. But one thing we may say with a fair measure of assurance. Socrates, the more we study him and his age, appears not merely as the continuator of the religious side of Pythagoreanism, the Olympic contest for eternal life against the world, the flesh and the devil, but also as its continuator on the more purely speculative side as a searcher after the "real essences" and "causes" of the world-order. His identification of "the cause" with "the good" is, in fact, the proclamation of the lines on which all legitimate philosophy has ever since had to proceed. To borrow an image of his own, he was for all mankind the *προμνηστρία* of the *ἱερὸς γάμος* between genuine

knowledge and true faith, a marriage which cannot be dissolved except by the destruction of *φιλοσοφία*. Whom God has joined, let no man put asunder.¹

¹ Possibly the work of Anaximenes (the so-called *Rhetoric to Alexander*) should have been included among the compositions examined in this Essay. It has been omitted on the ground that it seems to add nothing to our knowledge of the history of the terms *εἶδος*, *ἰδέα*, beyond what we have already learned from Isocrates.

EPILOGUE

I HAVE once more to confess at the end of this series of studies, as I confessed at the beginning, that it forms only the first half of a plan the complete execution of which has been, as I trust, only very temporarily interrupted. What I hope from the complete realisation of the whole, should its results find acceptance, is the dissipation of the clouds of mystery which, as recent historians, such as Max Wundt in Germany and G. Zuccante in Italy, who lack the courage to break fully with modern fashions and to return to the Academic tradition, openly confess, veils from us what is admittedly the most striking personality in the history of Greek thought. Our task, be our success in it what it may, is to restore Socrates to his rightful place as the first thoroughly intelligible figure in the great line of succession by which Greek Philosophy is indissolubly linked with Christianity on the one side and modern science on the other. It must be honestly said that even the fullest execution of such a plan only rolls the darkness a little farther back. Here, as in all our researches, *omnia abeunt in mysterium*. Behind Socrates, if the main ideas of these studies contain substantial truth, we dimly discern the half-obliterated features of Pythagoras of Samos, and behind Pythagoras we can only just descry the mists which enclose whatever may be hidden under the name of Orpheus. And behind Orpheus, for us at least, there is only the impenetrable night. But it is a night in which, as we can hardly fail to recognise, the Church, the University, the organisation of science, all have their remote and unknown

beginnings. They are all "houses" of the soul that, by what devious route soever, has come by the faith that she is a pilgrim to a country that does not appear, a creature made to seek not the things which are seen but the things which are eternal. And this is why I have chosen as a second motto for these pages the Scriptural command to lay fast hold on eternal life. Philosophy, as the history of her name shows, began as the quest for the road that leads to the city of God, and she has never numbered many true lovers among those who "forget the way." It was precisely because it held out the prospect of the life everlasting to be won by converse with unseen things that Platonism, even apart from its baptism into Christ, had inherent strength to outlast all the other "philosophies," and to grow up again into a new and profound metaphysic and ethics in the evil times of the third century of our era when the whole system of visible things seemed sinking into the "gulf of Non-being" before men's eyes. For if the things which are seen are shaken, it is that the things which are not seen may remain. And, if I am not merely mistaken in my main contention, no small part of this inextinguishable vitality which has made the Platonic Philosophy, in the favourite image of Plotinus, a spring of the water of life in the deserts of "becoming," is directly due to the teaching as much as to the life of the thinker whose last word was the message of immortal hope, *καλὸν τὸ ἀθλόν καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς μεγάλη.*

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